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Art. 1.—PHILOSOPHY AND THEISM.

1. *Naturalism and Agnosticism.* By James Ward. Two vols. Second Edition. Black, 1903.
2. *The Realm of Ends, or Pluralism and Theism.* By James Ward. Cambridge: University Press, 1911.
3. *The Principle of Individuality and Value.* By Bernard Bosanquet. Macmillan, 1912.
4. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual.* By Bernard Bosanquet. Macmillan, 1913.
5. *Theism and Humanism.* By the Rt Hon. Arthur James Balfour. Hodder and Stoughton, 1915.

A SURVEY of the philosophical literature of Europe during the last twenty-five or even fifty years describes perhaps no stars of the first magnitude. Here as elsewhere it is perilous to anticipate the verdict of posterity yet it is difficult to believe that any one of those who have taught or written during that period will ultimately be ranked as equal with Descartes or Spinoza or Kant or Hegel. It may be that the day of the great system-builders is for ever over, that even the hope of that great synthesis of human knowledge which philosophy once aspired to realise is extinct, and that the philosophic mind, recognising that to conquer it is necessary to divide, has accepted the condition of that specialisation which has proved so fruitful in the advance of science. The task of co-ordinating and summing up results so won is deferred to a distant and receding future. Lip-service is done to its necessity as the consummation of many convergent enquiries, but we now look almost in vain for thinkers courageous enough to claim that they

themselves possess the clue to the future unification. The majority of workers within the philosophic field regard the fulfilment of the task as Utopian, or reject it as a pseudo-ideal of thought. Much of this feeling is doubtless due to a genuine modesty becoming Epigoni, conscious that they are successors to an age of daring and original speculation, the results of which are far from being even now appropriated and assimilated, and still require testing, verification, correction. But this respect for the past is not perhaps very widespread. Indeed there seems to be prevalent in philosophic writers a spirit not modest but rather contemptuous and negligent of their predecessors, and a claim, resting on some real or supposed change in subsequent experience, to set them aside as antiquated or mistaken.

The impression of this dispersion of philosophic effort must not be exaggerated. It has, indeed, led many into devious paths. The goal towards which these divided paths converge is obscured, forgotten or occasionally despaired of. But the instinct towards unity, which is the soul of philosophy, exercises still a powerful charm upon minds eager in the pursuit of truth; and the deeper if hidden currents of speculative thought still set in the direction of synthesis and system. Individuals and even schools no longer, indeed, expressly aim at a deliberately encyclopædic treatment or profess to expound a complete view or conception of the world. Yet, if there is a weakened faith in the possibility of attaining system, there is, on the other hand, no satisfaction felt in eclecticism, no contented acquiescence in a premature agnosticism. The search for first principles continues, and the old fundamental issues are still raised and canvassed. The perennial problems of philosophy concerning the nature of Man and his environment, of God and the relations of Man to Him, of Immortality, still excite that curiosity and wonder from which philosophy springs, and by recurrence to which it continually regains fresh interest and life.

The fact appears to be that in civilised Europe such interest and concern is more widely spread than ever before. With this widening has come for the time a certain dilution of that interest, and a consequent lowering or weakening of the powers engaged in satisfying it.

Diffusion carries with it a loss of concentration. From the wider audience more and more voices break in upon the academic debate, and in the endeavour of the specialist to adapt himself to this situation he has been driven to adopt a more popular and less professional mode of speech; he is reluctant to push a claim to be regarded as a leader or even as a teacher, and is more and more content to be accepted as a fellow-enquirer with no peculiar title beyond others less erudite or specialised to be heard. More rarely than of old does he aim at communicating results or attempt to form a school. It has become for him almost a point of good manners to avoid technicalities and to disdain the classification and labelling of his views. To this general rule there are, of course, still exceptions, and we can descry in the contemporary world of philosophy both would-be leaders and well-marked groups of disciples; yet a careful diagnosis of the philosophical situation would perhaps prefer to ignore personalities and schools, and speak rather of tendencies and movements where influences affected almost all contemporary thinkers and schools without being limited to or exclusively concentrated in any. It is this diffusion rather than any deliberate abandonment of the former ideal of system and unity which produces the appearance, among the innumerable contributors to the secular and 'collegiate' work of building up the fabric of philosophy, of amateurishness, capriciousness, or even eccentricity.

The operation of these influences crosses, and indeed ignores, all familiar frontiers, national, social, ecclesiastical, personal. The themes of philosophical discussion are by their very nature of general, or rather universal, human interest and concern; and in the discussion of them the usual divisions which separate man from man are forgotten or recede deep into the background. No doubt, the individual thinker continues to be influenced by them even while he labours to counteract and discount them; nor is it otherwise than well that this should be so, for these factors enter into the very substance of his experience. But he is not, or ought not to be, ruled by them, and he uses them without being controlled by them. They colour and individualise his thought, entering into it as the special qualities of his material enter

into and enrich the finished work of the artist; and certainly a philosophy which bore no mark of its author's nationality or social and ecclesiastical position or personal temperament would be something without potency or life, a pale and ineffectual ghost. While a philosophy must not be merely the abstract and faded reflex of its author's national or political or personal prejudices, it must spring from his own experience and recall its variegated and shifting hues. In this sense—but in this alone—can we justly speak of English or German or French or Italian philosophy. To map out the world of philosophic thought according to states or nationalities is to view it most superficially, and is justifiable only as a temporary convenience, to be thrown aside as we advance in understanding.

So for the moment viewing it, we may venture briefly to summarise the various movements of philosophic speculation in the chief countries of Europe. In Germany, the grandiose idealism of the early part of the 19th century collapsed with astonishing rapidity, and was succeeded by a short period of dogmatic and even blatant materialism, in turn displaced by a more or less critical empiricism. Under the stress of a renewed study of Kant, this has become more and more conscious of the insecurity of its foundations, and has exhibited efforts in various directions towards the reconstitution or reconstruction of its basis. For the principles of reconstruction it is still to seek; and it continues to search for them outside and apart from metaphysics (the very name of which is in ill odour with it), in epistemology, or in psychology, or in some 'Theory of Values.' The general impression left on the mind of the student by most recent German philosophising is of something far below the intellectual level of the earlier achievements of the German mind, second or third-rate, distracted by the abundance and multiplicity of its material, destitute of novel or fertile ideas, contracted but above all dulled, blunted or jaded as by a surfeit of ill-connected facts. Nowhere is the impotence or despair of achieving a unifying or unified grasp of the whole material of experience so marked; the aim at system, where it survives, is little more than an academic tradition.

In France, the latter half of the 19th century is

characterised by a movement of thought definitely idealistic, or at any rate by a definite reaction against the hegemony claimed for science. Great expectations had been formed of the intellectual and moral results to be attained by the dethronement of metaphysics in favour of the 'positive' sciences, with their promised but still delayed synthesis; and the disappointment with their failure cut deeper than it did in Germany. Positivism has not given up the contest for the supremacy, and proves no mean antagonist, but the dissatisfaction with science as a substitute for philosophy grew and is growing. The counter-movement, or group of movements, is no mere barren reaction: it has passed beyond criticism towards construction. Nor has the thinking mind of France declined '*et ab hoste doceri*'; it recruits itself by the study of Leibnitz and Kant and Lotze, as well as by that of Descartes. The memory of its experience and hopes, while yet it trusted in the clear and distinct knowledge offered by the mathematical and physical sciences, still is fresh, but it has opened its eyes to much in history and life which, though irreducible by the methods of science, is none the less obviously reasonable. French speculation has not relinquished its old ideals of clarity and logical order, but it has become more patient, and so both reached wider and plumbed deeper. Profound and illuminating ideas are brilliantly expounded and skilfully applied. Especially M. Bergson has won for himself a European fame and importance, to which no single living thinker in Germany can be said even to approach.

It is only of late that the philosophic thought of Italy has attracted much attention outside its native land. That attention may, as far as England is concerned, be said to be slight and as yet directed to writers of some interest but no great originality. But the forecast may be ventured that in time there will not fail to be discovery of that important movement of thought in Southern Italy, the freshness and vitality of which is partly hidden by its acknowledged derivation from the great German Idealisms of the early 19th century. The systematic '*Philosophy of the Spirit*,' to which Benedetto Croce has given so full an expression, and the profounder though as yet somewhat formless

or inarticulate 'Absolute Idealism' of Giovanni Gentile cannot long pass without recognition and study by those among us who are on the watch for help towards the deeper explanation of our present experience of man and his world.

What have we in England—with which we include Scotland and the United States of America—to set in comparison with all this? We may answer, not without a just pride, a body of philosophical treatises which in mass and quality need not fear any comparison. In form often less systematic, in style generally less technical, our writers nevertheless make serious and solid contributions to the swelling volume of philosophic literature, which explores and illuminates the hidden foundations of experience. They are especially successful in probing the depths of the religious consciousness, viewing it as a matter not for the theological expert, but as of universally human interest and concern, and discussing the fundamental issues which are raised by reflection upon it and its implications with an admirable absence of sectarian bias. Not neglecting to cultivate the old provinces of Logic and Ethics, they concentrate upon the deeper and larger problems of Metaphysics, and in doing so are in their enquiries accompanied and supported by a widespread welcome and encouragement from a public never before more eager to learn or more competent to follow and appreciate. No atmosphere more favourable to the fruitful prosecution of philosophical speculation could be desired, and the supply is not unworthy of the great demand.

It was a happy instinct that led the late Lord Gifford to direct the lecturers under his munificent endowment to make the exploration of this region the common goal of their convergent enquiries and discussions; and those responsible for the selection of lecturers under the Trust have on the whole been faithful to its purposes; they have rightly, and to our great advantage, put a wide and generous construction upon the measure of relevance to this central aim. As Mr Balfour points out, 'Gifford Lectures have been devoted to such diverse themes as Comparative Religion, Primitive Mythologies, Vitalism, Psychology of Religious Experiences, the History of

Religious Developments at particular epochs. And, in addition to these, we have had expounded to us systems of metaphysics of more than one type, and drawing their inspiration from more than one school.' The result has been a constant flow of important tributaries into the main stream of our philosophical literature. It is as if we were privileged to be present at a high, serious, and on the whole well-ordered debate by the best qualified minds among our countrymen on the largest and profoundest issues which rise before the human race as it speculates upon the meaning of its experience. To survey the whole of this great collection is impossible; all that can be attempted is to review some of the more striking of the more recent contributions to it. Any selection must appear to do injustice to those omitted, and the choice here made may be at once avowed to be arbitrary. Still, it may be claimed that the lectures here selected for examination are not without a certain representative character. All of them are the work of Englishmen, all are specially directed to the problems described as central or fundamental, while each approaches them from a different and peculiar avenue of experience, and each issues in a defined and distinctive world-conception of a high degree of metaphysical generality.

Professor Ward has twice held the office of Gifford Lecturer, first at Aberdeen and subsequently at St Andrews. Between the publication of his Aberdeen lectures and that of his St Andrews lectures twelve years have intervened. The first series falls outside the scope of our present review. But we may here recall how in it the author concluded to an acceptance of a spiritual Monism, definitely Theistic, and set aside as 'unspiritual' the suggestion that the problem of the One and the Many could find its solution in the theory of a spirit which lives and works in all spirits—it in them and they in it—reserving 'the relation of God as the supreme Mind to finite minds' as the theme of future discussion.

To the discussion of this self-chosen problem Prof. Ward's second series of lectures is devoted, under the double title of 'The Realm of Ends, or Pluralism and Theism.' Here the former antagonists of the truth—

naturalism, mechanism, necessitarianism—are treated as defeated or antiquated. But new antagonists present themselves, or at any rate one new antagonist in various guises. For the enemy he invents or adopts the name Singularism, and defines it by its maintenance of the position that 'beyond the universe of the Many (minds or spirits) there is a single transcendent experient, who comprehends the whole' (p. 228). He finds the predominance of this view 'the most striking characteristic of the 19th century, so far as philosophical speculation is concerned,' and it is further identified as the view 'presented by such different thinkers as Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer'; Mr Bradley also is referred to as the author of 'the latest and one of the most important expositions' of it. It is this which, under its synonym of Absolutism, was, because of certain of its real or supposed consequences, in the former series pronounced to be 'unspiritual.'

Concerning this identification it may be remarked that the grouping together of thinkers so different and, it may be added, so independent, as those cited arouses a suspicion of whether identification has not been carried too far by Prof. Ward; certainly the identification seems to ignore, e.g., Hegel's constant and even violent endeavours to distinguish his own from Schelling's view of 'the Absolute' (with Schelling's view, or with one of Schelling's many views, what Prof. Ward has in mind may fairly be identified); nor, if we remember, say, Hegel's 'Phenomenology of Mind,' can Prof. Ward's suggestion that the advocates of this view 'begin' or 'attempt to begin with it' (p. 432) be accepted as doing justice to the position assigned to it by its supporters. The examination of Hegel's position in Lectures VII and VIII is based on a less patient and extended study of the original sources than might be expected from Prof. Ward: it is hurried and, to speak plainly, somewhat superficial, and bears marks of defective sympathy or even positive antipathy.

For a counter-movement which he names Pluralism Prof. Ward has more liking and approval. As he finds it stated, he is unable to accept it. But he obviously regards it as at a less distance from his own *via media* than its opposite or rival. It explains much, it holds

'within limits'; it is indeed entangled in difficulties and finds itself at times in extremities; but we cannot begin by ignoring it altogether, and, if we accept the teaching of history, we have no choice but 'to begin our inquiry about the universe as a realm of ends from the pluralistic standpoint' (p. 432). In the end, Pluralism is not so much to be rejected as transcended, that is, supplemented or completed; it is not final, but it is a step, and the first step, on the way towards the ultimate truth.

What is Pluralism? As a solution, upheld among others by 'Personal Idealists' (pp. 24, 25), it is a form of Idealism or Spiritualism which denies the necessity of completing itself by Theism, or questions the possibility of 'the step from a world of spirits to a supreme spirit'; but, as an initial assumption, it takes the many as given, it 'assumes that the world is made up of [real] individuals, each distinguished by its characteristic behaviour.' It is as such an assumption that Prof. Ward accepts it, because it 'takes the world as we find it' (p. 437). He describes this assumption as provisional and open subsequently to large correction and supplementation. But clearly the provisionality assigned to it is to a large extent nominal, and it is not regarded as liable to reversal; it states an aspect of the truth which no later reflection must attempt to explain away; we must from the beginning set our faces against any Absolute into which the many are absorbed and vanish. This Pluralism has, as Singularism has not, a value to the end as well as at the beginning.

Prof. Ward's final view retains the Pluralism from which it started. Plurality of individual spirits is 'given,' while unity is not, but at the best 'deduced.' No doubt it can be deduced, but the unity which is deduced is not the unity of Singularism, it is that of Theism; that is, it is not a unity in which the difference between God and the world is removed, but one which is constituted by God *and* the world. What reflection leads us to is a unity of the One *and* the Many, or (what Prof. Ward regards as the same) of the subject and the object, not a unity which transcends them both. How are we to understand such a unity? We are told that 'any adequate idea of God-and-the-World is beyond us.' If it is suggested that it may be conceived, at least not

wholly inadequately, after the analogy of our own experienced self-consciousness, Prof. Ward decisively rejects the analogy, as playing fast and loose with the genuine otherness of the object, Nature, the Many. He prefers the analogy of the experience of artistic genius in relation to its 'creations'—the experience of 'intellective intuition'; but this analogy too he finds very imperfect. The idea in question 'meets the defects of Pluralism and is the only idea of the Absolute we can admit'; yet it is left by Prof. Ward in a very questionable position, avowedly 'transcendent' or 'beyond our reach.' How, being so, it can for any mind discharge the explanatory or interpretative office ascribed by him to it is, we confess, to us excessively obscure. Is it entitled even to be called an 'idea' at all? To us it appears little better than a name for the problem created by the finality attributed to the duality or dualities which it is supposed to unify.

We hope it may not seem offensive to trace the unsatisfactoriness of this conclusion to a certain bias which throughout governs the argument of the author, a bias which arises from and is confirmed by those psychological studies with which its author has so long and deeply occupied his mind. Is the view which makes him regard Pluralism as a natural assumption for reflection other than a 'prepossession' or prejudice generated by his contention (in our opinion equally mistaken) that the standpoint of Psychology is necessarily individualistic? And is not his failure (for such we hold it to be) to understand what his chief opponents mean by 'self-consciousness' just the inevitable consequence of the caricature of it in Psychology as the awareness of a peculiar sort of object called 'the self,' side by side with the not-self in the *totum objectivum* or among a host of other objects more or less similar to it and some of them also called (other) selves? It was certainly not in this sense that it was ever supposed to transcend the distinction between Subject and Object, or Self and Other, or the One and the Many, or was offered as a clue to the understanding of the unity which embraces them both. Prof. Ward's attack upon his dearest foe is not very far removed from an *ignoratio elenchi*.

If this is so, it must seriously qualify our verdict

upon the value of his contribution to the great debate, however we may admire his learning, his skill in exposition and criticism, the depth and sincerity of his convictions, the evident pains he has bestowed upon meeting the objections which have suggested themselves to him or been made by others to his doctrine. It is not merely that his Theism is not theoretically proved—it avowedly 'does not admit of theoretical proof'—but that it remains in an unstable position, unsure of its own ground, and constantly threatening to pass over into the 'unspiritual' heresy of Absolutism. How are we to distinguish it from an imperfectly defined and insecure hypothesis? Indeed the office ascribed to it of eking out the deficiencies of an unsatisfactory Pluralism, into which it also 'introduces at any rate one essential modification' (p. 231), makes of it almost the *Deus ex machina* of a Pluralism otherwise *in extremis*. Nevertheless we would not depreciate the interest and helpfulness of so thoughtful a summing up of the reflections upon the great central problems of philosophy which have commended themselves to a mind long and assiduously devoted to meditation upon them.

When we pass from Prof. Ward's to Mr Balfour's lectures we become conscious of a less cloistered air. No one could rightly accuse Prof. Ward of any pedantic parade of erudition, but his discussions are, and most properly, as well 'documented' as Mr Balfour's, equally properly, are not, and they bear the outward marks of their origin in the scholar's study. In Mr Balfour's lectures, as the appeal is to 'the plain man,' and the author with an unnecessary modesty disclaims the title of an expert, the style is much more that of the world than of the schools; and no praise could be too high for the dexterity of its use and the consummate ease with which the argument is conducted. His audience must have been both surprised and charmed as they found themselves guided through the mazes of the delicately balanced adjustments and compromises of the view taken, relieved of their nascent objections by gentle touches, insensibly led, or fascinated into, an almost irresistible acquiescence in its conclusions, and made delightedly conscious of the excellent grounds for what they had all along secretly regarded as the deliverances of practical common sense.

And all this skill is exercised with an engaging candour which precludes any suspicion of irony or even dialectical artifice. The modesty and deference to the specialist are no rhetorical devices, but the native attitude of a mind conscious that absorption in practical affairs is not, whatever compensating advantages it brings with it in such a general debate, the best preparation for taking a part in it, and leaves but few seasons of leisure for the requisite 'quiet thought and careful writing.'

To most readers perhaps the chief interest of these lectures will lie in their containing an almost personal confession of the creed, avowedly religious, which has formed and fixed itself in the author's mind as the result of his wide secular experience and reflection upon it, a creed which, if it does not emerge out of these experiences or is deduced from it by no strict or formal reasoning, yet finds in it no opposition and much confirmation. It would be a mistake to suppose that the basis of Mr Balfour's argument has any narrow reference to his work as a politician or statesman; he has always maintained his contact with the thought of his contemporaries in other fields, especially that of the physical sciences, and much of his argument starts from the examination of beliefs which have been supposed by students of these sciences to underlie them. Like Prof. Ward, he is attracted by the speculations which seem to issue directly from reflection upon the processes and results of the natural sciences, and by the difficulties which they meet when principles which appear necessary to the validity or trustworthiness of the sciences are tentatively or it may be rashly, extended beyond that first field of their application. The consequence is that sometimes, despite all the freshness of statement, the views ascribed to his antagonists have a somewhat old-fashioned air, and his discussions constantly recall the controversies of an earlier generation. Mr Balfour, with his usual candour, does not conceal or dissemble this; and perhaps no single passage in these lectures is so illuminative of what he is 'driving at' as the 'autobiographical parenthesis,' in which he recounts how his interest in such questions began at Cambridge in the middle sixties. The only excuse we can make for a comment which sounds like a complaint is that he has continued to maintain so

fresh an interest in later forms of such speculation that the selection of Mill and Spencer, of Leslie, Stephen and Huxley as objects of his criticism, however natural it in the circumstances may be, is a matter to his readers for some surprise and even regret.

In this connexion we may note the incidental confession that at that time 'for the history of speculation' he 'cared not a jot.' His business was, and continues here to be, with the groundwork of living beliefs, especially those of modern science. But is it not a large and hardly justifiable assumption that no light upon these is to be found in 'the history of speculation,' or outside the attempts by men of science, or those who try to remain in close contact with them, to 'provide science with a philosophy'? The criticism here implied sounds like a demand that Mr Balfour should have converted himself into a professed student of technical philosophy. That is not our meaning, yet we cannot but feel that some omission to acquaint himself with 'the history of speculation' has left Mr Balfour without a comprehension of certain methods and results of thought which might have profoundly modified his view of the whole situation. The world of speculation beyond the region to which he limits his vision is to him peopled with fantastic figures which he in some degree misconceives or misrepresents. Of course in this he has 'the plain man,' and also 'the man of science,' already with him, and can count upon their agreement in ignoring them. But, to a deeper consideration, much of his argumentation appears to keep with bloodless phantoms an unprofitable strife. The 'Reason' for which, in his view, such extravagant pretensions have been made is a mere caricature of that for which such claims as he deprecates are maintained by any contemporary or recent philosopher of the first rank. To him 'Reason' is still that faculty whose sole and only method is formal ratiocination, 'deduction,' a matter of premises and conclusion. For that misconception we know no remedy save a recurrence to and persistence in the study of that 'history of speculation,' not as a dead past but as a living present, for which in effect Mr Balfour still 'cares not a jot,' or sets aside as too remote in its methods and results from science and common sense. To him it is

a region of 'mist-enshrouded territories devastated by unending disputations' (p. 145), inhabited by the shapes of dreams. If we cherish 'a very keen desire to discover *what* we ought to think of the world and *why*,' can we justify ourselves in a hasty rejection of all answers that are not rendered in terms agreeable to students of science and men of common sense, or which do not assume as beyond question beliefs which they find themselves constrained or inclined to hold? It would, of course, be very unfair to Mr Balfour to attribute to him utter ignorance or merely unconsidered rejection of such speculations; but, if the doctrine of Hegel is (as perhaps as a whole it is) a dead system and an abandoned fashion, there are bodies of coherent 'speculation,' alive and combative enough, not botched together by men of science in their moments of relaxation, which he at any rate seems, by the implication of his silence, to rule out as irrelevant to his enquiry '*what* we ought to think of the world, and *why*.'

The philosopher of Mr Balfour's imagination—the bearer of that spirit which has produced and is producing 'the history of speculation'—is in his eyes one who has devised an ideal of what a system ought to be, but is wrong in thinking that this is what any system is or has been; one who 'refuses—in theory—to assume anything which requires proof . . . admits—in theory—no ground of knowledge but reason . . . asks what creed reason requires him to accept . . . conceives that within the unchanging limits of his system an appropriate niche can be found for every new discovery as it arises' (p. 263). This is not deliberate satire or caricature; it is meant as portraiture (not, of course, of any individual); but where is any original of it to be found? Yet it is in opposition to such an antagonist that Mr Balfour in the end defends his own position as one recognising certain facts and truisms 'which few philosophers are in practice disposed to accept.' The picture he forms and presents of that antagonist is, as it were, one of a mind obsessed or self-hypnotised by a worship of 'Reason' (in Mr Balfour's sense), and therefore blind to an enormous amount of that by which all minds, and no less itself, live and act.

Mr Balfour repeatedly dwells on the mass of beliefs which are accepted without reasons or reason by all or

most men or all or most experts in science. Some of these are 'inevitable,' beliefs we must hold; others are beliefs that we are inclined to hold; all are produced by 'causes' and are neither guaranteed nor supported by adequate reasons; they have various degrees of probability, descried by intuition and not amenable to calculation, commended to or forced upon us by no argumentative plausibility. In accepting them and their guidance we are following a sense of values which, both on aesthetics and ethics, we find we can trust. This trust or faith is the indispensable but logically indefensible basis of science also. A 'doctrine of congruity' will connect all this with Theism, and so 'a belief in God rests on a belief in science' (p. 253), a belief which itself, together with a belief in beauty and a belief in goodness, rests upon—what? Not, Mr Balfour is quite sure, upon 'Reason'; while, on the other hand, if any hasty reader summarises his doctrine as 'If you want to reach truth, follow your unreasoned inclination,' he replies, 'Brief, but also unjust' (p. 238). Unjust to Mr Balfour's intention it certainly is, for he clearly rejects the explanation that such beliefs are generated or developed in us by 'Nature,' that is, by the mere pressure of environing fact. To him their cause is spiritual, begotten by a 'faith' which is itself the response to or effect of 'the purposeful working of informing Spirit,' the 'Providence' and 'Inspiration' of God (p. 267).

The beliefs in question are some of them 'assumed in all sciences of nature, in all histories of the past, in all forecasts of the future, in all practice, in all theory, outside philosophy itself' (p. 15); others underlie the ethics and aesthetics of Western civilisation. All this Mr Balfour regards and treats as a developing and improving system, of which the present phase is the most developed and the best. The acceptance of them at their face values involves a certain view of their origin, and the maintenance of faith in their credit a certain view as to the direction in which their converging indications point. 'Converging indications,' for even in the apparently less promising field of 'the historic movements' of scientific thought he 'sees,' or 'thinks he sees,' 'drifts and currents such as astronomers detect among the stars of heaven' (p. 288). As the various currents of causal connexion

which make up the web of history have their hidden source in God and return towards Him, so the currents of thought and belief which reproduce their movements and have no less their source also in Him set, *outside philosophy*, towards the goal of Theism. 'Unto the place from whence the rivers come, thither they return again.' The Theistic conclusion is not presented as proved or established, for 'theological beliefs are not inevitable, at least not at our present stage of culture' (p. 23); and the method here followed for its establishment cannot guarantee to it 'a certitude either greater than, or independent of, the beliefs of science and common sense.' Mr Balfour expresses no opinion as to the possibility of the gradual working-out of a theory which shall more fully satisfy our reason or conscience; 'but that consummation is not yet.' He even commends 'philosophers' for their dissatisfaction with this incomplete result, and their rightful striving for more.

But it is difficult to avoid the feeling that Mr Balfour does not expect this consummation ever to be achieved within actual history, and that for him the date of its happening is—the Greek Kalends. And indeed there is no alternative between thinking it possible, or even actual, here and now, and thinking it possible nowhere and never. 'Not yet' is in this case the same as 'never,' for what basis can be imagined for the mind to build on save its present experience, or what faculties to satisfy its reason and conscience other than those which it now possesses? Without the supposition of some breach in the evolutionary progress, how shall we ever be better off than we are now? For philosophy, 'here or nowhere is our America'; a 'futurist' philosophy is the most idle or mischievous of dreams; and the less we suffer our imaginations to run riot in the thought of it with its impracticable methods and its fanciful results the better for our sanity. History—actual history—is for philosophy the only basis, and in history is its only life and being.

To what type or form of Theism does Mr Balfour conclude? Of what sort of Deity does he wish to establish the existence? To this he would answer, a Deity conceived as He is in religion, not in or by metaphysics. With Prof. Ward he regards a God so conceived as a definitely 'ethical personality,' 'a Spirit among spirits,'

taking sides, having purposes and preferences, etc.; to such a God alone are personal relations possible, and especially those of love and worship. With this, again in company with Prof. Ward, he unfavourably contrasts the counter or metaphysical conception which he describes as an Identity wherein all differences vanish, or, even less sympathetically, as 'the logical glue which holds multiplicity together and makes it intelligible.' Yet he does not wholly reject the latter, refuses to dogmatise on the incompatibility of it with the other view, cannot to his own satisfaction fuse them or again profess to be content with their separation. Indeed he acknowledges that some of the greatest religious teachers of the world have more or less explicitly held both, nay, confesses that in religious mysticism the chasm is bridged in a manner which may 'well represent the highest wisdom.' Yet it is clear that he rather dreads than welcomes this possibility, and feels that, if the second view prevailed, no man would be moved for the sake of it to do anything at all, not even to labour intellectually, or would find in it as the conclusion of such labour an adequate reward for his pains. In reality he recoils from it as definitely as Prof. Ward; it seems to him that such a conclusion would annihilate all the values which we find and enjoy while still on the way to it. For this conviction, so far as he is able to assign any reason for it, he appeals to past experience. If no man has for the sake of a purely 'logical Absolute' (so he names such a conception of God) been moved to do what a later and higher morality condemns, that is because, for the sake of such an Absolute, no man has ever yet been moved to do anything at all. Once more, we take it, in agreement with Prof. Ward, he would regard such a view as 'unspiritual.'

But surely this reading of experience or history may be questioned; and we may ask whether it is quite certain that those of the greatest religious teachers, Christian and non-Christian, who held it along with the other, or those religious mystics who found no difficulty in reconciling it with the other, were merely paralysed by its immixture in their thought, and were moved to whatever deeds they did, not by it, but by the other conception that survived alongside it or merged with it in undivided

unity? Did the thought of it chill their love, silence their prayers and check their worship, discourage and dishearten all their efforts after good? Not so do they report of its effect upon them; and on the strength of what is their testimony rejected? True, they speak of its effect not so much in terms of incitements to action, but rather or more often in terms of peace and quietude; yet are we so sure that this, rather than a restless impulsion to action, is not at the very heart of religion? To contrast this, even 'without prejudice and merely for convenience,' with the other as 'the religious conception' is to beg the most serious of questions at issue in the discussion. The prejudice, or prejudgment, is already there; and its presence may be fairly ascribed to the unconscious bias of a thinker prepossessed by too exclusive a concern with the necessities of practice, itself too narrowly conceived. To rise above this prejudice, the last and perhaps deepest duality in the spirit—that between theory or thought and action—must be denied to be ultimate and surrendered to the control of a unity which transcends as well as includes 'the differences which it somehow holds in solution' (p. 21). Whether this unity is to be called God, and how far it is to be identified with 'the God according to religion' whose being Mr Balfour wishes to prove, is another matter; but those who believe in it cannot acknowledge the other as an alternative conception with which at best it is to be fused, or accept for it the status of a 'purely logical Absolute,' leaving to the other supreme dominion in the sphere of practice or morality; it is either the whole—the whole Truth—or nothing.

In neither of the writers we have examined is the kind of unity which leads us to speak of the universe explained or justified. What they find and report is a duality or collection of dualities, connected by no intelligible bonds. The universe consists of Subject and Object or Objects, of Spirit and Spirits, of a One and a Many. Or, if a unity linking these together is acknowledged, it is left a mystery impenetrable to reason and to be accepted as sure fact; or again it is pronounced to be 'not yet,' an eternal 'To be' which never is (nor, duly considered, can be), *magni nominis umbra*. But

surely, if this be so, for us as rational beings, what is loses all title to be called a Universe at all; in so naming it we know not, and can never discover, what we mean. It is rather what Prof. James called it, 'a multiverse,' an aggregate or mass of opposites. Such a doctrine undermines at its foundations the most inevitable of all beliefs—the most inevitable because the most rational. Except upon it neither art nor science nor history nor religion can stand; 'the pillared firmament is rottenness and earth's base built on stubble.'

Mr Bosanquet's two volumes transport us to an ampler and, it may at once be added, a rarer ether—so rare indeed that common sense and science and religion may well be excused for a dread lest it fail to supply them with the necessary breath of life. The author offers their content as at least 'the record of a very strong conviction,' but no less as a straightforward argument naturally establishing a philosophy which is the quintessence of experience. The basis is experience widely and generously conceived; and a glance at the indices will show what pains he has expended in the enlargement of that basis for his own philosophising. If any complaint can be made it is not of any narrowness, but rather of too catholic a welcome for divergent views. But it must not be forgotten that Mr Bosanquet has in his other works pointed out the several ways from this extensive field up the middle heights to the distant summit of his lofty conclusion; and over the middle region explored in his first series he once more guides our steps. Of the nature of that conclusion we are not left uncertain; it is just that uncompromising Absolutism the prospect of which so alarms and repels Prof. Ward and Mr Balfour; and it is presented not as a preferable alternative to their conclusion but as absorbing and superseding it. Except to note that in the first series of lectures Mr Bosanquet chooses 'Individuality,' by a sort of challenge, as the best name for the clue to the character of the whole, and as best expressing the principle which ultimately determines its nature and structure or constituents, we need not further refer to this earlier section of his argument. It is a reasoned refusal to accept the view that 'Individuality' necessarily spells isolation or ultimate plurality, and to acquiesce in

the indissoluble attachment to it of mere incidents annexed to it by a mistaken tradition; its positive nature lies not in reciprocal exclusion, but on the contrary in effective inclusiveness and special self-determination. There is, therefore, neither at the beginning nor at the end, any irreconcilable opposition between it and 'Universality'; the individuality of nothing, and therefore not of the finite self or spirit, forbids its expansion into a world or universe, as the universality of *the* universe is not debarred by its nature from a genuine concentration of itself in the finite individual. There is, therefore, as yet no ground for accepting a sharp or final distinction between God ('the God of religion') and the Absolute. The second series is a continuation and application of the argument contained in the first, and is intended to raise afresh this question and deal with it specifically in relation to the religious consciousness. It squarely faces the issues formulated by Prof. Ward and Mr Balfour (though it is not expressly or specially directed against them), and decisively declares against their Theism and the claims made for it.

However strong is its author's hold upon the unity of the whole, it does not appear to him to require of him any denial of the existence of finite selves or souls within the whole, or any depreciation of the value of 'personal feeling' with its witness to their distinction. To him the universe is, just because of the kind of unity which must be ascribed to it, a place of 'soul-making,' 'a world of claims and counterclaims,' a theatre in which finite spirits are formed or form themselves under the discipline of hazards and hardships, and so win and possess a genuine stability and security. It is true that he does not accept the theory that this is the last word that can be said as to the nature and constitution of the whole, or hold that indefinite or endless progress of or in its parts can be taken to be its life. The destiny of the finite individual is to be absorbed in the ultimate Individual, or rather it is already and always so included; the finite self can only absolutely secure or save itself by self-transcendence, that is to say, by a profound self-recognition of its own genuine infinitude or absoluteness, by a renunciation of its exclusive and excluding finitude with its accompanying relativity of values. This is not,

or not merely, the working out by the individual of his own salvation, but just as much the recognition and acceptance of the *opus operatum* of the whole, for the accomplishment of which the whole has not to wait upon the temporal process of human history. It is impossible sufficiently to admire the adroitness with which this difficult position is stated, defended and illustrated by Mr Bosanquet, with a supple dexterity of style which fits like a glove the prodigious subtilty of the subject-matter. To summarise his argument would be to mar and even to misrepresent it, so vitally do large principle and intimate detail cohere and support one another.

From our present point of view the high argument may be said to culminate in Lecture VIII, where the evidence of the religious consciousness to objective truth is examined, and the question raised whether religion in its widest sense or again in the highest experience of religious genius involves the existence of God ('the God of religion') as a fact? The answer is decisively rendered, that it 'neither depends upon the demonstrations of a separate Being's existence nor does it corroborate them.' So far as it demands or insists upon that, it is even as religion imperfect, and so untrue to its deepest and most real self. Over-anxious to be practical, it sinks back to a lower level of insight into reality, and acquiesces in various unstable and indefensible forms of dualism or pluralism, substitutes for it as its object an incomplete and self-contradictory appearance, and a complementary but opposed subject or subjects also incomplete and self-contradictory. Or rather it oscillates between a consciousness of the unity and the duality, thus only at best inexplicitly—dimly and fitfully—recognising the finitely infinite nature of its own spirit. In its expressions of its own experience—in theological doctrine as well as in devout utterance or thought—it lapses to the level of imagination and externalises its apprehension of its own inward being. Thus it fails to secure even itself, or to achieve a full self-recognition or self-knowledge, and in effect denies to itself an experience of the Divine, for it is only in self-consciousness that complete stability and security, practical and theoretic, is attained.

Mr Bosanquet is well aware of the impatience which at this point of his argument will be felt by his hearers,

and confesses that in past years he himself strongly experienced it. But he is convinced that this conception of God not as a Supreme Being, an independent and isolated existence, but as 'the greater self recognised by us as present within the finite spirit, and as one with it in love and will' (p. 256), not only assigns to Him the highest reality, but also is 'the sum and substance of religious experience when it is most solid.' In the end no other would be found to harmonise with the essence of the experience itself. Religion neither needs nor establishes any external or isolable God as the object of its love or adoration, or as the mover and rewarder of its *nisus* towards perfection; its God is 'continuous with and present in the finite—in love and the will for perfection. It does not need to appeal to facts of separate being. It is an experience of God, not a proof of Him' (ibid.).

It would clearly be impossible to exaggerate either the greatness or the gravity of the dissent between Mr Bosanquet on the one hand and Prof. Ward and Mr Balfour on the other. Οὐ περὶ μικροῦ ὁ ἀγών. The first impression of the reader of these works may be one of despair; who shall decide when such doctors disagree? But the debate is not closed, and on a deeper consideration we may perhaps hearten ourselves with the reflection that there is no surer or more hopeful sign of fruitfulness in controversy than when the central issue has reached a clear and exact definition, and the parties to it have agreed upon that on which precisely they differ. In the meantime while we, their admiring and grateful audience, await further contributions, or perhaps a judicial summing-up, we may congratulate ourselves on the high seriousness and the courteous and sympathetic temper in which these contributions have been made to the enlargement of our knowledge and the enlightenment of our darkness. Speculation has often been condemned as unprogressive; *eppur si muove*.

J. A. SMITH.

Art. 2.—SOME AFTER-WAR PROBLEMS. L ✓

IN the crisis through which this country is passing, a Coalition Ministry has no doubt some advantage; but if, as there is too much reason to fear, the present Coalition has been formed on the principle of concentrating upon war problems and of excluding from consideration all matters likely to give rise to party controversy, it involves a serious danger. We have seen during the war how heavily a nation is handicapped, if its rulers have failed to foresee the particular emergency which in fact arises and to think out the policy to be pursued and the measures to be taken to meet it. The war took us unawares. Whether it was probable or improbable only those who had access to official information were in a position to judge; but it was at least a reasonable possibility and, if it occurred, it required no extraordinary degree of wisdom to foresee the various problems which would arise. The necessity of creating and equipping a vast army, the colossal war expenditure, the need for economy, the disorganisation of our industries by the withdrawal of men for purposes directly or indirectly connected with the war, the decline in our power to produce goods for export coupled with the growing necessity for imported goods, the general rise in prices, the attitude of the various labour organisations with regard to wages and war profits—all or at any rate most of these problems must have occurred to any one who sat down to think out the situation. But no one will contend that the policy to be pursued or the measures to be taken to deal with any one of them had been adequately thought out or matured.

The object of this article is not, however, to emphasise the mistakes which have been made in the past, but to urge the necessity of avoiding similar mistakes in the future. The war may have been improbable, but peace will certainly come, and with it a number of problems which, if dealt with by impromptu or opportunist measures only, may easily entail on our posterity calamities even greater than those entailed by the war itself. The danger that peace will find us as unprepared to meet the problems which it will bring as we were

admittedly unprepared to meet the problems arising out of the war, is greatly increased by the existence of a Coalition Ministry which deliberately avoids the discussion of all questions touching on party controversies. Most, if not all, of the problems which will arise after the war fall under this category and are susceptible of being treated on party lines. We are at last beginning to realise that the continued existence of the British Empire depends on the issue of the struggle in which we are engaged, but we have yet to realise that its continued existence will depend also on the policy to be adopted when the war is over. If for the purposes of the war it be imperative to sink party controversies, it is equally imperative to sink such controversies in order to decide on the policy to be adopted and the measures to be taken in dealing with the problems which peace will bring.

Let us for a moment consider the several factors which will determine the situation we have to face. First and foremost we shall find that about 3,000,000 or nearly one-third of the industrial workers of this country have been withdrawn from industrial life for military service, and that about 1,000,000 more have been diverted from their ordinary pursuits to the production of munitions or other things, the demand for which will cease when the war is over. Most of these men will desire to return to their former occupations, but many of them will find that their places have been taken by others and, to a large extent, by women. Meanwhile, by reason of the scarcity of labour and other causes, large sections of our working classes will have been in receipt of wages on a scale unprecedented in their history; and the families of those engaged in military service will, by reason of liberal separation allowances, have been enjoying an affluence to which in many cases they had hitherto been strangers. With the peace this scale of wages must inevitably fall and separation allowances will cease. It is far easier to increase than to reduce expenditure; and there is little reason to hope that there has, during this period of prosperity, been any substantial saving to meet the less prosperous days to come. Moreover, the war has caused an unparalleled dislocation in the industries of the country. Many of

these have been brought to a complete standstill. Others have been converted for war purposes. If after the war these industries are to be restarted or reorganised, time and capital will be required. With so many seeking work, time is of the essence of the problem; and, by reason of the colossal expenditure entailed by the war, capital will be scarce and, if obtainable at all, will only be obtainable on onerous terms. Further, when the war is over, we shall have to face a struggle for the markets of the world keener than anything we have yet known. If we fail in this struggle our industries, and with them our national prosperity, must decline. Lastly, it is by no means clear that for the purposes of this competition we are not in a worse position than even Germany herself. It may probably be taken that during the war we have been exporting everything we could possibly export, in order to pay in part for our increased imports. Germany, on the other hand, by reason of our control of the sea, has had during the war little export trade at all; and, even if she has experienced a dislocation of industry equal to or greater than our own, it is not improbable that she has been able to accumulate considerable stores of merchandise with which to start her new industrial campaign. By placing these stores of merchandise on the markets of the world at cost price or even less, she might gain an initial advantage which it would take years to counteract.

It is obvious that these factors, taken together, must produce a situation which, unless wisely and firmly handled, may easily give rise to general discontent, extensive want of employment, grave labour difficulties and even civil discord. It is therefore a matter of paramount importance that we should consider beforehand and determine upon the policy to be pursued and the measures to be taken to meet the several problems which will arise.

The most immediate and obvious of these problems are those connected with the demobilisation of our military forces. These are the least likely to be the subject of party controversy, and accordingly the most likely to be considered by the present Government. We have the authority of the Paymaster-General for saying

that they are now being considered. It is apparently proposed to grant each soldier a month's furlough on full pay, all separation allowances being continued for the same period. It is further proposed to give to each soldier an insurance against unemployment for one year and possibly a money gratuity. It may be admitted that these provisions will go far to prevent actual distress arising from want of employment, but they will not assist any one to obtain employment. For this purpose the Government propose to rely on the machinery of the Unemployment Insurance Department, the Territorial Forces Associations, and the Labour Exchanges. It may be doubted, however, whether these three bodies are in a position to give the assistance required. They are independent bodies with no common organisation. No one of them is likely to have at its disposal the information necessary in dealing with the problem. In order to return so large a body of men to industrial life with the least possible friction and in the shortest possible time, we surely need some central executive body in close touch with those requiring work on the one hand and with their possible employers on the other, a body which will not content itself with helping individual applicants but will itself take the initiative in the matter. Such a body might well contain representatives from the Unemployment Insurance Department, the Local Territorial Associations, and the Labour Exchanges. It will probably have to act through local committees, but, before it can act to any useful purpose, it must make itself fully acquainted with the material facts. It will have to ascertain and classify those who, when the war is over, will desire to obtain employment, with their qualifications and preferences as to locality and otherwise. It will have in like manner to ascertain and classify the various industries throughout the country which, after the war, will require labour, and the extent to which and the time at which this labour will be required.

An enormous mass of useful information will be found in the national register; but unfortunately this was compiled at so late a stage in the war that it will have to be supplemented, as to all who joined the colours before Aug. 15, 1915, from other sources. Possibly there

are War Office records which may be useful. But, in order to ascertain the various industries throughout the country which will require labour after the war, it will no doubt be imperative to make local enquiries founded on the statistics in the possession of the Board of Trade or of such institutions as the Garton Foundation. It may also be advisable to consider what industries ought, from the standpoint of financial credit, to be reorganised first; for example, whether for this purpose our export industries should not take precedence of those which minister to home consumption, more especially if these latter are concerned with the production of luxuries rather than necessities. It will also have to be considered whether and how far it may be desirable for the State to use its credit for the purpose of raising the capital which may be required for reorganisation purposes.

Moreover, it appears at least questionable whether, instead of turning our citizen soldiers adrift with an insurance policy and money gratuity, it would not be wiser to retain some control over them until their return to industrial pursuits be ensured. There can be nothing more demoralising than want of employment, even if actual distress arising from this cause is precluded by State allowances. Not only does unemployment entail incessant anxiety for the future, but, worse still, a man who day after day seeks work in vain soon comes to the despairing conclusion that there is no place or use for him in the body politic. Those who have served in the army ought, to some extent, to have realised the value of discipline and cooperation for national ends, but this lesson would in a period of enforced idleness be soon unlearned. There would appear to be no insuperable difficulty in the services of those who cannot be immediately reabsorbed in industrial life being temporarily utilised by the State. If, during this interval, the men could be made familiar with the outline of the imperial policy to be adopted after the war and the several elements essential to its success it would be all to the good. It should be noticed, too, that the Government scheme, as outlined by the Paymaster-General, apparently ignores the large number of workers of both sexes who are now engaged in the production of munitions, but will be

almost necessarily thrown out of employment when the war is over. The position of these workers also requires careful consideration.

Again, it may well happen, as happened after the Boer War, that many of our soldiers may prefer to seek employment elsewhere than in the United Kingdom. It is to be hoped that the number of them will not be large. The nation will have suffered heavy loss in its manhood by reason of the war, and can ill afford further loss by emigration. However this may be, we ought to keep two things in view. We ought in the first place to take care that those who emigrate should leave this country because they really prefer to do so and not because they have been forced, by want of work, to the conclusion that their country, though willing to utilise them to the full in time of war, has no further use for them in times of peace. We ought in the second place to see whether the services of those who emigrate, though lost to the mother-country, cannot be still retained by the Empire. For this purpose it would be satisfactory to know that the various colonial Governments were being consulted with a view to ascertaining what opportunities may be open after the war in H. M.'s Dominions beyond the Seas. It would be quite impossible to draft any considerable number of men to these Dominions without the cooperation of the Dominion Governments.

Lastly, one of the most difficult problems connected with demobilisation concerns the position of those women who during the war have been doing industrial work hitherto done by men only. It is unlikely that, after so clearly demonstrating their capacity to take a larger part in industrial life, women will be content to return to the conditions which prevailed before the war. Nor is it at all certain that it would be for the advantage of the nation that they should do so. It may well be that in its women a nation has an asset of enormous industrial and economic value, more especially where, as in the case of the United Kingdom, the number of women is so much greater than the number of men. But, if women are to compete with men to a greater extent than they have done in the past, a series of fresh problems must necessarily arise. It will of course be necessary to consider

upon what conditions and subject to what limitations women can be admitted to industrial competition without danger to their health or the health of the next generation. Besides this, it is obvious that increased competition in the labour market has a tendency to reduce wages, and must almost necessarily do so unless accompanied by a corresponding expansion in industries, for which time and capital will again be required. Moreover, men are not unlikely to resent the increased competition of women; and this resentment would be justifiable as long as employers are able, by reason of the fact that women's labour is unorganised, to impose on them a scale of wages lower than that enjoyed by men doing similar work. If women are to compete with men, they should be organised as men are organised; and the question will arise whether it is better policy to aim at giving them an organisation of their own or at procuring their admission to the existing workmen's organisations.

The latter would probably be the easier course, but the former has much to recommend it. No one will contend that existing Trades Unions are constituted on lines entirely consistent with the safety and welfare of the State. If it were possible to organise women's labour on lines which, while avoiding the undesirable elements in existing Trades Unions, would, at the same time, secure to women equal advantages with men as to rates of wages and otherwise, the experiment might be well worth trying. But, if anything useful is to be done in this direction, the initiative should come from women themselves. They must not rest content, as they have been content in the past, with adopting methods pursued by men. They must raise the whole subject to a higher level, insisting on duties rather than on rights, and placing the well-being of the State generally above the immediate interest of any individual or class.

If we pass from problems connected with the demobilisation of our armies to those arising out of the necessity of reorganising our industries and mobilising our industrial forces for the trade war which is to come, we at once get into a region in which politicians who desire to keep party controversies in abeyance may fear to tread, but which, nevertheless, ought in the true

interest of the nation to be thoroughly mapped out and explored. Of these problems some relate to the general lines of policy to be pursued; others to the particular measures to be taken to carry into effect the policy which may be adopted. All or most of these, though no doubt susceptible of treatment from the standpoint of party controversy, can be equally well discussed from the business standpoint. Politicians may repudiate the distinction, but it will be reasonably clear to those who, like myself, have taken no part in current politics.

The chief party controversy at the present moment centres round Free Trade or Tariff Reform. To call a man a free-trader or tariff-reformer labels him as belonging to one party or the other, but it conveys little further information. From the business standpoint it is always a question of the best means to secure a desired end. If the only or best way of securing the end be the imposition of a duty in respect of this or that imported or exported article, the business man will advocate the imposition of the duty and will be to that extent a tariff-reformer. If the best way to secure the desired end be to repeal or refrain from imposing a duty on this or that imported or exported article, the business man will to that extent be a free-trader. Thus, if the end be cheap bread, an import duty on wheat will be undesirable, for it will raise or tend to raise the price of bread. If the end be the raising of revenue, an import duty on wheat, though it will bring in revenue, may be equally undesirable unless accompanied by a corresponding excise duty on home-grown wheat; for otherwise, to the extent of the home supply, it will take money out of the pockets of the consumers for the benefit of the farmers or landlords and not of the Treasury. If, on the other hand, the desired end be to increase the number of acres under wheat in this country, an import duty on wheat might be desirable. It would raise the price of wheat and thus enable it to be grown with profit on less productive soils. If it were thought unfair to tax, for this purpose, those only who were consumers of wheat, the same result would be obtained by subsidising the producer of wheat at the expense of the general taxpayer, but the principles of free trade would be equally infringed.

Adam Smith called his great book 'The Wealth of Nations.' The title was aptly chosen, for his endeavour was to show how the affairs of a nation ought to be conducted if the object be to secure the greatest material wealth. The term 'Political Economy' used by later writers is far less fortunate. It ignores the object in view, and thus converts what is really a hypothetical proposition into a kind of categoric imperative. 'The way you ought to act, if you aim at material wealth' becomes 'the way you ought always to act, without reference to any particular end.' In this manner a science which should have been the handmaid of the statesman has become the ruling goddess of one political party; while the other party, after spending much time and ingenuity in controverting the hypothetical proposition, has set up a rival goddess under the name of Tariff Reform. The truth is that neither Free Trade nor a system of tariffs has any value apart from the end which it is desired to secure. The free-trader may fairly say that material wealth is desirable, and that it is best secured by free trade. The true answer is not a bare denial of the statement but something in the nature of confession and avoidance. True, we may reply, but there are other things more valuable than material wealth, and those can best be gained by the imposition of a general tariff on imported goods or by the imposition of a duty on this or that imported article.

In this connexion the history of the Free Trade movement is of considerable importance. Cobden was fully convinced that, if this country adopted free-trade principles, the advantages gained would be so manifest that other nations would do the same. He was wrong. The reason is not, as sometimes stated, that foreign statesmen were blind to the advantages incident to Free Trade, but that they had in view objects which seemed to them more desirable than material wealth, and considered that those objects might be best secured by a system of tariffs. There is much to be said for the criticism on Political Economy which Peacock puts into the mouth of the Rev. Dr Folliott:

'Material wealth is not the object for a community to aim at. The nation is best off in relation to other nations which

has the greatest quantity of the common necessities of life distributed among the greatest number of persons; which has the greatest number of honest hearts and stout arms united in a common interest, willing to offend no one, but ready to fight in defence of their own community against all the rest of the world, because they have something in it worth fighting for.'

As has been often pointed out, isolation is a great factor in the growth of national unity. Tariffs are to a certain extent barriers against intrusion from outside and may be utilised to serve this end. They may also be made to assist the creation of new industries, the substitution of skilled for unskilled labour, increase of population, the distribution of material wealth and other purposes. Thus it is quite possible that the imposition in this country on imported wheat of a small duty from which imports from Canada were free would not only secure to Canada a preferential market for her wheat, but would largely increase her population by diverting to Canada the stream of immigration which would otherwise flow to the United States. The same applies to South Africa and the imposition in this country on imported maize or tobacco of a duty from which South African imports were free. In refusing to follow the lead of this country in the adoption of a free-trade policy it is far more probable that foreign statesmen were influenced by such considerations as these than that they failed to appreciate the validity of Cobden's conclusions. Looking upon the matter from the business standpoint, which is after all the standpoint of true statesmanship, they may well have thought that a tariff was the best means of securing the end they had in view, and that any sacrifice of material wealth involved in a departure from the abstract principles of free trade was of little importance compared with the advantage of securing this end.

The foregoing illustration of the difference between the party and the business standpoint has been chosen because one of the most important problems which will arise after the war is the trade policy which this nation should adopt with reference to foreign nations and her own colonies. It is of the utmost importance that the problem should be dealt with as a matter of business and not of party controversy, and it can obviously be

best discussed by a Coalition Ministry while party controversies are in abeyance.

The present war has amply demonstrated the industrial and financial dangers incurred in war time by a nation so largely dependent for necessities on outside sources as is the United Kingdom. It has long been recognised that, to obviate these dangers, we must at all cost retain, as we in fact retain, command of the high seas. But this has proved insufficient. All that we import has to be paid for; and, leaving out of account the extent to which imports are paid for by interest on foreign investments or services rendered by way of shipping or banking facilities, we can only pay for imports by corresponding exports. By withdrawing so many workers from industrial life, the war has increased our need of imported goods in inverse proportion with our ability to pay for them.

Further, we have discovered since the war how largely we are dependent on foreign sources of supply, and in many cases on our enemies, not only for the necessities of life, but for the necessities of our industries. Our chances of being victorious in the war are jeopardised by this economic dependence, just as Germany's chances of success are enhanced by her relative economic independence. Are we to acquiesce in the continuance of this state of things after the war or are we to take measures to obviate it in future? No doubt the United Kingdom, with its present population, must always be dependent on outside sources for a considerable part of its food supplies, but is there any reason why it should be similarly dependent on outside sources for many of the necessities of industry? We could certainly produce our own dye-stuffs, optical instruments and chemicals. There is no insuperable reason why our razors should be sent to Germany to be ground, or why many of our cotton manufactures should go to Germany for the finishing process. Even in the case of food there is no reason why we should not produce a good deal more than we do. Again, if complete economic independence cannot be secured for the United Kingdom, it might well be secured for the Empire at large. We could get all our wheat, all our maize, all our meat, all our wood-pulp from our overseas Dominions; and, in so doing, we

should develop their resources, increase their population, and unite them with the mother-country by community of interest.

All this seems in itself desirable, but it is no use desiring the end, if we are unwilling to adopt the means. The economic dependence of this country is largely due to our free-trade policy. Under the influence of Free Trade we produce only what we can produce as efficiently and cheaply as foreign nations and exchange it for what can be more efficiently and cheaply produced elsewhere. If we are to start or keep alive in this country industries which would never arise or would perish under the combined influence of a free-trade system at home and subsidies and tariffs abroad, we shall have to abandon Free Trade to some degree, and possibly for the sake of security submit to some diminution of material wealth. The real question is whether the result to be gained is worth the price to be paid.

Let us consider what will be Germany's commercial policy after the war. There can be little doubt on the matter. Whatever other result she may attain by the war, she has at least conquered Austria-Hungary; and her policy will be to enforce on Austria-Hungary a commercial union, thus preparing the way for a political union in the future. A nation whose rulers make a business of war in their ambition to establish a world-empire will certainly aim at securing economic independence even at the cost of some sacrifice in material wealth. With this object Germany will, if possible, bring the Balkan States and the Turkish Empire within the union. This would lay a sure foundation for German supremacy from the Baltic to the Persian Gulf. The resources of so vast an area would be developed by German initiative and German capital. There would be sufficient isolation to promote the growth of the German Imperial ideal and the spread of German Kultur. Germany is not likely to overlook the value of tariffs in founding empires or securing economic independence in time of war. Further, she has long been well aware of the possibility of utilising tariffs and subsidies, not only to secure internal advantages, but to determine the course of trade in other nations. There can be little doubt that our own economic dependence in many respects is the outcome of

a deliberate policy on her part directed towards weakening our position in time of war. In these circumstances ought we or ought we not to endeavour by a common commercial policy to cement the various parts of the British Empire into a closer union, in order to develop their resources and to secure their economic independence? Surely this ought already to be a matter of serious discussion between our Ministers and those of our Overseas Dominions. It would be a fatal and unpardonable mistake to postpone its consideration for fear of reviving controversies, which in dealing with it ought to be put on one side altogether.

In discussing the desirability of a closer commercial union between the United Kingdom and her Overseas Dominions, there are several points which ought to be borne in mind. In the first place we must learn to appreciate the Colonial standpoint. The ideal commercial union would from our point of view involve internal Free Trade, with fiscal barriers limiting intrusion from outside. But, in their present state of development, it is more than doubtful whether this would be acceptable to our Dominions. Dominion statesmen have to deal with problems which do not arise in the mother-country. A sense of separate nationality is not necessarily inconsistent with loyalty to the Empire; and we must expect that this sense will to some extent influence the trade policy of each Dominion. If in this country the coal measures were so widely distributed and so rich that we could supply the whole world with better and cheaper coal than could be got elsewhere, we should under a system of Free Trade run the risk of becoming a nation of colliers and middlemen producing coal only and exchanging it for everything else of which we had need. No one would desire this result, even though it were accompanied with the maximum material wealth. The well-being of a nation depends not only on the amount but on the nature of what it produces. It requires a variety of occupation, the development of the highest skill in diverse industries, the educative element which comes from social intercourse between men engaged in multifarious businesses and widely different walks of life. Canada might well refuse to adopt a

trade policy which would impose on her the rôle of wheat-grower for the rest of the Empire. She might well prefer to aim at the further development of industrial life within her own boundaries; and the same is true of other Dominions. It would seem to follow that any Customs Union between the United Kingdom and her Dominions must take the form of what is known as Imperial Preference. Only later, when the industrial development of the Dominions is on a par with our own, can we hope for Free Trade within the Empire.

But, if we accept this position, a difficulty at once arises. It is no use our giving to the Dominions a preference in relation to goods which they do not export; and, their chief exports being at present food-stuffs and raw materials, it is little use talking of Imperial Preference unless we are prepared to impose duties on food and raw materials coming into this country from extra-imperial sources. The demand for a general tariff on everything except food-stuffs and raw materials has little if anything to do with Imperial Preference. If it can be justified, it must be on other grounds. Indeed, for Imperial Preference you do not want any general tariff at all. You merely want duties in the case of goods which we could get either from our Dominions or from other sources. The party of Tariff Reform, by giving up the idea of duties on food-stuffs, in effect gave up the idea of Imperial unity based on preference with which Mr Chamberlain inaugurated the movement known as that of Tariff Reform. From the point of view of Imperial Preference the question therefore reduces itself to this. Is it worth while to impose duties on, and therefore increase the cost of, food-stuffs and raw materials in order (1) to assist in developing our Overseas Dominions, (2) to secure a preferential market for our own exports, (3) to strengthen the idea of Imperial Unity, and (4) to strengthen our position in case of future wars?

If this question be answered in the negative, there is an end for the present to all idea of Imperial Preference, though a tariff in this country on manufactured articles may be advisable on other grounds. Of the advantages usually claimed for a general protective tariff on manufactured articles, that which depends on

its effect in promoting a sense of national unity may probably be disregarded. In Great Britain, at any rate, the sense of national unity needs no artificial stimulus. With regard to Ireland it is quite possible that the repeal of the Corn Laws, coming as it did upon the top of the Irish famine, is responsible for many of our later troubles. Fiscal barriers against the import of foreign food-stuffs might have rendered the Irish a prosperous agricultural people, dependent for their welfare upon union with Great Britain; and, in such circumstances, the sense of separate nationality might probably have become less acute and far less disastrous. But in this respect we cannot retrace our steps, unless we are prepared to tax imported food-stuffs for the benefit of Ireland.

A general tariff on imported manufactures might, however, make us less dependent on outside sources, and so add to our national strength in times of war. It might even in times of peace be desirable for various reasons. It is true that a protective tariff may, besides bringing in a certain amount of revenue, transfer a good deal of money from the pockets of consumers to the pockets of producers. But this is not its only effect. By ensuring home markets for home productions it ensures the security of the capital invested in, and attracts capital to, home industries. This may be comparatively unimportant when there is a large amount of capital seeking investment, but it may be very important when the amount of capital seeking investment has been so largely decreased as it will have been by the present war. An investor may well be deterred from risking his money in developing an industry if that industry has to face world-wide competition. He will certainly be deterred, if his competitors are in effect subsidised by their own Governments. Germany's practice of subsidising her liners may well deter a man from investing in British shipping. Moreover, considerations of the same kind are not confined to cases of direct subsidies. A protective tariff, as is well recognised in Germany if not in this country, operates as a State subsidy; and, by enabling manufacturers to charge higher prices at home, it puts them in a position to undersell their competitors abroad. On this view a free-trade

nation never competes on equal terms with a nation in which there is a protective tariff.

Apart from the adoption of a general tariff, it may still be advisable by means of special tariffs or subsidies to start or keep alive in this country industries without which our position in times of war is seriously jeopardised. It must, of course, be for the Government to determine what industries ought to be so started or kept alive. But, when this is once decided, the amount of the tariff or subsidy is a business matter. To decide it, we want a business tribunal. Suppose the Government determined that we ought to have a glass industry or a beet industry in this country, and a capitalist offered to put half a million into the venture, provided foreign glass or beet-sugar were subjected for a period of years or in perpetuity to this or that import duty, the business tribunal would consider this offer as a matter of fair bargaining between the person who made it and the State, and would advise as to its acceptance or otherwise. The duty would be imposed or refused according to the views of the tribunal. In this way one of the chief political evils incident to a fiscal system in which tariffs play a part might be entirely obviated. If, as many suggest, a ministerial department of commerce and industry be created, this tribunal might form an integral part of such department; and it would be desirable that the head of the department itself should not be changed with each change of Government.

Here we come to another problem equally important, whatever trade policy we may adopt—the problem how best to equip ourselves for the trade war which will follow the cessation of actual hostilities. We want for this purpose organisation and cooperation. Just as in actual war we require a General Staff, with an organised intelligence department, to anticipate, consider and advise on all strategical problems which may arise, so for the purposes of the trade war we shall want an organised body, whether it take the form of a department of commerce and industry or otherwise, whose duty it will be to anticipate, consider and advise on industrial and commercial matters, collating and digesting the reports of intelligence officers in all parts of the world. Hitherto every trader has been left to act on his own judgment,

based on such imperfect information as he could individually obtain. No wonder that in these circumstances we have so often failed to anticipate and take advantage of openings for our trade. The duty of such a body as has been mentioned would be to see that our industries were supplied with information both as to probable trade developments and as to the character and quality of the merchandise suitable for particular markets, and to help in securing shipping facilities. Last year there was an enormous maize crop in South Africa. It will be for the most part wasted for want of freights, while we continue to get our maize from Argentina or the United States, and in this way further depreciate the pound sterling. With more knowledge and foresight we might have had the benefit of this crop, and thus have diminished our imports from the other side of the Atlantic.

But, besides organisation, cooperation between the various classes engaged in industrial life is necessary to success. In the past there has been little sense of the need for such cooperation. On the contrary, employers have been organised against workmen and workmen against employers. Class war has become the basis of our industrial system, a war so bitter that neither side hesitates to adopt methods of 'frightfulness' in relation to non-combatants. On one side we have the lock-out, on the other the strike; and no one seems to care for the suffering or loss which these methods entail on innocent persons, or on the nation at large. If this suffering and loss be weighed against the advantages gained, there can be little doubt which scale would kick the beam. A nation in which something like civil war is raging, whether it be a war founded on territorial or racial diversities or on class interests, cannot hope to succeed in a war against foreign nations, whether such war be a war of armed forces or of trade competition. Moreover, recent experience has shown that the existence or even the anticipation of such internal strife is a direct inducement to attack from outside. If we are to secure success for our own industries in the trade competition we have to face, it is absolutely essential that we should discover some way of reconciling the interests of Capital and Labour.

Let us look at the matter from another standpoint.

If British and foreign manufactured goods offered in the same market be of equal reputation and quality and equally suitable to the requirements of buyers in that market, those will be preferred which are offered at the cheaper price. The price at which goods can be offered, so far as not affected by direct or indirect subsidies or by the cost of carriage, depends in the long run on the cost of production. In the cost of production there are many elements. There is the cost of power. For power this country is dependent on coal. Her industrial supremacy in the last century was largely due to the fact that she was the first nation to develop her coalfields, and for a long time obtained power more cheaply than other nations. We have no longer that advantage. Other nations have not only developed their coalfields but have alternative sources of power in water and oil. Having ourselves no such alternative sources, it is important that we should husband our coal supply. The more coal we consume or export, the greater the price we shall have to pay for coal in future; for the measures which are readily accessible and can be worked at little cost are running out, and every rise in the price of coal must increase the cost of our manufactures. Our coal policy, as also the possibility of developing in these islands some alternative source of power, are therefore matters requiring consideration.

Another element in the cost of production is the cost of obtaining the necessary capital. For the most part this depends on the relation between demand and supply. After the war the demand will probably be greater, and the supply will certainly be less, than it was before the war. The supply depends upon the national savings; and we ought therefore to encourage thrift in all classes. The present rate of expenditure shows how deficient we are in this quality.

But the chief element in the cost of production is, after all, the cost of labour; and this is the element which needs most consideration. The cost of labour is determined by two factors. It is, of course, determined to a great extent by the actual wages paid to the working classes, but it is determined quite as much by the efficiency of labour. The wages paid to the working classes have no doubt in many cases been unduly raised

by war conditions, but, if the scale of wages which prevailed immediately before the war be considered, no one can say that it was excessive. On the contrary, in many trades it left much to be desired. It is of national importance that the wages paid to the working classes should be as high as possible. Not only is this the sole way of securing a healthy and contented population, but it is also in the interest of employers; for every increase of wages either increases the demand for goods by the production of which our industries thrive, or adds to the savings of the nation, thereby increasing the supply of capital and diminishing its cost. We come then to this, that the only practical method of decreasing the cost of labour is to increase its efficiency.

The efficiency of labour has its objective and subjective side. On the objective side, what is required is the most economic machinery and the best processes of manufacture. On the subjective side, what is required is the greatest technical skill, coupled with the willingness to use that skill to the utmost possible extent. On the objective side we should endeavour to encourage new inventions, and to secure that new inventions, when made, shall be brought into use at the earliest possible moment. Our patent laws are justified by the desirability of encouraging new inventions; but it is very doubtful whether they have that effect, while they are often used to prevent new inventions being utilised at the earliest possible moment. In this connexion we should reconsider and overhaul our patent laws. On the subjective side, we want better general education and a more perfect system of technical training. We want also the removal of all trade-union regulations directed towards the limitation of output. These regulations have proved inimical to our chances of success in war, and have accordingly been suspended for war purposes, but only on the understanding that they shall be revived when the war is over. Of course this understanding will be observed. But, if inimical to success in war, the regulations in question must in the long run be equally inimical to industrial prosperity in times of peace; and it is worth while considering why the Trades Unions attach so much importance to them, and why, far from demanding (as one would expect) opportunities for

better technical training, they remain comparatively indifferent on matters of education. The reason is surely clear. It is the existing relations between employers and workmen. The latter are quite certain that an increase in the efficiency of labour, whether due to increased technical skill or increased output, will increase the profits of their employers. They are by no means certain that it will increase their own wages or bring them any other advantage.

We have reached the same point by another route—the absolute necessity of a permanent peace between capital and labour, if this country is to succeed in maintaining its industrial prosperity. If both employers and workmen can be brought to recognise this, it ought not to be impossible to devise some scheme, whether by way of profit-sharing or otherwise, whereby every increase in the efficiency of labour is accompanied by an increase in the remuneration of labour, and does not enure solely for the benefit of the employers. The war will have changed many things. If it results in permanent domestic peace, it may, even from the point of view of material wealth alone, have been well worth while.

There being, then, so many after-war problems which require immediate consideration, the question arises how they can be best considered. Obviously the most able intellects and the greatest expert knowledge which the country possesses should be brought to bear on them. Further, none of them can be properly dealt with in entire isolation from the others. They are all problems of Imperial Reorganisation; and the practical measures to be adopted in reference to one problem may materially affect those to be adopted in reference to another. Thus, any scheme of land settlement with the object of increasing the amount of foodstuffs produced in the United Kingdom may materially affect the measures to be adopted in connexion with the demobilisation of our military forces; and, again, any such scheme must be itself affected by the policy to be pursued in reference to the imposition of tariffs. It follows that, however diverse the questions requiring consideration may at first sight appear to be, they are in fact interdependent, and should be considered as a whole. Isolated enquiries into

particular questions, whether undertaken by Government departments or otherwise, are not enough. To secure the necessary co-ordination we want a single advisory committee, constituted on non-party lines.

For such a committee we have a valuable precedent in the Committee of Imperial Defence. Why should not the Government follow this precedent and appoint a Committee of Imperial Reorganisation? Such a committee could map out the various subjects on which enquiry is needed, and, while giving due consideration to their interdependence, refer them singly or in groups to sub-committees, through which the best intellects and the greatest expert knowledge which the country possesses could be focussed and brought to bear on every matter which requires investigation. In some such way only can we make adequate preparation for the future, and hope to arrive at results and to devise means which may in some degree compensate our posterity for the burdens entailed upon them by the present war.

In regard to these and other matters, the Government of the country will have to put its hand to work from which it has hitherto, on principle, abstained. But *laissez faire*, however excellent in its way, has, like every other principle in practical politics, its limits. A nation may be under-organised, as well as over-organised. Individualism may be carried to an excess which threatens the safety of a people. A wise and courageous Government will strike the happy mean.

PARKER OF WADDINGTON.

Art. 3.—AIRCRAFT IN THE WAR.

WHEN war was declared, one of the earliest bodies to mobilise was the Royal Flying Corps. The enthusiasm and vigour characteristic of youth inspired this, our youngest force. It was making its traditions. If we were astonished at its preparedness in men and material, it was partly because no prophet has honour in his own country, and partly because our peculiar method of administering stimulus to ourselves is, unlike the German habit, to carp at what we have, and this had led us for some years past to depreciate a by no means despicable aerial position. We had come to believe in our own feebleness—an attitude only less foolish than that of expecting to be invulnerable. Both the hot and the cold wind have fluttered the newspapers a good deal of late. We seem to recall how every branch, from the Secretary of State to the expert aeronautical adviser and the constructor, has been covered with the snow of reproach; and we felt a warm glow of satisfaction when the R.F.C., on being put to the test, gave the one satisfactory answer—that of prompt performance.

Nevertheless that preparedness did not and could not in its extent exceed the limits set to it by the cheese-paring attitude previously maintained by those who controlled the purse. So far as it had been possible to provide our little army with the best of aeroplanes and their appendages—spares, engines, tents, and equipment—so far were we ready. That readiness was put to good service at once; the seedling of aerial supremacy was planted, and Sir John French's early dispatches have borne witness thereto. Our supremacy might have taken firm root had it not been for the direct and indirect effects of an untimely 'money squeeze' a year or two before the war. This 'squeeze,' which also took effect elsewhere, is not likely to be forgotten by soldiers for many a long year. Valuable aeroplane firms were crushed out of existence in their infancy. They were exposed to the Spartan rigours of acute competition invited by the contracts branch of the War Office, when the loss of an order from the only purchaser, the State, meant speedy extinction to the firm.

The increase, on the initiative of Lord Kitchener, of our Expeditionary Force from about 160,000 men to the figure stated by Mr Asquith on Feb. 15—1,600,000 men—and of the total of our armies to at least three millions, implied (though it has strangely eluded public mention in this form) the creation of a corresponding Flying Force. We have no guide to official numbers, but clearly that force required at once a tenfold, and later a twenty-fold increase. Some reasons will presently be stated for supposing that the required increase should be put still higher. In any case, the demand for aircraft material must have imposed a tremendous strain somewhere—a strain rendered far more severe by the fact that it was wholly unforeseen in a country that did not plan this war. Our resources proved equal to the strain, and recent dispatches prove that we have kept our head up. They show that in the four weeks immediately prior to Jan. 24, 1916, of which we have an official record, we carried out four times as much aircraft work over the enemy's ground as he ventured on over ours. We may certainly conclude that at this date we had been neither outnumbered nor tamed.

Let us first consider the many conditions which yet further enlarged the demand for aircraft beyond mere proportionality to the augmented army. The training of the extra personnel at the intense rate required must have acutely affected the wastage of material at the most critical time. If we had but a tenfold production of pilots, this demanded not only the preparation of the aeroplanes which should be ready in the field by the time the men were trained, but we were forced to retain in England a substantial nucleus of instructional machines just when the difficulty of sparing any from the Front was at its highest. We know that the work of the Central Flying School at Upavon was carried on with unflagging energy; that preliminary schools were either taken over or continued ceaselessly their instruction of pupils; and that these were supplemented by other schools started within the Squadrons and at Farnborough. Both policy and foresight were indicated here.

Of course no one knew or could know what would be the wastage of aeroplanes in war, still less the various rates of wastage of the different types. Yet replacements

in proportional quantities had to be and were supplied. It was not till much later that any census of casualties to aeroplanes could be got out to show, as they did show, that some constructions were much better than others in strength and ease of handling. Be it remembered that at that time many soldiers, and among them gunners of experience, thought, even after the early weeks of strife, that the gun would outclass the aeroplane and settle the question of supplies in a manner widely different from that which time has revealed. At the beginning of the war, while flying was as yet conducted at what are now considered the comparatively low heights of 4000 feet or 3000 feet, anti-aircraft shrapnel proved so effective as seriously to aggravate the call for spares and parts; but this did not alter the conviction of the constantly increasing importance of aircraft.

A little later it was the gunners themselves who most emphatically demanded additional service from aeroplanes. They began to call in the aid of the airmen on all occasions for 'spotting,' i.e. for telling them from the air by signals precisely where their shots had fallen, thus correcting their aim and making their fire many times more effective. It is to admit a certain amount of inexperience to say that this was a novel demand, but it was a rightly urgent one, from a novel quarter. It meant more pilots, more observers, and more aeroplanes. Following on this came yet further demands. Aerial photography was shortly put to good use; and, as this affords the means of analysing at leisure the minutest details of the enemy's position and noting the daily changes in his dispositions of troops, his earth-works, defences and other preparations, it is easy to see why the General Staff emphasised its demands for yet more of whatever machinery could offer such service.

Bomb-dropping is another form of activity which, delayed for a time, was largely developed subsequently, and, from the moment it was fairly started, proved so attractive that whole bevvies of machines were called for. For this purpose new types had to be considered, partly because of the constantly increasing size and number of the bombs carried, and partly because of the necessity for defending the bombers. Still, good work was done and continues to be done with many of the original

machines. The low-powered machines that we began with were, before long, to be unduly loaded, and hence were exposed to more danger of fire from the ground and from the air. But, as it became clear that an effective attack on the enemy's line would always be assisted by a distribution of explosives amongst the railways and communications by which he might bring up supports to the point attacked, bombing took a definite place in military operations, and machines had to be produced and modified accordingly.

Another cause of increased demand was the unsatisfactory character of most of the landing grounds unavoidably allotted to the wings and squadrons. This gave rise to breakages of the alighting gears, and not unfrequently to wrecked aeroplanes, which had to be replaced till the sites were improved. How the alighting troubles have been overcome it is not for us to reveal, but it is common knowledge that landings are much better now than they were. Moreover, during the conveyance of aeroplanes and messengers as well as sundries to and from England and the Front by way of the air, there must have been losses; and, in the frequent transits between the Paris flying grounds and the Front, pilots have occasionally lost their way, descended to enquire, and been captured with their machines by the enemy.

In addition to these general causes, some of the earlier phases of the war necessitated great activity in aircraft production, and placed intense pressure on our initially small Headquarters Staff at home. During the retreat from Mons we suffered severe losses in aeroplanes and sundries, some of which had to be destroyed by ourselves. While rapid movements were in progress, pilots who had been for some hours up in the air were not, and could not be, aware of the exact line of demarcation between friendly and enemy country when they descended. The perfecting of an aircraft base cannot be achieved in a moment; and, though new bases were not formed with undue frequency, it was inevitable that our aeroplanes should occasionally have suffered from inadequate or imperfect housing during the storms which occurred during the autumn of 1914. One particular 'line squall,' which blew with exceptional violence and arose

with all the unexpectedness which characterises this class of gale, is said to have destroyed a large portion of our aerial equipment. Aeroplanes were piled upon one another or blown off into a neighbouring wood, while certain very large tents were destroyed in a heart-breaking manner. Some fine salvage work was done, and the officers and men on the spot displayed admirable promptitude and resource, but they could not prevent a very substantial loss. Owing to this misfortune the maintenance of our activity would have been seriously imperilled, but that the Germans had underestimated the value of the aeroplane in war far more than we had. They were thus unable to take advantage of the nearest approach to shortage which has occurred on our side. Indeed they have never caught us up; and the airmen at least are determined that they never shall.

All these causes have necessitated that enormous increase in the provision for aviation of which we see the signs round us at home; and we should not fail to do honour to those who stood the severe strain and produced a number of aeroplanes fully adequate to the personnel and consistently maintained it from the outset. Such a result does credit to the energy and devotion with which the successive difficulties were met by the military and expert personnel at home, as well as by the motor-car and other manufacturers who bent themselves to what was the entirely novel task of constructing military aeroplanes with nothing but piles of official drawings to start work upon. A place of honour must also be kept for those bodies known in the service as Aircraft Parks to the Royal Flying Corps. Each Aircraft Park is analogous to a small Aircraft Factory; and on it falls the burden of tackling on the spot the repairs that can be done without the full supply of tools available in a large establishment. An Aircraft Park is the first body to feel the recoil of any aerial disaster; and many an anxious night has been spent by the weary and may-be dirty Park Commander in his struggle to keep efficient such machines as we had.

It is interesting to note that the large majority of aeroplanes used by the Royal Flying Corps in all our various fields of operation are British-made; and of

these by far the larger number are of British design. The only significant exception is one French make of aeroplane, which has been used by one of our squadrons. These machines, which we obtained through the courtesy of the French Government, did first-class service. In view of the story that American aircraft, imported in large numbers, saved the situation for the British, it is well to put on record the fact that no American machines have been at any time used by the Royal Flying Corps at the Front, and that no foreign-made or foreign-designed aeroplanes are in use with the Flying Corps in France to-day, except as stated above.

Among the causes of that continuous demand for aeroplanes to which we have referred, one of the most important is the rapid 'antiquation' of types, for it will be readily understood that the progress of the science under extreme pressure evolved better types on both sides. At the beginning of the war we naturally used the accepted best biplanes of the time—Avro's fitted with an 80 H.P. rotatory engine, 'B.E.8's' with the same engine, and British H. Farman's. There were other types, to be named later; but these are mentioned first, because they were the first to be recognised as inadequate to modern conditions. They were seen to be under-powered, and were therefore sent back from the scene of war; but they were not wasted, for they were utilised for school-work at home.

To be under-powered means many things to the pilot. He finds his aeroplane, originally his pride and safety, excelled by the enemy's newer experimental types. To be under-powered is to be too slow in travelling and too slow in climbing. These defects, expressed in terms of risk, mean that the pilot is exposed during the period of climb to the improved shooting from the ground which the practice of this war has induced. He is obliged to delay all approach to the enemy's country till he has completed the climbing stage. Moreover, the greatest height attainable by an under-powered aeroplane is insufficient to ensure safety from gunfire. Lack of speed means also an increased period of exposure, aggravated by every contrary wind, which not only detains him longer within the danger zone, but aids the ground-gunners by giving them a slowly-moving or even

stationary target. These are the reasons why some of the types first named no longer figure at the Front.

Fortunately we began our work with many other craft. There were 'B.E.2's' in good quantity. These biplanes, though fitted with engines of only 70 H.P., were exceedingly efficient, and were the mainstay of the Flying Corps for all hack-work, owing to their exceptional strength. Their speed, measured at ground level (for it is usual to express the speed of aircraft in this way, and not in terms of the speed at 6000 feet or other heights at which they may in fact be used), exceeded that of the average German machines at that time by some 15 per cent. These machines would no doubt have passed away from the Front by now but for the timely evolution of a new engine of official design and of much greater power. Their retention was also due to the popularity they enjoyed, owing to the fact that they were the only 'stable' aeroplanes in use in any of the armies engaged, and were therefore easier and safer to land. On more than one occasion a totally unskilled observer is reported to have climbed, in mid air, into the place of a wounded pilot and landed the machine without getting hurt. On another occasion a wounded pilot who fainted owed his safety to the same cause. The early Avro was actually faster than the B.E.2, but was unstable. It had what we should have called in those days a very good turn of speed, and was famous for its ability to fly slowly as well, a valuable quality.

Another design, brought out by the British and Colonial Aeroplane Company, of a single-seated aeroplane of 80 H.P., eventually lost its attraction, not because of any deficiency in speed, rate of climb, or controllability, but because the growing equipment of guns and sundries overloaded it for the heights later demanded of all aeroplanes, and it thus became, for the duties it was called on to perform, under-powered. Nor was this a solitary case. The developments which made aircraft so useful in their varied technical applications greatly increased the loads to be borne; and this handicapped machines, however good in their day, which had been designed when these uses were not fully foreseen.

Speed and climbing power had been obtained in all

our craft not by using big engines—for, unlike the Germans, we had no big engines to use—but by aerodynamic skill in producing wings of remarkable efficiency, bodies of low resistance to the air, and propellers of fine design. The results thus achieved were adequate to earlier conditions; but the conditions changed. It became necessary to attach to the aeroplane, externally, devices which together constituted serious impediments to the free flow of air past a rapidly moving machine. Such obstructions included cameras, bombs, bomb-sights, wireless apparatus and aerial wires, ammunition boxes, machine-guns and their mountings, and occasionally extra petrol tanks, while not infrequently the internal load was added to by observers' magnetic compasses, maps, and other sundries. Moreover the necessity for frequently fighting in the air involved the removal of substantial portions of the wings in order that the pilot and the gunner should not be cut off from the earliest possible view of an approaching enemy aeroplane. The result was that much of the power formerly available for propulsion and speed was expended in thrusting against these large resistances and lifting these heavy weights, and thus the need for higher-powered engines became imperative.

All this must have happened to the Germans as well as to ourselves; but—and here we strike the crux of the matter—the Germans had, for a totally different purpose, been evolving a large engine which they found ready to hand for their aeroplanes just as we were driving them out of the air. These engines were already in use in their Zeppelins, Parsevals, Shutte-Lans, Siemens and other airships. They had had the advantage of some fourteen years' study and use, and had been brought to very considerable perfection. It would not be correct to say that no one in this country had foreseen the use of big engines in aeroplanes, for we can recall the invitation issued to engine-makers some three years ago, to produce for a competition (limited to aeroplane engines and to British firms) horse-powers up to 200, with the prospect of orders up to 40,000*l.* and a cash prize of 5000*l.* to the best engine. The competition was jointly naval and military; but, as the lowest limit of power was almost universally aimed at, it is clear that the expectation that

what was called the airship size of engine would be required was limited to a small technical circle. Thus the abandonment by the army of the airship, with its call for larger engines, has directly and indirectly been the root of more than one trouble, not the least of which has been the inferiority, in size at least, of British engines. It was because of this deficit of power that we fought with 70 H.P. and 80 H.P. engines, while engines of over 160 H.P. were available to the enemy even before the war began. These and even greater H.P.'s were used, as we now know, shortly after the outset of hostilities. It was only the clearly inferior aerodynamics displayed by the German equipment which saved us from serious discomfiture in the air; and it is satisfactory to relate that such enemy aircraft as we have captured, by no means their worst, confirm this substantial inferiority. It must not, however, be supposed that, while we were unable for the reasons given to attain to the high powers of the German machines in the majority of our squadrons, there were no engines of more than 70 or 80 H.P. installed and working in our aeroplanes even at the beginning of the war. From the first we had some aeroplanes, officially designated as 'R.E.5's,' which were fitted with 120 H.P. engines. A little later we had some Vickers Fighter aeroplanes, with engines of 100 H.P. of the ingenious system known as Mono-Gnome. Both these aeroplanes were two-seated and possessed advantages which kept them longer in the field. The 'Vickers' and the official design known as 'F.E.2,' propelled by a 120 H.P. engine, are in use to this day, in company with the 'Martinside,' 'de Havilland' and 'F.E.8' types, as well as improved 'B.E.2's.' Of none of these is it permissible to give any details at present.

The layman, who may be impelled to a keener curiosity than usual by recent reports of a single-seater German machine, is not in a position to know what significance attaches to the difference in performance between single-seater and two-seater aeroplanes; yet some understanding of this is needed for the intelligent appreciation of aerial warfare. He has heard that the Germans are employing a defensive aeroplane called the 'Fokker' with great skill and some effect; he has probably mixed up the defensive value of this machine with some

notions of his own that it must be also formidable for the offensive; he may have read in his paper that the aeroplanes which came to Dover were Fokkers (which they certainly were not), and that the Fokker carries but one man who fires a gun forward right through the obstruction of his propeller; and, impressed with all this newly-found knowledge about a diabolically dangerous appliance, he wants urgently to know how we are going to counter the Fokker, whether we have done it yet, and why we did not do it sooner. This and other things we hope to deal with in another article.

The position of this country in respect of airships, though not directly within the scope of these notes, must nevertheless be touched upon, because, as already stated, it bears on one aspect of our subject. It is an ordinary maxim of one's earliest training in military or for that matter naval equipment, that it is essential to prepare for like with like; and, by every canon, we should therefore have had not only those large engines we have spoken of for aeroplanes, but also airships equal to or better than the Zeppelins. It is not for us to say who should be criticised for this deficiency; but, if we look back to the few published expressions which may guide us to the recommendations of the Government's technical advisers, naval and military (to which reference may be made at some later time), it is impossible not to suspect that their acceptance was made subservient to purely monetary considerations at the time. The necessary funds were undoubtedly withheld; and, if a scape-goat is needed, the public must glance at the mirror of its opinions from day to day. It will realise with gratification, no doubt, that, if there is one thing certain in public life, it is that the public controls the national purse and refuses to entrust any contact with the strings to the Services, at any rate in time of peace. It will recognise its daily adviser in the daily press.

Long-range attacks by air being necessarily entrusted by the enemy to his long range aircraft, i.e. to airships, airships and eventually giant aeroplanes should form our staple defence, together with such other weapons as the defensive position adds to our armoury for the purpose—viz. 'up-guns' and fast-climbing aeroplanes,

the latter mainly for daylight work. In the frenzy of scribbling which has beset the question of air defence lately, it has been customary to speak almost exclusively of the last two weapons, and to forget the essentials—the 'equivalent aircraft.' The result is unfortunate and disappointing, but nothing else was to be expected. Luckily the Navy have the sole charge of airships, and the heavy-weight long-range seaplane is also their province; so that, for all our unpreparedness, we may look for some relief. There were certain obvious reasons, and probably correct ones, for entrusting, some two and a half years ago, the sole charge of airships to the Navy; notably their greater familiarity with problems of navigation, their aptitude in handling large craft, and last and not least their freedom from War Office financial domination and easier access to the essential funds. The approach to the country's coast-line, by whatever medium, seems also to fall appropriately under Admiralty control, since assailants must in any case cross the water. This disposition, unsuccessful as it has been, we must perforce approve until we are guarded by a totally separate Air Service. It may be useful for the Navy to call in the Royal Flying Corps to help, as is being done at present; and no one can suggest that either Service is likely to shirk its share.

What weighs with us more is that with our fighting forces constituted as they are now, the demands of our armies in the field are the first business of our Military Aeronautics, and that the supply for this purpose should on no account be encroached upon. Our real defence, our speediest defence, against air-raids is undoubtedly the decisive defeat of the enemy; and no massing of protective devices against raids at home can by any stretch of the imagination warrant the weakening of our main offensive or defensive. The determination as to where we had best concentrate the main strength of our aerial devices is a purely military matter; and we shall play into the enemy's hands and make his airships 'worth while' indeed, if by political pressure we override our military strategists, even though we may be actuated by the highest motives of pity for the civilians, women and children in large part, who have suffered from the enemy's bombs. Let us merely say that it is fortunate

for us that the main decision is being fought on other soil than our own, and help those best able to secure the favourable decision—the Generals in charge.

The question of establishing a new Ministry of the Air was keenly debated a short time ago. Now the creation of new Ministers is accompanied by a dilution of the collective responsibility of the Cabinet which makes all thinking men very shy of such suggestions. If a popular demand results in the work of an existing Minister being taken away from him, it implies, at the least, that he is overburdened. Thus the shackles of the War Office Financial Department had recently to be removed from the purchase and manufacture of munitions; and a separate Ministry was created to discharge a task with which the existing organisation could not satisfactorily cope. Does the exceptional position of the new Arm warrant a similar procedure?

We have heard it urged, in favour of an Air Ministry, that the following advantages would be gained:

(1) The unification of the purchasing system of the two Services, and a central responsibility for whatever moneys are spent on air-work. (2) The extinction of inter-Service jealousy and competition. (3) The abolition of the secretiveness which prevents the information possessed by the Naval and Military Wings of the Royal Flying Corps, and the fresh knowledge acquired by airmen and experts, from becoming the common property of both. (4) An escape from the precedents and procedure of the War Office Finance Department. (5) The removal of competition for a lion's share of the annual money grants which might exist between the Army proper and its Air Section, or between the Navy proper and its Air Section. (6) The securing of continuity in the interest taken in the Aërial Arm after the special enthusiasm due to the war has died out. (7) The fostering and regulating of that side of aeronautical activity which has been introduced or stimulated by recent experience, e.g. the study of the upper air in general, of organised aërial fighting in squadrons and fleets, of bomb-work at long range, of methods of countering the enemy's long-range bomb-work, and of a host of minor problems which do not fall within the province of the Army or the Navy as

constituted—such as the aerial magnetic compass, the finding of the vertical aerial dead-reckoning, wireless work in the upper air, and even the international legal position of aeronautics.

Now, it is well to know that each of these advantages (excepting those relating to finance), if advantages they be, existed completely in the scheme on which the Royal Flying Corps was originally formed, a scheme which continues officially to exist at the present day, though it has become in practice a dead letter for causes which may be indicated. In 1912 the Air Service of Great Britain was constituted as one body, firmly supported on two sturdy limbs, the Naval Wing of the R.F.C. and the Military Wing of the R.F.C. Legally it remains so to-day. This body was fed from one source, the Central Flying School at Upavon, with an eminent sailor at its head and a distinguished soldier as his right-hand man. This School was paid for out of joint Admiralty and War Office funds.

The technical *expertise* of the British Flying Corps was and is centered in one brilliant body, the Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (often known as Lord Rayleigh's Committee), on which sit service-men flyers and specialists, with certain Fellows of the Royal Society and others who have made a study of aerial matters. This Committee is in intimate relation with, on one side, the Royal Aircraft Factory, a laboratory for full-scale experimental work and design from which have emanated the now well-known B.E. and F.E. types of aeroplane; on the other, with the National Physical Laboratory, whose valuable work is done by research on models in the National wind channels, and whose funds are derived directly from the Treasury and not from either Service. It seems that, on paper, nothing could be more unified than the British Air Service; its various heads, naval, military, technical, educational, and political, meet on a central committee called the Air Committee; the Navy was to handle all airships and seaplanes, the Army all aeroplanes; and all knowledge acquired was to be their common property through this common centre.

Why then should there be, as there certainly is, a strong demand for a change which would bring about the aforesaid advantages by a process of unification?

It seems impossible to believe that the actual organisation, prior to Lord Derby's appointment, was really what has just been described; but so it is. The mischief has arisen from the fact that the matter has been profoundly misunderstood by publicists, and hence by those Parliamentarians who, with good intentions, have spasmodically interested themselves in the things of air. This misunderstanding spread to the Services themselves before the *régime* had had time to make itself felt. A part of the Press vaguely supported the Royal Flying Corps arrangement; another part, in assailing details of development, unwittingly attacked it; and the two camps have found their counterpart in the Services. The camp which decried the existing scheme claimed that everything was to be gained by developing into a separate school the small seaplane school which existed at Eastchurch. Shortly afterwards there appeared a large increase in the number of aeroplanes (not seaplanes) at that place. This was hailed as an important relief from the competitive method of purchase which the financial dictators of the War Office had decreed; and such no doubt it was. The backward state of seaplane design in itself warranted this development, though perhaps the incidental or partial boycott by the Navy of the Central Flying School and of the Royal Aircraft Factory was to be regretted, since it was here that the separation of the two elements of the Air Service began.

The camp which supported the position as by law established did not perceive, and indeed no one could have had such prophetic power as to foresee, that in this departure from the agreed basis of development the seed of a strongly marked separation of feeling was sown. All that was observed was that the authorities were moving. It was not till the trial of war came upon us that the severance became sufficiently glaring to call for comment; it was then noticed that there were two services using different names, a different motto, a different uniform, different schools, different grading of officers, both doing precisely the same thing but competing with one another for the supplies of aeroplanes and aeroplane materials, to the not inconsiderable pecuniary loss of the State. The camp which had unknowingly fostered this state of things at once took

credit to itself for the consequent flourishing condition of the aircraft and aircraft-engine industry in general, to the very comprehensible satisfaction of those industrials who, instead of competing for orders, found themselves the object of competition. The requisite rigour of inspection was in some parts relaxed; one recognised object of a Government dockyard—that of keeping prices to a sane level—was also swept away; and the Royal Aircraft Factory, which had fulfilled this unpopular function, could no longer discharge it with much effect at precisely the time when it was most needed, since the war had increased the demand out of all proportion to the size of this establishment.

If now we enquire why the Central 'Air Committee' so easily lost control of its component elements, we find the answer in its one weak point: viz. that each of the Wings (Naval and Military) had access to funds, limited it is true, but completely independent of the governing committee. They could and did snap their fingers at its agreements and resolutions. It is safe to prophesy that precisely the same fate awaits the new Committee under Lord Derby, unless, with his characteristic common-sense, he awakes to the fundamental weakness of its position. The zeal of the 'new broom' era will of course carry things along for awhile, especially at a time of hotly awakened patriotism; but let us hope that at an early date he will discover that his committee's policy, whatever it is, calls not only for funds but for the power to grant or withhold independently of those elements which he has been called in to control and unify. Whether this necessarily means that he must be a Minister of the Crown depends chiefly on the magnitude of the funds controlled; and this again depends on the attitude of Parliament towards the significance of Aeronautics in our task of maintaining our status as a first-class Power. For ourselves, we think that the threat by air is sufficiently great; and, so thinking, the sooner we turn our air committee into an Air Office or an 'Airvy' the better, and by all means let Lord Derby be the First Air Lord.

Art. 4.—THE FORESTS OF FINLAND AND EUROPEAN
TIMBER SUPPLIES.

Atlas de Finlande. Articles by Prof. A. K. Cajander,
P. W. Hannikainen (Director-General of State Forests),
and A. B. Helander (Inspector of Forests). Helsingfors :
Geogr. Society of Finland, 1911.

THE Great War has given rise, in certain parts of Europe, to almost unprecedented demands for various classes of timber. The materials have been utilised in a variety of ways, outside their ordinary peace-time usages—for the flooring, walling and roofing of trenches and dug-outs, the hutting of troops in training, the preparation of barbed-wire entanglements, the handles of entrenching tools, and for many other purposes, both naval and military, which are better perhaps left undisclosed. It was estimated the other day that there were some 2000 odd miles of trenches on the Western and Eastern fronts. To construct these an enormous amount of wood has been needed. The whole of this material is lost to the world, for what remains of it at the end of the war will never prove serviceable. This excessive consumption of wood, outside its ordinary purposes, has rendered necessary the institution of a very careful enquiry into the sources of present and future accessible supplies and into the probable amounts available in the forests of the allied countries situated in Europe. Urgent as this problem has already become to some of the Allies, ourselves for instance, the question will be still more acute at the close of the war. A previously undreamt-of demand must inevitably make itself felt with the advent of peace. It is becoming therefore an imperative duty—and each month that passes adds to the urgency of this duty—that the Allies should place themselves in a position to deal with the question in the least wasteful and most efficient manner possible. Owing to our insular position, we are, or should be, even more concerned in grappling with this problem than those of our allies who will have forest resources of their own to fall back upon. Competition in the timber markets at the close of the war between countries now fighting as close allies will on the one hand be playing into the

hands of the Central Powers, and on the other be alike fatal to true economy and to rapid progress in the rebuilding of the towns, villages and homesteads which have practically ceased to exist within the areas devastated by the operations of war. And this great demand, even in the absence of such competition, must, it is to be feared, react unfavourably on industries dependent on wood for their raw material. The economic questions involved require to be carefully thought out, and a settled plan of action should be determined upon between the Allies now.

The great forests of some of the European nations and their contents, both in volume of timber, sizes and classes of materials, and estimated values, are more or less well-known. For instance, the fine forests of the Central Powers and their prospective value and importance when peace comes can be more or less correctly estimated. The same may be said for the forests of France and of some other western European nations. Norway and Sweden, as is well known, have continued to supply, down to the commencement of the war, and in fact to the present time, large amounts of materials of the classes here under consideration. It is difficult, however, to forecast the extent to which they will be able or prepared to assist us in meeting the infinitely greater demands which must arise in the near future. They have been taking advantage, Sweden especially, of the high prices now existing. But are they prepared to continue to do so, and can their forests stand the strain? There appears little reason to expect, or even, in the future interests of the countries themselves, to hope, that these Governments will continue to consent to the exhaustion of their forests, even to take advantage of an excessive inflation of prices. It has also become the duty of the countries most directly concerned to endeavour to prevent such an inflation of prices as would be the immediate outcome of direct competition amongst themselves in the timber markets. At the same time, it is a first necessity in the interests of future generations that the forests of Europe should be so managed that as little interference as possible may take place in the existing plans of management of the woods. Such plans are primarily based on the removal of the normal

increment; or, to put it in more popular language, on the removal of the annual interest, whilst the capital is left behind intact. Over-cutting means trenching upon the capital, interference with the supplies of the future, and is financially unsound in the case of large areas of forest managed by the State on commercial principles in the interests of the community.

It is admitted that to some extent it should be possible for America and Canada to assist us in this matter. They have, in fact, been taking advantage of the high market rates; but it is these rates which it is imperative should be brought to a lower level at the close of the war, and if possible before this problematical date. This problem, in its main issues, is one for the Allies alone, and they will certainly be called upon to solve it for themselves.

The sources of supply form the first point for consideration. It becomes necessary to ascertain whether there exist in Europe accessible areas, or areas which can be made accessible with comparative ease and at a remunerative outlay, of commercially exploitable forest which can be utilised to supply the heavy demands which will exist. There are other matters of urgent importance, such as the afforestation throughout Europe of all land which in the opinion of experts will prove financially sound in the interests of the several communities. This and other problems which will arise are outside the province of the present article.

Having settled upon the source of supply, the next point to ascertain is whether the commercially exploitable forests referred to above contain an excess of old growing stock, i.e. whether, owing to insufficient demand in the past, or to a scanty population, to their inaccessibility, or the existence of forests in the country with better export facilities, these forests have been left unexploited up to now. It is forests of this nature which the world has been busily cutting out for over a century, and more especially since the advent of steam communication. The greater part of them have been already exploited or ruined by fire and other causes. Tracts of considerable size and practically untouched do, however, exist; and Russia probably owns the greatest area of them in Europe. A considerable portion of these forests

is managed by the State Forestry Department of the country, and, save in the more densely populated parts, the fellings made annually in these areas have been far below the possibility; in other words, want of demand or of export facilities has rendered it impossible to remove the annual amount of timber which proper forest conservancy and a correct management of the areas on financial lines would indicate and justify. European Russia, Siberia and Finland contain vast tracts of such forests, some more accessible than others. It is proposed here to confine ourselves to a consideration of the forests of Finland, which, owing to their proximity to the sea and their comparative accessibility, should, if the matter is managed on statesmanlike lines, prove of incomparable value to the Allies in the near future.

From time immemorial the forests of Finland have played a very important part in the development of the country. In the distant past, when the population lived a nomadic existence, they hunted in the forests to supply themselves with food. With the advent of agriculture, the forests still continued to play an integral part in the life of the people. Areas were felled and burnt to provide additional room for the raising of crops, the ashes of the burnt materials forming a valuable manure for the new fields. The method is still practised in Eastern Finland, economically wasteful as it is. Materials for building purposes, heating and cooking, agricultural implements and so on, were all derived from the forests. But except to provide the local needs of the population the forests had little other use. Until comparatively recent times there was no export of forest produce, nor were the forests conserved in any way. Small beginnings were made in 1862-3 with the establishment of a Forest Service and a forest school at Evo. But progress languished. It was thought that agriculture would pay better; and for years subsequently all efforts were concentrated upon this business. It was gradually perceived, however, that the high hopes placed on successful agricultural development were to be disappointed; exports of agricultural produce remained small, while, so late as 1907, Finland was importing over 4,000,000*l.* worth of cereals, grain, etc. On the other

hand, during this period, the value of the forests gradually increased. The exports of timber, from being negligible, amounted in 1907 to nearly $9\frac{1}{2}$ million pounds sterling, or 70 per cent. of the total exports of the country. And this in addition to providing all the wants of the local population.

The greater part of Finland, with the exception of the coastal regions, where the soil is argillaceous and more or less fertile, and the great prairies stretching along the rivers of Ostrobothnia, is a forest country. The soil is poor and stony and the climate cold—both factors more adapted to tree growth than to agriculture. Other points favourable to the maintenance of the forests of the country are the ease with which they can be renewed naturally by seed falling from parent trees, thus eliminating the expenses of planting; the small snowfall, which does not impede felling and extraction operations in the winter; the abundance of water transport, which forms a net-work of excellent communications; and the amount of available water-power for driving saw-mills, etc.

The State owns about 36 per cent. of the area of Finland, or 32,804,695 acres, excluding some small areas purchased by the State for various purposes. Of the above area 32,078,457 acres are covered by Government forests, the remaining 726,238 acres comprising chiefly farms and other Government enterprises. This large area was constituted a State forest in olden times, as in so many other countries, when forests were not considered to possess any economic value, all land not at the time under private ownership, or occupied by villages, becoming crown property. At this period the area was considerably larger than 36 per cent. of the whole country, large grants having been made from time to time for extending cultivation and other purposes.

Even at the present day such grants continue to be made, but only after a careful examination of the area to ascertain whether they can be put to better economic use than by the growth of trees; for the economic value of the forest, in the interests of the people and the country at large, is now fully recognised. Accordingly, the Government has within the last few years extended the forest area in the south and centre of the country

by purchasing extensive areas of privately-owned forests. The following table shows the approximate areas of forest in the seven Governments of Finland :

Name of Government.	Area, including water, in acres.	Estimated approximate areas, in acres.				
		Cultivated lands.		Best quality forest soils.	Better classes of marsh and fenland.	Water.
		Tilled land.	Meadows and burnt areas.			
Nyland .	6,662	85	190	4,755	1,132	500
Abo .	368,467	3,187	8,030	174,237	173,117	9,875
Tavastehus .	249,757	3,530	5,837	146,815	84,420	9,145
Viborg .	624,132	365	4,832	322,317	260,835	35,682
St Michael .	102,627	537	680	64,412	31,462	5,535
Kuopio .	1,318,197	1,425	7,552	668,242	597,847	43,130
Vasa .	1,034,430	4,715	13,332	527,700	465,155	23,527
Uleåborg .	28,374,562	6,242	110,977	11,814,245	15,294,147	1,148,950
Total .	32,078,834	20,086	151,430	13,722,723	16,908,115	1,276,344

The above figures show that forest soils of the best quality occupy an area of only 13,722,723 acres, or 43 per cent. of the total forest area. Bog or fen areas of the better class (16,908,115 acres) are either covered with forests or are rocky and barren areas of little forestal importance. A portion of the good quality forest soils is situated in the far north, and the forests on them are chiefly maintained for protection purposes. There remains, however, a large area of State forests containing merchantable timber of good quality. But this does not by any means exhaust the forest resources of the country. In 1899 (the last valuation made) it was computed that there existed 24,688,677 acres of private forests occupying best quality forest soil, and 4,597,235 acres of afforested bog and fen land. These figures include the areas of forests on Government farms and ecclesiastical farms and tracts of communal forests. The communal forests, belonging to towns and villages, are of interest. For instance, the town of Kajana, which owns the largest forest estate, possesses an area of 24,192 acres ; the town of Torneå about half this amount, Kuopio nearly a third, and so on.

Timber-working companies also possess forests of their own amounting to 1,421,847 acres, managed for

purely commercial purposes. No less than 55 per cent. of the country which has been cadastrally surveyed is in the hands of private proprietors, who thus own the greater part of the private forests. These areas, in consequence, play an important and, so far, a not unsuccessful part in the economic forest policy of the country, although their silvicultural treatment leaves much to be desired. So far as their exploitation goes, i.e. their conversion into cash, the private properties have been the chief source of timber export in the past. In 1906 only about 13 per cent. of the raw material used by the saw-mills came from the State forests, and in 1907 only 16 per cent. In 1907 Finland exported one million cubic metres of pit-timber and 420,000 cubic metres of wood for paper-making, while in that year all the State forests only yielded 78,000 cubic metres of these materials. There is practically no restriction to fellings made in areas of forest owned by timber companies and private persons; and consequently their methods of working are usually wasteful and extravagant. There exists a law under which the owner is bound to take measures to reafforest all areas of above twelve acres in extent which he clears, but it is a dead letter. The future of the country, so far as its forestry resources go, will depend more and more upon the State forests, unless the forest laws are revised and drastic measures taken to enforce them. Here, however, we are more concerned with the timber export possibilities of the country at the present time; and in this connexion the whole area of forests, State and private, requires careful consideration.

The history of the forests of Finland and their nature may be told in a few words. When man first made his appearance in Finland the whole country was a vast forest. The chief trees were the Scots pine and the spruce. The pine had originally formed vast pure forests, but on the better classes of soil it was giving place to the spruce, which had come in from the East. The areas on the shores of the Arctic Ocean and the elevated mountains were bare. Between the barren area (*tundra*) along the Arctic Ocean and the forest zone proper stretched a narrow band of stunted birch. In the south, especially to the south-east and south-west,

groves of oak occupied the more fertile soils in the plains and on the lower slopes of the hills. On similar soils in other parts of the country mixed woods probably existed, containing in the centre and south, amongst other species, the maple, ash, elms, and lime, etc. The water-courses were bounded by meadows and fringed with narrow belts of birch and alder.

This period was followed by the drying-up of the lakes and the flooding of the forest soil by water which gave rise to vast marshes. The peat areas grew stunted pines, the swampy ones spruce or birch, or, in places in the south, the glutinous alder. Man has since then considerably modified the nature of the forests, the marked transition following the period at which he settled down on the soil in organised communities. Fire played an important part in the change. There are probably few of the afforested areas in Finland which at one time or other have not been ravaged by fire. For example, fires destroyed either wholly or partially 160,752, 135,557 and 168,905 acres of State Forest in 1868, 1883, and 1894 respectively. These fires have considerably altered the distribution of the pine and spruce. The former, having a thick bark and deep-going roots, is easier able to resist fire than the thin-barked, shallow-rooted spruce. Also the young pines suffered less from frost and drought, and were thus able to occupy, with greater ease, the burnt, exposed and dried-up areas. The more often fire passed over an area the quicker was the disappearance of the spruce from the locality, the species only remaining in deep damp hollows into which the fire could not penetrate. In areas which suffered in this way in the past, the drier sandy soils are now occupied by forests of pure pine, the more fertile soils being covered with birch.

This latter species, owing to its very light seed, easily wind-borne, and to the fact that it seeds abundantly every year, while the pine in central Finland only produces a seed-crop every seventh year, quickly invades burnt-out areas. The year following a fire will see the birch beginning to appear. The great stretches of birch forest existing in Lapland and Northern Finland arose in this fashion. Other great tracts of pure soil existing in Finland, now absolutely devoid of tree-growth, are also chiefly the result of incendiarism, and, to a less

extent, of the wasteful devastation by man of the previously existing forests. With the protection of the forests and the rarer occurrence of fires the distribution of the species again began to change. Starting from the swampy lands and damp hollows where it had held its own, the spruce invaded the pine and birch forests, forming at first an underwood. With the development in height and crown extension of this spruce underwood, it in time came to form a high forest, from which the old pine or birch gradually disappeared. Owing to the thick shade which the spruce throws on the forest floor below, no young pines or birches—both species requiring light to enable them to develop—could grow. Young spruce, on the other hand, are able to develop in the shade of their parent trees; and, owing to this peculiarity, the species gradually took possession not only of all the soils on which it was able to grow to perfection, but also of others less well suited to it, which, from a commercial point of view, were better occupied by the pine. In the coastal regions of Nyland and the Governments of Abo and Vasa the spruce is already more widespread than the pine. In other parts of the country, such as Ilomantsi and Korpiselka, great stretches of spruce forest exist; and here, doubtless owing to the presence of extensive swamps and deep ravines, fire was never able to spread to any great extent, so that the spruce forests were never destroyed by this agency.

Another agency, probably even more destructive than fire, was the pernicious custom of 'shifting cultivation.' A patch of forest was felled; the felled trees were fired, and the burnt ashes strewn over the area; and one or more agricultural crops were then raised upon it. As soon as the area ceased to yield a satisfactory crop without undertaking a more intensive cultivation of the soil, the cultivator moved on to another patch of forest, which he treated in the same fashion. The spruce forests were the first to be treated in this fashion, because they occupied the best soil. When the cultivator left the area, it was seized upon and rapidly covered by the light-seeded birch. Where the cultivation had taken place on drier areas of poorer soil, the pine subsequently appeared. Of all methods of cultivation this system is the most pernicious.

But the birch forests were not the only result of

treating areas of better class soil in this fashion. When, in course of time, the birch forests were in their turn felled and burnt for a like purpose, the birch gave place to forests of white alder; and, the more often the burning took place on such areas, the purer became the resultant alder forest, owing to the fact that the alder reproduces itself by sucker and coppice shoots, and that these grow quicker than seedling birch, and thus in the struggle for life killed out the latter. The extensive forests of alder which exist round the villages in Carélie, in the Savolaks, and in parts of Tavastland, originated in this manner. The system, which is still practised in the east of the country with Government consent, has caused the disappearance of great areas of valuable forest in Finland. Already, in parts, efforts have been made to ameliorate the condition of affairs by burning areas of pure alder and sowing pine seed on the resultant bed of ashes. The one favourable feature of the alder forests in the past was the fact that, owing to the open nature of the woods, a fine crop of grass grew up which was used for pasturing cattle. But, as has been shown above, most of these areas would carry a much more valuable conifer forest. Large areas of privately-owned 'forest,' if it can be given the name, consisting mostly of birch and scattered alder, are also used as cattle parks—a most wasteful method of utilising good forest land where national economy is considered.

In the north of Finland and in Lapland the custom of reindeer breeding is also destructive to the forests, by rendering it almost impossible to raise young crops of trees. Since the reindeer lichen, which grows on the moors, is not nearly sufficient for the great herds reared, the shepherds fell large numbers of spruce covered with lichens (*Alectoria*, etc.), upon which the reindeer, in the absence of a sufficiency of the other plant, have to feed. The State suffers considerable losses owing to illicit fellings made for this purpose in areas where the forests are very large and the protective staff too small to stop these wholesale thefts.

The distribution of the various species of tree in the forests of Finland is a point of considerable interest at the present time.

The Scots pine (*P. sylvestris*) is the dominant species over the greater part of the dry moorlands and areas of pure sand. It also occupies, practically alone, the numberless peaty areas. Mixed with other species, it covers the slightly better class of soils, although here the spruce is usually present as an underwood. On all these classes of soil, both favourable and unfavourable, the pine in Finland develops a fine straight stem which always finds a ready market.

The spruce (*Picea excelsa* and *P. obovata* with intermediate forms) covers the greater part of the swampy soils. It also forms the dominant species on the more fertile soils which have not been subject to bad fires. It is for this reason that the spruce is commoner than the pine in Finland proper, the sea-coasts of Western Nyland and the Government of Vasa, and the northern parts of Carélie in the direction of the Russian frontier. In the State forests in the north and in the regions adjacent to Suomenselka the spruce occupies areas in which, from the commercial forestry point of view, it is not the species most suitable to the soil. It is also present in nearly all the mixed forests which gradually pass into pure spruce areas.

The birch (*Betula verrucosa* and *B. odorata*) forms the chief species on the extensive tracts of Lapland and north Finland which have been subject to incendiarism. It also forms more or less extensive forests in all parts of the country which have been subject to fire, or to the pernicious system of shifting cultivation in which fire plays so important a part. Cattle parks are often chiefly covered with birch. It is also present in the mixed forests and in the areas which have been long worked irregularly to furnish the domestic requirements of villagers and private proprietors. The two species are found generally together, *B. verrucosa* preferring the drier and *B. odorata* the moister localities.

The white alder (*Alnus incana*), originally existing only as a fringe to the water-courses (with the exception of the coast in the south-west of Finland), has become, as a direct result of the system of shifting cultivation, the chief species over great tracts in Carélie, the Savolaks, Tavastland and the regions beyond Kajana. The glutinous alder (*A. glutinosa*) forms narrow pure woods

along the shore of the lakes, especially in the south-west of Finland. In the south it spreads over the marshy lands, where it occasionally forms pure woods, as, for instance, in the coastal regions.

The oak (*Quercus pedunculata*), which formerly, in the 'oak period,' held a place of considerable importance amongst the forest species in the south, is now only found in small isolated woods in the extreme south. The aspen (*Populus tremula*) is widespread, and is found on the fertile soils as well as on the driest of the sterile moors, but only reaches considerable dimensions on the former soils, where it occasionally forms small pure woods. Larch (*Larix sibirica* and *L. europaea*) has been introduced and some of the plantations formed have done well. The oldest, of *L. sibirica*, was planted between 1738 and 1820 and shows excellent results. Willow, maple, ash, lime and elm occur sparingly in the south.

The oldest fellings in the forests of Finland were made for what may be termed purely domestic requirements, such as firewood, charcoal, timber for building, household and other purposes, for small enclosures, and for obtaining tar. These fellings were undertaken without system, the best materials for the purpose being selected and the remainder left standing. In this fashion, in the neighbourhood of villages and townships, the forest gradually became open and honeycombed with holes and glades in which birch, alder and aspen made their appearance. The trees were also topped and hacked about to provide litter or fodder for cattle and sheep. When an outside demand for timber sprang up and made itself felt in the country, the really destructive fellings began; and certain of the privately-owned forests have been more effectively ruined by the methods of felling employed than by all the previous damage they suffered from fire, shifting cultivation and local requirements.

The sales from private forests commenced with the introduction of the saw-mill industry in the middle of last century. At first only material for the mills was required, and the damage done was not of great consequence. But soon the demand arose for pit-wood,

wood-pulp, etc.; and private forests were felled wholesale. Great stretches of them were often sold standing to the timber merchants, who cut everything on the ground which could be sold, what was left on the areas being worthless. Thus considerable areas of privately owned forest were ruined. In the State forests, on the other hand, the management went to the other extreme. The only fellings undertaken were made on what is known as the selection system. Only sound logs were sold, the oldest trees being selected here and there in the forest for the purpose. Only small openings were made in the canopy by the removal of these trees; the forest was thus kept too dense; and young trees, with the exception of spruce, had not sufficient light to enable them to develop and take the place of the old ones removed. Under this system the spruce came in and occupied soils which should have been confined to the Scots pine only. The idea underlying this method of felling was 'to spare the forest,' i.e. that to underfell was good silviculture; whereas, to carry over from year to year a preponderance of mature and over-mature growing stock is neither good silviculture nor sound forest finance. Recently this system has been modified by the order that cleanings should be made in the cutting areas when the old trees are selected and felled. The chief point for our purpose in this management of the State areas is that, as the forests have been admittedly underfelled in the past, they must contain a considerable preponderance of old growing stock, i.e. of mature timber ready for the axe—timber which it would be in the interest of the forests themselves to remove, and which should prove a great asset to the Allies at this juncture.

The Finland Forestry Department was created in 1863, but, owing to the almost total absence of timber sales from the forests, the progress of the new Department was very slow. The protection of the forests formed its chief work and proved most necessary. The people, as has been the case in most other countries, looked upon the forests as their own to enter and cut timber, etc., at their will; and the forest officials had for years to face open hostility on the part of the public in carrying out the new regulations. The staff was far too

small to undertake the work entrusted to it; and the revenue realised from the sales of timber, in the absence of all knowledge as to the contents of the forests, did not even cover until 1872 the expenditure of the Department. From that year a surplus, which gradually increased in amount, was realised; but the excess of receipts over expenditure only showed a notable increase (with small drops) from the year 1890 onwards, as the following table exhibits:

Year.	Receipts in £.	Expenditure in £.	Deficit in £.	Surplus in £.	Expenditure in % of receipts.
1861	5,064	18,247	13,183		360·33
1870	10,242	21,389	11,147		208·84
1880	49,337	33,898		15,439	67·70
1890	108,332	39,126		69,205	36·12
1900	244,900	47,884		197,015	19·57
1901	176,973	45,619		131,354	25·78
1902	185,108	50,548		134,559	27·31
1903	326,660	74,540		252,120	22·82
1904	306,606	72,115		234,491	23·51
1905	240,775	88,859		151,915	36·91
1906	349,790	90,752		259,037	25·94
1907	496,717	111,253		385,463	22·40
1908	463,396	147,421		315,974	31·84
1909	464,089	189,529		278,559	40·80
1910 *	660,000	195,000		465,000	29·00


* Approximately.

These figures prove two things: (1) that satisfactory progress in the exploiting of the Government forests was made between the years 1900 and 1910; (2) that the additional expenditure for additional staff, opening out of communications, and so forth, led to a satisfactory increase of receipts, a result well understood by the forestry expert.

The receipts and expenditure and free grants of forest produce for the State forests of Finland between the years 1861 and 1910 is diagrammatically shown on opposite page.

The work of enumerating the contents of the State forests was commenced in 1904, and some progress has been achieved in this direction, the object being to draw up plans of working for periods of ten years, under

which a regular system of fellings and regeneration of the areas cut over will be undertaken. These enumerations of the standing crop in the various forests brought out the pleasing fact that the number of trees of timber-size proved to be considerably greater than had been anticipated, especially in the northern districts. The



work is still uncompleted, and the Forest Department is as yet unable to definitely state the numbers of trees of timber-size ripe for felling.

The following table, based upon actual enumerations of some forests, has been drawn up for the ten Forest Districts in the country which are in the charge of Chief Forestry Inspectors :

District.	Stems with a diameter of 30 cm. (11½ inches) or more at a height of 4' 3" from ground level.	Stems with a diameter of 25-30 cm. (9½-11½ inches) at a height of 4' 3" from ground level.	Total.
Govt Abo-Tavastchus .	2,628,824	3,539,383	6,168,207
Dist Evo-Vesijako . .	78,192	319,914	398,106
Govt of Viborg-St Michael	2,701,818	4,803,933	7,505,751
Joroinen District . .	41,520	352,270	393,790
Govt of Knopio . . .	5,290,605	7,580,420	12,871,025
Govt of Vasa	2,622,760	4,439,414	7,062,174
Ulea Lake	4,787,587	7,349,668	12,137,255
Ii	5,887,168	10,438,643	16,325,811
Kemi	13,870,000	13,129,964	26,999,964
Lapland	13,457,133	17,974,086	31,431,219
Total	51,365,607	69,927,695	121,293,302

Some 121,000,000 trees, of approximately 10" diameter and over, at 4' 3" above ground, therefore exist; and, in the present exceptional circumstances, considerable fellings could be made to remove old growing stock, ripe or over-ripe. Its removal, with the additional transport facilities which would doubtless in places require to be created, should place the Department in a far better position, and in a far shorter period of time than could have otherwise been hoped, to take up the many interesting sylvicultural questions which demand attention in these forests. The trees in the State forests are usually sold by auction standing, chiefly by the stem but also by volume. A deposit must be previously made by bidders, which is forfeited if the bid is not completed. The bids are submitted to a higher authority and may be refused or accepted; in the latter event the bidder completes his payment before felling and extracting the trees. These auctions for the big timber are carried on in August at large centres. Smaller auctions, at which the smaller material is disposed of, are held locally as may be required. Even here the offers have to be submitted to the district forest authority before they can be accepted. The chief difference between the two auctions, omitting the size of the timber, is that for the small material one year only is allowed between purchase and its removal from the area, whereas for the larger timber two or more years may be granted to the contractor to fell and extract

the trees purchased, these trees having previously been marked by the forest staff.

Latterly the Department has been working departmentally, i.e. felling and converting the trees in the forest itself and selling the converted material on the spot to purchasers. The Department appears to favour this method. But, except in abnormal circumstances, experience has shown, in other places where the method has been tried, that the trouble entailed usually so ties the hands of the staff that necessary inspection and protective work and the proper silvicultural care of the forests are sacrificed, to the ultimate detriment of the woods themselves, although doubtless at the time a greater revenue is made. The departmental work in this instance is undertaken to supply Government Railways with sleepers and fuel for the engines, and with material for the three existing Government sawmills.

The following table for the twelve years 1898 to 1909 shows the numbers of stems sold at the main public auctions, the sales at these furnishing the best indication of the prices obtained for large-sized timber and of the increased demand during the period:

Year.	Number of stems sold.	Mean price per stem in shillings.
1898	816,962	4.12
1899	1,306,344	4.13
1900	933,848	5.16
1901	1,306,483	4.62
1902	1,568,746	4.29
1903	996,889	5.78
1904	1,360,033	4.21
1905	1,868,331	5.03
1906	2,205,166	5.39
1907	2,392,579	4.75
1908	2,874,037	3.60
1909	3,395,042	3.53

The drop in the mean price is explained by the fact that in 1908, 1909 the chief fellings were made in the great forests in the north, where prices always ruled lower than in the centre and south of the country; it was also to some extent attributable to the fact that the marking of trees for sale is now done on better silvicultural lines. The selection is no longer made only

amongst the finest stems, as was formerly always the case, the system of cleanings having, as has been already stated, come into operation. In 1908 the total timber sold from the State forests amounted to 0.24 cubic metres per hectare (2½ acres) of dry forest soil. The mean annual increment of wood put on per hectare has been valued at 1.5 cubic metre for the whole country. There should therefore be, and in fact is, a considerable excess of mature timber in the State forests.

The figures of exports from Finland in 1907 show the following forest produce exported from the country :

	Net measurement in cubic metres.
Poles, stems and logs	215,727
Pit wood and wood for paper pulp	1,135,008
Fuel	640,892
Beams, approx. in the round	1,113
Spars, squared, approx. in the round	234,200
Sleepers, approx. in the round	45,382
Total	<u>2,272,322</u>

In the same year industries absorbed the following amounts :

Saw mills	5,169,025
Bobbin mills (in 1906) approximately	177,559
Paper pulp mills (mechanical and chemical), 1st class	704,975
Paper pulp mills (mechanical and chemical), fuel approx.	350,000
Wheels, blocks, rollers, etc.	13,500
Charcoal making	33,718
Distillation of tar	79,721
Total	<u>6,528,498</u>

Added to this were the amounts of wood utilised on lines of communication steam-boats, which consumed 250,000 cubic metres rough measurement. Railways absorbed in 1908 a total of 9,000,000 cubic metres as fuel and for other railway work; and telephones and telegraphs another 10,000 cubic metres. In round figures it may be said that in 1907 industries and exports utilised about 10,000,000 cubic metres of wood, net measurement. Now of this total only 1,303,582 cubic metres was of State forest origin. The remainder, a total of 8½ millions of cubic metres net measurement, came from the privately-owned forests of the country. This is an important point, for these private forests are by no means yet

exhausted; and therefore to the estimated total of 121 million trees with a diameter of approximately 10" and over at 4' 3" above ground existing in the State forests must be added a total probably as large, and in all probability far larger, standing in the privately-owned forests.

It has been estimated that the domestic requirements of the population absorb 13,186,452 cubic metres, net measurement, in addition to the amounts given above. These materials are, however, of small size and do not affect the question from the point of view here considered. It is the commercial timber which exerts the chief influence on the exploitation of the forests; for it is the timber markets which demand the finest timber, the local requirements being satisfied with inferior qualities. It is the big markets which attract the private owners of woods, as also, to a considerable extent, the Government owner; since it is in these markets that the best prices are obtainable for the larger material which they are in a position to supply.

An endeavour has been made to point out in this article that in the forests of Finland there exists one direction at least to which the devastated countries may look to obtain materials at a reasonable price with which to repair the destruction wrought by the Great War. Those industries in the Allied countries which depend upon timber for their raw material may also hope to obtain a part of their requirements from these forests. But both these possibilities remain possibilities only. It will depend on the Governments being sufficiently far-seeing to come to some definite working arrangement between themselves and Russia before the war closes, if advantage is to be taken of existing opportunities. And the Finland forests, with their easy export facilities offered by their numerous waterways and available timber of the kinds which will be most in demand, Scots pine and spruce, present one of these opportunities. Are we in Great Britain going to see that it is taken in time?

E. P. STEBBING.

Art. 5.—THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT IN INDIA.

1. *Report of the Committee on Co-operation in India*, 1915. Simla : Government Press.
2. *Co-operation in India*. Resolution by the Government of India, in leaflet form. Calcutta : Superintendent, Government Printing, 1914.
3. *Proceedings of the Conference of Registrars of Co-operative Societies in India*, 1906, 1907, 1908, 1909, 1911, 1912, 1913. Simla : Government of India Press.
4. *Annual Reports on the Working of the Co-operative Societies in the Presidencies of Bombay, Madras and Bengal, the Provinces of the Punjab, Burma, United Provinces, Central Provinces, Bihar and Orissa, Assam, Coorg, Ajmer, and the Native States of Mysore and Baroda*. Printed at the Government Presses of the respective Administrations.
5. *Statements showing Progress of the Co-operative Movement in India, annually, 1910-11 to 1913-14*. Simla : Government of India Press.
6. *Rural Economy in the Bombay Deccan*. By G. F. Keatinge, C.I.E., I.C.S. London : Longmans, 1912.
7. *Handbook of Co-operation for Burma*. By A. E. English, C.I.E., I.C.S. Maymyo, 1914.

No phenomenon in the economic life of Modern India is more striking than the rapid growth of the co-operative movement. Introduced only eleven years ago, it has spread and progressed until it now comprises 15,000 societies, with 744,000 members, and a total working capital of about 5,144,000%. These are amazing figures to have rewarded so few years' work among a population to whom the ideas implied in the co-operative system were at first quite foreign ; and they foreshadow developments which promise in time to solve some of the most stubborn problems with which the Government of India is faced. The new societies have weathered local famines in Gujerat, the Deccan, and the United Provinces, and have passed almost unscathed through the financial crisis which brought down so many joint-stock banks in Bombay and the Punjab during 1913 and 1914. It is, perhaps, too soon to assume that the higher finance of the movement has been placed on a basis which leaves

no room for alarm in the future. But the village societies, on which the whole co-operative structure rests, have been at work long enough to show that they are on the whole sound and well-managed, and likely, as time goes on, to prove themselves increasingly important factors in the rural economy of the country.

The causes which led Government to introduce the movement into India deserve a brief notice. The past fifty years have witnessed a remarkable growth in the commerce and total wealth of India. In this general prosperity the peasant class has had little part. Far from decreasing, the burden of their indebtedness has probably increased. Bad seasons, the fatalistic tenour of their minds, lack of education, and absence of organisation and business capacity have combined to prevent them from securing their fair share in the profits of agriculture. The great mass of them still turn to the village money-lender for the capital necessary for carrying on their industry; and in a transaction in which their needs and ignorance are pitted against the greed and shrewdness of a hereditary class of financiers, they are usually overreached and have to pay far higher rates of interest than the security which they have to offer justifies. Agriculture can never be a lucrative occupation so long as the capital with which it is carried on is considered cheaply obtained at 20 or 30 per cent. This persistent indebtedness and stagnation amongst vast masses of the agricultural population is, perhaps, the greatest barrier in the way of progress that the Indian Government has to encounter. From time to time various remedies have been tried. The Legislature has placed numerous restrictions on the alienation of land by agriculturists; in certain tracts a legal maximum has been set on the rates of interest chargeable by money-lenders; a system of State loans has been introduced; Post Office Savings Banks have been opened; and the principles governing the assessment of land revenue have been revised in the direction of lenience. But no mere legislative fiat can control the working of economic law. The weaker class has continued to go to the wall, and their general condition to stagnate. It was seen that in order to restore the equipoise between lender and borrower, which under more primitive conditions was

assured by the public opinion of the countryside and the difficulty of recovering dues from an unwilling debtor, the first step was not only to redeem the debtor and supply him with working capital at cheap rates, but at the same time to set before him an ideal of self-help and independence and to inspire him with a sense of responsibility which would prevent him from borrowing rashly or misusing the money placed within his reach.

The idea of using co-operation as a means of combating the Indian rural problem was first conceived by the Government of Madras, which sent Sir Frederick Nicholson to Europe to study the theory and practice of agricultural banking and to suggest means by which a similar movement might be started in their Presidency. Between 1895 and 1897 he issued an exhaustive report, which is even yet a mine of information on the subject; and he summarised his conclusions in the words 'Find Raiffeisen.' By this he meant not only that the system of rural credit societies first invented by Raiffeisen should be given a trial, but that genuine enthusiasts were needed to launch the movement. To the honour of the Civil Service, such men were speedily forthcoming. Scattered Societies on the lines indicated by Nicholson were started by Mr Duperneux in the United Provinces, Mr MacLagan in the Punjab, and by a few other keen and far-sighted officers. Lord Curzon, the Viceroy at the time, was quick to realise that no great results could be expected from uncoordinated individual effort, and accordingly appointed a Committee under Sir Edward Law to examine the existing pioneer societies and to suggest lines on which legislation might be undertaken. The result of its enquiry was the Co-operative Credit Societies Act, which was passed into law in 1904. Societies were classified as rural and urban; and, while the latter were left a free choice, the former were bound to accept unlimited liability. Their area was closely restricted. Loans might be made only to members and on personal or real, but not ordinarily on chattel, security. An annual official audit was made compulsory. The interest of any member in the share capital of the Society was strictly limited; and special exemption from fees payable under the Stamp, Registration, and Income Tax Acts were conceded. Separate official Registrars were

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at once appointed in each Province, the results of whose work may best be seen from the figures in the subjoined Table, which includes the statistics for the native states of Baroda and Mysore as well as for British India :

Year.	Number of Societies.	Number of Members.	Working Capital.
			£
1906-07	843	90,844	159,000
1907-08	1,357	149,160	294,000
1908-09	2,008	184,889	537,000
1909-10	3,498	230,698	826,000
1910-11	5,432	314,101	1,291,000
1911-12	8,177	403,318	2,238,000
1912-13	12,324	573,536	3,562,000
1913-14	15,673	744,226	5,144,000

The movement so far outran the dreams of its authors and ramified in so many new directions that in 1912 it became necessary to undertake fresh legislation. The new Act swept away the old distinction between rural and urban societies, and substituted a more scientific distinction based on the character of the members' liability. The registration of new types of association for the supervision or finance of primary co-operative societies was for the first time legalised. Co-operative organisations with other objects besides that of furnishing credit were allowed. The exact form which these should take was not definitely laid down ; and, pending fuller experience, Registrars were left a wide discretion in building up the higher storeys of their provincial co-operative structures. In 1914 a Committee, presided over by Sir Edward Maclagan, was appointed to review the whole position and to advise the Government of India more particularly on the higher organisation of the co-operative movement and the financial connexion of the various parts of the system. Their report, which has recently been published, marks a definite epoch in the history of the movement. It is the first critical survey of the whole field of Indian co-operation by men of administrative experience in the East, and abounds in practical suggestions and cautions, which cannot fail to have a profound influence on future policy.

Such in very brief outline is the history of a movement which deserves more attention than it has yet

received at the hands of economists in Great Britain. It has already achieved results of which it is worth while to take careful stock. The co-operative ideal, alien as it was in origin, has struck root so firmly in Indian soil that the manner of its growth demands careful study, both in order to forecast the influence which it is likely to have on the future of India and to bring to light any peculiar features, unknown to European practice, which have come into being under Eastern conditions.

It is a familiar fact that the great bulk of the population of India belongs to the peasant class and still depends on agriculture for its livelihood. Outside a few large towns, the percentage of persons in industrial occupations is very low. This circumstance is reflected in the returns, which classify no less than 13,882 of the 14,566 societies existing in British India as agricultural. The development has, perhaps, been too one-sided. The founders of the movement have had their eyes fixed mainly on the rural problem. But with rising prices, insufficient housing accommodation in large towns, the prevalence of sweating in the matter of pay and factory hours, and the growth of higher standards of living due to education, industrial unrest is bound to appear; and the time has probably come when it would be wise to make an effort to mitigate the difficulty before it becomes acute by fostering suitable types of co-operative association among artisans and the lower urban classes generally. Several most successful societies of this type in Bombay, Madras, and elsewhere have shown that the way is clear for such a development. At present, however, the number of these societies is so few that they may be excluded from a general survey without affecting its conclusions. In the same way, although a hopeful beginning has been made with agricultural societies for purposes other than credit, their numbers are still too small to call for particular notice. Of the 167 such societies, no less than three quarters are situated in Burma, and are chiefly concerned with the insurance of cattle, and the sale of paddy and groundnuts. The remaining societies, numbering nearly 14,000, confine their operations to agricultural credit. It is the constitution and working of these last societies that at the present stage will best repay study.

✓ The stability of every co-operative system must

depend chiefly on the soundness of the primary societies on which it is based, that is on the small village societies dealing direct with individual members. In most parts of India these have been formed on the Raiffeisen model. A group of ryots, finding themselves severally unable to borrow the funds they need except at exorbitant rates, come together, and, relying on their knowledge of each other's characters, agree to pool their credit. This they do by arranging to undertake a joint unlimited liability and, on the improved security afforded by their combined credit, raising money at lower rates than they would have to pay separately. This association is registered as a society, with a personality of its own and a full set of bye-laws. The members elect a small committee, whose business it is to consider applications for loans, to sanction such advances for necessary purposes as they think fit and as their funds allow, and to see that the money is used for the purpose for which it was granted and is repaid punctually in such instalments as may be fixed. The area covered by a society is narrowly limited, so as to ensure that the members are well acquainted with each other. This thorough mutual knowledge enables the Committee, in granting loans, to pay attention more to the character of the borrower for thrift, industry, and integrity than to the value of his real property. That is what is meant by calling the co-operative system 'the capitalisation of honesty.' The money raised jointly by the society, at rates which in India generally vary from 6 to 12 per cent., is subsequently lent to the individual members at about 3 per cent. more than has been paid for it. At the end of the year the entire profits, after deducting working expenses, are treated as indistributable and carried to reserve fund. With the growth of this fund the credit of the society improves; and, as a result, the rates paid on its borrowings and charged on its lendings are lowered, and the risk of the enforcement on members of their unlimited liability is diminished. The accounts are audited at least once a year by an official answerable to the Registrar, and are presented to an annual general meeting of all the members in whose hands lies the ultimate control of the society.

Such in brief is the co-operative unit which, with many local variations, has spread over the length and

breadth of India and Burma. In estimating its usefulness, two questions naturally arise: How far has it succeeded in obtaining funds in the shape of loans and deposits from the public for reasonable terms at moderate rates of interest? And how far is the working capital so obtained adequate to meet the needs of members?

For the answer of the first question very full statistics are available. The working capital of these societies is derived partly from members in the form of fixed deposits and shares, partly from non-members as deposits and loans, and partly from financing institutions, known as Central Banks, established for the express purpose of supplementing the funds obtained locally. Since one of the prime objects of these societies is to encourage thrift, the extent to which they are able to attract deposits from their own members must be regarded as a vital element in their success or failure. Deposits by members are not only a concrete proof of thrift in a village, but are valuable as tapping for productive purposes a new source of capital which would otherwise usually be hoarded, and as giving the members a direct personal stake in the welfare of their society. Deposits by neighbours who are not members serve as a gauge of the degree of public confidence which the society enjoys. In India the deposits of members and non-members, which happen to be almost equal in amount, form together only 18 per cent. of the working capital. To this may be added another 13 per cent. which represents the amount subscribed by members as 'shares,' a practice which will be explained later. The total proportion of capital obtained locally is only 31 per cent., as compared with 87 per cent. in the Raiffeisen societies of Germany. No doubt the obstacles in the way of increasing this percentage are great. The number of recently established societies, which have not yet had time to earn public confidence, is large. The rates of interest obtainable in commerce or private money-lending are very high. The conservatism of the ryot, who is accustomed to hoard his money under his own hearthstone, yields slowly to new ideas. Persons in possession of capital to invest are far fewer in India than in Germany. Yet, even when full weight has been

given to these difficulties, the fact remains that the proportion of the capital raised locally is less than it ought to be, and must be increased before things can be regarded as quite satisfactory. In the province of the Punjab the figures are better than elsewhere, and may perhaps indicate that under a system of small holdings, subject only to the Government assessment, the ryots are more able to amass savings than under the various forms of landlordism prevailing in most other provinces. Whatever may be the cause, more emphasis must be laid on thrift and self-help until the present figures show a decided improvement. The remaining items in the working capital consist of accumulated reserves, amounting already to more than 7 per cent., as against only 4 per cent. shown by the Raiffeisen societies of Germany, and of loans from financing institutions which will be dealt with below. State aid, which at the beginning of the movement was granted, though sparingly, to enable societies to be started in poor tracts, has now been discontinued, and forms an insignificant element in the total capital.

It is much more difficult to judge how far the total sum raised from these various sources is adequate to meet the needs of the members. The actual amount available for loans is about 3,000,000*l.*, distributed among about 14,000 societies, with an average membership of 41 each. In other words, the sum available per head is about 5*l.* Experience has shown that the chief needs of agriculturists may be classed as current expenses of agriculture, land improvements, necessary domestic expenses, and the liquidation of old debt. Every one of these objects of expenditure is incalculable. The size of holdings varies from the minute sub-divisions of the Konkan to the large estates of Oudh and Bihar. The cost of cultivation may be anything from 60*l.* per acre for irrigated sugarcane to 10*s.* per acre for hill millets. So far as it is possible to generalise on a basis so uncertain, it would probably be true to say that the total working capital is at present barely enough to meet the current agricultural needs of members. But it is often impossible to refuse loans for other and not less urgent purposes. Land improvements can usually be postponed till funds are found for them, but expenditure on weddings,

funerals, education, doctors, etc., is no less imperative because it is unproductive. Old debts present a problem of peculiar complexity. The dilemma is this. If a society does not pay off a member's previous debts on his admission, then his property is subject to a lien prior to the society's, he himself has exchanged one master for two, and the out-turn of the society's loans may be seized by the money-lender in payment of his own dues. On the other hand, it is often dangerous to trust a member with a large advance immediately on admission, for the liquidation of his old debt without any corresponding effort on his part may corrupt his zeal and integrity, and it is impracticable for any society to start work by locking up the great bulk of its capital in long-term loans. All that can be said with certainty is that the working capital is at present by no means equal to all the legitimate demands upon it, and that societies have no chance of doing all the good of which they are capable until they are in a position to arrange for the redemption of all their members from old debt. This stage is evidently still far distant.

Reference has already been made to the higher storeys in the co-operative edifice. The summary account which has been given of primary societies will have suggested the functions for which such higher organisations are needed. They are, firstly, to finance primary societies, since they are unable to get all the capital they require locally; and, secondly, to train and supervise them, since they are composed for the most part of ignorant and illiterate members. Though occasionally united in a single institution, these functions can best be treated as distinct.

Owing to the special nature of the business done by co-operative credit societies, the extent to which they rely on personal credit, and the difficulty of keeping them under observation, Joint Stock Banks are reluctant to deal with them direct. It has therefore been found necessary to start special institutions, known as Central Banks, to supply them with funds. Of these there are 189 in British India, controlling a working capital of about 1,300,000L., and using it almost exclusively in loans to societies. Various types of organisation have been

tried in different parts of the country, but the most successful have been those which include both affiliated societies and individual shareholders in their membership. When composed entirely of societies, the management is generally unbusinesslike and commands little local credit. If, on the other hand, Central Banks admit only individuals as shareholders, the identity of interest between the lending and the borrowing parties, postulated by the idea of co-operation, is lost. It is almost impossible to reconcile the interests of the lenders, who look mainly for safety and good dividends, with those of the borrowers, who demand cheap loans and convenient terms of repayment. For this reason the mixed type of Central Bank, which flourishes in the Gangetic provinces, seems to promise the best results. These are based on share capital and limited liability, and in constitution are not very unlike Joint Stock Banks. The societies which borrow from them are required to take up shares in proportion to their borrowings, and in this way gradually secure a dominating voice at the annual general meeting. Central Banks are thereby brought to realise that they are the servants and not the masters of the societies which they finance. The individual shareholders are generally local men of influence, who are willing to take a part in public work. They form a majority on the directorate, supply the business ability without which the Banks would certainly fail, and by their presence greatly enhance the credit of these institutions. In granting loans they are guided partly by the opinions of their colleagues, elected to represent the affiliated societies, and partly by the reports of their inspecting staff, which is engaged in constantly touring with the double object of estimating the trustworthiness of societies and watching the way in which they use their loans. A quarter of the net profits is carried to reserve, and the remainder is available for distribution as dividends, subject to such maximum as may have been imposed by the Local Government.

Since the aims of these Banks are mainly financial, their success must be judged by the soundness and efficiency of their finance. None of them has yet failed in such a way as to cause any loss to the public. At the

same time it is clear that most of them have not yet succeeded in gathering sufficient capital to meet all the needs of their clientèle. It would, perhaps, be wise to retard the formation of fresh primary societies until Central Banks are able to supply more fully the demands of the societies already in existence. Some anxiety has been felt as to their capacity to meet all their liabilities punctually in the event of any kind of crisis. Loans invested in agriculture can only be recovered at the harvest season. The business is of a kind known by bankers as 'sticky.' In order to meet the possibility of withdrawals by depositors at other seasons, Central Banks have either to open cash credits in their own favour with other financing agencies or to maintain on hand unprofitably large cash balances. In 36 cases cash credits to the total amount of 136,000*l.* have been arranged with Presidency or Joint Stock Banks. But these banks are not as a rule ready to grant cash credits on the security of unbacked agricultural paper taken from primary societies; and the support which they now give is liable to be stopped at dangerously short notice. The alternative of maintaining large amounts of cash on hand is not one that any bank is likely to choose if it can be avoided. In five provinces, therefore, Provincial Co-operative Banks have been started, to focus the financial resources and needs of Central Banks, and to discount their agricultural paper as far as possible in times of difficulty. They are useful as balancing centres, as suppliers of working capital, and as holders of cash reserves for the support of Central Banks when their own fluid resources fail. The types of Provincial Bank are too diverse to be discussed here. But the time has evidently come when the Central Banks of those provinces which have not yet formed Provincial Banks will not be justified in extending their liabilities much further without some central financing agency to which they may turn for support.

In arranging for the supervision of primary societies there has been a great variety of policy. The Registrar and his staff, in addition to making the statutory audit, always consider the inspection and instruction of societies an important part of their duties. In many provinces they are helped by local gentlemen who are enrolled as

Honorary Organisers, and devote themselves to guiding and training old societies and forming new ones. But the agency most commonly employed is the Union, an association into which societies enter for mutual control and supervision. In its simplest form a Union undertakes no financial responsibilities whatever, but merely levies a rate from its members, out of which it maintains a district staff whose business it is to visit societies and help them generally with the upkeep of their accounts and the conduct of their affairs. In the Central Provinces a very successful Union, embracing all the societies of the Province, confines itself to these functions. But, as a rule, mere supervision, unweighted by any responsibility for its results, is found to be careless and barren. To overcome this defect many Unions have undertaken the work of Central Banks on a small scale, and use the knowledge which they have gained by their inspections to guide them in the granting and recovery of loans. In Burma they have followed a different line, and serve the Central Banks by guaranteeing the loans which are advanced to affiliated societies on their recommendation. The acceptance of this liability has quickened their sense of responsibility and made them more energetic and useful bodies than in most parts of India. These, however, are small beginnings; and the problem of self-supervision is one that for the most part co-operative societies have still to solve. Reliance on official help is a tradition of the country. The agricultural classes as a body are lacking in initiative and imagination. Whatever the solution may be, it is clear that the illiteracy of the masses makes continuous and effective supervision an absolute necessity, and that it would be a grave error to weaken official control until trustworthy agencies to take its place are well in sight.

This short account of the co-operative organisation of credit in India is sufficient to show that it follows in its main lines European precedents. But there are certain local conditions which, as time passes, are likely to distinguish it more and more widely from its model. The first is the wide margin of interest on which Indian societies are able to work. The current rate of interest charged on loans in the bazar is so high that societies

are not only able without complaint to advance loans at rates well in excess of the rates which are payable on deposits, but are actually bound to do so in order that over-facile credit may not encourage reckless borrowing. As a result, societies can earn substantial profits and build up an owned capital in the form of reserve fund infinitely faster than in Europe, where the margin between the lending and the borrowing rate rarely exceeds 1 per cent. They are also in a better position to subscribe to shares in Central Banks and so secure control of them, and to contribute to the expenses of their own audit and supervision.

Another distinctive feature may be found in the nature of the control exercised by Government. In Europe Governments have generally been able to assume the capacity of co-operators to manage their own affairs in a business-like manner without much official guidance. It is in the provision of funds and of facilities for discounting agricultural bonds and pro-notes that their help has been mainly sought. This aid is usually given through some form of State-guaranteed and State-controlled bank at the apex of the co-operative system. In India the illiteracy of the rural classes has reversed the position. Help is required not so much in the shape of finance as of careful official supervision and a detailed audit of every society. This is the sheet-anchor of the credit of the whole movement, and at the present stage is the chief feature which inspires the public with confidence. In country places there are so few other openings for the investment of savings that, when confidence has once been gained, loans and deposits are sure to flow in rapidly. This does not mean that, as the volume of business grows, apex-banks, when formed, may not require a Government guarantee to help them in negotiating agricultural paper. That stage may be nearer than many think. But at present the power which the Local Government exercises through the Registrars of directing and controlling all lines of development, checking abuses, warning and advising peccant societies, and cancelling unsound organisations, over-paternal as it may seem to European eyes, is the very foundation of the success that has been gained. The movement is still in its infancy; and any sudden

relaxation of control, before co-operators have learnt to stand firmly on their own legs, would inevitably be followed by a collapse as startling as the growth has been.

Special types of co-operative organisation that have been evolved in India are perhaps more interesting to experts than to the public. Two are, however, important enough to call for brief notice. The first is the Burmese system of Guaranteeing Unions, created by Mr A. E. English, C.I.E., under which societies unite not only for mutual supervision but also for the purpose of assessing each other's credit, recommending loan applications to the Central Bank within the limit assessed, and guaranteeing jointly all loans granted on their recommendation. This practice is in defiance of the teaching of European co-operators, who recoil from the linking of the liability of primary units on the ground that no society should be responsible for another society which it cannot control. But it has worked admirably in Burma. By rigidly restricting the area covered by a Union, it is possible to ensure that societies are well acquainted with each other's working and can keep an effective mutual control on their outside borrowings. The system makes for promptness in finance, and by delegating so much power to the Union immensely increases its sphere of usefulness.

A second feature worth mentioning is the "share" system that has been grafted on to primary societies in the Punjab and elsewhere. Shares varying in face value from Rs. 10 to Rs. 100 must be subscribed by every member, to such extent as may be fixed by the Committee, and paid up by half-yearly instalments spread over ten years. At the end of that period the shares themselves are as a rule withdrawable, and, in addition to their share-money, shareholders are entitled to participate, proportionately to the shares that have been paid up by them, in three-fourths of all net profits subsequently earned by the society. Profits earned before the completion of the decennium are, however, wholly or mainly credited to reserve. This system, which in some points resembles that prevailing among the Luzzatti societies of Italy, is valuable both as compelling members to lay by a small sum yearly, and as providing

societies with 'lying' money which can be used in long-term loans for such objects as debt liquidation. Its working is, however, very complicated and differs widely in different provinces.

The ultimate goal to which co-operation is tending in India cannot yet be foreseen. Its first aim is to free the rural and industrial classes from the state of economic serfdom under which they now labour. There is every reason to suppose that in time it will accomplish this. With a peasantry emancipated from debt, many avenues of rural regeneration are opened up. Cheaper and more plentiful capital within easy reach will give the ryots a chance of improving their time-honoured methods of agriculture with an assurance that they will enjoy the fruits of their own enterprise. The purchase of tools, manure, and so forth, and the disposal of produce, can be arranged in a more business-like way. A better use may be made of irrigation. Stock-breeding, dairy-farming, and scientific fodder storage will become feasible. Above all no result of co-operation is more certain and more dynamic than the impetus which it gives to education. The experience of affairs gained in innumerable co-operative societies, and the impulse they give towards independence and higher standards of life, cannot fail to awaken in the masses a new spirit of self-help and self-assertion. Men drawn from the working classes will achieve a platform from which they can utter at first hand the real thoughts and wishes of the millions behind them. At first, no doubt, economic and perhaps social questions will occupy their attention, but in time the societies may possibly be in a position to play a useful part in some future system of local self-government. Indeed a movement, which has begun with the democratisation of credit, may end by democratising society and perhaps even the State itself.

(R. B. EWBANK.

Art. 6.—GERMAN BUSINESS METHODS IN FRANCE
BEFORE THE WAR.

1. *L'Expansion de l'Allemagne*. By Capt. H. Andrillon. Paris: Rivière, 1915.
2. *L'Allemagne en France*. By L. Bruneau. Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1915.
3. *Les Méthodes allemandes d'expansion économique*. By Prof. H. Hauser. Paris: Colin, 1915.

DURING the last twenty-five years, the nature of German emigration has undergone a radical change. The poorer classes of Germany, which, about the middle of the 19th century, poured in large numbers into the United States and other American countries, have almost ceased to leave their native land. The richer Germany grew, and the more work there was at home, the less temptation to go abroad. On the other hand, Germany was seeking in all parts of the world markets for her manufactured goods, and endeavouring to obtain fresh supplies of the raw materials needed by her factories. In order to attain these ends, she began to send abroad, not destitute workmen, but an army of clerks, commercial travellers, engineers, contractors, who settled temporarily or permanently in the countries from which they hoped to draw the resources needed at home or which they intended to flood with goods manufactured in Germany. If necessary, Germany exported also the capital needed to start the works which she intended to set up in foreign parts, or to purchase those suited for her purpose, because in doing so she prepared customers for German industry. But, as a rule, this export of capital was reduced to a minimum; in many cases the financiers, after having prepared the ground for the manufacturers, and settled in the most important positions the greatest possible number of foremen, experts, managers, directors, took the first opportunity of selling the shares which they had subscribed, so as to keep for themselves and their fellow-countrymen a controlling power and a part of the profits of the business, without running any risk. For instance, Germans themselves confess that, some years ago, they had sold the shares subscribed by them in the railroads, banks, and industrial companies of Italy, while taking care to retain a permanent influence in these

undertakings. Such are the main lines of German *ante-bellum* operations throughout the world during the last generation. We will study them in France by surveying the different fields of industry, commerce, and finance.

Mines.—One great problem for Germany has been to secure a sufficient quantity of iron ore. Her iron lodes are small, and by no means in proportion with her collieries. Her annual output of iron ore is about 28 million tons, and in 1911 she imported 11 million tons. Her coal output, on the other hand, is rapidly increasing, and nearly equals that of the United Kingdom. It will soon be second to none except that of the United States; the figure for 1913 was 275 million tons. In France the reverse is the case. The coal output has notably increased since 1870, especially through the opening of the Pas-de-Calais fields; but still it does not exceed about 40 million tons, whereas the consumption reaches about 60 millions. On the other hand, the iron deposits of French Lorraine, in the department of Meurthe-and-Moselle, have proved to be very important; they are estimated at 3 milliards of tons. During recent years, great lodes of iron ore have been discovered in Normandy, a country which hitherto was exclusively agricultural, but now seems able to provide, within a few years, a large quantity of the metal which is the paramount basis of modern industry.

This statement explains Germany's purpose; she has always been anxious to get the greatest quantity of iron possible. In order to get it, she has had recourse to two methods; she has bought leases, and she has sold, to the owners of the ore deposits, coal or coke in exchange for their ore. In 1912 she exported to France 6 million tons of fuel and imported from France 3 million tons of ore. German manufacturers have concluded with French companies agreements, the purport of which is clear, though the actual texts have not been published. Organs have been created, through which they have tried to get, by indirect ways, what they could not reach off-hand. In Lorraine, for instance, contracts have been made, which bind the parties to furnish, the one coal, the other iron; such a treaty exists between the Société Française des mines de Valleroy and the German Karl Alexander colliery. But this kind

of covenant, in which the reciprocal rights are well balanced, is comparatively rare. In many cases the Germans secured benefits for themselves without giving due compensation; such as that of the Phoenix, Hasper und Hösch Companies, which produce yearly nearly two million tons of pig iron, and have been successful in securing the ownership of the Jarny and Sancy concessions. The mines of Murville belong nearly entirely to the Aumetz-Friede Company, which owns eight blast furnaces in German Lorraine. The mine of Moutiers is worked by a syndicate of four companies—one French, two Belgian, and one German. In several cases German and Luxemburg firms are participating; these latter very often disguise purely German influence. Four groups have been acting in this line: (1) Röckling, (2) Phoenix, Hasper-Hösch, Aumetz-Friede, (3) Gelsenkirchen, (4) Auguste Thyssen.

The Röckling Company works, jointly with the Aciéries de Longwy, the mines of Valleroy and owns also the mine of Pulventeux. The second group, besides their Lorraine interests, have been acting in Normandy, where contracts entered into with a French group bind the latter to sell iron ore, a minimum dividend on its shares having been guaranteed by the buyers. The directors of the mines of Saint-André, of Maltot and of Bully, are, for the most part, representatives of German interests. Gelsenkirchen is one of the most powerful German undertakings. Its yearly output is 10 million tons of coal; it works seven blast furnaces, one foundry, one wire-mill, mills in the Rhine province, and two factories at Esch-sur-Alzette in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg; one of these turns out yearly 500,000 tons of steel, or three times as much as the French Creusot. This company has acquired a controlling interest in several French coal leases. At the beginning it often had only a small part, but it lost no opportunity of increasing this; it succeeded, for instance, at Saint-Pierremont, Sexey, Haute Lay, Saint-Jean, Sainte-Barbe, Crusnes and Villerupt.

Herr Thyssen is the man whose name has been most often heard in connexion with the German *ante-bellum* invasion of France. His Deutscher Kaiser colliery produces yearly four million tons of coal; he has also

six blast furnaces, one steel works, and mills producing two million tons of iron, steel and wrought iron. Herr Thyssen is also the principal manufacturer in Germany and abroad; the expenditure on one of his plants, at Hagendange near Metz, amounted to 4,000,000*l*. In order to feed his works, he was looking everywhere for ore; he ordered it from Russia, where he had obtained, in the port of Nicolaiew, a temporary lease of ground for the loading of his steamers. In the French Lorraine basin he owns the mines of Batilly, Jouaville, Boulogny, the surface of which is 4850 acres. In Normandy he has bought the mines of Perrières, Soumont, and Diélette, covering 5800 acres, about one-sixth of the whole basin. It must be acknowledged that the first lessees of these iron deposits had been trying to get financial aid, which was denied to them in France and which they were induced to accept from Germany. The mines of Diélette, which are at the northern end of the Department of the Manche, about fifteen miles from Cherbourg, seemed to be unworkable; Herr Thyssen, however, was not afraid of the obstacles which faced him or dismayed by the prospective cost. The technical difficulties have been removed; the lode is estimated to contain 70 million tons. Herr Thyssen was charmed with Normandy, where he found the lime-stone which is so much wanted in Germany. The lime-stone flux, which costs 5 francs per ton in Westphalia, is worth in this French province something like a franc and a half. At Diélette, Herr Thyssen got from the municipal council a lease of the granite cliffs; these he quarries, and sends the produce to the German provinces on the Baltic coast, where this material is badly wanted. This granite is one of the finest of the world. All these enterprises have turned out well for Herr Thyssen, whose wealth is estimated at 20,000,000*l*.

One-seventh part of the French Eastern basin and one-half of the Normandy basin belonged to German manufacturers, who owned besides mining interests in other parts of France and in French colonies. They include, in addition to the lease of mineral veins, surface purchases from private people and also from the municipalities. We may mention, in this connexion, the celebrated iron mines of Ouenza in Algeria, which have been much discussed of late, and have caused passionate

debates in Parliament and the newspapers. It seems strange that, in order to work a mine the annual output of which does not seem likely to be worth much more than 600,000*l.*, it was necessary to form a syndicate in which the great industrials of France, England, Belgium and Germany were represented. A Government conscious of its duties would have granted this concession to a responsible French group. It was the more unfortunate that room was made for the Germans in this particular case, because they adduced this precedent in order to claim a share of the leases in Morocco.

It has been asserted that French capitalists, in their exchanges with the Germans, have been adequately compensated for what they gave; but the few shares taken by Frenchmen in German undertakings are not to be compared with the control acquired by Germans over our mining resources. We know only one instance, the Friedrich Heinrich colliery, in which French interest could be styled a controlling one. It would have been fair to sell to our competitors part of our iron ore against the coal which we want; but this was no reason for putting several French companies under foreign control.

Metallurgy.—Once having got the ore, the Germans have built mills near the mines or have bought mills situated in the neighbourhood. This has been done, for instance, by the Gelsenkirchen Company. Through many clever devices, especially by buying from the Société Générale de Belgique the majority of the shares of a company which purported to be French, the Gelsenkirchen company got control over Aubrives-Villerupt; through this it was able to build in France powerful mills, which can successfully compete with the French ones. By similar proceedings, Herr Thyssen tried to conquer the Calvados. In 1910 the Société des Hauts-Fourneaux de Caen was formed, with the modest capital of 20,000*l.* In 1912, it was turned into the Société des Hauts-Fourneaux et Aciéries de Caen, with a capital of 1,200,000*l.* The intention was to build six blast furnaces, each producing 400 tons a day, and flattening mills and steel works with a yearly capacity of 750,000 tons of sheets, rails, plates, etc. The electric railroad between the mines and Caen was to be nearly 20 miles long; 7000 workmen would have been required, which means,

with their wives and children, a population of 20,000 souls. With a yearly output of one million tons, the mines are calculated to last for 60 years; but this output not being sufficient for feeding six blast furnaces, the directors have been busy in getting other concessions in the Calvados near those of Soumont. At this stage in the proceedings, the public began to feel nervous about these German encroachments; and the Société Française des Anciens Etablissements Cail came to an agreement with the Germans, under which the majority on the board was to remain French. After this, through the action of this Société Française de Constructions Mécaniques (Anciens Etablissements Cail), the Thyssen invasion was partly stopped. Thyssen was to get a share of the ore, provided that no injury was done to French interests or the independence of the French management. The concession of the railroad, which was necessary for the working of the deposits, has been granted; but the German participation was reduced to 40 per cent. in the mining and metallurgical companies.

The war has put an end to these dangers. The chairman of the Société des Hauts-fourneaux et Aciéries de Caen, who, at the general meeting of Jan. 31, 1914, declared that Herr Thyssen did not own more than 30,000 shares, viz. one quarter of the whole capital, was able to inform the meeting on June 29, 1915, that the business was now entirely French, and that the share of influence that foreigners could have claimed 'had never gone beyond the limits which may be granted to experienced colleagues who, on special professional questions, may be called to give technical advice.' So, even before the declaration of war, the French control of the undertaking had been secured. But, in the meanwhile, some other industrial and mining German groups, especially the Gutehoffnungshütte, had secured mining concessions in the Calvados.

Germany was not satisfied with establishing her industrial captains on our territory; she was selling us a growing quantity of goods manufactured within her borders. In 1912, she sent us 94,000 tons of engines and 26,000 tons of tools and machinery, whereas she bought from us only 5,200 tons of the former and 4,000 of the latter. Amongst the engines imported from

Germany, one is not a little astonished to see a large number of locomotives—90 bought in 1906, 225 in 1907, 75 in 1908, 126 in 1909, 125 in 1910, 160 in 1911. Fortunately these orders have been much smaller of late years. The French railroad companies ordered in Germany only 20 engines in 1912. M. Thierry, who was then Minister of Public Works, said in the Senate, on July 22, 1913, that the proportion of equipment ordered abroad by the railroad companies had been only 5 per cent. of the whole wanted during the first half-year. But it was rather startling to learn that, some time before, our railroad companies had apparently become regular customers of the German manufacturers—the more so as it is a well-known fact that the quality of German locomotives, as well as that of many other goods, is very inferior to that of the French.

Much has been said about the conditions of German competition. In many instances it was based on the practice known as 'dumping,' i.e. offering goods abroad at a price much under cost, so as to compete successfully with the native products of the country which it is intended to conquer. For this purpose, the exporting manufacturers must be linked together in a strong pool, so as to be able to uphold high prices in their own country. By these they get compensation for the losses which they sustain temporarily through their sales abroad. This loss, in the mind of the members of the pool, is only a temporary one; the final aim is to crush the industry of the country which they invade. As soon as this part of the programme is realised, they put up the prices and gain ample compensation for the sacrifices made during the struggle with their former competitors.

One of the most habitual forms of this invasion of France by German industry has been the formation of French companies, the capital of which was owned by Germans, and under whose shield they sold their products. Thus the Adler Werke vormals Heinrich Kleyer A.G. of Frankfort founded the Société des Etablissements Adler (typewriters); the Deutsche Waffen-und Munitions-fabrik of Berlin, the Compagnie Française pour la fabrication des Roulements à Billes; Herr Franz Mathes, the Société des Usines Mathes; the Mannesmann Roehren of Düsseldorf, the Comptoir Métallurgique et

Industriel; the Lindstrom company of Berlin, the Compagnie Française des Disques et Machines Odéon et d'Instruments de Musique. The firm of Koerting Brothers, established in Linden (Hanover) with a capital of nearly 1,000,000Z., is busy with the construction of steam-heating apparatus; they have organised, in most European countries, various companies, of which one is French. German firms are on the watch for opportunities of getting an interest in French companies, and even endeavour to absorb them entirely, leaving only a French frontage. Thus the Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nürnberg bought the printing-machine factory Alauzet in Paris; while the firm Orenstein und Koppel made a treaty with the Société des Etablissements Decauville, by which the latter gives up to Orenstein und Koppel their foreign agencies, and is bound to order from them goods not made in their own works and needed for their undertakings.

Chemical and Pharmaceutical Products.—The manufacturing of chemical and pharmaceutical products is one of the fields where German supremacy has been most effective during the last thirty years. This is the more surprising as nearly all the great discoveries, which have been the origin of the dyer's industry, were made by Frenchmen. The latter have not drawn from their discoveries all the practical results which our foes have subsequently evolved. According to their habits, they created in France companies with a French frontage, whose only business it was to act as agents of German factories. For instance, the Société Industrielle des Produits Chimiques was founded in 1896 at Lamotte-Breuil (Oise) under the auspices of the Chemische Fabrik Griesheim Elektron, for the application of certain processes in the electrolytic decomposition of alumin chlorides employed by the German company. The celebrated Badische Anilin-und Sodafabrik in Ludwigshafen had a settlement at Neuville-sur-Saône; the firm Meister Lucius und Bruning of Hoechst had turned the Compagnie Parisienne de Couleurs d'Aniline into a branch. The Aktiengesellschaft für Anilin-Fabrikation controlled the former firm Lucien Picard & Co. at Saint-Fons; the Cassella Company, of Frankfurt, controlled the Manufacture Lyonnaise de Matières Colorantes.

The Hoechst Company owned at Creil, on the banks of the Oise, the factory of Le Tremblay, in which it has developed mainly the production of drugs: there are made, with materials imported from Germany, melubrine, novocaïne, trigemine, pyramidon, orthoform, argonine, dermatol and many other drugs, extensively advertised as being made exclusively in France. The firm Merck, of Frankfurt, had, at Montereau, a factory for pharmaceutic products, such as morphine, papaverine, sevadine, abrine, ricine, sparteine, thyroïdine. The Farbenfabrik Vormalis Bayer, of Leverkusen, had in France a firm, the Société Anonyme des Produits Friedrich Bayer & Co., at Flers-au-Breuc near Lille. It had also an agency in Paris, which dealt in many pharmaceutic products, such as citarine, heroine, mesotan, protargol, neronal, sulfonal, trional, iodothyryne, aspirine, somatose. The firm Schering of Berlin was represented in Paris by the Société Helios de Produits Chimiques et Pharmaceutiques. Besides these German branches there are in France only five establishments where dyeing material is made. The most important is the Société des Matières Colorantes et Produits Chimiques de Saint-Denis; this was the first in the world that made aniline colours. In Germany, thirty factories are now busy with this work, and they produce nine-tenths of the world's consumption. From January to October 1912, Germany exported dyeing materials to the value of 11,000,000*l.*

Oleaginous Products.—Similar phenomena occurred in the manufacture of oily materials. The firm Oelwerk Stern Sonneborn, of Hamburg, had established in Paris the Société Anonyme Française Stern Sonneborn. The firm Scheidemandel, which owned chemical factories in several German towns, made pastes, gelatines and organic fertilisers with bones and meat wastes. It had absorbed several French firms, out of which it had created companies like the Fonderie Parisien, devoted to melting. The firms Tancrède, Collette et Germain, Verdier-Dufour, Georget have ceased to exist; they handed over their establishments and their customers to a group which is under the direction of the Scheidemandel firm. This latter had tried to monopolise in France the manufacture of pastes, gelatines, fertilisers,

farine animale, greases, tallow and other by-products extracted from dead animals. Nor did the Scheide-mandel firm limit its activity to this field, large as it is; in 1912 it founded in Antwerp a Société Auxiliaire de l'Industrie Chimique, with a capital of 480,000 L ., the object of which was to take part in every undertaking relating to this industry.

Electrical Industry.—The German electrical companies have tried in several ways to get a footing in France. The celebrated Allgemeine Elektrizitäts Gesellschaft (A. E. G.) founded the Compagnie Centrale d'Énergie Électrique, through which they acquired some interests in Rouen, Châteauroux, Alger and Oran. The Schuckert, another great electrical concern, had also a share in several French companies. In this field, as in metallurgy, the object was the same—to conquer the French market; but the method was different. The invaders concealed themselves; they tried to keep French frontages in order to make people believe that the products sold by them were made in France and sold by Frenchmen. They endeavoured to retain old customers, while altering the *provenance* of the goods they sell.

Trade.—Industrials make the goods; tradesmen sell them. The task of the latter was to import into France a part of what German factories were producing beyond the needs of their own people. Amongst the means used by the Government of Berlin in order to foster this movement, we may mention first the direct and indirect premiums. The direct premium is seldom employed; it occurs occasionally in the case of sugar transactions. It is the money paid to the exporter at the moment when he sends abroad his goods, sold to foreigners, and is the crudest form of protection, which cannot easily be defended even before a nationalist public. There is, however, another form of premium which is more frequently adopted. The producers make arrangements between themselves in order to keep at a very high level the prices of the goods which they sell within their own borders, so as to get considerable profits on the sales; they give up a part of these profits in order to sell abroad at low prices the excess of their production. For instance, in 1902, the price of Westphalian coke was 12s. per ton in Westphalia and less than 9s. in France. Through

the organisation of 'cartells,' Germany had been able to adopt this policy on a large scale.

In order to secure the outlets needed by her growing industry, Germany employed all the forces she could dispose of. Under governmental auspices a company has been formed, in which the chief shareholders are the two great shipping companies, the Norddeutscher Lloyd and the Hamburg-Amerika Packetfahrt, the powerful banks Deutsche Bank and Disconto Gesellschaft, the electrical concerns Allgemeine Elektrizitäts Gesellschaft and Siemens und Schuckert, the metallurgists Krupp, Gruson and others. With pecuniary assistance from the Imperial Foreign Office, this association, acting in conjunction with the notorious Wolff Bureau, did its utmost to heighten the industrial prestige of Germany abroad, and disseminated throughout the world all sorts of information in favour of Germany.

Among the agencies working for German export trade the first place should be given to the great shipping companies: as they are constantly in touch with customers in every country where German steamers land, they never fail, whenever foreign goods are handed to them, to try to obtain orders for German firms. They praise the quality of German goods, their cheapness, the length of the credits which are granted to the buyers. Besides these agents, who, by virtue of their business, are a kind of official pioneers of the export trade, one must not forget the innumerable Germans established in France, especially in the departments of the East and the North, where the men served in business firms as servants or masters and in the towns as workmen, the women as teachers or nurses. They were constantly engaged in spying out and preparing means of approach for the tradesmen as well as for the soldiers of their country. The good-natured French people have made it only too easy for their foes to prepare an invasion which had been decided on a long time ago. The dissimulation, the obsequiousness, the tenacity of these emissaries were such that we ought to have suspected them as dangerous to our safety, and implacably closed our doors against them. On the contrary, we invited them to enter our homes, and we supplied them trustfully with the fullest information regarding our strong as well as our weak sides.

The main factors of success in their commercial campaign were the cheapness of their goods, the quickness of their deliveries, and their easy terms of payment. Moreover, through the variety of their resources and the excellence of their machinery, German industrials were able to furnish whatever the buyers required, provided, however, that they did not look too closely into the quality of the goods. Everyone knows what was the motto of German goods: 'schlecht aber billig' (bad but cheap). Unfortunately people in the present day are too often satisfied with poor articles, which are well presented, well packed in neat parcels, and abundantly advertised. German commercial travellers were clever in deceiving the buyers and dazzling people's eyes. The German industrials have themselves been the most powerful agents of penetration from the commercial point of view. They felt that, in spite of all their efforts, they would meet with heavy difficulties if they offered their products in France with their original inscription, 'Made in Germany.' So they came themselves, they founded establishments in France, and manufactured, on French soil, products made from German materials, through German processes, with German workmen or foremen, but which, issuing from so-called 'French' factories, would not be distrusted by the public. We have enumerated some of the methods which have been employed. The German exporters have been clever enough to evade the tariffs which have been built up to keep them off, by burrowing under the wall of protection and reaching the French market with products apparently made in France, through which they secured for themselves the whole profit of the business.

Finance.—For many reasons the financial penetration of France by Germany is much more difficult to ascertain than the industrial and commercial. What is called 'great industry,' that which deals in heavy goods, is more important in Germany than in France; and German trade is growing fast. But financial supremacy does not belong to them. Liquid assets, metallic resources, savings invested in foreign securities, are all to be found on a greater scale in Paris than in Berlin; and France enjoys a more powerful influence on foreign finance, and possesses a larger market of foreign securities, than Germany.

Consequently, Germany has never been able to intervene in the field of finance as she did in industrial and commercial matters. She has tried to combat the influence of our capitalists in several countries; sometimes she has succeeded, much more through our mistakes than through her own cleverness. In these attempts she has consistently followed underhand and tortuous roads, in order to counteract French work and influence.

On the other hand, Germany has tried hard to attract French capital. As the rate of interest has, for a score of years, been higher in Germany than in France, French bankers have used a part of their liquid assets in discounting German paper or lending money on securities to German firms. This did not imply German interference with French financial affairs; but such appropriations of funds did harm in several ways. French markets were deprived of liquid assets; German markets were supplied with them, to the great advantage of our shrewd competitors; and finally the Paris market was placed in a very difficult situation when the war broke out. We were suddenly prevented from getting our money back, and had to leave it in the hands of the enemy at the very time we wanted it most. We must insist upon the fact that our *ante-bellum* proceedings would not have been dangerous, but for the warlike intentions of Germany; in other circumstances attention to foreign markets with a view to the profitable employment of liquid assets is not a mistake on the part of a banker, whose skill consists in handling his pieces on a world-wide chessboard. The latest events have taught us that, even in peace times, it is not safe to enter into certain dealings except with allied or friendly nations.

The dealings of French with German banks were not confined to the direct transmission of money to Berlin, Frankfurt, Hamburg or Vienna; French banks sometimes authorised the German to draw upon them, or accepted drafts from the firms on whose behalf credits were opened and which pledged themselves to remit funds when the bills fell due. This was another way of furnishing Germans with capital. As soon as drafts had been accepted by the French banks, the Germans had them discounted on the Paris market and got free money in exchange for these promissory notes signed by the French

companies. When the war broke out the drawers of these bills did not send the money required to pay them off; millions and millions of pounds sterling, accepted by French and English bankers, had to be paid by the drawees, who did not receive any money from the drawers and will not receive it before the end of the war.

A third way of placing French capital in Germany was through the medium of Belgian and Swiss banks, especially the latter. For many years, French capitalists have been in the habit of keeping deposits in foreign countries, especially in neutral countries, which they thought would keep clear of European conflagrations. These neutral banks were in constant touch with Germany and lent money to German banks; the indirect result was the same as would have arisen from the direct deposit of funds in the German banks themselves. Moreover, in these cases the depositor lost money, for part of the interest payable on such indirect deposits was cut by the Belgian and Swiss banks, to secure their own profit.

Germans not only tried to get resources from France; they also endeavoured to exercise a certain influence on the French market. Sometimes they wished, or pretended to wish, to co-operate with French financiers in other countries. At a time when political relations between the two neighbours were less strained than they have been since the beginning of the 20th century, issues of securities have been made simultaneously in Paris and Berlin. French and German met on neutral ground like Italy, where, for instance, one of the main banks, the Banca Commerciale Italiana, had on its board of directors prominent financiers from both countries. For some undertakings, from which Germany expected to draw the greatest share of economical advantage, she tried to get the help of France. A striking example is to be found in the treaties signed between France, England and Germany for settling their financial shares in the Bagdad railway. When the treaty of 1909, which, according to the hopes of that time, was intended to settle the Franco-German quarrel, was signed, both parties promised that they would co-operate in the Morocco affairs; the claims of the Brothers Mannesmann soon showed how this co-operation was understood beyond the Rhine.

In many instances, German banks, receiving French

capital in the various forms which we have described, have tried to get a footing on the boards of the great financial French establishments. But they never succeeded, except once, when they turned a Franco-Belgian firm into a bank in which the shares were subscribed mainly by the Dresdner Bank in Berlin. The part played by this bank in Paris is not important. A bolder attempt was made in one of the biggest Paris banks, which has many branches. In this case the German scheme seemed on the point of succeeding; but the war put a stop to the danger, which had indeed already been partly obviated by the dismissal of the personage who was playing the chief part in the plot.

In that part of the Paris Stock Exchange which is called 'coulisse,' i.e. the body of non-official brokers, some German infiltration took place, but did not go far. Several firms had foreigners among their sleeping partners. There was much talk, in the year before the war, about an Austrian, who was entering into large deals on the Paris market; but in this field nothing was done which could be compared with German successes in the industrial and commercial campaigns which had been going on so long. Under the rules of the 'coulisse,' and still more under those of the official brokers, none but French citizens can be heads of firms; this is a very strong barrier against possible abuses. Generally speaking, the financial penetration of France by Germany has been small compared with what has been achieved in other fields. Indeed a French penetration of Germany would rather have had to be recorded, if the French bankers had utilised the situation to which they were entitled through the lending of their capital to German undertakings.

A great lesson has to be drawn from the facts which we have put before our readers—namely, that coherency of plan, and the vigorous execution of a well-conceived design, may bring about very important economical results. Before the war, the French people was beginning to allow the Germans to become masters of several industries for which France does not need them at all. France has capital enough to organise nearly all the manufactures that she needs; certain raw materials, like coal and coke, are all that she requires from her

neighbours; and these she may get as well from England. There is no reason at all for France being flooded with chemical products, dyeing materials, drugs, electrical engines, etc., coming from Germany or made by the Germans in France under the mask of French companies. France has money, men and, in nearly all departments, the requisite raw materials. Let us hope that, after the war, French industrials and tradesmen will have a full comprehension of their task and of the fields open to their activity; and that both financiers and capitalists will foster the enterprising spirit of their country and understand that it is absurd to lend money, at a low rate of interest, to industrial undertakings abroad, when it is possible to use it in stimulating the creation of useful associations at home. German penetration has been the more dangerous in France because it was carried on amid a population which was not always well-informed enough to perceive, or courageous enough to oppose, the schemes of the invaders. Strange to say, a people which has shown as much gallantry on the battlefield as at any time of its glorious history, is sometimes timid in business ventures. This timidity does not prevent Frenchmen from exporting their capital; on the contrary, they might be blamed for having, in many cases, opened credits in favour of foreign States that did not deserve it. It is rather a kind of laziness which prevents them, after having worked hard and put aside important savings, from looking personally after undertakings in which they take a financial interest. They did not understand that in many branches a fertile field was open before them in their own country.

Some people have gone so far as to contend that German intervention was, after all, of some real use. Nobody raised any objection to Herr Thyssen adding, year by year, more acres to his Normandy estates. He considered that, even if the bowels of the earth failed to furnish his works with all the minerals he expected, it was a safe investment to get good pastures and fertile wheat-fields in the Cotentin. But French people should henceforth remember the eloquent appeal which Montchrestien, their great economist of the 17th century, addressed to their ancestors: 'Foreigners enter freely the room where we are trying our arms and learning how

to fence; they become aware of our strokes; they fight with us and very often against us. In one word, they know all our fencing, and we do not know theirs.' Some German writers, for instance Herr Rommel, try to justify the infiltration of their fellow-countrymen in France by contending that it is due to the natural law of communicating vessels; the water must stand at the same level in both. On one side the population is too dense, on the other side too thin; is this not sufficient to explain why the sons of the larger families fill the rooms where there are fewer children? One of the secret supplements of the 'Deutsche Export Revue,' which is sent only to German subscribers, declares that, in order to conquer a country economically, it is necessary to export into it men; this has been done with the tenacity which is one of the features of the German character. Where the ground was favourable, as in Antwerp, they flooded it. In France, where they knew that public sentiment was, in a certain sense, against them, and where they met with powerful national organisations, they acted more modestly. But everywhere they were doing their underground work, trying to extend their influence, to penetrate all the secrets of the country of which they were the guests, and to prepare in silence a way for their armies. If things had continued thus for a decade or two longer, one may ask what would have stopped the German progress in France. The great shock which has wakened all the energies of the nation has also shown the right way to those who are in charge of its economical future. One must think deeply about the lessons which are taught by this German penetration, which was as remarkable for its organisation as it was dangerous in its consequences.

RAPHAËL-GEORGES LÉVY.

Art. 7.—THE BOY SCOUT MOVEMENT.

THE Boy Scout Movement owes its origin to the genius of Lieut.-General Sir Robert Baden-Powell. The idea of training boys in scouting dates from 1884, when he applied it to recruits in his regiment, and, in revised form, from 1897, to young soldiers in the 5th Dragoon Guards. He had found that it was necessary to develop a man's character before putting upon him the routine training of drill. The system was based on education as opposed to instruction, and was an evolution of the ideas of Epictetus, the code of the Knights, the Zulus and Red Indians, Dr Jahn, Sir William Smith, Dr Arnold, Thompson Seton, Sir Robert's own father, and others. The possibility of putting responsibility on boys and training them seriously was brought to the proof on a small scale during the siege of Mafeking, when Sir Robert and Lord Edward Cecil raised a corps of boys. The success of the experiment was so great, that the possibility of further developments, on an extended scale, was forced on the attention of the originators of the idea.

When Sir Robert came home from South Africa in 1902, he found his book, 'Aids to Scouting,' being used in schools (and by Boy Organisations) for teaching boys. As the book had been written for soldiers, it was not really suitable for boys. An experimental camp for boys, under Sir Robert's own direction, was held in 1907; and as the result of the work there carried out the book was re-written, as 'Scouting for Boys,' in 1908. At that time there was no intention of having a separate organisation of Boy Scouts. Rather was it thought that the Boys' Brigade, the Junior Y.M.C.A., the Church Lads' Brigade, and other similar organisations would utilise the idea. However, a large number of boys and men, outside these organisations, took up the idea; and it was found necessary to form some kind of a directorate to control it. This directorate, at first, consisted only of three persons, Sir Robert Baden-Powell, Major McLaren, and Miss Macdonald; they did their work, with the help of a grant of 500*l.* from the late Lord Strathcona, in a room provided by Mr Arthur Pearson. The movement grew and assumed such proportions that Sir Robert gave

up the army in 1910, in order to be able to devote his whole time and energy to the Scouts. The methods, aims and organisation underwent close examination by the Privy Council in 1910; and a Royal Charter of Incorporation was granted. His Majesty the King became Patron, and H.R.H. the Prince of Wales became Chief Scout for Wales.

Such, in bare outline, is the origin and development of the movement. At the present time the cowboy hat and the bare knees of the Scout are such a familiar sight that the scoffer—and there were plenty in 1910—has ceased to regard them as a legitimate target for his banter. Further, in a vague kind of way, many people are even beginning to realise that the picturesque uniform and uncanny cries of the Scout conceal possibilities of educational and moral progress of a high and serious character. At the same time, it is amazing that, after almost six years of marked progress and development, so few people have anything but the most indefinite ideas as to what the Scout Movement really means. There are people who think it is 'good for the boys,' especially slum boys, because it may keep them out of mischief. There are bitter anti-militarists who regard it as a dodge of the conscription party and oppose it accordingly. There are military men who see in it the same idea, but regard it as merely 'playing at soldiers.' Not one of these numerous classes has caught the merest glimpse of the ideas of the founder. Here and there may be found some man of note—statesmen like Lord Rosebery, educationists like Mr Sadler—who has realised what it may mean to the nation, and who has not hesitated to express his approval in unmeasured terms.

To put the whole thing in a nutshell, Scouting is a moral force—a game perhaps, but a serious game, a matter (as Lord Rosebery has said) 'of high importance, inspiring and uplifting every detail of a boy's life. It is a great fellowship, embodied to preserve and observe great principles—self-help and help to others, patriotism, loyalty, honour, faith and duty.' During the few years of its existence, this movement for the development of character has laid its hands on the whole civilised world, and has spread with the rapidity of a new faith. At the end of 1913 there were close on 200,000 Scouts of all

ranks in the United Kingdom and in the Overseas Dominions. It is estimated that in foreign countries there are at least half a million. Of these, the greater number, 300,000, are in the United States of America. In Germany there are over 50,000. There is not one of these hundreds of thousands of recruits but has felt an influence, such as the ordinary systems of education have failed, in greater or less degree, to apply. The influence has been felt most where it is most needed. It is like washing; the results are most apparent where it is most required; the need, however, is universal.

A moral movement rests upon a set of principles or rules, which its adherents must recognise, understand, and be prepared to follow. The moral basis of the Scout Movement is the Scout Law. It may be described as the Boys' Decalogue. It is in a language which they understand, bears a message which they recognise, and is a call to action which they are willing to follow. No boy can be enrolled as a Scout until he has promised, on his honour, to keep this Law.

The following is a brief statement of the Law :

1. *Honour*.—A Scout's honour is to be trusted.
2. *Loyalty*.—A Scout is loyal to the King and his officers, to his country and to his employers.
3. *Helpfulness*.—A Scout's duty is to be useful and to help others.
4. *Friendship*.—A Scout is a friend to all and a brother to every other Scout, no matter to what social class the other belongs.
5. *Courtesy*.—A Scout is courteous, especially to women and children.
6. *Kindness to animals*.—A Scout is a friend to animals.
7. *Obedience*.—A Scout obeys the orders of his patrol leader, scoutmaster, and parents, without question.
8. *Cheerfulness*.—A Scout smiles and whistles under all circumstances.
9. *Thrift*.—A Scout is thrifty.
10. *Purity*.—A Scout is pure in thought, word, and deed.

It will be noticed that these laws are all commands to the boy to do or be something, not to forbear doing or being something. A boy wants to be actively, not passively, virtuous. It is easier for him to help his mother by weeding the garden than to 'sit still and be

good.' Too often our conception of character is negative; it refers chiefly to resisting power, the power to resist temptation and to avoid evil ways. But, as a matter of fact, character is much more than self-restraint; it is self-direction; and the aim of the Scout Law is to help the boy in the right direction of himself.

It would occupy too much space to give here a detailed account of the various ways in which the different laws are put into practice. As an example, however, the Third Law may be taken—'a Scout's duty is to be useful and to help others.' When a boy is enrolled as a Scout, he not only promises, in general terms, to keep the Scout Law, but he also promises, in more specific terms, to 'help other people at all times'; and his instructions include the important one that he is to let no day pass without doing cheerfully, and without reward, a good turn to some one else. These good turns vary considerably in character; it is possible that they are not always performed with the regularity demanded by the official instructions, but failure in this respect is oftener due to lack of opportunity than to want of will.* There is no doubt that the element of knight-errantry, embodied in the custom of good turns, has a fascination for the boy, and calls forth all his most generous impulses.

To test the truth of this remark it is only necessary to ask the first Scout met in the street—somebody who is a complete stranger—to go out of his way to do something, and it will be found that he will not hesitate, excuse himself or refuse. What is more, he will not take a reward for his service. This fact is now so well established in places where Scout troops exist, that it is sometimes difficult to satisfy all the demands upon them for public service. These demands have immensely increased since August 1914.

At the outbreak of the war the Scouts in all centres were called on to volunteer immediately for certain

* By way of illustrating the quaint conceptions some boys have of this duty, Sir R. Baden-Powell, on the occasion of a public dinner in connexion with the movement, told the following story. A Scout one evening went to bed regretting that he had had no opportunity of doing a kind action that day. He was just going to sleep when he heard the trap close on a mouse. Happy thought! He got up, opened the trap, took the mouse out by the tail, and—gave it to the cat.

services pending proper mobilisation of the Reserve Force. These services included watching telegraphs, telephones and railway bridges, and guarding certain sections of the coast. The military and police authorities in all parts of the country were offered and gladly accepted the services of the Scouts within the first few hours of the declaration of the war; and several thousand boys took up their duties, being ready organised in convenient units of eight, equipped with tents and transport, and trained to signalling, patrolling, despatch-riding, and cooking for themselves.

A War Service Badge was instituted for Scouts who performed twenty-eight days' service of three hours a day without reward; and in the first five months over 5000 of these badges were issued. More than 50,000 Scouts, during the same period, gave their services in Government offices, hospitals, relief associations, police stations and other places. In a few cases a small sum has been paid for maintenance; but, generally speaking, the work has been done without pay, because it is a Scout's duty to help all people at all times.

At the firing line in France there is, at the present moment, an ambulance car, provided and manned entirely by Scouts. As the car is getting worn out, the Scouts at home have promised to send another. Now, no Scout is allowed to beg for money, either for his own or any other organisation. So the rich Scout must give his own pocket money; the poor boy in employment must give out of his wages; and he who has neither work nor pocket-money must find a job and pay out of his earnings.

The Scoutmaster of a troop in connexion with the Digbeth Institute, in perhaps the poorest part of Birmingham, determined to find out, if possible, whether or not his boys did actually do their daily good turns. One evening he distributed strips of paper among them, and asked them to write down honestly what good turn they had done that day. In order to avoid either false shame or false vanity the papers were to be returned unsigned. Amongst the reports sent up were the following:

'I have clend the windos.'

'Helped a man with a handcart up Hill St.'

'Led a blind man home.'

'Stopped a boy throwing at a dog.'

'Helped a small child with a lot of coal up the gutter.'

'Bathed a boy's head for him when he had cut it with a sharp stone.'

'Carried a little child across the road.'

'I have took to helping an old lady every morning.'

'I gave a boy who called himself a Scout a good hiding for kicking a dog.'

'I have not done one so far, but will see what lays in my power to do one on my way home.'

Now, it is an easy thing to provide a boy with a law of conduct. It is not very difficult, if the appeal be made properly, to get him to promise to keep it. It is quite another thing so to lay your schemes that the promise shall be kept. If a law is to be operative there must be some kind of force behind it—the power of the State, public opinion, an inner consciousness of right. In the case of the Scout there can be no compulsion, no force from without. The power that impels the Scout to try to live up to his promise—and he does try—is not so very difficult to determine. We may get an inkling of it if we say that he is beguiled into goodness as a kind of game; and it is the nature of the game that next demands attention.

Scouts are divided into different classes or ranks. A boy passes from one rank to the other as he becomes more and more proficient. There are no seniority promotions. The tests for promotion are graded in quality and quantity. They are easy enough, in the lower grades, to offer no discouragement to the weak and feeble; they are difficult enough, in the higher ranks, to call for considerable industry, patience, and skill.

The lowest rank is that of the Tenderfoot. To attain this, the boy must know the Scout Law (moral training), know the composition and history of the Union Jack (history and patriotism), be able to make certain salutes (discipline and smartness), understand a number of secret signs (appeal to his sense and love of mystery), and tie a number of useful knots with rope (pioneering). The signs are used in the open air in following trails through woods and along roads, to places where hidden treasures are buried or deadly Indians concealed.

The next rank is that of the Second Class Scout. This Scout must be able to bandage a broken limb and to stop bleeding (help to others); to signal either in Morse or Semaphore (quickness of eye and concentration); cook his own dinner over a wood-fire laid in the open and lit with not more than two matches (pioneering); put at least sixpence in the bank (thrift); find his way about with a compass (pathfinding); follow a trail half a mile long in twenty-five minutes (observation and deduction); go a mile, walking and running twenty paces alternately, in exactly twelve minutes (judgment and physical exercise).

The First Class Scout has to continue his first-aid work and to learn how to deal with common accidents, such as drowning, runaway horses, and the like. Since the inauguration of the Scout Movement the total number of awards for various forms of life-saving has reached just over 1000. Other First Class tests are—to swim fifty yards; signal at an increased rate of speed; go a journey of fourteen miles on foot and write a report of it; read a map; make a rough sketch-map; find the points of the compass by sun, moon, and stars; cook a number of simple dishes in the open; judge distance, height, area, weight, number and volume within twenty-five per cent. error; increase the bank account to at least one shilling; make something either in wood or metal.

There are still higher ranks than that of the First Class Scout, but this brief account of the course of work up to that rank is sufficient to show how varied is the nature of the work and how many attractions it possesses for the average boy. But this is far from being the whole of the story. When a boy has attained the rank of Second Class Scout he may try to earn one or more Proficiency Badges. Of these there are over fifty. Some of the most important are classified below.

For *Public Service*. Such badges are given for proficiency as ambulance-helper, fireman, and missionary or sick nurse. The standard of attainment is sometimes quite high. For instance, Albert Edward Bentley, a Scout of the 1st Cheshunt Troop, joined the army as soon as the war broke out. Towards the end of October, 1914, he was seriously wounded in the thigh. In spite of his wound he stayed under fire for eight hours, and,

during that time, he dressed the wounds of three other men whom it was impossible to move. He had learned surgical dressing as a Scout. For his act of bravery he was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal, but it was his ability to help others that deserves emphasis.

The *hobbies* group of badges includes those of airman (making model aeroplanes), basket-worker, gardener, musician and photographer. The *occupations* group includes bee-farmer, blacksmith, carpenter, dairy-farmer, engineer, farmer, horseman, leather-worker, mason, metal-worker, miner, pilot, plumber, poultry-farmer, printer, tailor, and textile worker.* The badges for occupations and hobbies are intended to encourage the boys to take up definite pursuits in life; among the poorest boys they act in preventing the boys from entering blind-alley occupations. The question of employment has led to the formation of employment bureaux in connexion with some troops; in other cases the Scoutmaster acts as the link between the local Labour Exchange and the troop. In Middlesex, owing to the kindness of Mr Johnson of New Barnet, it has been possible to guarantee paid employment, leading to a definite career in adult manhood, to every Scout in the county. Several badges are associated with *sports and pastimes* for physical development; these include swimmer, boatman, cyclist, marksman, master-at-arms, pioneer, rescuer, and sea-fisherman.

We have noted the moral training afforded by means of the Scout Law, the formal training of the Scout for the different ranks of his order, and the encouragement afforded to all kinds of healthy pursuits by means of the system of Proficiency Badges. But even this long list of activities does not exhaust the means at the disposal of the Scoutmaster for the development of the Scout. We have yet to notice briefly the outdoor occupations, such as bridge-building, hut-building, tree-felling, and other pioneer activities, camps and games.

The Scout camp offers great opportunities for the cultivation of self-help, resourcefulness, and help to

* In one instance—that of the Scout corps at Wargrave-on-Thames—a patrol was (until the war) entirely self-supporting owing to the earnings of its members by small jobbing printing, instruction in which was given by two resident patrons.

others. Here it is possible to put into practice much that has been learned in the club room. One great feature of such a camp is its cheapness. The boys are taught to depend on themselves, and to do with as little equipment as possible. There are no luxuries; there are as many comforts as the Scout with his axe and his wits can provide from his immediate surroundings; and what these may mean are only known to those who have organised such camps. Perhaps one of the most successful of cheap camps has been carried out by the Scouts of the Harrow County School. A party of ten went from Harrow to Switzerland, tramped through the Bernese Oberland, put in two nights at Brussels, and returned home, after a month on the continent, having spent less than five pounds per head, all travelling expenses included. Camps for poor boys have been run at a cost of seven or eight shillings per head a week.

Scout games are numerous; most of them aim at cultivating observation. They often call for a knowledge of the map or some acquaintance with tracking. They are based on the boy's love of acting, preferably in the form of a pirate, a hunter, an Indian, or a general. They involve no expense; they require no prepared grounds. They can be played by any number a side from eight to a hundred. They solve, for the poor, the problem of open air games without expense, and illustrate, for the rich, a method of open-air enjoyment and physical exercise that does not require the velvet turf or the services of a groundman.

Each troop of Scouts is made up of patrols of from six to eight. The head of the patrol is the patrol leader, and is usually appointed by the Scoutmaster. The patrol leader chooses another boy as his assistant or Second. The patrol leader is given full responsibility, and he gets further training, by virtue of his office, over and above that which the Scouts in his patrol receive. For he is a real leader; he is the head of his 'gang' in games, and their instructor in everything of which he possesses sufficient knowledge. He has to be obeyed, and there is no appeal except to the Scoutmaster. His work develops powers of organisation and leadership that can be realised only by those who have watched their growth.

In connexion with the patrol system is the weekly

Court of Honour. The meeting is presided over by the Scoutmaster; the other members of the Court are the patrol leaders and, in some cases, the Seconds. The Court interviews offenders and slackers, deals with the troop finance, manages its business and plans its enterprises. The patrol leaders present reports of the work done by their patrols during the previous week; the boy secretary keeps the minutes; the boy quartermaster attends to the supplies. In all this there is a training in business habits and an introduction to civic life.

From this condensed account of what the Scout learns and does, it will be gathered that the idea in the mind of Sir Robert Baden-Powell was to produce that type of manliness which is best exhibited in the frontiersmen of our colonies, men distinguished for their energy, resourcefulness, pluck and endurance. The game is one in which muscles, brains and morals all have a part; and it is just because of the intimate connexion that exists between them that the moral element is able to exert so great an influence for good. In this new pastime that is put before the boys of the world, which is suitable for all classes, creeds and colours, it is necessary both to fear God and to know how to cook; to help your neighbour and mend your own boots. Duty and honour; swimming and bridge-building; kindness to animals and signalling; help for the weak and fire-lighting; the duties of an Arthurian knight and the adventures of a Robinson Crusoe—all skilfully interwoven into one never-ending, ever-varying, jolly game, whose spirit and rules touch every possible aspect of a boy's life.

It is not necessary to point out further the value of the movement to the schoolmaster. It is not an aid to education; it is an education in itself, and is as applicable to Eton as to a special difficulty school in the East End of London. Nor is it necessary to insist further on its value to the town boy in drawing him away from smoky streets to the purer air of the country side. A School Health Officer, at a recent conference, described this aspect of the movement in two happy phrases—'physiological righteousness' and 'applied hygiene.'

Within the limits of the space that remains it may be well to try to indicate, in outline, how, in the future,

the Scout Movement may help towards the solution of two problems of great national importance—Continuation Schools and National Service.

The alleged failure of the Elementary School, which has been such a marked feature of much educational criticism in recent years, is due rather to heredity, infantile neglect, indifferent or evil homes and parents, physical defects owing to insufficient nutrition, employment and bad environment out of school hours, and the abrupt termination of all the civilising influences of the school at the early age of fourteen. During the period of adolescence the boy develops new powers of reason, conscience, idealism and love. His physical growth is rapid and accompanied by the dawn of puberty. His senses become much keener, his emotions increase in force, and his imagination seeks wider spheres in which to satisfy itself. But at the same time there is an imperfect development of reason and will, a greater liability to evil, vice, and crime, accompanied, however, by an increased susceptibility to religious and educational influences. In the Secondary School it is the time of greatest profit. But it is the time when a boy leaves the Elementary School and is sent out into the world, often into an environment detrimental to all forms of progress. Hence arises the demand for the Continuation School.

It is curious that so many of those who demand compulsory Continuation Schools should have devoted their thoughts almost entirely to the perfection of purely technical training for higher grades of labour. They seem to have forgotten that, under modern conditions, it is impossible to 'teach a boy a trade.' Modern production is the work of machinery, and this calls for an abundance of cheap unskilled labour. Machinery will not and cannot be abolished to meet the wishes of the reformers; rather will it increase in efficiency with the passing of the years.

Skilled work, that is, work the performance of which requires that the workman shall have a definite training extending over a term of years, needs its own special technical schools; and these, in great measure, are already provided in all the big industrial centres. It is the needs of the unskilled worker, the man who attends to machinery and to mechanical occupations which can

be learned in practice and which require no definite training other than an elementary education, that have chiefly to be considered. These unskilled workers are by far the majority of those who get their living in factory and field. The Education Officer of the London County Council says that 'Only about one-third of the children leaving the elementary schools of the metropolis enter a form of occupation which can, by any stretch of the imagination, be called skilled.' These compulsory Continuation Schools, then, will be filled, for the most part, by children who have left school at fourteen to take up unskilled work. At present these children suffer from excessive hours of labour and lack of physical development; as a rule, they learn nothing of value through their work.

The hours of labour can be reduced by the State; but that will not solve the problem of the curriculum of the school or the expense of the maintenance of the new establishments. For the present, there can be no such development, both on account of the state of public opinion and the heavy costs that will have to be faced. At this juncture, the Scout Movement offers an escape from some of the difficulties, and a suggestion as to the curriculum of the future. By means of the Proficiency Badge system the boy can be encouraged to increase his industrial efficiency. He can get familiarity with the ordinary tools of the workshop and with simple machines, a grounding in mechanics, and some practice as a draughtsman, while working for his Engineer's Badge; and the same principle is applicable in many other cases. But, even on the side of industry, it is not specialised industrial training but a good general education that is needed, something that shall make of the necessary majority of unskilled workers a race at once energetic, resourceful, intelligent, careful, trustworthy and adaptable.

Further, these schools should give training in civics and in sex; should teach the duties of the citizen, father and husband. They must supply the pupil with a well-developed body, and so include many forms of physical exercises. In this latter connexion note the value of the Swimmer's Badge and that for Master at Arms, and the general teaching of the Scout in matters of health, by which the responsibility for his own health is thrown

upon himself. There should be some knowledge of First Aid and Hygiene, and, on the literary side, power to express thought clearly and some capacity of appreciating what is good in literature.

It will be gathered from what has been said in the previous part of this article that the training of the Scout makes for just that kind of education which it should be the business of the Continuation School to supply. And, when such schools come into being, quite two-thirds of what should be their curriculum could be done by the Scouts or organised in connexion with them. The nation would save in money and gain in increased moral power, for no school, as such, can hope to capture the imagination of the boy for good, in the way that the Scout blend of knight-errant, cowboy, and craftsman does. The supply of officers for these troops is another problem; but, if Scout Troops are organised in Secondary Schools with the view of training the pupils for social service amongst their less fortunate brethren, this difficulty might soon be solved.

The demand for National Service includes the training of boys. Military training is given to Cadets in many schools; and there is, under the influence of the war, a marked growth in the number of such schools. It is given also in such organisations as the Church Lads' Brigade. In an address given by the Chief Scout to the Royal United Services Institution in 1911 he pointed out the defects of the cadet system for national purposes. His conclusions were these:

1. The Cadet system requires specially capable officers for the training of boys; and these are difficult to find because good officers prefer more serious forms of soldiering.
2. The expense limits the Cadet training to a certain class of boys.
3. The principle of the Cadet Corps is only applicable to populous centres. In country districts a boy gets no chance of becoming a Cadet.
4. The physical training is only nominal. Exercise is obtained only on parade; and parades are not too frequent.
5. A very considerable portion of the nation conscientiously objects to the teaching of soldiering to boys before they are of an age to judge for themselves; and the objection is so powerful that it cannot be neglected.

6. The discipline is only nominal. The Cadet is under orders only while on parade; the discipline is put on and off with the uniform; it does not become a part of the character.

7. The glamour soon wears off. Previous to the war only ten per cent. of the Cadets joined any branch of the Service.

8. The system fails to give the boys any idea of their duties as citizens.

9. It involves the expenditure of public money.

On the other hand, the Chief Scout emphasised the following points in connexion with the Scout Movement:

1. The work appeals to officers and boys; and there is less difficulty in getting both men and boys to join.

2. The movement is non-military; and this appeals to a large number of parents. Boys of all denominations join, even Quakers.

3. It is applicable to small centres, for the unit is eight.

4. The moral training, and sense of duty and discipline, go on all the time. The Scout is never off duty.

5. The training in the open air makes not only for health but for handiness and resourcefulness.

6. It does not bore the boy or destroy his desire to serve as a soldier subsequently. About 70 per cent. of the Scouts joined the Service as against 10 per cent. of the Cadets.

7. It can be used to standardise the training of our race.

In the Annual Report of the Boy Scout Association for 1913, the Chief Scout states that the Scout training is a far better foundation for ultimate soldiering than any amount of mere drill. It is worth while to emphasise this point by way of conclusion. The general education of the Secondary School is regarded as a basis on which any kind of specialised form of training can afterwards be built; and the Headmasters, with one accord, decline to accept any utilitarian theories as to their work or mission. Yet, strangely enough, in the matter of national defence, they are almost unanimous in adopting the specialised form of military training given to Cadets. Now, just as the general education of the Secondary School is the best foundation on which to build subsequent professional studies, so the Scout training is the best foundation on which to build the future colonist, pioneer or soldier. This is particularly true under the conditions

of modern warfare. Evidence is accumulating in support of the following letter from an officer at the front:

'For this kind of fighting not only is pluck required, but also intelligent individual initiative, which no amount of drill can give. Our barrack-square training, improved though it has been, is not sufficiently up to date. Cadet and Boys' Brigade training is a good step forwards towards understanding discipline and punctuality; but I should like my men recruited from Boy Scouts.'

In this officer's company all the ex-Boy Scouts are non-commissioned officers; and one of them, a lad of twenty, with no previous military training, is Sergeant of the Battalion Scouts.

If the nation decides, after the war, that boys are to have some form of military training, then a powerful plea could be put in for the retention of the Scouts as an alternative form of training. Provision is already made in its schemes for musketry, by the award of a Marksman's Badge. This could be compulsory on all. A minimum of drill might be added. The Scout learns, in the ordinary course of things, to signal, to find his way by map, stars, sun and moon, to make rough sketch-maps, to write official reports, to cook his food, to build bridges and to bind up wounds. He learns all that a soldier needs, and yet is not a soldier or specially trained to become one. Under a national system of service the Scout troops would have to be inspected as to efficiency; and the duties of inspecting might fall either on the Education Department or the War Office. The absence of the military spirit would make the movement a desirable alternative for conscientious objectors; its cheapness would be an attraction to the taxpayer; and its moral value would become so evident as to win the unqualified approval of all those who have the national welfare at heart.

But, as a matter of fact, there is very little probability that there will be any general military training for boys of school age, except such as schools care to institute for themselves. Cadet training will, as now, be carried out in Secondary Schools among the older boys, where the masters show a desire for it. But the inspectorate and the official educational world generally are satisfied

that military drill has a narrowing effect upon the mind of the boy; and the military world thinks it of no very great importance. If, however, there should be national training for boys over school age, it would still be possible to retain the Scouts as an alternative or to institute Senior Scout Cadet Corps, attached to Scout organisations, but inspected by the War Office. These corps could specialise in signalling, first aid, engineering and so on, and be of greater value than those units whose training consisted of nothing but drill. They would preserve the Scout spirit of helpfulness and self-discipline and come under that moral influence that is absent from the mechanical evolutions of the barrack square. The officers could rank with those of the Territorial Forces; and a choice could be given to all those who were already Scouts as to whether they would serve in a Scout Cadet Corps or an ordinary regiment.

At the present moment a certain amount of pressure is being put on many Secondary Schools, either by the public, the boys, or the Governors, to start Cadet Corps. They would be better serving their country by establishing Scout troops. These offer, at one and the same time, a new form of education for boys of all ages, a course of continuation work suitable for boys leaving the Elementary Schools at too early an age, a basis for the professional training of future soldiers, and an opportunity for social service as Scoutmasters, to those who, having leisure, wealth, or intellect, desire to spend some portion of their treasure in brightening the lives of others whose lot has been cast in less pleasant spots than their own.

ERNEST YOUNG.

Art. 8.—COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE IN ENGLAND.

THE Right Hon. Sir J. A. Simon, on the occasion of his belated retirement from the Cabinet whose 'Military Service' policy he had all too long obstructed, made a remarkable statement in the House of Commons.* He spoke of the principle of voluntary enlistment as 'a real heritage of the English people.' One asks in amazement by what process of political jugglery a trained lawyer, who knows the meaning of the term 'heritage' and has the Statute Books at hand, can lend the weight of his authority to so gross a perversion of the truth. With even greater astonishment does one marvel that a scholar who has had the advantage of a good education can so completely have forgotten the elements of that Constitutional History which he must at one time have learned. It would perhaps be unjust to suppose that Sir John Simon has ever studied British Military History; but if he had at any time read such a book as the Hon. J. W. Fortescue's 'County Lieutenancies and the Army 1803-1814,' prepared under the auspices of his former colleague, Lord Haldane, his misstatement would be still more inexplicable and inexcusable.

The truth is that actual impressment for the regular army was in full operation till 1781; that the compulsory ballot for the militia was actively enforced till 1811; and that the press-gang was employed to keep the Navy manned right down to the close of our last great maritime war in 1815. Further, and still more to the point, in no one of the three cases did compulsory enlistment cease because it was abolished, but merely because, for the moment, the need to resort to it passed away. It was not abolished; it is not abolished yet. The laws which authorise and regulate army impressment, militia ballot, and naval press-gang are still on the Statute Books, and are as valid now as they were in the good old days of the 18th and 19th centuries. It is true that they are in part suspended; but all that is needed to bring them into full and active operation on Jan. 1 next is that Parliament should, during the course of its present

* House of Commons Debates, Jan. 5, 1916.

session, omit to pass the annual Expiring Laws Continuance Act. Far from voluntarism being the immemorial tradition of the English race, it is a mushroom innovation established (and that only tentatively and provisionally) under the eyes of our grandfathers.* Our earlier ancestors for at least twelve centuries were reared and ruled under the rigid *régime* of shrieval summonses, commissions of array, mustering statutes, militia ordinances, ballots, and impressments. They did not feel it inconsistent with freedom to be required and trained to protect themselves, their families, their possessions and their country from domestic and foreign foes. It is only their degenerate descendants of the Victorian era who, deluded by the pacifist prophecies of the Manchester School of politicians, forgot their martial traditions, shed their soldierly qualities, and relegated defence to voluntarists. Voluntarism, in short, is not a 'heritage' to be proud of and to cling to; it is a recent humiliation and disgrace, utterly unworthy of a race which aspires to be imperial, or lays any claim to leadership among mankind.†

Even if it could be shown, as it cannot, that voluntarism has an ancient and creditable tradition behind it, there would still be no possibility of laying a valid claim to it as a 'heritage.' For the right to call upon subjects to aid in the defence of the realm is inherent in the very conception of sovereignty. 'Nullum tempus occurrit regi'; and no length of prescription could divest the State of its power of summoning all its subjects in case of need to render it military service. Hallam, that devoted champion of individual liberty, recognises this

* 'For a couple of generations—not from all eternity as most Britons seem to think—our army has been a purely voluntary affair.'—G. G. Coulton, 'A Strong Army in a Free State,' p. 5.

† 'Let us purge our souls of cant,' wrote the late Prof. J. E. Cairnes. 'What does this system of voluntary recruiting, which we are asked to believe is the only system suited to our highly-developed political and moral feelings, mean? Simply this: that people who have sufficient means, instead of being required to pay their just debt to their country in their own persons, are allowed to hire others who have little choice but to accept their offer, to expose their persons on their behalf. No less lofty principle than this, it seems, can satisfy the highly developed conscience of the English people. The moral fastidiousness displayed is only surpassed in China, where, it is said, men may procure substitutes for the gallows. . . . In the name of common decency let us cease to put it forward as a national distinction to be proud of.'—'Political Essays,' pp. 232–3.

explicitly. He admits that universal service for home defence in this country is based not only on 'the Anglo-Saxon law,' but also on the 'primary and indispensable conditions of political society.*' Similarly J. S. Mill insists in general terms, in the midst of his pleas for personal freedom, that each and every member of Society must 'bear his share of the labours and sacrifices incurred in defending the society or its members from injury and molestation'; and he adds that 'Society is justified in enforcing these conditions at all costs on those who endeavour to withhold fulfilment.†' It is Hobbes, however, to whom we must turn if we wish to see the case stated in its most abstract and universal form. 'When,' he argues, 'the defence of the Commonwealth requireth at once the help of all that are able to bear arms, every one is obliged; because otherwise the institution of the Commonwealth, which they have not the purpose or courage to preserve, was in vain.‡' Against arguments such as these all pleas respecting a 'real heritage' would have to be declared invalid, even if they had the powerful support of long and unbroken precedent. I do not, however, press them at the present moment. For it is to the bar not of political theory but of history that Sir John Simon has appealed. To the bar of history shall he go.

The first glimpse of our ancestors after their settlement in this country shows us a nation in arms:

'The military system of the Anglo-Saxons,' says Gneist, 'is based upon universal service, under which is to be understood the duty of every freeman to respond in person to the summons to arms, to equip himself at his own expense, and to support himself at his own charge during the campaign.'§

When details of this universal obligation come to light we find that the burden of participation in national defence is incumbent upon all able-bodied males between the ages of sixteen and sixty, and that it is enforced by

* Hallam, 'Constitutional History' (New Ed. 1891), vol. ii, p. 132.

† Mill, 'Liberty,' ch. iv.

‡ Hobbes, 'Leviathan,' ch. xxi.

§ 'Englische Verfassungsgeschichte,' p. 4. Cf. also F. Grose: 'Military Antiquities,' vol. i, p. 1. E. A. Freeman, 'Norman Conquest,' vol. iv, p. 681, and W. Stubbs, 'Constitutional History,' vol. i, pp. 208, 212.

a heavy fine known as 'fyrdwite.*' We find further, however, that 'fyrdung' is not only an obligation, it is also a right peculiar to freemen. It is the distinctive and outstanding mark of their liberty. Not to be allowed to carry arms, not to be called to attend the assembly of the nation and the gathering of the host, not to be summoned to the standard of the king, is to be branded as a villan, to be stamped as unfree.

The military qualities of the Anglo-Saxon fyrd were tested to the full by the Danish invasions of the ninth century. The shire levies were called upon to face professional soldiers better armed, better protected, better organised, better disciplined, and better led than themselves. In the presence of such a foe rapid and drastic reform and reconstruction were necessary. Fortunately the country found in Alfred the Great a man capable of meeting the emergency. He placed the defence of England on a basis sound not only for his own day, but for all time—a strong navy, a small but highly-trained professional army, a disciplined and well-equipped nation in arms. His principal reform, so far as the fyrd was concerned, was to divide it into two parts, each of which fought in turn while the other tilled.†

When, in the tenth century, the Danish peril seemed to have passed away, Alfred's reforms were unfortunately allowed to lapse. Gneist, with unerring perspicacity, has put his finger upon the cause of our military disasters in this, and indeed in many another age. 'An ever-recurring feeling of insular security,' he says, 'prevented any lasting reforms in the military organisation; and this is what finally brought the Anglo-Saxon kingdom to ruin.'‡ Lured by the defenceless state of the island, the Danes returned in overwhelming force; and Ethelred the Redeless was not the man to extemporise the means to drive them out. His abler son, Edmund, when his opportunity came, did his best. In 1016 he 'put forth proclamation summoning every man to join his standard and denouncing the full penalty of the law against all

* 'If a gesitheundman owning land neglect the fyrd let him pay 120 shillings and forfeit his land; one not owning land 60 shillings; a ceorlsh man 30 shillings as fyrdwite.'—'Laws of Ine,' c. A.D. 690.

† Oman, 'Art of War,' p. 110.

‡ *Op. cit.* p. 18.

who held back.* But it was too late. Edmund perished, and the Dane Canute reigned in his stead. When the Danish line died out and the English House of Wessex was restored in the person of Edward the Confessor, this pious but incapable recluse made no effort to achieve military reconstruction. Hence in 1066 William the Norman was able to repeat the triumph of Canute, and establish a more permanent dominion than his Danish predecessor over the English race. 'The Anglo-Saxon Commonwealth had fallen,' says Gneist, 'through internal dissension, a defective organisation of its military array, and the faulty distribution of its military burdens.'†

William the Conqueror, who always denied that he was a Conqueror, and insisted upon his lawful succession to Edward the Confessor, maintained and cherished the English fyrd as a counterpoise to the turbulent and rebellious feudal levy of the Norman barons. On two notable occasions, in 1073 and 1087, he called upon it for active service, and used it effectively. It is remarkable that on the first of these two occasions the service demanded was service abroad, in William's county of Maine.‡ This indicated a very serious extension of the sphere of national military obligation. But it was quite consistent with William's general policy; and the English were in no position at the time to refuse obedience. William wished, by means of the oath of allegiance, to make all service personal to himself. Hence the geographical limits of shires and kingdoms were deliberately ignored, and the fyrd was called upon for general duty. 'Every freeman,' says Stubbs, 'was sworn under the injunction of the Conqueror to join the defence of the king, his lands and his honour within England and without.'§

In accordance with this principle William II in 1094 summoned 20,000 Englishmen to come to his aid in

* Freeman, 'Norman Conquest,' vol. 1, p. 415.

† *Op. cit.* p. 97.

‡ William of Malmesbury, 'Gesta Regum,' Book iii, p. 258.

§ The 'Laws of William the Conqueror,' § 2, run (regardless of grammar):—'Statuimus etiam ut omnis liber homo foedere et sacramento affirmet quod infra et extra Angliam Willelmo regi fideles esse volunt, terras et honorem illius omni fidelitate cum eo servare et eum contra inimicos defendere.'

Normandy; and they duly assembled at Hastings, each man bringing with him ten shillings for the cost of his journey.* Henry I used the fyrd to suppress Robert of Belesme; in Stephen's reign it drove back the Scots in the Battle of the Standard; under Henry II it helped to achieve the important capture of William the Lion at Alnwick. It was, of course, rare for the whole manhood of the country to be needed on these expeditions. The general practice seems to have been for the king to call for a certain quota according to his requirements from each shire or borough, and for the local unit to provide it in such manner as it found best, the burden being distributed as equitably as possible among the whole community.† Nevertheless the obligation remained universal, subject to the old restrictions of age and station.

So valuable was this national levy in cases of crisis that Henry II took pains to organise it and give uniformity to its equipment by means of the 'Assize of Arms' (1181). In this famous document emphasis is laid on the cardinal principle that freedom is the indispensable condition of the right to carry arms: '*præcepit rex quod nullus reciperetur ad sacramentum armorum nisi liber homo.*' If, however, none but a freeman has a right to carry arms, equally true is it that every freeman is bound to do so, and to attend the fyrd when summoned. The obligation rests on '*omnes burgenses et tota communia liberorum hominum.*'‡

That this obligation was no mere formality was shown conclusively in 1205, when John, having lost Normandy, was in mortal terror lest a French invasion of England should follow. He issued a writ calling a levy of all classes under the Assize of Arms. If any persons refused to obey—conscience or no conscience—they were to be subjected to the significant and peculiarly appropriate penalty of reduction to perpetual servitude. They would, in fact, by their disobedience have forfeited and discarded the distinctive mark of their freedom.§ Henry

* Florence of Worcester, 'Chronicon,' s. a. A.D. 1094.

† Thus Domesday Book says of Oxford: '*Quando rex ibat in expeditionem burgenses xx ibant cum eo pro omnibus aliis, vel xx libras dabant regi ut omnes essent liberi.*' ‡ Stubbs, 'Select Charters,' p. 153.

§ See Stubbs, 'Constitutional History,' vol. i, p. 634, and the references there given.

III made frequent, though less general levies of the nation, e.g. in 1217, 1223 and 1231. In 1252 he issued a writ for a survey of arms which should include the whole community between the ages of fifteen and sixty, and should even be extended to villans.* This survey of 1252, carried out by the sheriff and two specially-appointed knights in each county, may be regarded as the precursor of those Commissions of Array under which, from the reign of Edward I to that of Charles I, the national levies were raised and prepared for war. These Commissions were warrants granted to royal officers for 'the forcible levy or impressment of a specified number of men.'† Thus one of the earliest examples, dated 1282, authorises a certain William Butler to raise 1000 men in Lancashire. A similar Commission in 1295 provides for a levy of 3000 men in the counties of Hampshire, Wiltshire and Dorset.‡ Edward I, indeed, used the national forces freely, summoning on occasion as many as 30,000 men.§ He revised the Assize of Arms in respect of armament and other matters, and issued the new regulations as the Statute of Winchester in 1285. The final clause (translated) begins:

'It is commanded that every man have in his house harness for to keep the peace after the ancient assize; that is to say every man between fifteen years of age and sixty years . . . according to the quantity of his lands and goods.'||

So valuable did this reorganised and rearmed national force prove to be that the two successors of Edward I tended to use it for purposes for which it had not been intended, and to demand from it service to which it was not legally liable. Levies impressed under Commissions of Array were used widely throughout Britain in Welsh and Scottish campaigns, and were even conveyed across

* The commissioners were ordered to assemble 'cives, burgenses, libere tenentes, villanos et alios quindecim annorum usque ad ætatem sexaginta annorum, et eosdem faciant omnes jurare ad arma, secundum quantitatem terrarum et catallorum suorum.' See Stubbs, 'Select Charters,' p. 371.

† Medley, D. J., 'Constitutional History,' p. 469.

‡ See Stubbs, 'Const. Hist.,' vol. ii, p. 297, where many examples are given.

§ Cf. Morris, J. E., 'Welsh Wars of Edward I,' p. 97 and *passim*.

|| Statute 13 Edward I, c. 6.

the Channel to take part in the French wars. Hence Parliament (just establishing itself as a permanent factor in the constitution) passed a series of Statutes defining and restricting the common-law liability of the subject to police and military duty. Acts of 1327 (1 Edward III, c. 2) and 1352 (25 Edward III, c. 5), confirmed and consolidated by an Act of 1402 (4 Hen. IV, c. 13), limited normal police duty in the *posse comitatus* to the county, and military service to the kingdom; foreign service could be required only with the special assent of Parliament. Most of the 14th and 15th century levies were partial ones made on the quota system developed under the Commissions of Array. In 1338, however, at the beginning of the Hundred Years' War with France, and again in 1464, in the midst of the Wars of the Roses, general levies were ordered. The latter example is full of instruction as showing the compulsory principle in active operation at the close of the Middle Ages. It is thus recorded by Stubbs:

'In 1464, by letters close, Edward IV ordered the sheriffs to proclaim that every man from sixteen to sixty be well and defensibly arrayed and that he so arrayed be ready to attend on his highness upon a day's warning in resistance of his enemies and rebels and the defence of this his realm.'*

We pass on from the Middle Ages to the Tudor and Stewart periods. The Wars of the Roses destroyed the feudal baronage. One of the first acts of Henry VII was to secure the disbanding of the companies of professional soldiers (relics of the mercenary armies of the Hundred Years' War) who had long infested the country. Hence the Tudors found themselves with no other force than the national levies raised under the Statute of Winchester.† They were not sovereigns likely to allow the ancient prerogative of compulsion to fall into desuetude; nor did they do so. 'Every man,' says Froude, in the course of his description of Tudor England, 'was a soldier, and every man was ready equipped at all times with

* See Stubbs, 'Const. Hist.,' vol. iii, p. 296, and the references there given.

† Cf. Fortescue, J. W., 'History of the British Army,' vol. i, pp. 109-110.

the arms which corresponded to his rank.* That this was the case was due to the fact that 'the ancient obligation upon every freeman to be prepared to go to war in defence of his country still held good in the sixteenth century.'† Henry VII emphatically asserted this in a Statute (II Hen. VII, c. 18) in which 'the duty of every subject was stated to be to serve and assist his sovereign at all seasons where need shall require.'‡ Commissions of Array were issued, as of old, conferring full and absolute power upon the commissioners to raise the specified quotas of men.§ A series of rigorous statutes enforced on every man from the age of seven upwards regular Sabbath practice of archery.|| By a remarkable exercise of arbitrary power, the unrepealed Edwardian and Lancastrian Statutes limiting the liabilities of the *fyrd* were ignored, and the impressed levies of the shires were used on foreign service.¶

A considerable increase in military efficiency was given to the national forces by the appointment in 1550 of a new official, the Lieutenant (later Lord-Lieutenant) to take over from the many-functioned sheriff the supreme administration and command of the levies in one or more counties. The Lord-Lieutenant's commission directed him to 'levy, gather and call together all our subjects, of whatsoever estate, degree or dignity they be, dwelling within our said county or counties.'** The well-known 'Mustering Statute' of 1557 (4-5 P. and M. c. 2) graduated afresh the universal liability to bear arms, and made the interesting arrangement that poor men should be equipped at the public expense. The levies called up year by year for military training under the new officials, and in accordance with the revised regulations of the 'Mustering Statute,' acquired the name of the 'Train Bands.' Their prime function, of course,

* Froude, J. A., 'History of England,' vol. i, p. 63.

† Prothero, G. W., 'Statutes and Constitutional Documents,' p. cxix.

‡ Clode, 'Military Forces,' vol. i, p. 350.

§ See example in Prothero, *op. cit.* p. 156.

|| Froude, *op. cit.* vol. i, p. 67.

¶ Impressment for foreign service was after a time legalised by 4-5 Philip and Mary, c. 3. Cf. Hallam, H., 'Constitutional History,' New Edition, vol. ii, p. 131.

** Cf. Prothero, *op. cit.* pp. cxx and 154.

was home defence; and a general levy of them was appropriately made in 1588 when the country expected a Spanish invasion.* For foreign service or service in Ireland forcible impressment was still the normal method of recruiting. Barnaby Rich in his 'Dialogue between Mercury and the English Soldier' (1574) tells us that the constables welcomed an opportunity of pressing 'any idle fellow, some dronkard, or seditious quariler, a privy picker, or such a one as hath some skill in stealing of a goose.' The claim that it is an Englishman's privilege to refuse to defend his native land in an hour of peril would have made Shakespeare gasp in amazement. The idea that voluntarism is a 'real heritage' of the English people would—if the purport of the monstrous proposition could have been conveyed to his understanding—have filled Francis Bacon with indignant scorn. For, said he, 'The principal point of greatness in any State is to have a race of military men.'† When Bacon uttered this profound remark, however, the days of the great Elizabeth were over, and James I sat upon the throne of England. On this, as on many other matters, he disagreed with Bacon.

It is interesting to note that the Essay of Bacon just quoted contains the first example in standard English literature of the use of the word 'militia.'‡ 'Let any Prince or State,' says Bacon, 'think soberly of his forces except his militia of natives be of good and valiant soldiers.' Even so late as 1641 the word was a novelty unwelcome to some ears. Thus Whitlock, on March 1 of that year, protested in the House of Commons: 'I do heartily wish that this great word, this new word, this harsh word, *Militia*, might never have come within these walls.'§

When Bacon wrote and Whitlock spoke, however, the question of name mattered little; for the national forces, whether known as English trained bands or

* See Summary of Lords-Lieutenants' Returns in Colonel C. J. Hay's 'History of the Militia,' pp. 89-96.

† Bacon, Essay XXIX, 'On the True Greatness of Kingdoms.'

‡ Cp. Spencer Walpole, 'History of England,' vol. v, p. 447. The New English Dictionary gives an example dated 1590 from Sir J. Smyth's 'Discourse of Weapons.'

§ Clode, 'Military Forces,' vol. i, p. 31.

Latin militia, had been allowed to decline into deplorable inefficiency. James I was a pacifist of the worst type—a victim of great illusions that were bound sooner or later to plunge his kingdom unprepared into war. He signalised his accession to the throne of this country by securing the enactment of a statute (I Jac. I. c. 25) which relieved his subjects of the burden of providing arms for themselves. Henceforth arms were to be provided for them by a beneficent government and stored in county magazines. The statute, however, expressly reasserted 'the authority of the Crown to impress soldiers to serve in the wars,'* and, of course, it left untouched the common law obligation of defence.† The militia, indeed, continued to meet month by month for training; but the meetings degenerated into 'matters of disport and things of no moment,' and became notorious for their orgies of drunkenness. As a contemporary writer expressed it: 'The God they worshipped in their trainings was not Mars but Bacchus.'‡ The defence of England became dangerously weak.

When, at the close of the reign of James I, war with Spain broke out, impressment of course was resorted to. Charles I continued his father's military policy. In the expeditions organised by Buckingham in 1627-8, 'his soldiers were the pressed men of whom regiments meant for foreign service were usually composed under the later Tudors.'§ When trouble arose later between the king and his subjects concerning the levy of Ship Money for the defence of the realm, no one denied 'the obligation of every citizen to bear arms.'|| Even in John Hampden's famous case, St John, the counsel for the defence, together with the judges who gave judgment in Hampden's favour, expressly recognised that 'in case of necessity and danger, the King may command his subjects without Parliament to defend the Kingdom.'¶ The army required in 1639 for the campaign against the

* Cp. Clode, 'Military Forces,' vol. i, p. 352.

† Cf. Medley, 'Constitutional History,' p. 470.

‡ Cf. Firth, C. H., 'Cromwell's Army,' p. 6, where the sources of the quotations will be found.

§ Firth, C. A., *op. cit.* p. 3.

|| Clode, 'Military Forces,' vol. i, p. 16.

¶ Clode, *op. cit.* vol. i, p. 5.

Scots was duly raised by impressment, and provided with weapons from the militia depots.*

When the Civil War broke out, both sides equally admitted and applied the principle of compulsory enlistment. First of all 'the King by his Commissions of Array, the Parliament by its Militia Ordinance, summoned the trained bands to fight.'† The divided allegiance of the trained bands, however, combined with their general unwillingness to move beyond the limits of their own shires, rendered them ineffective. Volunteers, who for a time poured in to each camp, were most useful; and their numbers sufficed to supply the armies of both sides during the first two campaigns. But in 1643 impressment had to be resorted to. On the one side, Parliament by Ordinance (Aug. 10) ordered a forced levy of 22,000 men between the ages of 18 and 50; on the other side, the King issued Commissions, similar in purport, to 29 separate counties.‡ When, a year and a half later, Parliament resolved to establish a regular professional army—the 'New Model'—it had to fill up its ranks by the usual process of impressment. Less than one half of the infantry of this famous Puritan force were volunteers. Each county was required to supply its quota; and in most cases force was needed to secure it. The last great impressment of 10,000 men was made for the completion of Cromwell's work in Ireland in 1651. 'It was remarkable (says Prof. Firth) that the men raised by impressment for that service were better than those who had voluntarily enlisted.'§

At the Restoration the 'New Model' was disbanded, and the militia restored. It underwent a complete reorganisation.|| The King was recognised as commander-in-chief, and the lords-lieutenant were his representatives in the shires. The county magnates supplied the officers, the landed gentry the cavalry, the yeomen and citizens the infantry. The universal obligation to serve was the

* Clode, *op. cit.* vol. i, pp. 21-2. Firth, *op. cit.* p. 13.

† Firth, *op. cit.* p. 15; of Gardiner, S. R., 'Const. Documents,' pp. 244-60.

‡ Firth, *op. cit.* p. 20.

§ *Op. cit.* pp. 36-38.

|| See Statutes 13 Car. II, c. 6; 14 Car. II, c. 3, and 15 Car. II, c. 4. For summary of main features cf. Macaulay, 'History of England,' chap. 3, and Fortescue, 'History of the British Army,' vol. i, p. 294.

basis of the force as of old; but, since only a certain quota was required from each county, those who did not wish to serve in person were allowed either to provide a substitute or pay a pecuniary equivalent. The militia at once became, and long remained, an immensely popular force. It was regarded as the bulwark of English liberties against the menaces of that standing army which the troubled condition of European politics made necessary. So late as 1798 Wilberforce said: 'The circumstances which rendered our militia so dear to us as a constitutional force was its being officered by county gentlemen, whose arms were in no conjuncture likely to be turned against their country.'* This view of the militia was emphasised when James II, in pursuit of his despotic designs, tried to destroy it by dismissing lords-lieutenant and disarming the gentry, and when he tried to use the standing army to subvert the religion and the constitution of the realm. The expulsion of James II and the close of the Stewart period saw the national militia in the heyday of its popularity.

During the early years of the new era, the militia was called up and used on three notable occasions—in 1690, when a French invasion threatened, and in 1715 and 1745, when the Stewarts made attempts to recover their forfeited throne.† The long Continental wars of the 18th century, however, of course demanded a regular, professional, standing army. This, like the navy, was filled by impressment. 'It is a stern fact,' says Captain Hime, 'that limited conscription was resorted to on every occasion on which troops were required from 1695 to 1781.'‡ This conscription was regulated by a good many statutes during the period in question, the most notable of which was that of 1756 (29 Geo. II. c. 4), whereby criminals, vagrants, and paupers were delivered to the mercies of the press-gang. In 1778 smugglers and deserters of families were included.

Meanwhile the militia, which had lost its first zeal during the long, slack era of Walpole's easy-going

* Clode, *op. cit.* vol. i, p. 44.

† 'Manual of Military Law,' p. 210.

‡ Hime, 'Universal Conscription,' p. 125.

administration, was put upon a new and better footing by a notable act of the elder Pitt in 1757 (30 Geo. II. c. 25). The preamble to this Statute laid down the important principle that 'a well-ordered and well-disciplined militia is essentially necessary to the safety, peace, and prosperity of this kingdom.' The purpose of the Act was threefold, first to increase the authority of the central over the local administration; secondly, to make the discipline more rigid; thirdly, to secure on the relay system a general and national training in arms. Hence no provision at all was made for voluntary enlistment. The ballot reigned supreme. The annual levies, whose numbers were fixed for each county by the Statute—they ranged from 1600 for Middlesex to 80 for Anglesey—were to be

'chosen by lot from lists drawn up by parochial authorities for the Lords-Lieutenants and their deputies; and every man so chosen was to serve for three years, at the close of which period he was to enjoy exemption until his turn should come again. Thus it was designed that every man in succession should pass through the ranks and serve for a fixed term.'*

The excellent effect of the measure is emphatically recognised by the latest biographer of the elder Pitt, Mr. Basil Williams:

'This force,' he says, 'was not merely useful as a precaution against such humiliating panics as those of 1744, 1745 and 1756, but became the means of uniting hitherto discordant religious and political elements in the countryside by a bond of brotherhood and public duty.' Again: 'The chief value of this embodiment of the militia was its moral effect on the people. Men thought the more of their country for being called upon to fight for her.'†

This newly organised national force did good work in the Seven Years' War and in the American War by providing garrisons and guards whose services released regular troops for active campaigning. Unfortunately the Act of 1757, by a fatal concession wholly inconsistent with its main principle, continued to allow substitution

* Fortescue, 'History of the British Army,' vol. II, p. 301.

† Williams, 'Pitt,' vol. I, pp. 295, 405.

in place of personal service; and during the period of peace, 1783-1793, which followed the American War, the practice of hiring substitutes to perform militia duty firmly established itself, to the ruin of the force.*

The long wars of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era necessitated the employment of compulsion for both navy and army on a gigantic and unprecedented scale. It is impossible to tell here, even in outline, the complicated story. When I say that the militia alone claimed 171 statutes during the period 1793-1815, the nature of the historian's task is sufficiently indicated. I can only refer my readers to the admirably lucid works of the Hon. J. W. Fortescue.† For my present purpose it is enough to note that, beyond the regular impressments for the fleet and ballots for the militia, the most important measures involving compulsion were Addington's 'Levy-en-Masse' Act (1803), Windham's Training Act (1806), and Castlereagh's Local Militia Act (1808). The 'Levy-en-Masse' Act (43 Geo. III, c. 96) is in some respects the most remarkable of the three. Its intention is expressly stated to be 'to enable His Majesty more speedily and effectually to exercise his ancient and undoubted prerogative in requiring the military service of his liege subjects in case of invasion of the realm.' It provided for the calling up and embodying of the whole male population of the United Kingdom between the ages of 17 and 55. Windham's Training Act (46 Geo. III, c. 90) had as its object the creation of a nation in arms. It proposed to divide all the able-bodied men of the Kingdom into three classes, and to select from them by ballot a certain number annually to receive twenty-six days' training until the whole should be accomplished. General Pulteney, speaking in support of this measure in the House of Commons, said that he 'would no more trust to voluntary services for the defence of a nation than to voluntary contributions for the support of its finances.'‡

The effective application of this valuable enactment

* Cf. Hallam, 'Constitutional History,' vol. iii, p. 262.

† Especially 'The British Army, 1783-1802,' and 'The County Lieutenancies and the Army, 1803-1814.'

‡ Hansard, 'Debate,' June 24, 1806.

was unfortunately prevented by the fall of the Ministry which had carried it, in March 1807. Castlereagh, the successor of Windham in the War Office, adopted a somewhat different policy. He was entirely at one with his predecessor in the matter of compulsion. During the debate on the Training Act he had emphasised 'the undoubted prerogative of the Crown to call upon the services of all liege subjects in case of invasion.* But he wanted to have a force more immediately available for service than Windham's trained nation. Hence he instituted, strictly for home defence, a Local Militia, organised in battalions, in which personal service for four years, without the option of substitution, should be insisted on. The basal principle of the Local Militia Act (48 Geo. III, c. cxi) was, says Mr Fortescue, 'that instruction in the use of arms should be imposed upon all able-bodied men between 18 and 30 as a positive duty,' to be enforced as such, if necessary, by fine and imprisonment.† It is noteworthy that, when Scharnhorst reorganised the Prussian military system, after the disaster of Jena and the humiliation of Tilsit, he took the compulsory English system as his model.‡ I wonder whether in Germany a hundred years ago there were protests against the Anglicising of Prussia!

When, in 1815, the overthrow of Napoleon gave Britain peace after twenty-two years of almost incessant strife, a general disbanding of forces took place. The training of the militia was stopped in 1816; the holding of the annual ballots was suspended in 1829. Hence by 1837, when Queen Victoria ascended the throne,

'all that remained of the great militia force that had been under arms in Napoleon's days were some 127 effete adjutants and 1017 aged sergeants who were hidden away in our country towns, dragging out so useless an existence that it was difficult to justify their maintenance on military grounds.'§

* Cobbett, 'Parliamentary Debates,' vol. viii, p. 818.

† Fortescue, 'County Lieutenancies,' p. 205. Cf. Walpole, S., 'Hist. of England,' vol. v, p. 448.

‡ Shee, G. F., 'The Briton's First Duty' (5th Edition), p. 164.

§ Viscount Wolseley on 'The Army,' in T. H. Ward's 'Reign of Queen Victoria,' vol. i, p. 173.

This sort of thing was all very well so long as weariness and economic exhaustion kept the nations of Europe quiescent. But the excursions and alarms of the forties caused grave anxiety to thoughtful observers in this country, owing to the decay of Britain's defensive forces. Sir John Burgoyne raised a warning voice in 1846. Towards the close of the same year Lord Palmerston presented to the Government a disquieting report on 'The Defence of the Country.'

'Surely,' he said, 'there can be no duty more urgently pressing upon the Government than to place the country which it governs in a position to defend itself; and, if any mischance were to happen, what possible excuse could be made for the ministers by whose apathy and neglect the country had been left without adequate means of protection?'

The Great Duke of Wellington took up the theme in a letter to Sir John Burgoyne (Jan. 9, 1847), which found its way into the press in 1848 and created a profound impression. In the circumstances the Coup d'État of Louis Napoleon (1851) caused something approaching a panic in the country, and 'the newspapers teemed with letters and articles proclaiming and deploring the defenceless condition of the country.'*

It was decided to revive the militia. Russell brought in a bill to reconstitute Castlereagh's Local Militia of 1808 with all its machinery of compulsion; but Palmerston persuaded the House to restore Pitt's General Militia of 1757, to be recruited primarily by voluntary enlistment, but with the ballot in reserve in case the specified quotas fell short. The Act of 1852 (15-16 Vict. c. 50) provides that:

'in case it appear to Her Majesty . . . that the number of men required to be raised . . . cannot be raised by voluntary enlistment . . . or in case of actual invasion or imminent danger thereof, it shall be lawful for Her Majesty in any such case, with the advice of her Privy Council . . . to order and direct that the number of men so required to be raised should be raised by ballot as herein prescribed.'

This Act is still unrepealed. The arrangements for the

* Walpole, S., 'History of England,' vol. v, p. 447.

holding of the compulsory ballot were revised in 1860 (by Statute 23-4 Victoria, c. 120); and the detailed regulations of this enactment are yet valid. In practice the ballot had never to be enforced, as the high pay offered to recruits for the militia kept the ranks full. The efficiency of the revived force did not, however, become high. Soldiers were not satisfied; nor did the public attain to a sense of security. Hence, in 1859, the volunteer movement spontaneously sprang up to provide an army of defence supplementary to the militia. Even this, nevertheless, did not suffice to allay alarm when the wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870 revealed the extraordinary power of the military forces of Prussia. Warning voices again were raised.* Hence the reorganisation of the military forces in 1871, with the general purpose of bringing regulars, militia, and volunteers under one central and unifying control. This reorganisation, no doubt, effected a considerable administrative improvement, but it did not materially increase the defensive resources of the kingdom. Both the militia and the volunteers were notoriously inefficient; the regulars, though excellent in quality, were wholly inadequate numerically to the magnitude of their imperial duties. In 1887 Lord Wolseley uttered some weighty words which should fall upon the ears of the present generation with the solemnity of a prophecy fulfilled:

'The day will surely come,' he said, 'when England in dire need of soldiers will realise too late that an army cannot be improvised in a moment, or organised in a week. When that day comes, an angry because a deluded people will call for vengeance on those who lacked the honest courage to take them into confidence—who dared not tell them the whole truth as to our want of military organisation, our utter unpreparedness for war.'†

Lord Wolseley's words remained unheeded by either politicians or populace, and the nation blundered blindly on into the Boer War, which would never have taken place but for the well-grounded belief of the Boers in

* E.g. Major J. M. Bannatyne, 'Our Military Forces,' 1867; Sir Charles E. Trevelyan, 'The British Army,' 1868; and Lord Elcho (later Earl of Wemyss), 'Letters on Military Organisation,' 1871.

† Ward, T. H., 'Reign of Queen Victoria,' vol. i, p. 224.

the military feebleness of Britain.* Never was a more signal nemesis of the neglect of the maxim: If you wish for peace, prepare for war. As Major Charles Ross truly says: 'An unready or inefficient nation is a sure cause of war.'† The early disasters and humiliations of the Boer War awoke us rudely from our apathy and lethargy. By putting forth our whole military energy, by running the appalling risk of leaving our own shores virtually undefended in the face of a most unfriendly Continent; by sacrificing tens of thousands of devoted lives; by squandering hundreds of millions of money in reckless and wasteful extemporisations, we succeeded in three years in reducing to submission the two tiny farmer-republics. At the conclusion of the tragicomedy, even our party politicians seemed in a mood to face the facts of the situation. Colonel Seely, who later as War Minister so flagrantly neglected his own warning and abandoned his own principles, said in a speech in 1902:

'This war has taught us that it may not rest with this country whether we go to war or not. The other country may go to war with us. And as that other country, whatever it be, will be more numerous than our recent enemy, we may reasonably assume that we shall then come to an end of our trained men, not in a year and a half, but in months or even weeks. I myself, speaking as a Member of Parliament with a seat to lose, say openly that I consider it would be extremely desirable that it should be obligatory on every male in this country to be trained to arms. I also believe that five-sixths of the people of this country would welcome such a proposition. I am strongly in favour of the matter being put before the public quite frankly. Our countrymen should be told that the danger is imminent.'‡

A Royal Commission, under the presidency of the Duke of Norfolk, reported in 1904 to the same effect. It urged that 'the whole able-bodied male population should be trained to arms,' and expressed its conviction that 'only by the adoption of these principles can an

* 'With a home army even approaching the Continental armies in organised numbers we could have had no Transvaal war.'—G. G. Coulton, 'A Strong Army in a Free State,' p. 6.

† Ross, 'Problem of National Defence,' 1907, p. 278.

‡ I quote from the 'National Service League Leaflet M.'

army for home defence, adequate in strength and military efficiency to defeat an invader, be raised and maintained in the United Kingdom.' Mr (now Lord) Haldane, appointed Secretary of State for War in order to carry out the necessary reforms, seemed when he entered upon his duties to share these views; for in 1906 he said at Newcastle, 'A nation in arms is the only safeguard for the public interests should war break out.' But, as time went on, and as opposition to military training manifested itself among an ignorant but numerically not insignificant section of his supporters, the party-politician in him triumphed over the patriotic statesman; and, instead of trying to educate his misguided followers and open their eyes to the truth of the situation, he yielded to their pressure and produced in his Territorial Forces Act of 1908 (7 Edward VII, c. 9) one of those plausible compromises which are the very worst obstacles to adequacy and efficiency. It will not be enough to plead, in defence of this action, that he could not advance in front of public opinion. He did not try to lead it. He left the nation to be educated by disaster. 'I do not believe,' he said (Dec. 1, 1911), when the designs of Germany were known to, or at least suspected by, the Cabinet of which he was a member, 'that we shall ever have real compulsory training as on the Continent until this country has been invaded once or twice.' Once or twice! What would be left after one German invasion to make it worth while for the Germans to undertake a second? What should we have remaining to us that would repay the trouble of defence?

The Territorial Forces Act was the triumph of voluntarism; and, if the right to ignore and repudiate the duty of national military service is the 'real heritage' of Englishmen, it dates from 1908. Still even in that year of fatal compromise, although the old English militia was sunk and lost in a 'special reserve,' and although the ideas of obligation and compulsion were carefully obscured, the Ballot and Impressment Acts were not repealed, nor was the ancient machinery of conscription put out of gear. Mr Haldane himself said in the House of Commons, April 13, 1910: 'The Militia Ballot Act and the Acts relating to the Local Militia are still unrepealed and could be enforced if necessary.' They are merely

suspended by an Expiring Laws Continuance Act originally passed in 1865 (28-29 Vict. c. 119), but requiring to be annually renewed.

The facts summarised in this article, none of which I think are disputed, are I hope sufficient to show the utter perversity and groundlessness of the assertion that the 'real heritage' of Englishmen is anything so base and contemptible as the right to shirk the first duty of citizenship—the duty of defending home and faith and freedom against domestic and foreign foes. Nor do I believe that Englishmen as a whole will wish to shirk it. We should have more of the faith shown in the following eloquent passage from a book first published during the crisis of the South African War:

'An axiom or maxim which appears to guide the utterances if not the actions of statesmen, the maxim that the British people will under no circumstances tolerate any form of compulsory service for war, is unjustified by history. It has no foundation in history at all. Nothing in the past justifies the ascription of such a limit to the devotion of this people. Of an ancient lineage, but young in empire, proud, loving freedom, not disdainful of glory, perfectly fearless—who shall assign bounds to its devotion or determine the limits of its endurance? I go farther, I affirm that the records of the past, the heroic sacrifices which England made in the sixteenth, in the seventeenth century, and in later times, justify the contrary assumption, that at this crisis, a crisis such as I think no council of men has had to face for many centuries . . . the ministry or cabinet which but dares to trust this people's resolution, will find that this enthusiasm is not that of men overwrought with war-fever, but the deep-seated purpose of a people strong to defend the heritage of its fathers, and not to swerve from the path which fate itself has marked out for it amongst the empires of the earth. This, I maintain, is the verdict of history upon the matter.'*

The fact is that Englishmen have been accustomed to the ennobling compulsion of law from their remotest recorded past down to the present day. The worst that

* J. A. Cramb, 'The Origins and Destiny of Imperial Britain,' Edn. 1915, pp. 108-9. The passage is from a lecture delivered on May 29, 1900.

can be said against them is that in times of security they have grown slack, that they have waited for danger to call them to discipline, and that they have trusted to their capacity for 'muddling through' in crises brought upon them by their own lethargy. The days when they could count upon being able to muddle through are gone for ever. The alternatives before them now are the duty and discipline of national service or destruction. Already the self-governing daughter-commonwealths beyond the seas—Australia and New Zealand—have made the great and right decision. Canada still hesitates, although she actually has on her statute books a Militia Act of 1867 (31 Vict. c. 40) which recognises and carefully defines the duty of all males from 15 to 60 to serve for home defence. It may be safely said, however, that her hesitation will not be for long. But it is for Great Britain to give the lead by reviving the ancient and still vital, though dormant, principle of universal military training. A British Empire defended by the whole of its peace-loving but militant manhood would not only be secure against the assaults of an envious world; it would also be the surest safeguard against the recurrence of such a catastrophe as now devastates Europe. It is the tragedy of deluded pacifists like Norman Angell and voluntarists like Sir John Simon that they cause the very calamity which they seek to prevent. It was not the blustering Russophobe Palmerston, but the weakly amiable Russophile Aberdeen who lured the Tsar Nicholas I into a diplomatic entanglement from which the only outlet was the disastrous Crimean War. Similarly the responsibility for the present colossal conflict falls to no small extent upon those persons who assured Germany that we should never go to war with her in any circumstances, and who in defence of the imaginary 'real heritage' of a worthless voluntarism prevented Great Britain from equipping herself to fulfil her international obligations.

F. J. C. HEARNshaw.

✓ *Mr. Black*
 Art. 9.—THOUGHTS ON THE PARLIAMENT OF SCOTLAND.

1. *The History of Scotland*. By John Hill Burton. Second Edition. Vols VII, VIII. Blackwood, 1873.
2. *The Scottish Parliament before the Union of the Crowns*. By Robert S. Rait. Blackie, 1901.
3. *The Unreformed House of Commons*. By Edward Porritt. Two vols. Vol. II. Camb. Univ. Press, 1903.
4. *History of Scotland*. By P. Hume Brown. Vol. II, Book vi; Vol. III, Book vii. Camb. Univ. Press, 1905, 1909.
5. *The Scottish Parliament: Its Constitution and Procedure, 1603-1707*. By Charles Sanford Terry, M.A. Maclehose, 1905.
6. *An Historical Account of the Rise and Development of Presbyterianism in Scotland*. By Lord Balfour of Burleigh. Camb. Univ. Press, 1911.
7. *The Legislative Union of England and Scotland*. By P. Hume Brown. Oxford Univ. Press, 1914.
8. *Parliamentary Representation in Scotland*. By Robert S. Rait. (Scottish Historical Review, Jan., April, and Oct. 1915.) Maclehose, 1915.

THE Imperial Parliament* of to-day has been created by the union of three legislative bodies belonging to three different countries, namely, the Parliament of England, the Parliament of Scotland, and the Parliament of Ireland. Any educated Englishman is convinced, often quite erroneously, that he understands the growth and the working of England's Constitution. Through the course of recent events, the history of the Parliament of Ireland, though he generally reads it wrong, has been forced upon his attention; and the knowledge, slight though it be, of that history is made the easier because the Parliament of Ireland was, like so many other parliaments, an imitation, though a misdeveloped copy, of the Parliament of England. Of the old Parliament of

* The word 'Parliament' is throughout this article used as meaning, in accordance with current phraseology, when applied to Scotland, the House of Parliament, and when applied to England or Ireland, the two Houses of Parliament. See Dicey, 'Law of the Constitution,' 8th ed., pp. xviii and xxv, note 1.

Scotland he till recently knew little or nothing, and would often be found to confuse the Union of Crowns, which marked the year 1603, with the Union of Parliaments which belonged to the year 1707.

This ignorance of educated Englishmen was encouraged, if not excused, by the want of interest in Scottish constitutionalism displayed by eminent English writers. Hallam was an author in advance of his time. But in his 'Constitutional History of England,' a work of about 1300 pages, he dedicates but seven pages to the Constitution of Scotland. Freeman's admirable 'Growth of the English Constitution' contains little, if any, reference to either of the great Acts of Union which gave birth to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. Macaulay, the most brilliant, the most parliamentarian, and still in virtue of his genius the most influential, among the historians of England, though he knew the facts of Scottish history, had not even in 1852 discovered, till it was revealed to him by Burton,* the now open secret that one main explanation of the Union between England and Scotland 'lay in the urgency of the Scots for participation in the English trade.' Bagehot, the most original among the thinkers of genius who since the time of Burke have analysed the working of the English Constitution, had, though he lived till 1877, paid little attention to the way in which the two Acts of Union have told upon the development of

* 'I remember,' writes Burton, 'upwards of twenty years ago a talk with the great historian of the English Revolution. . . . He said he believed I had been studying the Union; he was yet far off from that period, but he saw some points of difficulty. One was that, although the Union was notoriously unpopular in Scotland, yet there were symptoms of pressure on the side of Scotland in its direction. He had thought whether this might be the action of the Episcopalian party to obtain protection from England, but that did not seem a satisfactory explanation. I said I believed he would find a simple solution in the urgency of the Scots for participation in the English trade, and that he would find his way to this solution in the laws of the Protectorate and those of the Restoration. I find in a short letter from him, dated 20th November, 1852, immediately on returning to his own books—"I have looked into the question of the commercial relations between England and Scotland after the Restoration. You were quite right, and the subject is full of interest." How affluently he would have made the world a participator in this full interest had his days not then been numbered, can only be matter of regretful conjecture.' —Burton, viii, p. 3, note 1.

representative institutions which were, at one time, of purely English growth.

In truth the success of the Union with Scotland has concealed the greatness of the obstacles which it overcame, and has propagated an idea, for which there is no true justification, that the political unity of separate countries, each endowed with a representative Parliament, is a matter of easy accomplishment. During the last thirty years or more, the parliamentary annals of Scotland have been the subject of assiduous and most fruitful research. My aim is to summarise some few of the results of this investigation, and to show that the development, and even the arrested development, of the Scottish Parliament, from the Union of Crowns in 1603 to the passing of the Act of Union in 1707, worked towards the success of the arduous and, as it at one time seemed, hopeless attempt to create the United Kingdom of Great Britain. This end I hope to attain by the statement and elucidation of a few leading thoughts as to some of the peculiar characteristics of the Scottish Parliament during the century following upon 1603.*

First Thought.—From 1603 to 1689-90 the Scottish Parliament did not exercise anything like predominant authority either in the making of laws for, or in the administrative government of, Scotland.

From 1603, and indeed from a far earlier period, the Scottish Parliament passed many laws, and often very good laws, but the Scottish Parliament did not before the Revolution of 1689-90 in reality govern Scotland. For the Parliament's action, even as a legislature, was controlled by the Committee known as 'The Committee of the Lords of the Articles,' or 'The Lords of the Articles.'† This Committee constitutes by far the strangest and the most original creation to be found in the whole Scottish constitution. The Parliament had from early times shown a marked willingness to confer power and even legislative authority upon parliamentary

* Little reference is made throughout this article to legislation passed or constitutional changes made during the revolutionary period from 1638 to 1660.

† Sometimes, even in Acts of Parliament, called simply 'The Articles.'

committees. This disposition to favour government by a body selected from the Parliament itself reached its height in the creation of the Lords of the Articles. The special function of this Committee, which, as Prof. Rait has shown, had a close connexion with the King's Council, was to prepare the 'Articles' or, to use an English term, the 'Bills,' which were to be submitted to the Parliament for acceptance or rejection, and which, if accepted by the Parliament and sanctioned by the King, would become Acts of Parliament. The Committee was, during the period with which we are concerned, regularly elected at the commencement of each new Parliament, and had power to act until that Parliament was dissolved.* The Committee was carefully constructed so as to represent each class of which the Parliament consisted, and generally contained somewhere about 40 members, ranging from 39 at the lowest, to 43 at the highest.† To understand the position of the Committee, it must be remembered that the Parliament was a One-House Parliament, and was never, as regards numbers, an unwieldy or an unmanageable body. Prior to the Restoration (1660) it never in number exceeded 183, and often consisted of only about 150 members. After the Restoration the Parliament only twice exceeded 190 members, and the Parliament of 1703-6 averaged only about 226 members.

Now, it is pretty certain that on almost any mode of choice the Lords of the Articles would bring to the work of legislation as much of official knowledge and of legislative ability as could be found among any 200 Scotsmen of the day.‡ If the Committee had merely prepared the Bills to be submitted to Parliament there would have been nothing very peculiar in its position. The extraordinary importance of the Committee arose from its exercising almost the whole legislative authority

* See Terry, p. 119.

† See particularly Terry, p. 108, and take as an example of the constitution and number of the Committee, the election thereof for 1612, in which the Peers number 8, the Bishops 8, the County members 8, the Burgh members 9, the Officers of State 7, making 40 in all.

‡ Unless we had sought for them in the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. But this Assembly was never looked upon with favour by any Stewart before 1690.

of the Parliament. Upon the election of the Lords of the Articles the action of the Parliament for the moment ceased. It did nothing, as a rule, by way of debate or otherwise, till it was summoned, say after a week or two, to meet again. The Bills prepared by the Committee were at such meeting submitted to the Parliament, and without debate or amendment accepted or rejected by the Parliament. If accepted and then assented to by the King, they became the enacted law of the land. And we may assume that acceptance was far more usual than rejection. Parliament, in short, had little voice in the matter of legislation beyond saying Aye or No to the Articles or Bills submitted to it. The person, or body of persons, who could control the Committee possessed for practical purposes the control of the Parliament.

The whole working of such a system depended upon the way in which the Committee was appointed; and from 1603 to 1689-90—the revolutionary period (1640-1660) of course excepted—the appointment lay in the hands of the King. James VI (in common with every man who had held executive power since the Committee came into existence) had taken care, since the time when he held anything like real power, to secure for himself the nomination of the Lords of the Articles.

He achieved this end by a method singularly characteristic of his combined cleverness and unwisdom. In 1606, and probably in 1607 and 1609, he nominated the members who were elected. In 1612 he partially revived and partially invented the following plan of appointment. There were at this date very few prelates in existence; they were all the King's creatures. The peers, as he arranged it, were to choose the Lords spiritual who should form part of the Committee. Any bishop whom the peers chose would be of necessity not disagreeable to the King. The bishops were in turn to select the peers who should sit for the Committee. They were certain to choose men as obsequious to the King as themselves. These chosen representatives of the bishops and the nobles were to select the most suitable members of Parliament, whether burgh members or county members, to be Lords of the Articles. These again were sure to be persons pleasing to the King. He himself

nominated the officials who had, as such, seats in Parliament to places on the Committee.* This royal scheme combined the nominal choice of the Lords of the Articles by and from the groups of which the Parliament consisted, with all but absolute security that no man should sit on this Committee of whose appointment the King disapproved.

The practical result of the power thus obtained by the Crown has been described in the following words :

‘Except for the few years between the Revolution and the Union [1690–1707] the Parliament of Scotland was not a deliberative assembly like the House of Commons at Westminster. It could not be a deliberative assembly so long as the Committee on the Articles existed, and when all that Parliament had to do was to accept or reject the measures of the Committee. “During all these centuries,” writes Innes, in describing the Scottish Parliament from the 14th century to the 17th, “I am not aware that an article, as we should say now a Bill, was brought in and discussed, opposed, supported, and voted upon in Parliament, I mean in open and plain Parliament.”’†

The language here used is slightly too strong. After the Restoration, but before the Revolution of 1689–90, Bills presented to Parliament by the Lords of the Articles were sometimes the subject of debate, but the words of Innes appear to be substantially true; they at any rate come a good deal nearer to the truth than the theory that the constitutional development of the Parliament during the 17th century ‘may be expressed in the statement that, whereas at the beginning of the century the House was the servant of its Committee, a court of registration of public edicts, like the French *Parlements*, it had reduced the Committee to a subordinate and dependent place long before the century reached its close.’‡ This view, erroneous as it probably is, rests of course on no ignorance of facts. It is a misreading of

* See Rait, pp. 53, 54.

† Innes, ‘Lectures on Scotch Legal Antiquities,’ p. 145, and see for the whole passage here referred to, Porritt, ii, pp. 100, 101. Compare Mackenzie, ‘Affairs of Scotland from the Restoration of Charles II, 1660,’ pp. 19, 20; Spotswood’s ‘History of the Church and State of Scotland,’ i, 33.

‡ Terry, p. 15.

facts mainly based on the delusion that the progress towards civilisation must have been in the case of Scotland, as in the case of England, closely connected with the continuous development of the national constitution and a development which, though slowly, on the whole has tended towards democracy.*

It is admitted on all hands that, though to control the Articles was to control the Parliament, yet 'there is nothing to prove, indeed there is nothing to suggest, that before the middle of the 17th century the Committee which virtually reduced Parliament to the position of a court of registration, was regarded as incongruous or otherwise than with placid acquiescence.'† This acquiescence is curious, but it admits of explanation. Attendance in Parliament was, before 1689, rather a burdensome duty than a valuable right. Both to county members and to burgh members it gave trouble and expense; and both royal burghs and the King's freeholders in any county, after they had obtained representation, had to pay the expenses of their members. No want of good sense can be inferred from the belief that legislation would be improved by being left in the hands of 40 persons mainly elected by the members of the Parliament, and constituting the most intelligent and most statesmanlike part of the House. The submission of the Bills prepared by the Lords of the Articles to the vote of the House seemed a guarantee that no measure would pass into law which was strongly opposed to any conviction or prejudice shared by the majority of the Parliament. Nor was this guarantee in ordinary circumstances illusory. It is a modern delusion to suppose that an elaborate system of representative government is the sole method by which legislation which may grossly misrepresent the real wishes of a people can be averted. It may often happen that a small

* 'Constitutional progress was, for [Mr Hill Burton] as for other writers on this subject, the only justification for a nation's existence. It did not seem possible that a people could advance worthily, except as England had advanced.'—Rait, p. 4. Scottish history will never be understood by any one who does not realise that progress in Scotland was real, but at any rate till 1707 did not follow the same path as progress in England.

† Terry, p. 107.

class of men, or even a single person, in whose hands rests legislative authority, may really represent the wishes of a nation, because the small ruling class, or the despotic ruler, may well share the sentiments or the prejudices entertained by the people of a given country. Provided that a country is not ruled by some foreign power, it is only when the citizens of a State are divided among themselves by strong differences of opinion that the need for representative government is acutely felt.

It is, therefore, quite intelligible that, till the beginning of the religious reformation, the authority of the Lords of the Articles was hardly felt to be a grievance. The existence of the Committee might be commended to men of sense by strong though minor considerations. It conferred upon a One-House Parliament, such as was the Scottish Parliament, something like the advantages which many political thinkers ascribe to the existence of a Second Chamber. It lessened the evils arising from the absence in the Scottish Parliament of a Speaker. Englishmen of to-day are hardly in a position to blame with severity the ease with which in early times the Parliamentarians of Scotland allowed the legislative power of Parliament to slip into the hands of a Parliamentary Committee. Our modern Cabinet of 22 members performs most of the functions discharged by the Lords of the Articles. The Cabinet determines in effect what are the Bills which shall be brought before Parliament. The Cabinet, if it be a strong Government, decides which of these Bills shall pass into law. The House of Commons still indeed tolerates debate, but the Cabinet can put an end to debate by various forms of closure. The Cabinet has quite recently, amid general and possibly reasonable approval, received legislative authority more extensive in some respects than was ever acquired by the Lords of the Articles, for the Cabinet has power, acting in the name of His Majesty in Council, 'during the continuance of the present war, to issue regulations,' or, in other words, to make any laws which approve themselves to the Cabinet, 'for securing the public safety and the defence of the realm.'* The Cabinet, it will be objected, is more

* See the Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act, 1914 (5 Geo. 5, c. 8), and compare *R. v. Sir F. L. Halliday*, 'Times,' Feb. 10, 1916. It is worth

or less, though in a very indirect way, appointed by Parliament, and the Lords of the Articles were under the Stewarts practically appointed by the King. Does there live any prophet bold enough to predict that the Cabinet itself may not some day come to be appointed in fact by managers or bosses who may have got firm hold of the party machine?

However this may be, the acquiescence of Scotsmen in the Committee of Articles during part at any rate of the 17th century is explainable. It is worth notice that the revolutionary reformers of 1640 did not destroy the Committee, but only changed the mode of its appointment. The really noteworthy thing is not the acquiescence in a dangerous experiment of the Scottish Parliament, but the astounding sagacity which, except on two occasions, forbade the English Parliament to transfer to any other hands than its own its supreme legislative authority. At the bidding of Richard in 1398 the suicidal Parliament of Shrewsbury delegated its legislative power to a parliamentary committee appointed in effect by the King; and it is probable that this instrument of tyranny may have been suggested by the precedent taken from Scotland of the power given some thirty years before to the Lords of the Articles. This crime of the King was avenged and annulled by the dethronement and death of Richard. The Revolution of 1399 anticipated the more glorious and successful Revolution of 1689. In 1539 the dominating personality of Henry VIII wrung from the Houses the Act which under considerable restrictions gave to royal Proclamations the authority of statutes. This Act was repealed in the next reign. The excessive authority which circumstances lent to the Tudors, and which the Stewarts sought to perpetuate and to enlarge, led to the Civil War of 1642 and to the Revolutions of 1649 and 1689.

Second Thought.—From 1690 to 1707 the Scottish Parliament did in fact exercise predominant authority in the

noting that while the Cabinet is coming to exercise functions like those discharged by the Articles, the Parliament Act, 1911, goes near to converting our Two-House Parliament into a One-House Parliament somewhat like that of Scotland.

making of laws for, and in the administrative government of, Scotland.

The Convention which in Scotland carried through the Revolution of 1689 did not elect any Lords of the Articles. But it declared that 'the Committee of Parliament called the Articles [was] a great grievance to the nation.' As the first Parliament of William and Mary, it abolished the Committee. This legislation was no hasty resolution. It was a solemn Act of Parliament, passed in spite of the strenuous resistance of William III, and after more than one attempt on the King's part to preserve the existence of the Committee, while ensuring its fair election by and from the different Estates sitting or represented in Parliament.* His opposition was natural. His Dutch experience must have taught him the difficulty of harmonising the action of States which, though forming part of one Commonwealth, claimed each for itself something of independence. His wish to retain the Lords of the Articles, so long as the Parliament of Scotland existed, is quite consistent with his ardent desire to bring about the Parliamentary Union of Great Britain. The point to be forced upon the attention of every student is that the Revolution of 1689 had one effect in England and a different effect in Scotland. In England it repelled, and finally defeated, an attempt to destroy the historical authority of the English Parliament. In Scotland it gave to the Parliament an authority which in reality it had never before possessed. It made only one constitutional change, namely, the abolition of the Lords of the Articles. This change created what in modern phraseology we should term the Constitution of 1690.†

* See Act, 25th June, 1689, A.P.S., IX, App., 128; Terry, p. 202; Resolutions of 26th June, 1689, A.P.S., IX, App., 128; Terry, p. 203. Proposed Bill, 9th July, 1689, A.P.S., IX, App., 132; Terry, p. 204; 8th May, 1690, An Act concerning the Election of Committees of Parliament, A.P.S., IX, 113; Terry, p. 206.

† If there be any Englishman living who is still interested in the study of Constitutions, he may, as a mere matter of speculation, regret that in 1690 the Committee of the Articles was not reformed instead of being abolished. Had it been kept alive it might have exhibited a new development of something like Cabinet Government, or it might have turned into a body something like that elected Council which was intended to play a great part in the Cromwellian Instrument of Government, or, as we

The new Constitution of 1690—for it was nothing less—gave a new life to the Parliament. It became the scene of public debate. It became the true legislature of the country. The debates on the Union showed that sixteen years of parliamentary power had produced parliamentary statesmen. The legislation of the Parliament was at any rate effective. In 1690 the Parliament abolished the Committee of Articles. In the same year one Act of Parliament gave additional representation in Parliament to the greater shires of the kingdom;* another Act re-established the Presbyterian Church and banished Episcopalianism from the Church † of Scotland. An Act of 1790 abolished Church Patronage.‡ Nor was the energetic legislation of the Parliament merely spasmodic. The whole series of events connected with the Darien Scheme shows that, under the Constitution of 1690, the Parliament not only legislated but also substantially governed. The same lesson may be learned from The Act Anent Peace and War of 1703. The Act of Security of 1704, and all the steps taken by the Scottish Parliament which were intended to make certain that Scotland should either obtain a union with England on terms which she could accept, or should be able, on the death of Anne, to assert complete national independence, tell the same story. It is, in short, as clear as possible that, from 1690 to 1707, the Scottish Parliament was not only the supreme legislature, but also the Government of Scotland.

Third Thought.—The Parliament of Scotland never during the whole of its existence became the centre of Scottish public life.

This statement is simply the reinforcement, from a slightly different point of view, of the doctrine established by Prof. Rait that, while the progress of England is contained in the progressive development of her Constitution, the equally undoubted progress of Scotland

should now say, in the Constitution of 1653. It is worth noting that this most ingenious scheme of government created a One-House Parliament for the Commonwealth, contained an elaborate Reform Act, and also anticipated the Act of Union, or rather the two Acts of Union, by forming the Commonwealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland.

* 14 June, 1690, A.P.S., IX., 152; Terry, p. 207.

† See Balfour of Burleigh, p. 107.

‡ Ibid., p. 114.

depended upon many circumstances and institutions which have little to do with her parliamentary system; and that Scottish history may mainly 'be useful as exemplifying the limitations of the doctrine that national progress can be measured by constitutional advance.' An Englishman who tries to write a constitutional history of England finds it difficult to define the limits of his subject; for he soon perceives that the growth of the Constitution can hardly be separated from any circumstance whatever which promotes the development of the English nation, and ultimately of the British Empire. A Scottish historian, on the other hand, such as Burton, is troubled, and occasionally misled, by the impossibility of closely connecting the progressive civilisation of Scotland with the improvement of her parliamentary machinery, or with the issue of grand constitutional conflicts. This contrast and the fact which gave rise to it—namely, that the Scottish Parliament never won for itself the heart of the Scottish people—are equally certain.

This failure of Parliament to become the embodiment of Scottish nationalism is illustrated and proved by the whole course of Scottish sentiment. Fidelity to the Stewarts has often risen to tragic passion, though the Stewarts were men whom it was far easier to adore or die for when they were exiles, than to trust at home as kings. The Highlanders, when they blackmailed industrious and peaceable farmers, were detested by Lowlanders as ruffians and robbers. But, within sixty years after the Rebellion of 1745, the Highland chiefs and their clans were transformed into the national heroes of Scottish romance. This transformation was so complete that when George IV paid his one visit to Scotland, he flattered the citizens of Edinburgh by showing himself there, as is recorded, in the costume of a Highlander, and also by giving the toast of 'the Chieftains and Clans of Scotland' as equivalent to that of the Scottish people.* The Church of Scotland has deservedly excited the enthusiastic devotion of thousands of Scotsmen. The one Scottish institution which never, except possibly for a moment before the passing of the Act of Union, kindled

* Rait, 'Scotland,' p. 305.

the enthusiasm of the Scottish people, has been the Parliament of Scotland.

No man took a wider or a more generous interest in the annals of his country than did Walter Scott. His heart and his imagination, though scarcely his judgment, were devoted to the Jacobites. He created the romance of the Highlands. But, if he liked the Cavaliers, he also understood and commemorated the zeal and the fortitude of the Covenanters; and, if he has kept alive a very dubiously deserved sympathy with the misfortunes and the tragedy of Queen Mary, he has left in 'The Heart of Midlothian' an undying picture of the warm affection, the spirit of self-sacrifice, the energy and the truthfulness, nurtured by Presbyterianism among the noblest of the Scottish peasantry. But it would be difficult to find in the whole of his works a single picture of the Scottish Parliament, or a single tribute to its virtues. No Scotsman less resembled Walter Scott than did Thomas Carlyle. He was at bottom a Scottish Calvinist born out of due season. He would have been in his proper place among the sterner Covenanters of 1638, or among the dogmatic preachers who drove Leslie's army to defeat at Dunbar. Now, Carlyle was absolutely blind to the best side of parliamentary government, and, though an indiscriminating eulogist of Cromwell, could never understand the reverence for the parliamentary tradition of England which was felt as strongly by the Protector as by Hampden or by Locke. The explanation is clear. Carlyle was a typical Scotsman. He had never inherited the tradition of loyalty to Parliament handed down by each generation of Englishmen to its successor.*

How then did it happen that the Parliament of Scotland never became the centre of the public life of Scotland in the sense in which the English Parliament became the centre of, or might almost be identified with, the public life of England? How, in short, did the Parliament fail to become the typical representative of Scottish nationalism? The enquiry, in whatever shape it is put, admits of a pretty clear answer. The Scottish

* Is it too fanciful to suggest that the Toryism of Hume's 'History,' though originating in dislike to religious enthusiasm or intolerance, may be connected with the absence in Scotland of this parliamentary tradition?

Parliament, from its nature and constitution, never rendered to Scotland the immense service which England owes, in part at least, to her Two-House Parliament. This service was the formation of that union between the gentry and the people of England which lay at the bottom of the authority gained by the Commons of England, and enabled the Commonalty and the Parliament, of which the Commons became the most important part, again and again to come forward as defenders of the rights of the people.

The comparative powerlessness of the Scottish Kings might at first sight seem to have been favourable to the growth of parliamentary power. But in fact it was an all but fatal hindrance to the extension of parliamentary government, and this for two reasons. On the one hand no King, until the Union of the Crowns (1603), was sufficiently powerful to compel an alliance between the people and the nobility for the purpose of resisting royal despotism; and, on the other hand, so long as the power of the King could obviously be defied by powerful nobles or chiefs, it was impossible for the Parliament to increase its own power, as did the Parliament of England, by transferring to itself the impressive, if not unlimited, authority of the Crown. Add to all this that Scottish history produced at no time whatever anything like the premature and imperfect yet real constitutionalism which existed under the Lancastrian dynasty. The mere tradition of this early constitutionalism was, even under the Tudors, of great value to the English Parliament. At lowest, it compelled these powerful and self-willed monarchs to govern under and through parliamentary forms; it thus kept alive and gave importance to parliamentary discussion. But, as already pointed out, the Scottish Parliament was, before the Revolution of 1689-90, hardly, if at all, a field for parliamentary debate. We can therefore to a great extent explain how it happened that the Parliament knew little of great constitutional conflicts, and 'produced no Henry the Second, no Simon de Montfort, no Edward the First, no Hampden, and no Sydney.'* A silent Parliament can hardly move the heart of any people.

* Rait, p. xii.

Here it may be objected that, under the Constitution of 1690, the Parliament was not only the Government of Scotland but the field of free and vehement debate. It might, therefore, have been expected to become, in this period, the centre of Scottish public life. The reply to this objection lies ready. The influence of the Parliament was balanced, if not over-balanced, by the influence of a rival assembly which had already gained and had long possessed the trust and affection of every Scottish Presbyterian. This rival was the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. The Assembly was nominally indeed, like the Parliament itself, primarily a Court, but it was in reality something very like a legislature. It was from 1690 to 1707 at least as powerful a body as Parliament. It was admirably constituted so as to represent the Presbyterians of Scotland. It debated in public. It was not, as its name might suggest to Englishmen, a body of clerics. The Presbyterian minister was not a priest. If the minister sometimes possessed more than priestly authority, the General Assembly contained, as it now contains, almost as many elders (laymen) as ministers. The Assembly, both before and after the Union, was the training-school for preachers, for orators, and for statesmen. Knox in one age, Melville in another, Carstairs at the time of the Union, Chalmers at a day which some men still living can remember, were the ministers and the statesmen of the Church of Scotland. The existence of the General Assembly is not the only cause, but it is a chief cause of the Parliament during its last eighteen years of existence failing to become the centre of the public life of Scotland; and, we may add, that the Act of Union which merged the Parliament of Scotland in the Parliament of Great Britain secured the prolonged existence and continued authority of the General Assembly.

A critic may well object to this explanation of the failure of the Scottish Parliament to gain the hearts of the Scottish people, that there is a curious analogy between the position of the Parliament of Ireland, under what is popularly called Grattan's Constitution, which existed from 1782 to 1800, and the position of the Scottish Parliament under the Constitution of 1690; and that the Irish Parliament, in spite of many unfavourable

circumstances, did become before the Union the centre of Irish public life. The analogy is certainly curious. Under the Constitution of 1690 the Scottish Parliament obtained complete legislative independence and practically also the power to govern Scotland, and at the end of seventeen years consented to the Union between Scotland and England. Under Grattan's Constitution, which may be well called the Constitution of 1782, the Irish Parliament obtained by the repeal or modification of Poynings' Law complete legislative independence, and at the end of eighteen years assented to the legislative union of Ireland with Great Britain. But the Irish Parliament was during those eighteen years the centre of the public life of Ireland. Why, one asks, did the Irish Parliament succeed where the Scottish Parliament failed?

The answer to this question is apparently the more difficult to find because, on the face of the matter, the Irish Parliament suffered under disadvantages from which the Scottish Parliament was free. The Irish Parliament was not, while the Scottish Parliament was an institution of really national growth. The Irish Parliament was imported by invaders or settlers from England. It could hardly at any time have been considered to represent the whole people of Ireland. From 1691 to 1800 it did not contain among its members a single avowed Roman Catholic. From 1691 to 1793 no Roman Catholic could vote for a Member of Parliament. The savage rebellion of 1798, crushed in many cases with savage cruelty, greatly embittered Irish Protestants against Irish Catholics, and Irish Catholics against Irish Protestants. The defects of the Irish Parliament were patent. Its virtues, even as represented by the learning and fairness of Lecky, are at best hypothetical. But the Irish Parliament even before 1782 had become the centre of Irish political life. What is the explanation of this historical paradox? It is not in reality hard to find. The Parliament of Ireland was no doubt the legislature of the colonists rather than of the native Irish. It became after 1691 the Parliament of the Protestants, and not of the Roman Catholics. But it had several advantages denied to the Parliament of Scotland. The Protestant settlers from England had

more or less inherited parliamentary ideas brought from England. Among other ideas they had succeeded to the Lancastrian tradition. The Irish asserters of parliamentary power fought mainly if not wholly for the rights of the Protestants. But before 1782 the Parliament had become the asserter of Irish Nationalism. The names of Molyneux, of Lucas, of Swift, were known to every Irishman. The oratory of Flood and Grattan was known throughout Ireland and Great Britain. These men had, in or out of Parliament, by writing or by speech denounced real and grievous wrongs done to Ireland. And the Irish Parliament before 1782 was a Parliament of speakers. All classes of Irishmen had been educated in the belief that, whatever its defects, it was the body by whose action the wrongs of Ireland would find redress. Lastly, the Irish Parliament shared with the Parliament of England all the prestige which belongs to a legislature which has no rival. There was in Ireland no General Assembly whose existence detracted from the authority of the Parliament.

Fourth Thought.—Both the strength and the weakness of the Scottish Parliament facilitated the making of the Treaty and the passing of the Act of Union.

The strength of the Scottish Parliament lay in two characteristics. Firstly, since 1690 it had become, at any rate when supported by the Crown, the legal sovereign of Scotland. It had acquired the legal and the moral power to make the Treaty and to carry through the Act of Union. Secondly, it was a body singularly well fitted for performing the very difficult task of basing the political unity of Great Britain on an elaborate contract which, though it might excite no enthusiasm either in Scotland or in England, secured solid advantages to each of these countries. It was a Parliament full of national feeling, and yet less inclined than are most representative assemblies to pay undue respect to public opinion. Men such as Fletcher of Saltoun were patriots, but were certainly not democrats or even what we should call Liberals. They wished to serve what they thought was the true interest of Scotland. They were little influenced by respect for the 'great heart of the people.' It was well too that the Parliament had become a place for open debate. It was necessary that the people of Edinburgh,

at any rate, should know that the objections to the policy of unity had received open expression.

The weakness of the Parliament was that it had never become the true centre of the public life of Scotland. But this failure to become the incarnation of national sentiment facilitated negotiations for a Treaty of Union. The only terms on which any English statesman was prepared to accept the political union of England and of Scotland were that the Scottish Parliament should be merged in the one Parliament of Great Britain. This was to every English Whig essential. On any other point the Whigs of 1707 were prepared to make, and did make, immense concessions to Scotland. But anything like a federal union, which should keep alive the Scottish Parliament for any purpose whatever, was utterly opposed to the policy of the English 'Unionists' of that day. Now, had the Parliament of Scotland become to Scotsmen what the Parliament of England was to Englishmen it would have been impossible for the Presbyterians, or even for the Episcopalians, of Scotland to acquiesce in the Act of Union. It was just because the Scottish Parliament had never been identified with Scottish nationality that Scottish nationalists found it possible to assent, if not to consent, to the Act of Union. It is more than possible that, if the one happy occasion for achieving the unity of Great Britain had been missed by the British statesmen of 1707, Englishmen and Scotsmen alike might have been found, say in the middle of the 19th century, still labouring, in common with some other European nations, to attain that national unity which every sensible man felt to be essential to the prosperity of the British kingdom. We can hardly exaggerate the gratitude we all owe to the British Unionists of the 18th century. On some other occasion it may be possible to narrate the extraordinary skill by which they passed an Act which was at once the most revolutionary and the most conservative of any of the great enactments to be found in the British Statute-book. They succeeded thereby in creating the political unity of Great Britain without destroying the nationalism of Scotland; and this was a great achievement.

A. V. DICEY.

Art. 10.—W. G.

THE death of a distinguished cricketer at a time when the fate of nations is being decided on countless fields of battle may seem hardly worthy of notice. Yet, even in the midst of this gigantic struggle, the thoughts and memories of a vast number of persons will have been moved by the passing away of Dr William Gilbert Grace, whose prowess on many a green and bloodless sward made his name a household word in the latter half of the nineteenth century. There are forms that loom out of the past as supreme in the mastery of their art; Michael Angelo, Raphael, Beethoven, Joachim, Mario, Talma suggest themselves almost at hazard. In the realm of sport—that peculiarly British preoccupation—no other individual ever towered so colossally over all other players in any game as did he whom we all knew as 'W. G.' Thousands who never saw a match nor felt the faintest interest in the antagonism of bowler and batsman were aware of him familiarly by repute. To the English public 'W. G.' was almost as well known as 'W. E. G.'; and, in the midst of the excitement over the first Home Rule Bill, a distinguished diplomatist observed that there was only one man more talked about in England than Gladstone, and that was Grace. This unique reputation will have to be considered when the social and moral history of the past fifty years comes to be written, for the investigator will be compelled to ascertain how it came about that one who never forced himself into publicity, except by his paramount skill in a game, should have held so high a place in popular regard.

The explanation seems to be that he embodied in a particular way so much that appealed to his fellow-countrymen. Beyond all others, he stood out as the typical example of absolute supremacy in his own sphere. In the best sense he was an individual gifted with amazing aptitude, emerging from the middle classes to be foremost in a game dear to all ranks of English society. Whether sport was made of too much importance before the war is a question that need not be discussed just now. Given the conditions of sport, it is but a truism to say that, to all intent and purpose, Grace personified cricket to the whole Empire for successive generations of cricketers—he

played with the grandsons of those who had called him champion, and could still merit that proud title. It was not only what he achieved, it was also the individuality of the man, his massive, unmistakably British personality, which exercised a spell over the crowd and caught the imagination of those who never saw him to such an extent that, in his own lifetime, he entered the ranks of traditional popular heroes. No official distinctions came to him. He was never nominated to the annual office of President of the M.C.C., who is the virtual head of English cricket; he was never even a member of the committee that forms the governing body of the game. All Grace's honours came to him from the public; and the testimonials collected for him gave substantial evidence of how large he loomed in general estimation.

It became a commercial enterprise to arrange for his appearance at such towns, for example, as Cork, Inverness, Aberdeen, Lincoln, Wakefield, Darlington, Grimsby, Durham and Exeter, where no crowds otherwise could be induced to watch cricket. He alone among Englishmen proved an attraction from the gate-money point of view, as lucrative as that which the Australians subsequently became. In the seventies, a newspaper observed that the clubs emptied and a stream of cabs dashed towards St John's Wood when it was known that he was playing at Lord's. More than twenty years later, on his fiftieth birthday, twenty thousand people were packed round the same ground; excursion trains were run from the West of England; 'and, much to their annoyance, ladies and gentlemen, not in twos and threes but in hundreds, had to be turned away.' No other votary of any sport has even a tithe of the references to W. G. Grace that are to be found in the pages of 'Punch.'

It was appropriate that so many of the greatest achievements of 'The Old Man'—as he was familiarly called in his veteran days—should have been associated with the headquarters of the game in which he excelled. Countless are the occasions on which he descended the steps, first of the old, then of the new pavilion at Lord's, always to be greeted with acclamation, often with positive enthusiasm. Even to look at, Grace had no parallel. That huge, ponderous form, those tremendous arms—their hairy strength revealed by the upturned sleeves—the big,

familiar head, invariably wearing a red and yellow cap, the swarthy complexion, the thick, black beard—later 'a sable silvered'—through which an Australian express bowler once sent a ball that literally shot to the boundary—all revealed a man physically somewhat apart from the type usually associated with cricket. So immensely strong was he that no one would have suspected that he went through life with only one lung.

When he reached the wicket and took guard, he invariably marked the spot on the ground with one of the bails. Then he would adjust his cap and take a careful look round, to ascertain the placing of the field before confronting the bowler. Naturally, as a veteran, with increasing years and bulk, he leant more heavily on his bat, but in his prime his position was particularly easy. The weight of the body rested entirely on the right leg, the left foot being generally cocked up. He met every ball in the very centre of the bat, and whilst at the wicket inspired a curious confidence in his capacity to stay there. The late A. G. Steel—as great a master of the theory as of the practice of cricket—observed that it was waste of time on hard, dry wickets to put on fast bowlers when Grace was at his best. The runs that came from bowlers like Martin MacIntyre were astonishing; cuts, pushes through any number of short-legs, big drives and colossal leg-hits—all were alike to the great batsman. It was no less a person than Alfred Shaw who said of Grace: 'I put them where I like, and the big 'un puts them where *he* likes.' Yet this remark was made by the bowler who most frequently obtained his wicket, and was admitted by Grace himself to be the one he found most difficult to play.

Considering that he was such an aggressively rapid run-getter, it may seem surprising to assert that the chief characteristic of Grace's batting was his watchful defence. Nevertheless it is a fact that his magnificent punishing powers were only a superstructure on a foundation of solid impregnability. As a child, carefully coached, he was never allowed to hit at all until he had acquired complete defence. It was that reserve of protectiveness that stood him in such wonderful stead. Recollect how he, and he alone, systematically stopped the dangerous 'shooters' at Lord's in the seventies,

when Jem Mace, the pugilist, said he would rather stand up for ten rounds than keep wicket on that pitch. Grace had no pet stroke as other batsmen had. He was master of every stroke, and used the one best suited to the ball he was playing. He may not have had the wrist shots of Trumper, nor the elegance of Spooner, but he was more completely equipped with every conceivable means of baffling the bowler than any other cricketer who ever played. Ranjitsinhji has been compared to him; but the Jam Sahib of Nawanagar told the present writer that he only began where 'W. G.' left off, and he never batted on those baffling wickets on which the elder player made his reputation. A contribution of twenty on them was worth eighty made under modern conditions; yet Grace averaged fifty-nine runs per innings during his first ten seasons.

No one else ever played the game with quite so much care. Other men went to the nets just to open their shoulders; Grace always batted there with the same thoroughness as if he were in the critical part of a match. Richard Daft considered that the two secrets of 'W. G.'s' success were his self-denial and his constant practice. Another point was his ability to come quickly to a decision. Only a very slow bowler ever found him in two minds. Watching the ball with absolute concentration, he instinctively settled how it should be played and then played it hard in the way he wished. It was not only what he did but how he did it, which made his batting so profoundly interesting to watch. His timing was admittedly perfect. So was his placing, which he himself attributed to playing so much against twenty-two's for the All England Eleven, though old men tell me he possessed this quality from the very outset of his career. 'He was strictly orthodox in his batting, improving and standardising (so to speak) the strokes of George Parr, Tom Hayward the elder, and Robert Carpenter.' There were great cricketers before W. G. Grace, and no doubt there will be others after him; but it was he who took the old-time game and by his surpassing prowess made it spectacular, therefore more widely popular, and personally caused most of the various developments which have crystallised into what is now known as first-class cricket. So far back as 1871,

it was seriously proposed to alter the laws of cricket on his account, so baffling was the mastery he exhibited.

Moreover, he was endowed with abnormal power to resist fatigue. The longest day in the field or the longest innings left him fresh, until increasing bulk made running between the wickets an exhausting strain. True tales are told of his being up all night at the call of professional duty, and then making a huge score; of his rising before six a.m. to shoot or fish energetically before a long day's cricket; of his leaving a match at the Oval to win a sprint at the Crystal Palace. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that, in the earlier years of his supremacy, everything had to be run out. It was common, recently, to read that a batsman 'visibly tired as he approached his century'; he would have been more fatigued when getting fifty under the conditions prevailing when Grace made his first notable scores. But who ever saw Grace tired until he had passed the age of forty-five? It was this perennial faculty of endurance that assisted to make him so remarkable. Time after time we were informed that 'Grace was finished,' that 'he was done at last,' that 'even he could not be expected to go on for ever'; and shortly after he would play a succession of marvellous innings such as no other cricketer, young enough to be his son, could emulate.

The legend runs that, when the mother of the Graces wrote to George Parr suggesting that her son E. M. should play for the All England Eleven, she added that she had a younger son who would be an even better bat because his defence was sounder. She it was who had taught all her boys; and tradition asserts she could field as smartly as a man, possessing an excellent return. Many now only in middle-age can remember the old lady, with her hair in ringlets, watching Gloucestershire matches, with her sons in the intervals hovering about her to hear pretty direct criticism of their form.

W. G. Grace did not have to wait long for recognition. Some weeks before his seventeenth birthday, in 1865, this bearded boy—for already he had a stubbly beard—was representing Gentlemen against Players. What he did for the amateurs may be gathered from the fact that, whereas from 1853 to 1865 they had not won once, from 1865 to 1880 they never lost a match to the professionals

at the Oval and rarely elsewhere. The collective achievement of the Graces for Gloucestershire county cricket, from its inception until W. G. Grace severed his connexion towards the close of the century, is the most remarkable association of one family with a shire, more notable even than that of the Walkers with Middlesex. When the first test match in England was played against the Australians, all the three Graces were rightly chosen for our national eleven; and W. G. played a masterly innings of 152, surpassed by one run by his opponent and future friend the late W. L. Murdoch. First and last, he made far more than a hundred centuries, and he won the applause of players as well as that of the public.

As we turn over the pages of old cricket books or papers, traces can be found of that discussion which seems to have continued through the seventies whenever two or three cricket-lovers were gathered together: Was Grace a good bowler? His fine results seem to answer that question in the affirmative, especially as they would have been far better had he been more ready to relinquish the ball. It seems to be forgotten that, in his early days, he bowled fast medium, with his arm as high as the law would then allow. His cunning slow bowling, which so often baffled batsmen because it looked as though the ball were going to do much more than it actually did, was a later development—another proof of the amazing pains he took with his cricket. That leg-ball, which occurred in every over, was a legacy from the time when his younger brother G. F. seemed able to catch well-nigh anything hit on the leg-side. Moreover, no one estimating W. G. Grace as a bowler should forget that he was entirely indifferent to what punishment was meted out to him, just as he was unperturbed when his county in its weakness lost an aggregate of matches greater in number than the victories acquired in its zenith. 'No one (it has been said) could ever bustle "W. G."; and he owed much to that imperturbability. Though he never for a moment took the game lightly, he never made it more than a game.

It is a curious fact that among all the famous families associated with the game, the Lytteltons, Walkers, Graces, Steels, Studds, Fords, etc., in no single case was the eldest

brother the most distinguished cricketer, nor yet the best field. Owing to the length of his career, the pristine excellence of W. G. Grace in the field has been somewhat lost sight of. In his prime, he was regarded as quite the equal of either of his brothers in a department in which the latter were sensational; and, to the very end, if a ball came near his hand it seemed to stick in it. W. G. dropped uncommonly few catches, and he also possessed an uncultivated aptitude for keeping wicket. It was as a captain that he was least distinguished. He possessed many qualities that made for good leadership, such as not grumbling at the weakness of sides he had to direct, and always showing himself kind and encouraging to young players, while never abating his personal efforts, no matter how hopeless or how inevitably drawn a match might be. In those respects he set an admirable example. But, when he captained a team in the field, he did not avail himself of all the resources at his disposal nor sufficiently adapt his tactics to the exigencies of the moment. Hence it happened that another was occasionally selected to be captain, even when Grace was the strongest player on a representative side.

As a man, Grace inspired not only general popularity but actual affection among those who knew him well. He was completely free from affectation, and as much at ease among the highest and most notable as in his own family circle. To the very end there lurked an attractive, almost boyish cheeriness in his nature. He loved a good joke, delighted in being with young people, was charming to children, and entered keenly into every sport or game in which he could join. It might be said that he was a burly Peter Pan, who never grew old in heart; and, to the last, he possessed that rather boisterous, obvious, hearty sense of rough fun associated traditionally with the yeomen of England in Plantagenet and Tudor times. His tastes, apart from a rubber, were all for out-of-door pursuits; not only cricket, but running—as a young man he won many races—beagling, shooting, fishing, bowls, and golf, which he called 'Scotch croquet.' All these gave him keen delight; and he was also an attentive student of contemporaneous form on the turf, though not often seen on a race-course. As a public speaker, he was the first

to join in the perennial jest at his own quite unusual limitations. He could tell a good story cleverly in his broad, West-country accents, and was a capital listener, who often volunteered a dry observation redolent of natural humour. He never smoked; and nothing amused him more than the fruitless efforts of opposing unsophisticated cricketers to lure him into indiscretions at the luncheon table. Let it be added that he was exemplary in all the relationships of family life, that he possessed a host of friends, and that he was blessed with rude health and exuberant spirits.

His last two public appearances were among the most dignified of his career. At the dinner in commemoration of the centenary of Lord's cricket ground (1914), Mr C. E. Green proposed his health as 'the greatest cricketer that ever lived or ever will live'; to which Grace replied very briefly, saying he considered county cricket as good as ever it was, but that match play was rather too slow. A couple of months later, patriotically moved, he came forward with an eloquent letter urging the community to stop cricket: 'war-time is no time for games.' His own time arrived all too soon; and it is certain that thousands, who never felt the crushing grip with which he shook hands, realised an irreparable gap when they learnt that he had gone. A light of the happy past has been extinguished amid the deepening gloom caused by the bravest and best giving their lives in the noblest cause. The death of W. G. Grace closes an epoch in the annals of our national game. It also coincides with the end of an epoch in our national history. What will be the result of the war upon our social life, it is too soon to say; but one thing is pretty clear, that the easy-going, pleasure-loving times in which games assumed such importance, and in which it was possible for a great performer to attain such popular eminence, are gone, if not for ever, at least for a period of which even the younger generation can hardly expect to see the end.

HOME GORDON.

Art. 11.—THE SHIPPING PROBLEM.

THE description of 'The Greatest Economic Problem' was given to the shipping question, or, as it is better called, 'series of shipping questions,' a few weeks ago by the President of the Board of Trade, who has within his view the whole range of commercial subjects. The briefest reflection will show that the phrase was no exaggeration. People are sometimes apt to argue that, as in all previous wars freights have risen to high levels, therefore the evil of the present high freights should be endured without protest. The weak point in this contention is that in previous wars the country was not dependent to anything like its present extent on oversea commerce. Some centuries ago, Great Britain was self-supporting. Then came the time when we began to import certain luxuries, such as tea, coffee, and tobacco. All the time the population was steadily increasing. To-day the country is dependent on imports for the great bulk of the products required to feed and clothe the people, not to mention the innumerable commodities which are now regarded as essential to civilised life. Even the success of agriculture and the raising of live stock in this country is now dependent to a large extent on fertilisers and foodstuffs imported from abroad. So, whereas a hundred years ago high freights might have been regarded as an interesting though unpleasant feature of war, to-day they seriously affect the life of every one. Of course, high freights are only the direct result of an inadequate supply of shipping to meet the requirements of the country. The ordinary person is not in a position to know how far short the supply falls of the requirements; he merely knows that freights have risen enormously and that the prices of all the necessities of life have risen in accordance. There have never been such magnificent crops as have been harvested during the past twelve months—the supply of wheat has been far in excess of the world's requirements—yet the price of bread has risen to extraordinary levels. Other commodities have been produced in ample supply, yet it has only been too true that the strength of the chain of services between producer and consumer has been governed by the strength of the weakest link; and that

has proved to be shipping. The strengthening of the link is not a matter merely for shipowners; it is the vital concern of everyone in these islands.

It is important to remember that the present acute shortage of shipping has only indirectly been brought about by the action of the enemy, for the percentage of tonnage which the enemy has destroyed has, in spite of all his efforts, been quite small. The restriction of tonnage is mainly due to the action of Great Britain in throwing herself wholeheartedly into the European struggle. The high freights which the people of the United Kingdom are called upon to pay, a substantial proportion of which go in the form of taxation to the State, are undoubtedly part of the contribution which the nation is making to the common cause of the Allies. The people make this contribution every time they eat food or buy clothes. At the outbreak of war there seemed to be a superfluity of tonnage, and freights fell to very low levels. It was Admiralty requisitioning which started the upward movement. The ships first removed from the market were, presumably, colliers and storeships to serve the Fleet; then ships were taken to act as merchant cruisers, patrol vessels, and transports. Finally, ships were taken to bring the cargoes of munitions and other commodities, such as sugar, controlled by the Government. The amount of tonnage taken up by the Admiralty has steadily increased. The Dardanelles Campaign made heavy demands and, later, the Salonika Expedition. The amount of tonnage now in the hands of the Government is understood to be about 40 per cent. of the British mercantile marine, the great bulk of which is withdrawn from commercial purposes; and it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the removal of so much tonnage is the principal cause of the present scarcity of shipping.

This fact is the justification of those who have called attention to what they believed to be waste in the management of the requisitioned ships. Waste in the management has been admitted in Parliament, but always with the proviso that, where naval and military requirements are predominant, there must be what appears to the commercial mind waste. Criticism by business men is difficult, because they have not the inside knowledge of circumstances which have caused

certain apparently extraordinary incidents. We are aware that the Transport Department of the Admiralty before the war was a small office; and probably no one ever dreamed that it would be called upon to direct the movements of between 1,500 and 2,000 ships. Its task has been colossal, and, even if its organisation had been perfect, waste must have occurred. The shortage of shipping is so obvious now that it is inconceivable that the Department is not deeply impressed with the importance of making the utmost use of every ton of shipping within its control. It has at different times called to its assistance practical shipping men who certainly can have no doubts as to the urgent need of conserving tonnage; and the Department would not be keeping faith with the public if it relaxed its efforts in this direction.

While Admiralty requisitioning has been the main factor in reducing the supply of tonnage, there have been other considerable influences. One of the most important of these, because one of the most persistent, has been the difficulty of dealing with commerce at the ports, resulting in ships being kept in port far beyond the normal period. The difficulty was caused by the heavy enlistment of dock-workers and railway men, by Customs regulations imposed with the object of preventing the possibility of goods from this country reaching the enemy, and also, at different times, by the large dumping of certain Government cargoes. The congestion at all British ports has from time to time been very grave, though probably never so serious as at certain French and Italian ports. Obviously, sheer waste of tonnage occurs when ships are delayed for many weeks, waiting to discharge their cargoes, as has been the case at all British ports. Shipowners have been perfectly justified in arguing that it was futile to say that there was a shortage of shipping while there were not facilities at the ports to deal promptly with the tonnage available.

Another cause has been the substitution, owing to the war, of certain long voyages for short passages. For instance, a large number of ships have been employed in bringing sugar from the East and West Indies to replace the supplies which before the war made the short passage across the North Sea from Germany. Moreover, new trades have been created. There is the traffic in

merchandise across the North Atlantic, a steady flow of commodities from the United States to Vladivostok for the use of Russia, and the supply of foodstuffs organised by the Commission for Relief in Belgium. Within a year of the outbreak of war nearly 200 full cargoes of foodstuffs were brought from North and South America to Rotterdam for the feeding of the Belgian civilian population, involving the continuous employment of perhaps 35 large steamers. (It is interesting to note that the chartering of all these steamers has been done by British brokers, and that the whole of the commission received by them, amounting to a great many thousand pounds, has been given by them to the Relief Fund. The British underwriters quoted specially low rates of insurance.) These and other causes aggravated the trouble, but it was not until the early autumn of 1915 that a fresh rise took place, and freights began to reach those levels which have been the subject of so much public discussion. Two events which occurred in September assisted this upward movement.

On Sept. 21 Mr McKenna announced his intention of taking 50 per cent. of all excess profits during the war. There was clearly much to be said for this proposal, but it at once created an atmosphere conducive to a further advance in freights. Shipowners have since often in conversation expressed the view that this taxation nullified much of the objection to the extraordinary high rates. There has been an inclination to suggest that there could not be anything very wrong in their earning large profits when the State was going to take in taxation such a substantial proportion of them. It has even been maintained that these high freights became a very convenient means of taxing the people—taxation which none could escape. At all events, immediately after this taxation was announced, freights began to move upwards again. They rose so much further that within a short time the 50 per cent. left to the owners amounted to just as much as 100 per cent. of the profits before the Chancellor of the Exchequer made his announcement. It afterwards became probable that the Government would not be satisfied with taking only 50 per cent. of the excess profits.

On Sept. 22 the Panama Canal was closed, owing to a
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very serious slide, and remained closed for six months, until March 16, when three American colliers, with a maximum draught of 21 feet, were reported to have passed through. A large number of ships which were waiting at the entrances had to be diverted; and the length of the voyages of ships trading between this country and the west coast of South America, and between the Atlantic ports of the United States and the Far East, was immediately increased. The closure came at a critical time, and probably exerted a greater influence on the upward movement than is generally realised. The longer voyages necessitated further reduced the carrying power of shipping during the past six months.

Then, although the percentage has been small, the work of the enemy submarines has, of course, made a substantial hole in the tonnage available. All the while vessels were being lost through marine perils, which, in consequence of the war, were rather more serious than usual. Many of the ordinary coast lights have not been used, aids to navigation have been removed, captains have departed from their customary routes, and a large number of the most efficient officers have been drafted into warships. Further, the inaction of the German mercantile marine has left more work for the neutral ships. Happily, both Italy and Portugal have lately decided that the German ships interned there must do their share—a step which, no doubt, will be welcomed by the German companies, who will be relieved of continuing the heavy port charges and expenses of maintenance. It is right to add that another factor which assisted the upward movement of the closing months of last year was the diversion of a number of steamers (which had been chartered to load grain from Argentina) to the west coast of South America to bring nitrate home. The time required for this programme was itself increased by the closing of the Panama Canal. All the subsidiary causes of high freights would have been minimised if it had been possible to keep new construction up to the pre-war level. But with every yard employed to its fullest capacity on Government work, there was a very serious setback to new mercantile construction. Only within the past few months have many of the yards been able to turn their attention to private

orders; and, even so, the resumption of work started before the war, and put aside for naval construction, has been hindered by the increased cost of labour and materials.

As illustrating how these conditions synchronised with the sharp upward movement in the autumn months, some typical quotations may be given. Chartering for wheat from North America did not begin in earnest until September. On Sept. 20—the day before Mr McKenna announced the new excess profit taxation and two days before the Panama Canal was closed—the rate for wheat from the North Atlantic ports to the Bristol Channel was 9s. a quarter; by Oct. 20 the rate had risen to 12s., and by Nov. 20 to 13s. The advance continued steadily. By Dec. 20 the rate had risen to 14s., by Jan. 20 to 16s., and by Feb. 20 to 18s. This was the highest point reached. The rate remained on the same level until the beginning of March, when it began to decline and by March 18 had fallen to 15s. Another representative rate is that for wheat from the River Plate to this country. On Sept. 20 the rate was 57s. 6d. a ton, and by Oct. 20 it had risen to 70s. The subsequent movements to the highest point reached were as follows:—Nov. 20, 85s.; Dec. 20, 120s.; Jan. 20, 140s.; and Feb. 20, 157s. 6d.

Freights for coal exports from this country showed much the same movement. Thus, the rate from Cardiff to Genoa on Sept. 20 was 32s.; it advanced to 42s. 6d. by Oct. 20, to 51s. by Nov. 20, and to 65s. by Dec. 20. By Jan. 20 the rate had risen to 80s., at which it remained until early in March, when as much as 95s. was paid. The enormous rises in coal freights naturally brought about great increases in the price of bunker coals. By the middle of March the price of bunker coals at Port Said was 6l. 5s. a ton. At Buenos Aires and Montevideo the rate was 5l. 5s. a ton.* Rises such as these obviously affect very seriously the working expenses of the Liner companies, which may perhaps require eighty tons for each ship every day. The Liner companies are forced to raise their freights on the

* The high cargo rates just quoted compare with a rate of two or three shillings per quarter for wheat from the United States to the Bristol Channel in the few months immediately preceding the war, with 12s. 6d. per ton from the River Plate to the United Kingdom, and with seven or eight shillings per ton for coals from Cardiff to West Italy.

different commodities they carry to compensate them for the increased cost of coal, stores and labour. It is of interest to note, in this connexion, that passenger rates have been advanced very little since the outbreak of war. This really confirms the shipowners' contention that the rise in cargo freights has been mainly due to the law of supply and demand. Cargo freights have risen because, speaking broadly, there have always been two or three merchants anxious to charter a ship for every vessel available. Passenger rates have not risen, because, although working expenses have been higher, there has, as a rule, been accommodation enough.

The advances in the coal freights have undoubtedly meant a great deal to the Italian people, who are entirely dependent upon Great Britain for coal. The Italian Navy, the Mercantile Marine, the Railways, the Gas and Electricity Works, and all the manufactories require British coal. It would be grossly unfair, as has been pointed out in Parliament, for British shipowners to be saddled with the whole responsibility of the enormous rise in freights and the consequent rise in coal prices in Italy, since a large proportion of the coal imported there has been carried from this country in Italian and neutral ships. At the same time a certain responsibility does rest with Great Britain as owning the greatest mercantile marine. This the Government has recognised by requisitioning a large number of British ships on the Admiralty Blue-book terms to carry coals to Italy. Large numbers of ships have also been requisitioned to carry coals to France, who, with her minefields in German occupation, has been mainly dependent on British supplies; and this has involved a further strain on the British Mercantile Marine.

The Government, in its efforts to relieve the situation, has proceeded slowly, step by step. Its first action was to requisition the services of shipowners in assisting the Transport Department of the Admiralty. These owners constituted an Advisory Committee; and their duties seem to have been to advise the officials as to the suitability of tonnage for particular work, and to vary so far as possible the proportion of the tonnage taken up according to the size of the fleets belonging to the

different companies. One of the most successful of the Government measures was the requisitioning, just a year ago, of the whole of the refrigerated steamers in the meat-steamers trading between this country and Australasia, which was followed a few weeks later by the requisitioning of similar space in the steamers trading with South America. At the same time an arrangement was made with the meat companies for a certain amount of their weekly production at stipulated prices. The result has been that the meat freights have shown a rise of only about 50 per cent. on those ruling before the war, and that there has been no serious advance in the prices of imported meat, in spite of the fact that the consumption by the British Army has been enormous, and that for the first time the meat has been introduced on a large scale into France and Italy, where it has greatly simplified and improved the rationing of the armies.

At about the same time British owners were asked to keep the Admiralty informed of the movements of all their ships. In the early summer a successful scheme was carried out on behalf of the Indian Government for buying and importing and selling in this country the exportable surplus of the Indian wheat crop. By judicious management the freights were kept on a level which at the time seemed moderate, and, compared with those current to-day, was low.

It was not until the early autumn that the Home Government again acted vigorously. Three Committees were appointed within a short space of time. One was for licensing ships for voyages between foreign ports; the second was for requisitioning ships for the carriage of foodstuffs; and the third was for dealing with congestion at the ports. The Ship Licensing committee was from its inception very successful in a quiet way. Its principle was that, as ships were urgently needed in the home trade, voyages of British ships between neutral ports should be carefully scrutinised. Great Britain has been in past years the carrier for the world; and there was a natural disinclination to impose restrictions causing inconvenience to neutrals and at the same time depriving owners of earning credits in foreign countries which, as a means of assisting foreign exchange questions, are especially valuable. But it was obvious that, as great

hardship was being suffered by the British people through high freights, the employment of all ships should be carefully examined. One effective way in which the committee was able to relieve the situation was by refusing licenses for voyages to foreign ports where there was known to be great congestion. The principle of licenses was extended this year so as to require that all ships of over 500 tons trading to and from the United Kingdom should be licensed as from March 1. As in the case of trade between foreign ports, the licenses could be granted for whole services or for particular voyages. The system has enabled the committee to discriminate between the more or less congested ports of the United Kingdom, and has worked efficiently without friction.

The methods of the committee for requisitioning ships for foodstuffs were to direct owners to load in trades where tonnage was particularly wanted, and to leave them to accept the full market rates. Ships which the Admiralty found it could spare were released on condition that they loaded wheat in North America for this country. The committee dealing with congestion at the ports evidently found its task a difficult one, but there have been various signs lately of its efforts. It has been able to arrange for the employment of the military at ports in case of urgent necessity; and a few weeks ago it prevailed on three leading railway companies to agree to a mutual interchange of trucks, a concession which has been one of the burning inland transport questions, and it is hoped may be conceded by other railway companies and also by private owners. The Committee has also issued directions to the Port Authorities to impose heavier additional charges on all goods which merchants after warning did not remove, thereby impeding the through traffic. A new shipping note has lately been introduced, with a view to preventing the delays caused by Customs examinations after certain modifications had been made in deference to strong representations from owners.

In February last a new committee, described as the Allocation Committee or Shipping Control Committee, and presided over by Lord Curzon, was appointed. It is apparently to take a bird's-eye view of all the numerous shipping questions, and to proportion the tonnage in

accordance with the urgency of the requirements. Too much must not be expected from this committee, which has come very late on the scene. Lord Curzon, the chairman and the 'only amateur,' should, it is true, be able to bring a fresh mind to bear on the various shipping problems, but the acquisition of the knowledge necessary to grasp all their intricacies will test the capacity of the finest brain. Other members are Lord Faringdon, better known as Sir Alexander Henderson; Mr Thomas Royden, one of the Government's principal advisers on shipping; and Mr F. W. Lewis, the able deputy-chairman of Furness, Withy & Company, Ltd, and a director of other cargo lines. The composition of this small control board, which is to be the centre-piece of the various shipping committees, has naturally not exhausted the supply of master-brains even in the shipping industry.

On the principle that high freights are simply due to the fact that the supply falls short of the demand, the Government decided in February to place restrictions on certain imports. The first to be affected were paper, paper-making materials, tobacco, dried fruits, furniture woods, stones, and slates. In pursuance of this policy Orders in Council were issued last month prohibiting the importation into the United Kingdom of many articles which come under the general head of 'luxuries.' Among the articles placed under the ban were motor-cars for private use, musical instruments, cutlery of all kinds, hardware, cotton and woollen manufactures, chinaware, fancy goods and soaps. A restriction has lately been accepted with a good grace by brewers on the importation of certain brewing materials. The restriction of any imports is bound to have the most far-reaching effect on industries and professions, and is obviously a matter which needs to be handled with the utmost care and delicacy.

The Government wheat policy has also had a considerable influence on freights. On the ground that the wheat reserves in this country needed strengthening, the Government has at different times bought wheat both in North and South America. An International Wheat Commission was formed to act for Great Britain and her Allies; and this Commission appointed, as freight-chartering agents, a firm of brokers, which during the past

few months has secured a great deal of tonnage. Since owners had an assurance that vessels chartered for this business would not be requisitioned, the firm was able to secure tonnage at rates substantially below those which have had to be paid by ordinary merchants. The Government, on realising that wheat operations by the State on a large scale would tend to disorganise the wheat trade, gave an undertaking that, except in case of extreme national urgency, this wheat would not be sold until the middle of July, but would be held as a national reserve. The chartering of so much tonnage greatly increased the difficulties of merchants, upon whom the Government has relied to supply the daily requirements of the country, and it has undoubtedly been a great factor in raising or maintaining the grain freights. Within the past few weeks merchants have been authorised to give the same assurance as the Government brokers about requisitioning, and rates have declined. Government control has been extended in the direction of requiring full particulars of all transactions proposed.

Mention must also be made of the action of the Australian Government in endeavouring to arrange for the transport of their fine wheat crop. The Australian Government appointed freight agents to act for it in London, and set limits on the freights that were to be paid, which were far below the rates current in other trades. A freight of 95s. a quarter was fixed, although the freight from Argentina—about half the distance of Australia from this country—was 150s. It is understood that the Australian Government has not at present secured anything like the amount of tonnage that is wanted; and its action has been criticised on the ground that all the benefit of the reduced rate was reaped by the Australian farmer. On the other hand, it is maintained that, if the brokers for the Australian Government had 'met the market' in the matter of rate, the instant effect would have to be to raise freights in all the trades. In spite of the limitation of freight, the price of Australian wheat has been the highest ever reached, and lately stood at 68s. 9d. a quarter.

For Australia the question of exporting her fine wheat crop is a matter of first-rate financial importance. To ship the whole of the crop to Europe during the next

few months would require several hundred voyages, and in the present circumstances it would be utterly impossible to find the ships. Australia is some 12,000 miles from this country, as compared with the 3,000 miles which separate Great Britain from Canada; consequently the same number of ships could in a given period bring two or three times the amount of grain from Canada as from Australia, and it is imperative that the time of the ships should be put to the most effective use. If it were decided that, in the general interest of the Allies, ships were better employed in bringing grain across the North Atlantic than from the South Atlantic, Australia would be fully entitled to financial compensation. The Australian wheat is a hard variety; and possibly something might be done in the direction of providing storage accommodation, for which there are few facilities at present. Because of the distance of Australia from this country, the maintenance of the shipping lines of communication is for her a vital matter. The Australian Government has since the outbreak of war adopted a strong line on the shipping problem, and possibly it may not always have fully appreciated the innumerable difficulties which have confronted the Imperial Government in coping with their larger shipping problem.

The Australian Government has prescribed the exact proportion of the different commodities which vessels loading at Australian ports shall carry. First, they must load a certain proportion of wheat, then meat, and finally wool. The shipment of all cargo has to be arranged through central boards, on which the different trading interests are represented; and the calls of the ships at the ports are regulated with the idea that the vessels shall not consume time and coal in calling at ports where they would receive but little cargo. The whole policy of the Australian Government has been to put the available tonnage to the utmost possible use. It is concerned most in shipping its bumper wheat crop, and has insisted that the supply of coals for vessels calling there should be dependent on their loading some proportion of it. The importance of the matter to Australia may be gauged by the fact that the exportable surplus is something like 3,500,000 tons, and that only about 500,000 tons have yet been shipped.

It will thus be seen that tonnage has been subject to a great many influences. Shipowners have not been allowed to go their own ways unhindered. But the criticism seems to be thoroughly justified, that there have been too many authorities pulling ships in different directions and too many committees at work. One is forced to the conclusion that the Government has acted only when public opinion made any further delay really impossible. Its policy can hardly be described as a far-seeing one. Thus it was only after eighteen months of war and after a strong newspaper agitation that the Shipping Control Committee presided over by Lord Curzon was appointed. Yet the necessity of a central authority was obvious many months ago. Even shipowners were getting restless under the system of different committees, each with a strictly limited point of view. Many had long thought that what was really needed was not a number of different advisory committees, but a Board of Control comprised of a few of the ablest men in the shipping industry who could give the whole of their time to probing the complexities of the shipping problem. It has been only too obvious that the comprehensive view has been lacking.

For instance, as most people know, all the chief shipping routes served by liners are controlled by 'Conferences,' the principle being that each ownership shall contribute a certain number of vessels to the service. Until lately, at any rate, many of the lines were endeavouring to carry on their services almost as in peace time. Companies apparently hesitated to suggest reductions in their own or each other's services owing to business jealousies and competition. People who should be in a good position to know have asserted that more ships have been employed in these trades than were absolutely necessary to preserve them. During 1915 this idea of trying to maintain the regular line of services was a great factor in forcing up freights, for it meant that, whenever an owner had a ship requisitioned by the Government, he had to go into the market and charter another to take her place. To-day a very large proportion of the regular lines of services are being carried on by cargo steamers chartered in this way. It should have been one of the first functions of a central Control Board to enquire if these regular services were

being carried on with the minimum amount of tonnage necessary. The position ever since the war began has been that, while the amount of carrying work to be done was as great as, or much greater than, the amount in peace time, the number of ships available has been far fewer. Economies had to be effected somewhere; and it was a question whether they should be made scientifically or in more or less haphazard fashion, according to the individual ideas of owners. The central authority, had it been created sooner, would have been able to examine all services in the light of what was best for the country, whereas individual companies naturally incline to examine trades in the light of what is best for their shareholders. Again, it may well be asked why a large number of ships were allowed to be frozen in for the winter at Archangel, and why vessels were allowed to be seriously delayed at Vladivostok owing to congestion at that port. If there had been a central authority devoting all its time to seeing that the utmost use was got out of shipping, such things would not have occurred. It would be reassuring to know that this lack of efficient control is now remedied.

It is easier to be wise after the event than before, and there can be little doubt that much of the shipping muddle would have been avoided if the Government had acted differently in the early months of the war. A proposal was then made that the Government should take over financially for the period of the war the whole of the British Mercantile Marine—a scheme which could then have been carried out quite easily. At the outbreak of war and for some weeks after it, freights were on a very low level; and owners would have jumped at terms which would now seem ridiculously low. During the early weeks of the war ordinary cargo steamers were being chartered at about 3s. per ton dead-weight per month; and owners were quite satisfied later when the Admiralty offered them for the requisitioned vessels terms equivalent to 7s. 6d. per ton. This year 35s. per ton per month and even more has been paid. There are able owners who have maintained that the preliminary to putting all British ships under the most effective control would be to bring their finances to a common denominator. That is to say, the Government

would take over all the ships on the basis of the Admiralty Blue-book rates or (which would probably be fairer) on that of rates based on the original cost of the ships. The hire would only be for the period of the war or for such longer term as might be agreed upon. The ships could be left under their existing managements, subject to a superior control, and might be diverted from one trade to another in the national interests without imposing any real hardships on individual owners.

There are those who would like even now to see the whole of the tonnage dealt with in some such way; but since the early days of the war serious difficulties, which cannot be ignored, have arisen. Vessels have been changing hands at enormous prices; and terms which would have been accepted with thanks by the original owners would have yielded a very inadequate return on the new capital. Further, it might be argued that the Government had countenanced these high prices by allowing the prize steamers to be sold for as much as they would fetch. It is indeed a disquieting feature of the whole situation that so much tonnage has been changing hands. Whole fleets have been sold. Mr McKenna agreed in the autumn that the increased values of ships sold should not be subject to the excess profit taxation—a concession which encouraged owners to sell their ships and retain the whole of the proceeds, instead of having to share the ordinary profits earned by their ships with the Government. Those who have paid enormous prices for the ships must obviously look to a continuance of very high freights to recoup them for their outlay. They have speculated in shipping.

A great objection to such a scheme of Government hire as that outlined is said to be that it leaves out of account neutral shipping. Everyone admits that British shipping can be controlled in whatever way seems most fitting to the Government, but many people maintain that we could in no way control neutral ships, which would reap all the benefit of whatever restrictions were placed on British tonnage. It is pointed out that something like one-third of the imports into this country is brought in neutral vessels. The answer is that, if we are dependent to this extent on neutral ships, it also suits

them to be employed in British trade. It is, indeed, difficult to imagine that neutral vessels could even in these times find adequate employment outside British trade. Practically the only full cargo available for export from Europe is British coal. Neutral ships are accustomed not only to load coal cargoes in this country but also to come here for bunkers. They bunker also at British coaling stations throughout the world. Apart from political interests, the British and neutral Mercantile Marines have a great deal in common; and there is a strong body of opinion which holds that, if neutral ships enjoy all the coaling and other facilities available for British vessels, they should undertake not to engage in any trades inimical to the interests of British shipping. A certain amount of pressure has already been brought to bear on neutral owners in this way. Neutral firms have had the same facilities given to them as are given to British ships. They have even come to this country for repairs and have been dealt with while British ships were consequently kept waiting. Again, there is no reason why, if it should be so decided, vessels chartered to the Government should not reap the benefit of the highest market rates available. The only difference from the system hitherto existing would be that the Government, after paying the owners a liberal rate of hire and a commission on the profits, would take all the surplus earnings.

A most serious aspect of the rise in freights which has been allowed to go on has been the benefit to neutrals. They have throughout been able to earn even higher freights than the British owners, and they have all strengthened their position enormously. Denmark recently announced a special tax of 20 per cent. on shipping profits; and a similar measure has just been proposed in Greece. The events of the war have, no doubt, impressed neutrals with the desirability of owning large mercantile fleets of their own. American business men have seen enormous quantities of cotton, grain and timber detained at their ports simply because there were not enough ships to transport them to European markets. In peace there were always enough ships, mostly British, to transport their products across the ocean. It is not surprising that

Americans should have come to realise that, if ships are not available, there is an important link missing in the chain of transactions between the grower and the consumer. In normal times the United States could not compare with Great Britain in cheapness and building costs, but the war has brought British and American costs to much the same level, while in this country, owing to the demand for naval work, the output of mercantile tonnage is extremely limited.

It is somewhat unfortunate that British shipowners should have come in for so much criticism during the controversy. No thinking person could regret seeing shipowners enjoy prosperity, since the whole welfare of the country depends upon an efficient mercantile marine. Anything which discouraged enterprise would be damaging to the national interests, but the more intelligent owners have honestly regretted that the rise in freights has reached such levels, because they have realised that the movement has injuriously affected every industry in the country. It has been my privilege to discuss shipping problems with many London shipowners and managers during the past few months; and in almost every case they have shown a readiness to consider these questions from a quite impartial point of view. Many of them are engaged in other businesses besides shipping, and are in a position to realise the harmful and far-reaching effect of extraordinarily high freights. They have declared they had no desire to make unreasonably large profits, and have expressed a willingness to fall in with any scheme, once they were convinced of its effectiveness for the purpose in view, though some have thought the opportunity for strong action had been missed in the early stages of the war. The Liverpool owners have publicly expressed their mistrust of Government control; but they too, like the London owners, are among the best type of business men, and are prepared at any rate to devote time to trying to discover a solution of the difficulties. Whether the large number of owners of small fleets throughout the country are as capable of looking at the problem from an independent standpoint seems another matter. It is not improbable that many of them argue that, as shipowners have passed through lean periods in the past, it is only fitting that they should

now be enjoying prosperity, and that they are justified in making all they can before bad times recur.

The Government has, it would seem, reconciled itself to the high freights, and has even come to see a merit in the situation. On Dec. 24, 1915, when freights were far from their zenith, Mr Balfour referred in the House of Commons to the 'present terrible level' of freights, a level which 'certainly increases the price both of necessities of life to the poor, and of many things which are necessary to the Government in the proper conduct of the war.' Nevertheless shipowners have lately been given the impression that the Government sees no objection to high freights, and rather regards them as profitable to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. How far this change of attitude is due to a recognition that the situation has been allowed to go beyond Government control can only be a matter of surmise.

It is to be hoped that, though the Government delayed vigorous action on the tonnage question until it was really too late, they will formulate a clear policy on mercantile shipbuilding. Even the resumption of work on ships interrupted by naval orders has been delayed owing to discussions between builders and owners as to who should bear the increased cost of labour and material, the Government having refused to accept any liability on this account. Owners are afraid to place contracts with builders when complete uncertainty surrounds the cost and the date of delivery; yet the need of a vigorous mercantile shipbuilding programme is very urgent. In the opinion of naval architects much time might be gained by standardisation of construction; and it is satisfactory to learn from a recent answer from the President of the Board of Trade that a scheme for the placing of large contracts for standard cargo-ships has been under consideration. Joint action of some kind will be necessary, otherwise neutral owners will easily be able to outbid British owners in the terms offered for new tonnage.

The appointment of a strong committee by the Chamber of Shipping, acting in co-operation with the Liverpool Steamship Owners' Association, to consider trade policy after the war, is of hopeful augury. The appointment followed a speech delivered by Mr Runciman

in Parliament on Jan. 11, in which he declared that heavily subsidised foreign lines ought not to have the same use of our ports as those which received no artificial assistance, and instanced cases in which German ships had even had an advantage at British ports over British ships. In the past there has been little cohesion among British shipowners, and consequently they have had to yield bit by bit to the encroachments of the highly organised and subsidised German mercantile marine. It was difficult to arouse interest on the subject of the economic war which Germany was actively, though quietly, carrying on in peace time; but the British nation is now wide awake and realises at last that an efficient mercantile marine is just as important in its way for this country as a magnificent Navy. The officers and men of the mercantile marine, in facing hidden dangers as part of the day's work, have deserved well of the country; and, in spite of all the discussion of the past few months, the whole of the mercantile marine has found a place in the nation's heart which it never had before. That alone means much for the future.

CUTHBERT MAUGHAN.

Art. 12.—HORACE AT HIS SABINE FARM. ✓

1. *Découverte de la Maison de Campagne d'Horace*. Par l'Abbé Capmartin de Chaupy. Three vols. Rome, 1767-69.
2. *Nouvelles Promenades Archéologiques — Horace et Virgile*. Par Gaston Boissier. Sixth edition. Paris: Hachette, 1907.
3. *The Roman Poets of the Augustan Age: Horace and the Elegiac Poets*. By W. Y. Sellar. Second edition. Oxford University Press, 1899.
4. *Horace; Odes and Epodes, with an English translation by C. E. Bennett (Loeb Classical Library)*. London: Heinemann, 1914.

AMONG the poets of antiquity whose works have been preserved, none is so noted as Horace for the frequency and fullness of his allusions to the rural surroundings amidst which he lived, and for the warmth with which he acknowledged how much he owed to them as sources of his inspiration. He has made his farm among the Sabine Hills familiar to thousands of readers in all lands, who know it only as it is pictured in his poems. The actual site of an ancient author's home cannot often be definitely ascertained; but that of Horace has been determined beyond all reasonable doubt.

In the latter half of the 18th century an enthusiastic Frenchman, the Abbé Capmartin de Chaupy, devoted himself with extraordinary ardour to an exhaustive examination of the Sabine region, and succeeded in identifying the position of the celebrated farm. The results of his labours were published by him in three learned volumes, which, though they now stand dusty and unread on the shelves of public libraries, will preserve the name of their author in lasting remembrance among students of the classics. Since his time pilgrims to the place have been many, of whom some have left accounts of their visits. Probably the most widely known and generally appreciated of these narratives is that of the late Gaston Boissier, the accomplished Secretary of the Académie Française. In the admirable essay on Horace by the late Prof. Sellar, his account of the poet's home

shows his acquaintance with the actual locality. But the subject is not yet exhausted.

There cannot now be any doubt that the poet's '*vallis reducta*' was a sequestered vale among the Sabine Hills, which opens from the north into the wider valley of the Teverone or Anio, about eight miles above Tivoli. The stream that flows down this vale, and bears to-day the name of the Licenza, is beyond question his '*gelidus Digentia rivus*.' The two hill-towns which he mentions by name, Varia and Mandela, still rise prominently above the Anio; and his various topographical allusions can for the most part be identified. His description of the general aspect of the ground is quite accurate—a range of hills that would be continuous were they not sundered by a shady valley of which the one side catches the rays of dawn while the other side is lit up by those of sunset. The valley is a true glen among the hills, from which it emerges into an opener tract before the stream falls into the Anio. At the opening of the glen, its floor is about 1150 feet above the level of the sea. From this point it slowly rises to 1300 feet at its upper end, a difference of only 150 feet in two miles and a half, but quite sufficient to give the Licenza stream a rapid current. From the flat alluvial bottom the mountains on either side mount up steeply for more than 1000 feet. The distance between the opposite crests is at one place less than a mile; and the abrupt declivities on either side approach each other so nearly at their base as to leave between them a strip of meadow-land which in its lower two miles is probably not more than from 150 to 300 yards in width. Through this plain the river winds its way, with here and there strips of gravel along its margin.

Not, however, until we reach a point about two-thirds of the way up the valley can the truly mountainous character of the ground be fully appreciated. The heights on either side culminate in undulating crests that exceed 3000 feet in height above the sea, increasing in elevation towards the north, and finally converging to form a continuous encircling rampart of naked rock which seems at first sight to shut off all access to the country beyond. Perched conspicuously on a projecting ridge of the broken front of this barrier, the little hill-village of Licenza looks down the valley, while far to the left,

on the sky-line and 1000 feet above the valley-floor, stands the hamlet of Civitella. But behind this vast rocky rampart the tops of a group of much loftier blunted peaks rise into the sky—outer bastions, as it were, of a wild and seemingly inaccessible mountain-world that lies beyond. These summits belong to a part of the Apennine chain which reaches its highest point in Monte Pellechio, 4488 feet above the level of the sea, or slightly higher than Ben Nevis, the loftiest height of the Scottish Highlands.

In front of the great curving rampart of grey rugged rock, on the face of which the village of Licenza has been built, the glen widens out on both sides, so as to leave a greater breadth of cultivable land between the bases of the opposite slopes. It was here on a strip of ground that lies a little above the meadows on the right or western margin of the river that Horace's dwelling stood. The advantages of the site for a farm or country-house were certainly recognised by the Romans, for the characteristic remains of one of their villas have long been known to exist here. These remains have from time to time been laid open and covered over again. But a more extensive and systematic exploration is now in progress, from which much new light has been thrown on the extent and character of the establishment. Several rooms with good mosaic floors in black and white tesserae have been unearthed; likewise baths, and extensive arrangements for heating the house, together with other parts of the ground-plan. Many amphoræ, coins and other loose objects have been found, which are preserved in Licenza. A cryptoporticus has also been disclosed, with walls in reticulate work, leading probably southward into the garden.

This dwelling has long been popularly known as the 'Villa d'Orazio,' and every one would wish to believe the ascription to be correct. There seems, however, to be some reason to doubt whether the remains now visible do not indicate a more extensive and luxurious mansion than the poet's account of his Sabine home would lead us to expect. They may rather indicate the design of some later and wealthier owner, who though no doubt pleased to possess a property made famous by Horace, could not be content with the poet's simplicity. But that the

existing remains lie on or close to the site of Horace's country-house may be regarded as proved.

Horace has left no account of how he traversed the thirty-two Roman miles that separated him in the capital from his Sabine farm. As that retreat was inaccessible save from the south, he could only journey by the frequented highways of the Via Tiburtina and Via Valeria. If, as he himself confessed, a continuous drive for some hours on the well-paved surface of the Via Appia, that 'queen of roads,' was somewhat trying to his powers of endurance, it may be surmised that the high-roads into the Sabine country would be found not less irksome. Moreover, when he had arrived by the Valerian road at the point where he had to diverge to his farm, there still lay four miles between him and the end of his journey. And these miles may sometimes have been the most troublesome of all. Instead of a paved route he had probably now only a rough country-road or track that wound up his narrow glen and was best suited for a rider on horseback, or a stout farm-cart. In this high-lying district, where rain is heavier and more frequent than on the lowland further west, he might occasionally find that, even if he escaped a drenching, his wayward Digentia, swollen by many a furious torrent from the surrounding hillsides, had cut up the roadway, making it impassable for wheels and difficult for a horseman, or had even entirely submerged it under a sweeping flood.

Horace would probably be most independent on the back of his bobtail mule, on which, as he said, he could ride, if he chose, as far as Tarentum. We can picture him thus mounted, with the usual supply of literature crammed into his wallets, jogging along the great high-roads from Rome, and picking his way along the road or track up into his secluded valley. The journey would take at least five or six hours of continuous travelling. Obviously so long a ride, consuming the greater part of a day, could not but be somewhat fatiguing to a man of his build. Not improbably he would sometimes halt for the night at Tibur, of whose charms he had so keen an appreciation.

There has probably been little material change in the essential topographical features of Horace's Sabine valley since his time. But unhappily one important element

which gave the place its special charm in his eyes has disappeared. It is no longer the *opaca vallis* which he loved. The thick woodland is gone, with its venerable oaks and ilexes and gnarled olives, and the abundant grateful shade which they furnished. The whole valley may now be traversed from end to end with little or no shelter from the sun. The pilgrim to the poet's home finds it no easy task to picture the scene as it is depicted by Horace. With an effort of the imagination he must try to re-clothe the ground with the bosky covering under which it lay nineteen hundred years ago, and amid the present solitude of the place to imagine what the life and stir of the poet's estate must have been, with its households of tenants who sent their "five worthy senators" to the council meetings at Varia, its farm with eight slaves to work it and a bailiff to look after them, its company of domestics in the villa, some of them home-born, and Horace himself as the genial master of all.

But there is much in the landscape that must remain essentially as it was in the poet's time. From where his house stood we look across to the same steep hill-sides—the *arduos Sabinos*—with which he was familiar. The music of running water, so pleasant to his ear, still murmurs down the vale. From a cleft in the rocky slope above the house, the spring which he has made immortal sends forth the same limpid babbling stream ('*saxis unde loquaces lymphæ desiliunt*'); and the cool Digentia, gathering as of old its tributary brooks from either side and rippling over its bed of gravel, breaks the stillness of the scene. When early astir (for here he probably did not lie in bed till ten o'clock, as he did in town) Horace could see the rosy flush of dawn lighting up the group of grim northern peaks that were the loftiest ground in his landscape. And these same summits would catch for him the last golden gleam of the after-glow, when the sun had sunk beneath the western sea, and the gloom of evening was spreading over his valley. At night in the clear mountain air, unblurred by the City glare of torch and lamp, the deep Italian sky would reveal to him in all their glory the splendours of star-shine and moonlight. Familiar, like most country-bred Romans, with the chief stars and constellations in the firmament, he knew the times of their rising and setting,

and could watch their motion as they slowly sailed, hour by hour, across the narrowed space of sky between the bare crests on either side of his glen. In the warm haze of a summer noon, he could let his fancy discern amidst the shimmer of the opposite crags a group of the popular deities—perhaps Bacchus teaching his songs to the nymphs and the prick-eared, goat-footed satyrs; or in the cool depths of an autumn night, when the moon rode high, he could picture to himself a chorus of Nymphs and Graces, under the leadership of Venus herself, dancing their rhythmic measures on his green meadows by the river-side. In this remote recess among the hills we realise with a strange vividness the full meaning of Horace's allusion to it as his mountain citadel. Fenced off from the rest of the world by rough forest-clad pathless hills, he might well say that here he could live and reign like a king; and that, when wearied with the distractions of Rome, escape to this quiet home restored him to himself.

Before Mæcenas became his patron and friend, Horace used to frame his day-dream of what he would fain possess. This dream was amply realised when the Sabine farm was presented to him by the enlightened minister of Augustus. As he wrote:

'The gods have dealt more bountifully with me than I hoped for. I now ask nothing more than that they will confirm these gifts as indeed my own. Content and pleased with what I possess, my prayer is that my cattle may grow fat, together with everything else that belongs to me, save my wits' (Sat. II, vi, 4; also Od. II, xviii).

From the many allusions to his country home scattered through his poems, a tolerably distinct impression can be formed of him as he lived there. He has given a graphic sketch of the general aspect of his retreat. In his secluded valley among the high hills the air was to him pleasantly temperate. Thickets of copsewood bore abundant crops of cornels and plums; woods of oak and *illex* yielded ample forage for the cattle and cool shade for their owner. The rich verdure all around almost seemed to have been transported from his favourite Tarentum to this vale among the Sabine uplands. There was a spring, too, cool and pure as Hebrus itself; worthy

to give its name to some broad river, and bringing welcome solace alike to weary head and jaded appetite. In this delightful hiding-place, sheltered from the heat of the dog days and from the pestilential breath of autumn, he wrote this description of it to his friend Quinctius, whose coming he awaited (Epist. I, xvi).

To escape from the smoke and tumult of Rome to the warm shelter of his little villa amidst the silence and the freshness of the country; to exchange the prolonged and luxurious banquets of his city friends for short and simple meals, chiefly furnished from the produce of his own garden, followed, if he chose, by sleep on the grass under trees by the murmuring Digentia; to replace his walks through the crowded and bustling thoroughfares of the great capital with solitary rambles by streams and moss-grown rocks and through woods and fields that were all his own; to have around him a company of tenants and servants who looked up to him for protection and help—formed a combination of pleasures which evidently thrilled him with delight. He could have been happy, he said, with even less than had been granted to him. Should the gods be pleased to prolong his days, he only desired that he might be permitted to live to himself in that peaceful spot, with goodly store of books, and a provision of food sufficient for the year. An almost passionate feeling of contentment and gratitude finds expression again and again in his poems (Od. II, xviii; III, i, 47; xvi, 29).

Of all the sources of satisfaction that came to the poet from the possession of his Sabine estate, there can be little doubt that the deepest and fullest sprang from the consciousness of the profound influence of the place on his poetic temperament. He knew that his muse, 'the sweet solace of all his toils,' was the highest gift with which he had been endowed; and he felt that here, amid the romantic beauty and the restful solitude of the valley, he had found the fitting surroundings from which his muse could draw her inspiration. His poems are full of expressions of the unstinted admiration and delight with which these surroundings appealed to his imagination. While the whole landscape charmed him, it was the abundant running water and the shady woodlands which seem to have been the features that more especially

inspired him. He felt that, under the guidance of the Muses, it would be these features that would make him famous as a lyric poet (*Od.* IV, iii, 10). At times, as he tells, while he strayed by the banks of the streams and through the silent woods of his valley, a feeling of awe would come over him, such as he could believe must fill the soul of the sleepless Bacchanal, as from her mountain-crest she gazes afar over Hebrus and the snowy plains of Thrace (*Od.* III, xxv, 8). Again, in times of reverie he could fancy that he heard strains of celestial music, when he seemed to have been transported into an Elysian world. The day-dream that then shaped itself in his mind was a kind of glorified reproduction of his own Sabine landscape, wherein again he found himself wandering through sacred groves, by the side of pleasant waters, and fanned by the gentlest breezes (*III*, iv, 6). When he summed up the favours which kind Fate had bestowed upon him, he placed together in the forefront, as specially deserving of grateful recognition, his country-home and his poetic gift (*II*, xvi, 37).

Horace evidently took a keen personal interest in the various operations of his farm. He might himself be seen moving sods and stones on his ground, to the amusement of his neighbours, who smiled either at his enthusiasm or at the awkwardness of his manual efforts (*Epist.* I, xiv, 39). He owned flocks of sheep and goats that supplied food and materials for clothing to the dwellers on the estate; also draught-oxen that ploughed his fields. The sunny meadows by the river-side in which he took so much pride were apt to be inundated in times of heavy rain; and one of his cares was to see that his bailiff kept in due repair the embankments constructed to restrain the *Digentia* within its proper bounds (*Ib.* 29). In the belief that Heaven makes everything hard to those who take no wine, the poet had recommended his friend Varus at Tibur to plant the sacred vine before any other tree, and he doubtless followed this precept himself when he came into possession of his farm. From his vineyards there he made his own wine, which, crude and thin as it may have been, he would place on his table even when Mæcenas was his guest. He refers to his olives being sometimes shrivelled with the summer heat; but from them he would obtain his oil, which if not equal to that of

Venafrum sufficed for his needs. In his garden grew the chicory, mallows, ~~beans~~ and other vegetables that formed so large a part of his diet. And, though he inveighed against the prevailing luxury in regard to floral decoration, he yet found a place for the roses, lilies, myrtle, rosemary, ivy and parsley that served to furnish wreaths for his guests and himself at the evening meal. He had an eye for the attractions of individual trees on his property. The white poplar and the tall pine are singled out by him for special notice, as in the little landscape where he pictures their intertwined foliage, throwing a friendly shade over a dell wherein a clear brook murmurs down its winding channel (*Od.* II, iii, 9). The pine was particularly appreciated by him on account of the depth of its cool shade, and dear to him must have been the tree of that kind which overhung his own dwelling and kept off the glare and heat of summer (*III*, xxii, 5). There was likewise near his house the laurel tree under which his old comrade Pompeius was asked to rest his war-worn limbs (*II*, vii, 19).

Horace's experience as a farmer in an upland valley could not fail to bring vividly before him the many trials and anxieties of husbandry. He enumerates in particular those which arise from the weather and the seasons; how, for instance, on land that may have held out fair promise of successful farming, the vines may be beaten down by destructive hail-storms, the fields and trees may at one time be drenched with heavy rains, at another time burnt up with summer heat, or again blighted by the inclemency of winter (*III*, i, 29). His familiarity with rural life supplied him with occasional effective similes and allusions. Thus he would sometimes contrast the troubled lives of wealthy men with the quiet tranquillity of his Sabine home, where gentle sleep disdained not the cots of the field-labourers, and where the shady river-bank in the valley, fanned by the west winds, invited to unbroken repose. When he dwells on the qualities needed for the noblest poetry, he insists that the poet must be 'impetuous yet clear, like a limpid river,' such as the Digentia that rolled its cool current past his meadows. When he inculcates the duty of seeing that evil habits are not allowed to root themselves in our character, he quotes a warning from bad farming, where 'on neglected

land the fern springs up which is only fit to be burnt.' Complimenting a friend on his literary powers, he adds that the possession has not been allowed to remain, like neglected land, uncultivated and shamefully rough. And in a graphic and poetic simile he likens a disputant carried away by his anger to 'a wintry flood which as it rushes along, sweeps into woodlands where the woodman's axe has seldom been heard' (Sat. I, iii, 36; vii, 26; Epist. I, iii, 21).

It probably took some time for Horace to accustom himself to the change from the stir of Rome to the quietude of the country. For a while, as he says that his slave Davus told him, when at Rome he wished to be in the country, and when in the country he wearied to be back in Rome. But in the end the attractions of life in the Sabine valley outweighed those of society in the great metropolis. Eventually he came to be of opinion that 'the whole choir of poets loves the woodland and shuns cities' (Epist. II, ii, 77), and he grudged the occasions when what he called 'hateful business' dragged him to Rome. He has revealed some of the thoughts which passed through his mind at such times in the city, when a day would be wasted for him by importunate applicants and other interruptions.

'O country home,' he would soliloquise, 'when shall I see you again? When may I once more be allowed, now among my old authors and now in sleep and idleness, to drown the cares of life in sweet oblivion? When shall I have again my simple meal of beans and other garden vegetables that need no more seasoning than fat bacon? O nights and suppers of the gods! when with my friends I feast before my own family god and feed my saucy home-born slaves on the food which we have left. The talk that then arises is not about the villas or mansions of other people, nor whether or not *Lepos* dances badly. We discuss subjects that much more nearly concern us, and on which it is evil to be ignorant; whether, for example, men are happiest with riches or with virtue; whether friendship is more promoted from motives of self-interest or of right feeling; what is the nature of the Good and what is its highest perfection' (Sat. II, vi).

One would like to know whether Horace had any congenial neighbours. In the defile of the *Digentia* there

was hardly room for another landowner with as much cultivable ground as he himself seems to have possessed. He mentions only one neighbour who shared these evenings with him—a certain Cervius who, he says, used to prattle away, recounting such old-wives' fables as the talk might suggest. A specimen of the contributions of this guest is given in the now famous story of the town-mouse and the country-mouse. We may surmise that Cervius was a shrewd, honest farmer, not perhaps with much education, but full of the practical wisdom of his class; a good sample of the homely, sturdy and upright Sabellian yeoman for whom the poet had so high a regard, and of whom he has left so charming a sketch in the character of Ofellus.

In the large community of Tibur Horace could no doubt count on not a few friends and acquaintances whom he might invite to visit him at his Sabinum, while from his wide circle of friends and admirers in Rome there would be many whom he would gladly receive under his roof. A man of his sociable temperament might not often care to be wholly alone in his secluded retreat. From his poems it is possible to gather the names of a few of the associates whom he would be likely to have more or less frequently as his guests. We may be fairly sure, for instance, that the cordial intercourse between him and his friend the contemporary poet, Albius Tibullus, was not confined to such metrical correspondence as has survived in Horace's works.* Tibullus lived not many miles away among the Pedan Hills, to the south of the Anio valley. He might well from time to time pay a visit to the farm by the Digentia, where his gentle and plaintive nature would be cheered by the good humour that reigned there. Horace invited him on one occasion, with an assurance that if he were in need of something to laugh at he would find it in the fat, sleek and well-groomed person of his brother poet—a true hog of Epicurus' herd (Od. I, xxxiii; Epist. I, iv).

But, above all, would Mæcenas be welcomed and honoured in the home of the man whose life his bounty and friendship had made so happy and so fruitful. No one had so large a share as he of Horace's affection and

* Od. I, xxxiii; Epist. I, iv.

admiration. In one of the odes addressed to him by the poet, he is entreated to defer no longer his expected visit, for which everything was ready and waiting. In another ode he is forewarned as to the homely fare in store for him, but the invitation is given with that combination of delicate compliment and pleasing reminiscence which Horace, with his mingled deference and manly independence, knew so well how to express.* The birthday of Mæcenas was one of the chief festal days of the year at the Sabine farm, when friends came to join the poet in worthily celebrating the praises of the great statesman and generous benefactor. Horace has left a graphic description of the preparations for one of these festivities :

'a jar of Alban wine more than nine years old is ready to be broached; the garden will supply plenty of ivy and parsley wherewith to twine garlands for the company; the house is smiling with burnished silver; an altar of turf, bound with sacred boughs, is impatient to be sprinkled with the blood of a sacrificial lamb; the whole household is astir, lads and lasses jostling each other as they run hither and thither; even the very flames are in a quiver as they roll aloft the wreaths of dark smoke' (Od. IV, xi).

On occasions which warranted a departure from the wonted decorum of his modest repasts Horace did not think it out of place to play the fool or act the mad-cap. Such was the memorable day when he welcomed back Pompeius, his comrade at Philippi, war-worn and weary from his long campaigning, when the poet called on his domestics to fill the polished flagons brim-full of care-dispelling Massic wine, to pour out the perfumes from ample shells and to wreath the garlands of parsley or myrtle: he himself, he said, would revel as wildly as the very Edonians, for joy that a long absent friend had returned. Such, too, was the merry gathering in Rome, invited to celebrate the election of Murena to the augurship, when the enraptured bard, in recognition of the number of his beloved Muses, and full of the mad humour in which he sometimes delighted, would quaff his glass three times three, demanding aloud why they had stopped the blowing of the Bercynthian flute,

* Carm. I, xx; III, viii., xxix.

and why the pipe was now hanging up beside the silent lyre (Od. II, vii; III, xix).

In contrast with these occasional merry-makings were the many quiet evenings in which music was the chief employment. No one familiar with Horace's poetry can fail to recognise in it evidence of the poet's keen musical ear and instinctive perception of rhythm and melody. His odes, which he felt would be immortal, were meant, as he expressly declares, to be linked with the accompaniment of the lyre.* And there can be little doubt that they must often have been so sung at the Sabine farm. Horace could count among his friends, especially those of the fair sex, some who could sing and accompany themselves on the lyre or the cithara. Thus Phyllis, 'the last of all his loves,' was invited to come and learn the verses which, with her lovely voice, she would sing at the birthday festival in honour of Mæcenas; 'for gloomy care is lightened by song.' Tyndaris, as already mentioned, was asked to visit the Sabine farm where she would sing on the Teian lyre legends of Penelope and Circe. Lyde, with her curved ivory lute, sang in turn with the poet himself, she chanting the praises of Latona and swift Cynthia's darts, while he sang of Neptune and the sea-green tresses of the Nereids (Od. IV, xi, 34; I, xvii, 18; III, xxviii, 9).

Horace's poetry conveys the distinct impression that he must have been a genial *patronus* to his tenants, and a kindly master to his slaves. His good nature is pleasantly revealed in his letter to the bailiff of his woods and farm, and again in the patience with which, as he relates, he submitted to the Saturnalian criticism of his slave Davus (Epist. I, xiv; Sat. II, vii). He obviously shared with pleasure in the various annual rural festivals that had been handed down from antiquity (Epist. II, i, 139). The associations of his youth, which included a vivid appreciation of the simple life and upright ways of the Apulian farmer-folk, would be revived among his own Sabine peasantry, and it may well be believed that from this source of sympathy came not the least of the attractions that bound him to his home. In a hymn to Faunus he has described with evident fellow-feeling

* 'Verba loquor socianda chordis.' Od. IV, ix, 4.

the return of the merry time of the Faunalia, celebrated on Dec. 5, when the country-folk from the district held high holiday among the meadows, when the ox was given a rest from its toil, while the ditcher rejoiced to dance on the soil that gave him so much labour at other times (Od. III, xviii). But it was not only by sharing in their festivals that the poet manifested his interest in the affairs of his humble neighbours. When the rustic Phidyle laid before him her anxieties about the due observance of her religious duties, he listened to her tale and gave her the wise and enlightened counsel and the encouraging consolation which his sound judgment and liberal nature prompted and which have been recorded for all time in one of the most beautiful and touching of his Odes (III, xxiii).

How large a part of the year Horace spent at his farm can only be surmised. Probably, if the weather permitted, he would remain there until after the nones of December, when all the crops had been gathered and stored away, and the festival of Faunus drew the population of the glen together. But he disliked cold; and hence, when the mountain-tops on his northern skyline began to grow white and to send down cold blasts into the vale of the Digentia, he would descend from his upland fastness and betake himself with his books to some milder region, especially to the sea-coast, there to establish himself in narrower quarters until with the advent of the warm west winds and the return of the first swallow he could come back to the hills (Epist. I, vii, 11).

One of the charms of the Sabine retreat in the eyes of the poet must have lain in the ease with which he could at any moment secure the most perfect solitude, and wander at will through pathless woods, by the side of clear brooks, whose winding channels would lead him up into the loneliest recesses of the mountains. He came at such times into the most intimate contact with Nature. His companions were then the wild creatures that live apart from man, and he seems to have watched them with all the interest of a sympathetic heart. His simile of the deer, forgetful of its pasture and rushing off panting in hot haste, with its head held high, to escape from the wolf which it has descried on the

opposite side of the valley, may have been drawn from an observation made not far from his home (*Od.* I, xv, 29). It was on one of his solitary woodland rambles 'beyond bounds,' when he was making the silent forest resound with the praises of his Lalage, that he himself encountered a wolf, portentous monster, as he describes it, which nevertheless fled from him (*I.* xxii, 9). Yet another incident of sylvan life, of which he has left so delicate a sketch, may be what his own eyes had witnessed in the woods—a fawn seeking its timid mother among the pathless mountains, fearful of the stirrings of the breeze amid the foliage, starting in alarm and trembling in heart and knees at the quiver sent through the lightly-moved brier-leaves by the first breath of spring, or at the rustle among the bramble-bushes where the green lizards are stirring' (*I.* xxiii). One of the poet's favourite haunts was the ruined fane of the native goddess Vacuna which stood on rising ground a short way to the south of his farm. There he would lie in the shade and meditate, inditing now and then an ode or dictating a metrical epistle, happy in his retirement, save that the friend to whom he writes is not present to share in the enjoyment of the scene (*Epist.* I, x, 49).

Horace, in the earlier part of his poetic career, professed himself an Epicurean. Quoting Lucretius, he said that he 'had learnt that the gods pass their lives in careless ease, and that when any wonder is worked by Nature it is not sent down from the high vault of heaven by ill-humoured deities' (*Sat.* I, v, 101). He tells that he continued to be what he calls 'a sparing and infrequent worshipper of the gods,' until one day he was driven out of his scepticism by hearing thunder from a clear sky—a portent which the philosophers held to be normally impossible (*Od.* I, xxxiv, 5). The incident, such as it was, probably occurred in his Sabine home, where thunder might be heard from some neighbouring part of the uplands, though the narrow space of sky visible above the valley might chance to be free of cloud. This alleged sudden change of religious mood appears to have been afterwards confirmed by a memorable experience at his farm. In one of his walks through his woods an old tree fell and nearly crushed him. This accident happened on the Kalends of March, perhaps in a vernal

gale by which some of the more venerable trees were blown down. He commemorated the day, year after year, in the pious way which his humble tenants and neighbours would appreciate, by a sacrifice in recognition of the hand of some higher power in preserving him from sudden death. Yet, curiously enough, he seems to have been uncertain to which member of the popular pantheon he should attribute his deliverance, for at each allusion to the event he ascribes his rescue to a different divinity. At one time he affirms that Faunus, the god of fields and shepherds and likewise the guardian of poets, warded off the blow of the falling tree. At another time he assigns his escape to the intervention of the genial Muses of whom he was the devoted follower. In a third reference, he is convinced that his deliverer could be none other than Liber, the god of the vineyard, to whom he makes offering of flowers, and a basket of frankincense laid with charcoal on an altar of fresh turf, together with a savoury repast and the sacrifice of a white goat (*Od.* II, xiii; xvii, 27; III, iv, 27; viii, 1-10).

Deeply imbued with the poetry of Greece, Horace in his lyrics naturally availed himself of the mythology and theogony which Greek fancy had made so attractive. There can be little doubt that the combined wildness and beauty of his own Sabine surroundings, with their commingling of mountain and crag, meadow, grove and stream, furnished the kind of scenery that would often suggest to him the actual presence of the gods and goddesses of Hellenic legend and song. For the purposes of his Muse he peopled his glen with these divinities; and, in so doing, he probably had no inconsiderable share in helping forward the practice of transferring to the old native deities of Latium the attributes and adventures of the Olympian hierarchy.

During the years preceding his possession of the farm, Horace had lived in Rome, an ardent lover of town-life. He heartily enjoyed the agreeable society and the endless variety of interests, occupations and amusements in the city. He has himself drawn his own portrait at that time of his life when, as an active man-about-town, with pleasant speech and merry laugh, he delighted in fine clothes, wore his black hair shining with unguents, drank freely of unmingled Falernian wine,

even in the middle of the day, strolled in meditative mood along the Via Sacra, and in the evening sauntered through the crowd in the Circus and Forum, watching the tricks of the jugglers and fortune-tellers. At first, although glad from time to time to escape from the bustle and din of the capital to the quiet of his 'citadel among the hills,' he was not sorry to quit the solitude of the country and to find himself again at the great centre of the Empire. But, as we have seen, in the course of years the attractions of the Sabine home obtained such a mastery of his affections that he never cared to leave, and was always glad to regain it.

Thus by degrees the duties which his property imposed upon him, together with the quiet pleasures of country life, transformed the town-dandy into a temperate and careful landowner, who interested himself in the work of his farm, looked after the welfare of his tenants and slaves, kept open house for his friends, and took his part worthily as the head of a little rural community. But on the poetic genius of the man the influence of the country was still more profound. It continually accustomed him to appreciate the varied charms of hills and woods and streams, and gave him the boon of often finding himself alone face to face with Nature. It thus stimulated in him the inspiration which found vent in some of the finest lyric poetry of the ancient world. It likewise afforded him that uninterrupted leisure for reflection and meditation on the problems of life which enabled him to express in terse and vivid language the precepts of mellow wisdom and genial criticism which have made his Satires and Epistles the delight of every successive generation of cultivated men. That secluded valley among the Sabine Hills is thus sacred to his memory. It has become a shrine to which the scholar repairs to offer his tribute of homage to one of the great masters of Latin literature, and to which every lover of Nature and of poetry owes a deep debt of gratitude for the share which it had in prompting and sustaining the Muse of Horace.

ARCHIBALD GEIKIE.

Art. 13.—THE GRANVILLE CORRESPONDENCE.

Lord Granville Leveson Gower (First Earl Granville). *Private Correspondence*, 1781 to 1821. Edited by his Daughter-in-law, Castalia, Countess Granville. Two vols, with Portraits and Illustrations. London : Murray, 1916.

THE last thirty or forty years have witnessed the publication of so many autobiographies, collections of letters, and other contemporary documents dealing with the early years of the nineteenth century that it might almost be thought that there was no room for more books of the same kind. Add to these the many modern Lives of the eminent people of the epoch of Pitt and Napoleon, based by trained historians upon contemporary documents ; and what need, the impatient reader might ask, is there for any further materials for the history of that time ? We can make no better answer than to refer him to the two volumes of the Granville Correspondence, just edited and issued by Castalia, Countess Granville, the widow of the well-remembered Foreign Secretary. They cover the years 1781-1821, that is to say the last two-thirds of George the Third's reign, the wars with the French Republic and the First Empire, the predominance of Pitt and the wavering government of his successors, the Regency, the Union with Ireland—in a word, the origins of modern England. They treat the events of the time with intimate knowledge and with singular freshness ; and their personal and psychological interest is great. They are based upon a vast correspondence, of which practically the whole of one side has been preserved ; and the letters have been selected, and the whole book edited and annotated with an amount of care and skill that does great credit to Lady Granville. We need add no more by way of preface than that the centre of the correspondence was the late Lord Granville's father ; that quite two-thirds of the Letters were written by his friend Lady Bessborough ; and that the rest are either from himself or from one or other of his many friends, of whom George Canning was the chief.

Granville Leveson Gower was the youngest child of the well-known statesman who had been second Earl

Gower from 1754 to 1786, when he was created Marquis of Stafford. Lord Gower held high public offices, and was for many years in the front rank of Government men. In 1783 he was offered, and refused, the post of Prime Minister. The few letters from him which appear in this book imply a just and fair-dealing mind, but there is no denying that they also reveal the despotic temper of one whose word was law, and who meant that it should always be so. On the other hand, his third wife, who had been Lady Susan Stewart, and was the mother of Lord Granville, was a woman of a most kindly and amiable disposition, wise, accomplished, and religious; an admirable mother and a softening intermediary between father and son. Her letters, of which the first volume of the book contains a good many, are just what might be expected from a woman of this kind, with considerable experience of life, a clear sense of the dangers to which a wealthy young aristocrat was exposed, and a judgment that was in the best sense liberal. Of the other members of the immediate family we hear but little. Granville's half-brother and sisters were very much older than himself; when the lad was eleven years old, the eldest brother married Elizabeth, Countess of Sutherland, and, having inherited great wealth from his uncle, the last Duke of Bridgewater, ultimately became the first Duke of Sutherland. One of Granville's half-sisters became Lady Carlisle; and his own sisters married respectively W. Eliot, who became Earl of St Germans, and Lord Harrowby, afterwards a prominent statesman.

Granville himself, who received the courtesy title of Lord Granville Leveson Gower when his father, in 1786, was created Marquis, was born in 1773, became Viscount Granville in 1815 and first Earl Granville* in 1833. He married in 1809 Lady Harriet Cavendish, the daughter of the Duke of Devonshire and of the beautiful Duchess Georgiana; became the father of several sons and daughters, the eldest of whom was the Earl Granville who was Foreign Secretary under Mr Gladstone; and died in 1846. Before passing to the letters which he

* First of the new creation. The celebrated statesman Carteret had become Earl Granville in 1744, on the death of his mother, created Countess Granville in 1715; but the title became extinct on the death of his son.

received or wrote, the outline of his life may be briefly sketched.

There is not much to be said about his early education, which was carried on at two private schools, of which the first seems to have been chosen by the celebrated Lord Chancellor Thurlow, a close friend of his parents. After the fashion of those days, he was sent to Christ Church at the early age of fifteen. The few letters which remain from this next period show that the lad was taking a proper interest in work of various kinds, notably Livy, algebra and natural science; also, we regret to add, that he was beginning to practise the vice which beset him for a good many years afterwards—the vice of gambling—and this in spite of tender warnings from his mother and his father's severe remonstrances. On the other hand, Oxford provided him with several life-long friends, of whom the chief was George Canning, just three years his senior. He stayed about three years at Christ Church, those being the years of the French Revolution; and early in 1792, his father having expressed 'no wish' about his taking a Master's degree, he and his school friend Lord Boringdon started on the indispensable Grand Tour.

Lady Stafford was under no illusions as to the usual results of the Tour:

'Most of the Young Men who travel had better remain in their own Country; they learn Follies and contract Vices in Foreign countries, without getting either knowledge or Improvements; to make a Bow, or to come into a room like a Gentleman, they sometimes acquire. How many of them lose all Idea of Religion! they hold the Government of the Passions in Contempt, connect themselves with married Women, and return what the World calls a fine Gentleman. My dear Granville, if these were to be the consequences of your foreign travel it would break my Heart.' (I, 40.)

So the careful mother wrote, before her son started; but she need not have been anxious. He and young Boringdon proved themselves model travellers, taking their fill of churches and galleries, and using their social advantages to the utmost. Granville had already seen Paris; besides, France in 1792 was no place for a couple of young nobles. So they went to the Hague and to Frankfurt,

where they witnessed the coronation of the Emperor Francis II; to Dresden, Berlin, Moscow, and St Petersburg; thence home by Warsaw, Vienna, and Prague—a twelve-months' tour in all. As they were received by Royalties, including the Empress Catherine, and mingled freely with leading families everywhere, it may be imagined that the tour left a deep impression; indeed, to that impression we may attribute Granville's keenness in after years for foreign missions and for those Embassies in which he did such excellent work.

There was a second journey in the following autumn, but only to Italy, where he saw much of his half-sister's son, Lord Morpeth, and of Lord Holland, not yet compromised by his runaway marriage. 'An Englishman,' says Sterne's Yorick, 'does not travel to see Englishmen'; which only proves that Yorick did not know much of the spoilt children of Society, whose first object, in foreign capitals, was to find out English friends or acquaintances. At Naples, young Granville found, or made, a good many; one acquaintance in particular which had a deep and long-continued influence upon his life, and without which, it may truly be said, this book could not have come into existence. This was Henrietta, Countess of Bessborough, to whom we shall return. Enough to say here that in the few weeks before Granville was sent for by his father, to rejoin the Militia that was everywhere being organised to repel the expected French invasion (1794), he and Lady Bessborough had promised to correspond; and both these volumes show how faithfully the promise was kept. At least, the lady's letters fill more than half the book; of his, the great majority were apparently destroyed by himself after the lady's death, though he kept hers with care, writing dates or little notes on some of them.

He returned home; the alarm of invasion passed away; and before he was twenty-two we find him elected M.P. for Lichfield, which city he represented for four years, mainly as a silent member. In 1796, thanks to his friendship with that rising young politician, Canning, and to Pitt's friendship with Lord Stafford, Granville obtained a post that he thoroughly enjoyed—that of attaché to Lord Malmesbury's peace mission to Paris. This, it will be remembered, was the mission denounced

in Burke's 'Letters on a Regicide Peace'; and it came to nothing.

Granville's letters make it clear both that the French people were tired of the war, and that the Republican fever had quite died away. 'Two posts from Paris,' he writes to his mother, 'we were met by a deputation, who opened the carriage doors, and presented us with flowers, crying "Vive la Paix, mon grand Ambassadeur!"'; and he notes that 'the word Citoyen is very little in use.' But the war went on; the armies in Germany and Italy were doing too well for peace to be yet thought of. Already young Bonaparte was attracting every eye; nay, 'Madame Bonaparte,' writes Granville from Paris (Dec. 1796), 'is almost as much talked of as her husband'; and 'she and Madame Tallien are the only women much admired in Paris.' Things got worse next year; the mutinies in the British Fleet stiffened the backs of the Directory; and the events of September, when the Deputies Barthélémy and Carnot were arrested, made peace more hopeless than ever, and broke up Lord Malmesbury's second mission (to Lille).

Another mission, of which Granville was the head, followed soon afterwards. He was sent to Berlin to congratulate the new King of Prussia upon his accession; and the mission was evidently arranged mainly through Canning's influence. Granville was naturally shy in accepting it, for he rightly saw that it was much more than a mission of congratulation, and that 'the same person who is to perform the complimentary part will also be employed in negotiating the co-operation not only of the Court of Berlin, but probably that of Petersburg.' How was a young man of twenty-four, with very little experience, to settle matters of such importance? But his father would not hear of these objections; it was a farce to talk of timidity; 'he seems to me to be totally without Ambition, to have no Wish to distinguish himself. If he declines this Business, I shall not expect anything from him in future.' The son surrendered at once, and a few days afterwards his mother writes: 'I have just finished a letter to Mr Canning, in which I wished to express a little how much we feel his Friendship for you. He is a sincere and zealous Friend. We love him for it.' The mission was delayed on account of the

Prussian King's illness, but it was carried through satisfactorily; Granville made an excellent impression, and fell an easy victim to the charms of Queen Luise, 'who,' he writes, 'is very deservedly adored by all the inhabitants of Berlin.' The feeling was reciprocated by another Royalty, the Duchess of Brunswick, who presently wrote to Lady Stafford:

'MY DEAREST FRIEND,

'Yesterday Lord Granville came here, and this morning will leave us—that is the only fault I can find in him. The Ladies think him very handsome, the Duke and me find a great likeness to dear Lady Stafford, and he answers to your description, which is not exaggerate. Indeed, my dear, I wish you joye of having such a Son; he is all prudence, which you know the Duke admires in a young man.' (I, 207.)

À propos of those good looks, and the pleasant manners that went with them, it may be here remarked that they counted for a good deal in Granville's successes, not only with women. They, indeed, were easily overcome by his tall figure and his handsome face, illuminated by a pair of wonderful blue eyes; but all this had a certain attraction for men also, as had Granville's courteous ways and lively gift of talk.

After Berlin there followed six years of England, years full of momentous events and strenuous politics. Granville had remained nearly four years without opening his lips in the House of Commons; but in 1798, just after the dangerous Irish insurrection had been put down, Pitt sent him a message through Canning asking him to move the Address. He did so with great success, and it may be noted that Canning's letter of advice as to how to prepare his speech is of considerable interest. It throws light upon the eminent statesman's too elaborate oratory to find him writing as follows:

'You must trust *nothing*—not a sentence, not a phrase, much less any thing like the arrangement of topics or the choice of them—to the impulse of the moment. When you begin writing you must write the whole subject through at once—never mind how roughly—but do not stop to dwell upon one point and finish it to your mind at first. After the first

writing, re-write again any particular parts that you wish to labour; and if any new ones strike you, it is not enough to state them by themselves, but you must look carefully for the place where they are to come in, and make a mark so — or so —, or so as you like best, and must take care that they have each a head and a tail to hook on with what precedes or what follows, otherwise you may get very well to the end of one topic and then be bothered what to proceed to next; so take care to have catch-words, or catch-ideas, that shall remind you of the connection and dependency of the different parts of your subject. Then, when you have gotten the whole of your materials pretty well prepared as to substance, and have talked them over with Pitt to-morrow, sit yourself down quietly to write it all out fair, from "Mr Speaker" down to "that an humble Address," etc., as fast as you can go through it; and then look it over again and polish the style, and read it over, and over, and over again *usque ad nauseam*, till you are quite tired of it yourself.' (Vol. I, 226.)

Such a letter seems to confirm Disraeli's judgment of Canning in 'The Young Duke': 'He was a consummate rhetorician; but there seemed to me a dash of commonplace in all that he said.' Whether Granville followed his friend's advice we cannot say, but his speech was well received, Pitt expressed himself satisfied, and various friends of the family wrote that he had 'done himself infinite credit.' But neither then nor at any later date did he make much way in Parliament, though in due time he was made a Lord of the Treasury and, eleven years later, in the Duke of Portland's Government, Secretary at War and member of the Cabinet. The truth is that in the political complications of the time he was almost as difficult to place as was his friend Canning, whose prejudices and antipathies he generally adopted. He was a devoted follower of Pitt, but Pitt was not always in office; and, after his unexpected death in 1806, Granville could not heartily attach himself to any branch of the Conservative party, least of all to that led by Addington, whom he cordially disliked. This being so, it was natural that he should prefer to be employed abroad; and it is by his work at St Petersburg (1804-7) and in Paris (after 1823) that his real public services must be estimated.

There were two missions to Russia, of which the first was to all appearance successful, while the second failed through the *force majeure* of events. Pitt came back to power in May 1804, having vainly tried to induce Lord Grenville and Fox to join him; and readers of this book will be interested in the long letter in which Canning describes his efforts to prevail on the former, while the subject of our memoir was doing his best with Fox. The first object of the new minister was to form a strong coalition against Napoleon, just proclaimed Emperor; and in the early summer he appointed Granville, not yet thirty-one, Ambassador to St Petersburg, that he might persuade the Emperor to join it. The Russian Ambassador in London was delighted, except for one thing—Granville had a reputation as a gambler, and ‘un Ambassadeur joueur ne fera jamais rien en Russie. C’est le vice du pays.’ Happily Granville seems to have kept this propensity under control; and his two years in St Petersburg were blameless and successful, though often, except for one pleasant distraction, he found life dull.

The distraction was a fascinating little lady, the Princess Serge Galitzin, married, but separated at the church-door; a charmer who soon began to influence him to such an extent that he spent every evening *tête-à-tête* with her, and began seriously to think of agitating for her divorce, and marrying her. There was indeed another lady in England who thought she had a prior claim—none other than the afterwards celebrated Lady Hester Stanhope, Pitt’s niece; but there is reason to think that in this case the attachment was rather one-sided, and the affection hers, not his. Indeed, as we shall presently explain, the best part of young Granville’s heart had been lost long ago to the lady who was still his friend and correspondent, Lady Bessborough. Anyhow, the Galitzin affair came to nothing, nor did it at any time interfere with Granville’s diplomatic work. This resulted in a formal treaty, properly signed and ratified, and known as the Treaty of Consort (August 1805), by which England agreed to provide money and Russia troops against the common enemy, the amount being 1,250,000*l.* for every 100,000 men.

It would seem that the Treaty proved to be little more than a 'scrap of paper,' for, after Granville had been a few months at home, he returned to St Petersburg, at the urgent request of Canning, then Foreign Secretary, and of Lord Harrowby, Granville's brother-in-law, with the object of confirming and enlarging this agreement. He started on his second mission in April 1807, but unfortunately his efforts were in vain, for the battle of Friedland followed in June; the Tsar's resistance was crushed; and the Treaty of Tilsit made France, not England, the ally of Russia. War indeed was declared against us by Russia on Oct. 31; and a few days later Lord Granville left St Petersburg, not to resume the diplomatic uniform for some sixteen years. We are not concerned with his later embassies to the Hague and Paris, for they did not begin till 1823, whereas this book carries us down only to 1821. And the intervening years may be passed over in a few words, for their interest for the reader of these volumes lies much less in Granville's acts and public services than in the letters he received. None the less, it was in the early part of this period that there took place the happiest event of his life, his marriage to Lady Harriet Cavendish; also his admission into the House of Lords and, for a brief moment, into the Cabinet.

Thus far we have written as though the book was an ordinary biography, but it is much more. As we have indicated already, the peculiar interest of these volumes lies in the fact that they consist of letters, mainly from one remarkable woman, but to a less extent from men of marked historical position; that the lady's letters carry us through a very curious story of friendship, warming into love and then subsiding again into a pleasant, confidential intercourse, carried over many years; and that many of her letters, and all those of Canning and other statesmen, record and discuss the political and international events and characters of an extremely interesting period in such a way as to throw new light upon much that has till now remained obscure. We may therefore pass at once to Lady Bessborough and her story.

She was a sister of the second Earl Spencer and of Georgiana, Duchess of Devonshire; she was born in 1761,

and married, about 1780, the Earl of Bessborough, by whom she had several sons and daughters. These included the fourth Earl, to whom the Greville Memoirs pay a high tribute; Frederick, a very distinguished soldier; and Caroline, who became the eccentric Lady Caroline Lamb.* Granville first met Lady Bessborough at Naples, in 1794, when she was thirty-three, and he scarcely twenty-one; and from Lady Holland's Memoirs it is evident that the youth was deeply impressed. Their correspondence began immediately afterwards, to be continued till just before her death in 1821. The first letter is lively; Granville seems to have replied by some jocular warnings against falling in love with Lord Holland, or Lord Morpeth, or himself; to which she answers that, at her age, '*le rôle de Gouvernante me sied encore assez bien, mais tout autre seroit un ridicule.*' By November, when both have returned home, she promises him a lock of her hair if he can swear that he has kept his promise to abstain from play—a dangerous gift from one who still professes to be 'governess' and nothing else. Next April she is beginning to protest against his calling her 'very delightful,' and to beg him to address to others 'more able to return it' his 'love and attention.'

Soon afterwards she begins to quote Voltaire's verses to Madame du Châtelet, to tell him that, though he is of the age of love, she, though she weeps to confess it, is 'long past it,' and only fit for friendship. The cry is the same, only a little more emphatic, in the following October, when she begs him to regard her as a sister—'you cannot think what a good Sister I make . . . though to be sure the character of Mother would suit me better towards you.' As we have lost Lord Granville's replies, we can only guess at what they contained; but it is pretty evident that by the summer of 1796 some people at least must have been aware that it was beginning to be a question of something more than friendship. About that time Lady Webster left her husband for Lord Holland, who married her next year; and Lady Stafford seizes the opportunity to give, in her own name and his

* It may be mentioned that the letter of Aug. 12, 1812, gives the fullest existing account of Lady Caroline's running away, when Byron pursued her and brought her back in a hackney coach to her mother's house.

father's, a solemn warning to Granville. 'My Lord,' she writes, 'my Lord heard this story of Lord Holland with much Concern; it brought one he most dearly loves into his Mind. He desired me to observe to you the Misery, Disgrace, and Ruin that follow such Connections.' And so on as to the 'worldly Mischiefs' that follow; the dear, devout mother then passing on to higher ground, and 'praying the Almighty to give you Grace to withstand Temptation.'

What followed must be a matter of inference, but the lady's letters soon begin to sound a note which is scarcely that of friendship. When he goes to Paris with Lord Malmesbury, he declares that 'regrets at being absent from one whose society is most dear to me very frequently intrude'; and—to put the matter shortly—during all his absences for the next three or four years, she keeps expressing a passionate eagerness for his letters, and reproaches her 'dearest Granville' almost angrily if he does not write every day. As for the feeling on Granville's side, there is no reason to doubt the truth of what he wrote to Lady Bessborough from St Petersburg, in April 1805, nearly nine years from the time of which we have been speaking. He had long been urged to marry; he had made some kind of 'advances' to Lady Sarah Fane (afterwards Lady Jersey), and some to Lady Hester Stanhope; and at St Petersburg he was certainly under the charm of the 'little Barbarian,' as he and his friends called her, the Princess Galitzin. Yet here is what he wrote, not to her, but to the constant though, alas! married friend at home:

'I know not whether I have repeated to you before that to you I owe the happiest Moments of my life, but a truer opinion was never uttered or written by me; and I am persuaded that if it had been my Lot to have been married to you, I should have passed a life of happiness such as is enjoyed by few people. When I used to praise you, I remember you told me always that I viewed you under a temporary delusion. Whether that were so or not, I will not pretend to say, but I can with sincerity affirm that to this moment I look upon you as far, far superior to any other human being I have ever met with; and I look forward to the Time of our meeting with feelings of impatience such as I cannot describe.' (Vol. II, 72.)

The odd thing is that all through the period when the mutual affection was at its warmest—apparently three or four years—Lady Bessborough seems to have remained on excellent terms with her husband, to have taken every care of her children, and to have found no social difficulties either with the Court or the great houses. And, when both she and Granville had made up their minds that they must be friends, and only friends, she carried out the programme to perfection. Whether he was in the country in England, or fulfilling one of his engagements abroad, she wrote to him steadily, excellent letters, solid in matter and bright in style; letters full of personal and political news, in which talks with Caning, with Sheridan, or with the Prince of Wales take their place beside gossip on playhouse and opera, or lively little comments on books.

Moreover, as time went on, she really did wish him to marry, and was honestly pleased when, in 1809, when he was nearing thirty-five, he became engaged to her niece, Lady Harriet Cavendish. Now Lady Harriet, as we know from her admirably bright and witty letters, published some twenty-two years ago by her second son, was a clever, observant woman, as well as honest and warm-hearted; and if, either then or later, there had been anything abnormal, or even uncomfortable, in the relations between her husband and her aunt, she would have marked it. She did not, and Lady Bessborough's letters give us the reason. They are kindly, friendly, and perfectly regular. It puts the keystone on Lady Bessborough's character that she should thus have allowed reason to win the day, and that, whatever passion may have had to say in earlier years, she did not in the end allow it to spoil her friend's life, or her own.

It is not easy within the space of half a dozen pages even to sample letters which cover more than twenty years and fill quite five or six hundred pages of the book. At best we can only give some slight idea of the places Lady Bessborough visited, of her views on the curiously shifting condition of public affairs, of the statesmen she heard and talked with, and of the gossip in which she indulged when in a lighter vein. She generally writes from Cavendish Square or from her house at Roehampton—near which, by the way,

with ideas of social amelioration well ahead of her time, she had a school for beggar-girls, which was to train them as cooks and housemaids and so keep them off the streets. But often she writes from Trentham, then in its glory, or from Chatsworth, or from 'magnificent' Wentworth, or from Hardwick, gloomy but beautiful, or from Woburn, where she loved that 'delightful room,' the Library, wherein were 'the finest editions of books, magnificently bound, and over the book-cases some very fine pictures (portraits most of them, Titians, Rembrandts, etc.).' In a letter written in 1797 she quotes an appreciation of Pitt by the Duke of Bedford which is worth giving *in extenso* :

'I wish you could have heard the D. of Bedford talk of Mr Pitt to-night. I assure you your praises of his Eloquence are cold in comparison. He told me if I could imagine the purest, most correct, forcible, and eloquent language spoke in the most harmonious voice and animated manner, seizing with incredible quickness and ingenuity all the weak parts of the opposing arguments, and putting the strongest ones of his own in the most favourable point of view, that I should then have some Idea of what Mr P.'s speaking was. He said it was the most fascinating thing he ever heard. That in general he thought Mr Pitt plain in his person, but towards the close of an interesting speech that he look'd beautiful; and that he had so little Idea of the possibility of any *woman* hearing or seeing him at such a time without being in love with him, that if women were admitted to the H. of Commons, and the D. of Bedford was very much in love with any one, he would make it an absolute point with her always to go out whenever Mr Pitt got up to speak. There's for you. When did you ever say half as much yourself for your friend? It has made me die to hear him. . . .' (Vol. II, 177-8.)

The reader will note that she calls Pitt Granville's 'friend'; it must be explained that Granville and Lady Bessborough belonged to different schools in politics, and that she was proud to call herself a Foxite, while he, like his father and his whole family, was a keen supporter of Pitt. It is true that in later life, that is to say about the time of the Reform Bill of 1832, he went over to what his father would have called the enemy; but in point of fact his political evolution did not greatly differ from that of his friend and leader Canning, and long before that date

he had confessed to being no thorough-going aristocrat and to perceiving some merits in democracy. As to Lady Bessborough's politics, she is amusingly careful to disclaim having any at all on her own account. 'I have lived among politicians all my life,' she says in one place, but in 1798, when Granville proposes to bring Canning to have a talk with her, she protests against being present at a conversation where the business in hand was serious :

'for notwithstanding all my violence in politicks and talking so much on that subject, I perfectly agree with you that no woman has any business to meddle with that or any other serious business, farther than giving her opinion if she is ask'd.' (I, 218.)

A protestation of this kind may now and then have been necessary in those days, if a woman was to keep on good terms with her statesmen friends, but it must be admitted that in Lady Bessborough's case it hardly corresponded with the facts. Outside her personal relations with Granville and some others, her main interests were certainly political, if we take the word in its largest sense and include in it not party questions only, but the international questions which then as now were tearing the world asunder. When Granville was in Russia in 1805, her best and fullest letters to him deal at length with the Government's difficulties; one, four pages long, recounts a talk with 'The Pope'—their nickname for Canning—about a quarrel with Lord Hawkesbury (the future Lord Liverpool) and Pitt's attitude with regard to it; and she tells how pleased Canning was that 'a Foxite should try to make up differences.' By that time she had got over her original fear of Canning, of whom, seven years earlier, she had asked 'what possible chance have I of escaping under the eye of a person who judges every one with severity, women particularly, and me perhaps more than any other woman?' But this severity stood in the way of any really cordial intercourse. She admired Canning; above all, she regarded him as Granville's best and most powerful friend; but she seems to have wished for no more than to keep on good terms with him. He was never one of her intimate circle.

On the other hand, she intensely disliked Addington, for whom Granville also never had a good word; and

Castlereagh she regarded much as Canning did. She quotes with approval a description of one of his speeches as having 'nothing good in it, and a great deal of bad'; and she evidently resents Pitt's thinking him comparable with Canning. As to the war, she had enough of the Foxite in her to dislike and regret it at first; but with the rise of Bonaparte she became, like other English Liberals, a strong supporter of resistance. One of the most interesting passages in the book is that in which, during the brief interval of peace after the Treaty of Amiens, she describes a visit to Paris (1803) and a long interview with Moreau, the victor of Hohenlinden, who was then definitely committing himself to a course of opposition to Napoleon. The account of this is preceded by an interesting little comment on a certain difference between French and English society:

'In England it rarely happens that very clever or very celebrated men deign to mix in common society or talk on trifling subjects; they are usually wrap'd up in some pursuit, and live entirely with one another or in their families, etc. I might move Heaven and Earth before I could get three words from Mr Pitt; and Mr Fox, whom I know and love, I see perhaps two or three times in a year. . . . But clever men in England are too much superior to women; there is too great a distance between them to allow of *much* conversation. . . . In France, from the Generals to the Savants, everything *goes about*.' (i, 396.)

So, in Paris, she keeps open house for a small society, and men like Berthier and Moreau frequent it. Berthier cross-examines her as to English party-leaders, and then breaks out with 'Why all these political disputes? Why don't you and we agree to divide the world—you keep the sea and give us the land?' M. de Narbonne tells her the pathetic story of a scene, since well-known from other sources, in which he was a leading actor—how just before the fatal Tenth of August he and Berthier and others had implored King Louis to put himself at the head of his soldiers; how, after long walking up and down in deep thought, the King had said to him, 'Jurez-moi, sur votre honneur et sur Dieu, qu'il ne mourra personne!' and how, when the pledge could not be given, Louis said that he would not resist—that he

preferred to lose everything. Lady Bessborough's long talk with Moreau throws a strong light upon the mixture of motives which led that famous General to oppose and conspire—the motives of disappointed rivalry and of a genuine love of liberty, outraged by the avowed substitution of '*la volonté du Premier Consul*' for law and justice. Two passions, said Moreau, dominated the heart of Napoleon, hatred of France because she had long enslaved his native Corsica, and hatred of England—not of her navy, or her commerce, or her statesmen, but of '*votre représentation populaire, votre beau gouvernement raisonnablement libre, qui prêche tout contre le sien.*'

These examples will indicate the general character of Lady Bessborough's letters—the letters of an extremely able woman, thoroughly conversant with public affairs, with a strong grasp of essentials, and an intimate personal knowledge of the chief actors. Did space permit, we might say much more of her treatment of debates, of conversations, and of events; among the last such matters as the death and funeral of Nelson, and of those other two deaths which followed within a few months, those of Pitt and Fox. We must pass these by, only remarking that, in speaking of Nelson's funeral, the writer draws a painful contrast between the intensely but silently patriotic feeling of the crowd and what she calls '*the English fault*' of bad organisation. She gives, as an example, the fact that the authorities had '*completely neglected assigning any places in St Paul's to the Foreign Ministers!*' Her very full account of Pitt's last days brings out clearly the condition of overwork into which he had been allowed to fall, and confirms, on the evidence of Farquhar his physician, the common belief that Austerlitz dealt his enfeebled constitution the definitely fatal blow.

Much of the second volume is an excellent running commentary on the Peninsular War, and on the rapid but steady rise of Wellington; while, as to home politics, we have here what is perhaps the best extant account of Canning's difficulties with the Regent, and Lord Liverpool, and others, together with his frank acknowledgment of his mistake in refusing to serve with Castlereagh. The mention of the Regent suggests some further reference

to him, for Lady Bessborough knew him well, and found her loyalty to the throne sorely tried not only by his general manner of life, but by his behaviour to herself. There is one letter in particular, written in 1809, which describes a scene that appears almost impossible; did we not already know too much about George IV, it would be hard to believe that a Prince of Wales, who was an intelligent man at bottom, could have behaved with such a total lack of dignity.

Another person, eminent on other grounds, makes a disagreeable impression; this is Sheridan, who both in 1806 (when she was forty-five) and later persecuted her with the most unwelcome attentions. Clever as he was, and agreeable as he could be when he pleased, this political Sheridan—for his days of writing immortal comedies were long over—was a person in whom neither man nor woman could have confidence. He drank to excess, and his mendacity was notorious.

'If,' writes Lady Bessborough in 1803, 'Sheridan did not tarnish all his talents by duplicity and inordinate Vanity, I should approve of a great deal in his language and conduct, but then a great deal also is quite disgusting, and it is impossible to trust him for a moment.' And four years later, 'It has always been his Ambition to lead the Opposition, and with talents and Eloquence to entitle him to anything had he chose it, he has so degraded his mind and character that there is scarce any one sunk so low as to look up to Sheridan as his chief.'

But no notice of Lady Bessborough ought to be limited to the politics she watched so closely, or to the people with whom she associated. Her general cultivation was extraordinary, for those days; indeed at any period the women have been rare who could take an interest, at once so 'all round' and so keen, in so many departments of life. Her descriptions, in 1803 and 1814, of the sights of Paris, of the eminent people she met (M. de Narbonne, Talleyrand, La Fayette and the rest), and of the public whom she was shrewdly watching, are vividly true. In London, she was a regular visitor to opera and theatre, and had much to tell her absent friend about Drury Lane and Covent Garden, about Catalani, and Edmund Kean, and all the other theatrical eminences.

About one of them in particular it is worth while to quote what she has to say, for it is a monument of one of the most curious crazes—though a craze founded on admiration of real talent—that has ever taken possession of London. This was the ‘Roscius fever,’ the wild enthusiasm aroused by the acting of Master Betty, a boy of thirteen. Here is Lady Bessborough’s record of his benefit performance of ‘Hamlet,’ in March 1805—let the reader remember that ‘the Pope’ is Mr Canning, ‘K.’ the Duke of Devonshire, and ‘Sol’ Lord Morpeth.

‘Yesterday, except writing a few lines to you and taking a little walk with Frederick, I did nothing all day but get ready for the play, where I was before the Curtain drew up, and found the House quite full. Directly opposite Mr Fox, and in the next box Ld Sidmouth, with the whole train of Ministers, box after box along the row, already there, and above their Head, next to our box, the Pope and Mr Pitt. I was in the Prince’s, but could not help thinking the Audience alone (many of whom have gone repeatedly) are sufficient fame for the boy. He was very much afraid of failing in Hamlet, saying it must make or mar him, but he succeeded much beyond my expectation. There *were* faults, but so many more perfections, that he is undoubtedly the best Hamlet I ever saw. His first seeing the Ghost, his advice to the players, and reproaches to himself for (illegible) the play, the scene with his Mother, and the more familiar parts with Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, were all as good as possible. “To be, or not to be,” he did not speak so well, and the Scene with Ophelia I thought he fail’d very much in; but on the whole he met with excessive applause, and what applause! Mr Pitt, Mr Canning, Fox, Fitzpatrick, K., and Sol—all of them as good and as severe judges as one could pick out.’ (Vol. II, 39, 40.)

Then, again, Lady Bessborough could find time to read, and in one way or another had become possessed of a real knowledge of books. The ‘Life’ of Johnson was ‘her constant companion,’ and she loved what she ventured to call the ‘excessive folly’ of Boswell. ‘How glad I am,’ she writes to Granville in 1802, ‘that you agree with me in my admiration of Mad. de Sévigné. I think her letters delightful, and read them this year till I thought I knew her, and cried over her death as for a friend.’ So too she admires, but does not much

like, Madame de Staël, whose new novel 'Delphine' was (in December 1802) 'the chief conversation' in Paris; a fact which suggests the observation, 'there is no difference more striking between Frenchmen and Englishmen than the importance the former place in every trifle of this sort. You would think some great event had happen'd by the sensation this book causes.' She reads with delight an Italian translation of Apollonius Rhodius, and envies Granville his power of reading it in the original. Other books she studies for information—Maurice on Indian Antiquities, Weld's American Travels, and, no doubt to keep up with Granville and to follow Napoleon's campaigns, Rulhière on Poland. Then again she studies the philosophers and theologians, discusses the portrait of Hobbes at Hardwick, and questions the orthodoxy of Paley. And once she confesses to a mild imposture; when she visits the Paris Library, she has prepared herself to show off a little, and 'makes a great effect by asking for the Virgil with Petrarch's notes and the Dante written out by Boccaccio.'

This brief survey will give some idea of the interest and wide scope of Lady Bessborough's letters, which form as good and complete a view of the politics of England, of the upper ranks of English and French society, of the gossip of the day, and of the books that people were reading, as it would be possible to find. If we add the many letters from Canning, the bright references to his conversation and speeches and to those of Fox, Hawkesbury, Granville, Windham and many other statesmen, the first-hand accounts of Russia, Austria, and Spain and—by no means the last in importance—the descriptions of Ireland in and after 1798, it will be evident that these letters, with their short connecting-links of narrative, form a book of arresting interest and of permanent value.

HUMPHRY WARD.

Art. 14.—RETRENCHMENT AND THRIFT.

*Committee on Retrenchment in the Public Expenditure.
First, Second, Third, and Final Reports.* [Cd. 8086.
8139, 8180, 8200.] Wyman, 1915-16.

FINANCE has always proved one of our most effective weapons in the great wars in which we have hitherto been engaged, and it may be safely affirmed that we have never been involved in any conflict in which economic influences are destined to play a greater part than in the present. The magnitude of our economic task has at last been appreciated by the great mass of the people. For the year ending March 31, 1916, the war expenditure, including the cost of civil government, amounted to 1,559,000,000*l.*; and the revenue from taxation, etc., reached 329,766,000*l.*, leaving a balance of 1,229,000,000*l.* which has been raised by loans, etc. For next year, if the present rate of expenditure is not exceeded, the expenditure will be about 1,825,000,000*l.*, and the revenue may be expected to realise 502,000,000*l.*, leaving a deficiency of 1,323,000,000*l.* The dead-weight amount of our national debt (including the debt as it stood in March 1915) at the end of March 1917 may, therefore, amount to 3,600,000,000*l.*, involving an annual charge for interest and sinking fund of about 180,000,000*l.*

Before the war the national income of the United Kingdom amounted to about 2,300,000,000*l.* per annum; for the year 1915 it probably amounted to 2,600,000,000*l.*, and for the current year it may be estimated to amount to not less than 2,700,000,000*l.* It will be seen, therefore, that our burden involves a total expenditure by the Government of a sum equivalent to not less than two-thirds of the entire estimated national income. In order to form a sound conclusion as to our ability to bear this burden we must consider the national expenditure under all headings, and I have prepared the following provisional estimate for the year ending March 31, 1916.

Food—		£	£
Home produce		280,000,000	
Foreign produce		380,000,000	
		<hr/>	660,000,000
Drink			130,000,000
Dress, cottons, woollens, silk, linen, leather			200,000,000
House rent, furniture, coal, gas, water			234,000,000
Miscellaneous, education, motor- ing, newspapers, literature, church, locomotion, theatres and amusements			200,000,000
Cost of distribution			250,000,000
Professional and domestic services not comprised in other items			70,000,000
Local Government expenditure from rates		75,000,000	
Imperial expenditure other than war outlay		124,000,000	
		<hr/>	199,000,000
Total civil expenditure			1,943,000,000
War expenditure		1,465,000,000	
Less maintenance of 3,000,000 men, say	£	100,000,000	
Separation allowances, say		100,000,000	
		<hr/>	200,000,000
			1,265,000,000
Grand total.			<hr/> 3,208,000,000

The above estimates have been based mainly upon the paper which the late Sir Robert Giffen read before the British Association in 1903, and the paper read before the same Association in 1912 by Mr Rew. Due allowances have been made for the growth of population and for the very great rise in the price of foodstuffs and raw materials. Since the outbreak of war there has been an average increase in the cost of living of about 30 per cent.

The past year's operations may, therefore, be summarised as follows:

	£
Expenditure	3,208,000,000
Income	2,600,000,000
	<hr/>
Deficit	608,000,000

On the whole the British people have responded wonderfully well to the demands which have been imposed upon them by the war. It must be remembered that no lead in the direction of economy was given to them until the war had been in progress for a considerable

time. Broadly speaking, the result of the year's operations has been that we have increased our savings from an average of about 350,000,000*l.* per annum to well over 600,000,000*l.*, a remarkable achievement considering the increase in the cost of living.

Taking the governmental and civil expenditure together, the year to March 31, 1916, has closed with a deficit of about 650,000,000*l.*, the bulk of this amount having been covered by the sale of some of our foreign investments in the United States, by the raising of loans in that country, and by the calling in of our credits in the Overseas Dominions and in neutral countries. As a matter of fact, we have overcome the financial difficulties of the first twenty months of the war with astonishing ease, but the outlook for 1916-17 gives cause for some anxiety. The national income for the coming year may be increased to 2,700,000,000*l.*—in view of the needs of the army, I do not consider that we can reasonably expect that it will exceed that figure—and, if the cost of living does not rise further, the position at the end of March 1917 should be roughly as follows:

National expenditure—	£	£
Civil expenditure, as in 1915		1,948,000,000
War expenditure	1,701,000,000	
Less separation allowances and cost of maintenance of 4,000,000 soldiers	230,000,000	
	<hr/>	<hr/>
		1,471,000,000
Total expenditure civil and military		3,414,000,000
Estimated national income		2,700,000,000
		<hr/>
Deficiency		714,000,000

The process of balancing the national income and expenditure can only be satisfactorily accomplished by increasing the national income on the one hand and by diminishing the national expenditure upon the other. For the reasons stated above, we cannot depend upon any material increase of the national income; and it is of the utmost importance that the energies of the nation should be concentrated upon the problem of the reduction of expenditure.

This problem may be considered under four heads, viz.:

- (1) The reduction of the civil expenditure of the Imperial Government.
- (2) The reduction of the war expenditure of the Imperial Government.
- (3) The reduction of Local

Government Expenditure. (4) The reduction of private expenditure.

In the face of this great crisis in the national finances and the pressing necessity for universal and sweeping economies in public and private expenditure, the House of Commons approached the question of retrenchment in a spirit of characteristic feebleness and timidity. After an energetic campaign by Bankers and City men in favour of thrift and retrenchment, Mr Asquith announced on July 20, 1915, that a Retrenchment Committee of twelve members, with the Chancellor of the Exchequer as Chairman, had been appointed. The terms of reference were as follows :

'To enquire and report what savings in public expenditure can, in view of the necessities created by the war, be effected in the Civil Departments without detriment to the interests of the State.'

The result has been exactly what might have been anticipated from an enquiry conducted under such limited powers. The Committee has been debarred from reporting upon the war expenditure, which, for the year to March 31, 1916, represents an outlay of 1,465,000,000*l.* out of a total expenditure of 1,559,000,000*l.* Their activities have, therefore, been confined to the criticism of expenditures amounting to 124,000,000*l.* ; and even in this limited field they were informed that they were not to criticise expenditure arising out of questions of policy already decided by Parliament. The experiences of the Committee in connexion with Irish expenditure afford a luminous illustration of the hopelessness of looking for any material reduction of civil expenditure from the House of Commons as at present constituted. On Dec. 15 the Committee issued the following White Paper :

'In view of the pressure of Parliamentary business upon the Chancellor of the Exchequer, we were invited to turn our attention to the expenditure on Irish services under the Chairmanship of the Chief Secretary. Mr J. P. Boland, M.P., Sir J. Lonsdale, M.P., and Mr W. Kavanagh consented to join us for the purpose ; but the Irish Nationalist party subsequently decided not to nominate any members to serve on the Committee, and Mr Boland, therefore, did not attend any meeting.

'We have had three meetings, at which we had the advantage of hearing general evidence on the Irish services. We were informed of the steps taken since the outbreak of war by the Treasury and the Irish Government to secure economies by administrative action, and we understand that in the result certain savings have already been effected. We believe that further savings are possible, but large economies cannot be carried into effect without legislation likely to prove contentious.

'On consideration of the whole position, therefore, we felt that the prospects of economy resulting from our labours were not sufficient to justify a prolonged enquiry; and we arrived at the conclusion that the best course would be to leave the special questions of economies in the Departments in Ireland to be dealt with by the Irish Government and the Treasury, and we hope that, in connexion with the forthcoming estimates, they will carry still further the scrutiny of expenditure which has already taken place.' . . .

In other words, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, being engaged with matters of greater importance than retrenchment, turned the Committee on to the thorny question of the reduction of Irish expenditure. But the Irish Nationalist party, having been taught for years to regard the Imperial Exchequer as a sort of milch-cow, naturally viewed any reduction of Irish expenditure (which, by the way, has grown from 5,057,708*l.* in 1890 to 12,656,000*l.* in 1915) with extreme disfavour; and the unhappy Committee were firmly told to turn their attention elsewhere.

The Committee's final report was issued on Feb. 21, 1916. They obtained provisional estimates from all Departments for the year 1916-17, and they were able to report that, in addition to the economies secured in certain directions in the estimates for 1915-16, it was found possible to effect further considerable reductions. On the other hand, the Committee were informed that most of the large Civil Departments were engaged on war work, which would necessitate a substantial counter-balancing increase of expenditure next year, as it did for 1915-16. Excluding the cost of new services required entirely for war purposes, which are met from the Votes of Credit and do not appear on the estimates, the net result of the increase and decrease together is an

estimated decrease of expenditure on the Civil Service and Revenue estimates for 1916-17 to the extent of over 3,500,000*l.*, apart from the large reductions of capital expenditure, not shown in the estimates, which have been effected by curtailing the issue of loans to local authorities, etc.

Before giving details of the savings which have been effected, the Committee offer some general observations on the problem of public economy as it presented itself to them. In the first place, the Report states, there can be no dispute as to the enormous and unprecedented increase of civil expenditure in recent years. Since 1895 the Civil Service Estimates have risen from 19,000,000*l.* to 59,000,000*l.*, and the Revenue Departments Estimates (which include the Post Office) from 13,000,000*l.* to 31,000,000*l.* The total cost of civil expenditure has, therefore, risen from 32,000,000*l.* to 90,000,000*l.*—an increase of nearly 200 per cent.—apart from the increased cost of the Army and Navy and of local services paid for from rates throughout the country.

An analysis of the estimates shows clearly that the increase referred to is almost entirely due to new grants or new administrative work resulting from legislation or Parliamentary policy, and the consequential growth of expenditure on staff, buildings, stationery, travelling and incidentals. Of the increase of 40,000,000*l.* on the Civil Service Estimates, 35,000,000*l.* is due to the grants required for Old Age Pensions (13,500,000*l.*), National Insurance and Labour Exchanges (9,500,000*l.*), and Education (12,000,000*l.*), while the balance is mainly due to numerous other new services (e.g. new Agricultural Departments in Ireland and Scotland, Irish Land Purchase, Irish Congested Districts Board, Mental Deficiency, Child Welfare, etc.) and to the resulting miscellaneous charges for staff and incidentals. Most of the increase on the Revenue Departments estimates is due to the taking over of the National Telephone Company and to the cost of the extra staff required to collect the greatly increased revenue from taxation necessitated by the growth of expenditure. It follows, the Committee add, that, if any wholesale reduction of civil expenditure is desired, it can only be effected by

a general restriction of State activities and by the abrogation of Acts of Parliament enjoining such activities. The Committee do not suggest that the Civil Service generally is by any means overpaid; on the contrary, they record their opinion that the State is obtaining valuable services at a reasonable cost, and they point out that the cost of salaries and wages in Civil Departments accounts for only about 5,000,000*l.* out of the total Civil Service Estimates of 59,000,000*l.*

As regards arrangements for a temporary reduction of departmental work for the period of the war, the problem is comparatively easy to solve. Clearly all work which is not of vital importance to the country should be definitely set aside; the permanent staff employed on it should be set free for other duties, and the temporary staff discharged; while all new capital expenditure should be avoided and the cost of maintenance, travelling and miscellaneous items should be cut down to the lowest possible figure. The Committee understand that the Departments generally have made arrangements accordingly. At the same time they have been fully conscious, throughout their deliberations, of the very great difficulty, in some instances, of introducing large retrenchments in time of war without affecting the efficiency of our national services and consequently reducing the economic strength of the country in peace time; and they recognise that the possibilities of retrenchment in some departments must necessarily be limited by the need for preparing during the war a plan of action to deal with the grave economic issues which will arise on the conclusion of hostilities.

Permanent reductions of work are of course much more important from the point of view of economy than temporary reductions; and this aspect of the question has received the Committee's particular attention in view of the very heavy taxation which will be necessary to meet the interest upon war debt and the charges for war pensions, etc., and of the danger that the taxable capacity of the country may decline seriously when the artificial stimulus of war expenditure out of borrowed money is withdrawn. On the other hand, the problem of securing a permanent curtailment of Departmental duties is much more difficult than the question of

temporary economies. These duties have been imposed upon Departments from time to time, generally as a result of legislation or in response to a demand from Parliament, a Royal Commission, or a Committee; and it is very difficult for Heads of Departments to decide, as regards any particular item of work, that it can, with due regard to the welfare of the country, be discontinued permanently after the war.

The Committee state that they are not in a position, in most instances, to arrive at any final conclusion in doubtful cases, but they offer suggestions on a number of points. Important questions of controversial policy are often involved, which can only be decided by the Government, whose decision will naturally depend largely on the social and economic conditions which are likely to arise out of the war.

The Committee express the opinion that no vacancies on the permanent staffs should be filled without the concurrence of the Treasury. They make some suggestions for economies in particular cases, but they have not personally inspected the work of any departments. They recommend that the Heads of the larger Departments should appoint Office Committees, if they have not already done so, to consider economies generally; and that the Treasury should supplement the work of these Committees, if necessary by holding special enquiries. The Committee emphasise the necessity for the careful and systematic consideration by the Treasury at all times, not only of proposals for new expenditure, but also of all items of recurrent expenditure throughout the service; and, though they are aware that certain functions of ordinary administration must necessarily be performed by the Treasury in connexion with the imposition of taxation and the collection of revenue, they consider that every step should be taken to restrict its activities as a spending Department, so that it may be as free as possible for exercising the very important duty of securing public economy and financial regularity.

The Report then describes the measures already taken to secure economy in the financial year 1915-16, but it points out that, despite all steps taken for this purpose, the net result was that the gross estimated total of expenditure showed an increase of 205,000% in the Civil

Service and Revenue Departments Estimates, after taking account of new expenditure due to the war. The Committee found, however, that very considerable economies had been effected in other directions, and that the total reduction in the amount of new Local Loans approved from public funds was at the rate of 4,000,000*l.* per annum, though the full effect of this reduction will only be gradually realised. The total votes asked for in respect of the Revenue Department for 1916-17 amount to 31,378,000*l.*, a decrease of 246,779*l.*

The Committee then make some important general recommendations as to further economies. They recommend that the normal minimum working day of the Civil Service should be eight hours, with an hour's luncheon interval and a Saturday half-holiday, when the state of public business permits. They mention incidentally that this should reduce the expenditure on overtime, which is always large, and has at the present moment reached an abnormally high figure owing to the extra work involved by the war. They understand that in some exceptional instances the overtime earnings of individuals amount at present to 50 per cent. or more of their normal pay. After some minor suggestions, they recommend that legislation should be obtained, as soon as possible, to secure that, notwithstanding any statutory provision for the appointment of a prescribed officer or number of officers, any post or office may on the occurrence of a vacancy be left unfilled or amalgamated with another office where the Treasury is satisfied that this can be effected without detriment to the public.

We pass on to the special departments. The large increase in the *House of Commons Vote* in recent years has been due almost entirely to the provision required for payment of salaries to Members, which amounts to 252,000*l.* in the financial year 1915-16; but the Committee were informed that this general question did not fall within their terms of reference. Their attention was, however, drawn to the fact that no deduction had been made from the salaries of Members serving with His Majesty's Forces on the analogy of the deductions made from the salaries of public officials who are during the present emergency receiving naval or military pay; and

that, as a result, the authorities of both Houses of Parliament have felt bound to give their employees the same terms as are given to Members of Parliament. The Committee believe that no sufficient reason can be found for allowing Members and Officers of the House to receive salary both from civil and from war Votes in respect of the same period; and they recommend that they should elect to receive either their naval or military pay or their civil salaries, but not both. Effect has already been given to this recommendation; but the House of Commons may well be reminded that economy, like charity, should begin at home. It would be easy to devise a scheme by which Members who really require financial support should privately communicate the fact to the Speaker or to a small committee, and should receive their salaries as before, payment being withheld in the case of all others.

With regard to *Public Works and Buildings*, in their first report the Committee announced that the Office of Works had undertaken to secure a very large reduction in the expenditure on public works during the new financial year. This undertaking has been carried out; and the new estimates provide for a vote of 2,948,582*l.*—a decrease of 870,248*l.* As to Museums and Picture Galleries, in their third report the Committee pointed out that the total cost included in the estimates for 1915-16 for the upkeep of the various museums, Picture Galleries, etc., in the United Kingdom was about 300,000*l.*, in addition to the cost of maintenance of buildings, stationery, rates, etc., included in other votes; and after careful consideration they came to the conclusion that they would recommend the closing of these institutions for the period of the war. This is the only recommendation of the Committee which has been challenged in any way; and, in view of the comparatively small cost of keeping these institutions open and the small saving (50,000*l.* at most) effected, it may be hoped that the Government will reconsider the question.

With regard to the *Home Office*, the Committee recommend that the reports of Certifying Surgeons on accidents in Factories should be dispensed with. This would effect a saving of 12,000*l.* per annum. Police pensioners up to the age of sixty should be enrolled in a

Police Reserve. The Board of Control should be reduced in number, and certain of their duties delegated to Deputy Commissioners or Inspectors. A reduced contribution should be prescribed towards the cost of institutional treatment for mentally defective persons, except in urgent cases; and a limitation should be fixed on the cost of maintenance in all cases.

As to the *Board of Trade*, the Committee recommend that a reorganisation of the sub-Departments should be carried out as soon as possible after the war; and they express the opinion that some of the smaller branches should be discontinued. For example, the London Traffic Branch was established in 1907 for the purpose of bringing up to date the information collected by the Royal Commission on London Traffic with a view to the introduction of legislation on the subject. Despite the fact that the prospects of legislation appear remote, the branch has been continued at a cost of several thousand pounds per annum for the last nine years. The Light Railways Commission is a body set up in 1896 to facilitate the consideration of schemes for the construction of Light Railways. In 1914 the number of applications made to the Commissioners was only nine; and, in respect of these, only two orders, for the construction of $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles of new railway, were made. These labours do not appear to the Committee to justify the expenditure of nearly 4000*l.* per annum on the salaries of the Commissioners and their staff; and the Committee recommend that this Commission should be wound up at the earliest possible date. The Exhibitions Branch is another department, for the present at least, superfluous.

With regard to the *Board of Agriculture and Fisheries*, the Committee note that the gross cost of Government agricultural administration in England, Wales and Scotland rose from 274,000*l.* in 1910-11 to 915,000*l.* in 1914-15—an increase of nearly 240 per cent. A new Board of Agriculture was set up for Scotland at a cost of 292,000*l.*; and the expenses of the separate English Board increased from 274,000*l.* to 623,000*l.*, in spite of the fact that its duties in Scotland have been transferred to the Scottish Board. The Committee recommend that the agricultural schemes assisted by the Development Fund should be reconsidered after the war. They are of

opinion that the number and salaries of the higher administrative staff and the number of the Small Holdings Commissioners should be revised; and the statistics of the Department should be curtailed if possible.

With regard to the *Local Government Board*, the Committee consider that a special enquiry into the administrative staff should take place; and the fees paid to medical practitioners for notification of infectious diseases should be reduced. The Committee express the view that the Development Fund should be carefully husbanded. The Road Board should continue for the present to make advances to prevent the disintegration of important roads; but such advances should, normally, be loans, not free grants in future. The amalgamation of the Road Board with the Local Government Board deserves careful consideration.

Touching the *Legal Departments*, the Committee are of opinion that the recommendations of the Royal Commission on the Civil Service with regard to these should be carried out at the earliest possible date. They point to the significant fact that the Irish Legal Departments were excluded from the enquiry of the Royal Commission, and they remain untouched by the reforms recommended in England. The charge on the public funds in respect of the Judges' Secretaries, Clerks and Marshals, which aggregate over 16,000*l.* per annum, should be discontinued; and the pay of Revising Barristers, which amounted in 1914-15 to 25,000*l.*, should be substantially reduced. The final estimates for Law and Justice for 1916-17 amount to 4,740,461*l.*, a decrease of 287,959*l.*

The total vote for the *Board of Education* has risen from 9,593,000*l.* in 1900-01 to nearly 15,500,000*l.* in 1915-16, the increase being almost entirely due to additional grants to local education authorities, etc., for elementary and higher education and the training of teachers. Of the expenditure of 15,500,000*l.*, 12,400,000*l.* is in respect of grants to local education authorities for elementary education; and the Committee estimate that about 15,000,000*l.* will be expended in addition by the local authorities out of their own funds, making a total expenditure of over 27,000,000*l.* a year on elementary education. After careful consideration the Committee have arrived at the conclusion that a really substantial

permanent decrease can only be secured, without a loss of efficiency, by altering the present school ages so as to reduce the number of children in the schools. It would be inadvisable to lower the leaving age, which is in practice fourteen in London and between thirteen and fourteen elsewhere. But the Committee make out a good case for excluding from school all children under five years of age. At present parents are not compelled to send children to school below the age of five; but they may send them if the local education authority chooses to admit them. On Jan. 31, 1914, the school registers contained 290,000 children in England and Wales in attendance below the age of five. The Committee recommend that the whole matter should be made the subject of special enquiry by the Board of Education.

The Committee direct attention to the elaborate and expensive methods of calculating education grants and controlling local expenditure, and suggest that they should be revised with a view to simplification and economy. There is a large amount of overlapping, owing to the fact that Inspectors are appointed both by the Board of Education and the local education authorities; and the Committee recommend that steps should be taken to prevent any duplication of this work. The salaries of certain administrative officers in the Education Department are in excess of those of the corresponding grades in other Departments; and the Committee recommend that these salaries should be reduced on the occurrence of future vacancies. The activities of the Board of Education and the Local Government Board overlap to a considerable extent as regards arrangements for the health of mothers and young children under school age; and it is suggested that the responsibility for medical work should be transferred to the Local Government Board. The final estimates for Education, Science and Art for 1916-17 amount to 20,488,508*l.*, a decrease of 526,441*l.*

The vote for *Old Age Pensions* accounts for more than one-fifth of the total charge for Civil Departments, the amount voted in 1915-16 being 13,033,000*l.* for pensions, and 56,000*l.* for the expenses of Pensions Committees. In addition, the costs incurred by various Departments—chiefly the Customs and Excise, whose

officers act as Local Pension Officers—in the administration of this service are estimated at 450,000*l.* The present charge for pensions, the report adds, has proved greatly in excess of the original estimates. The Committee were assured that every care was taken to assess the income of applicants for pensions strictly, and, normally, to revise awards as soon as any increase occurs in a pensioner's means. The Committee understand, however, that last summer, owing principally to the shortage of labour, the Treasury decided that Pension Officers should not take steps to revise existing pension awards on the ground of any temporary increase of means due to the pensioner's re-employment arising out of the war. A large number of the pensioners, who were in regular employment and in receipt of substantial weekly earnings, voluntarily surrendered their books without drawing pensions; and the Treasury recently gave instructions that action should be taken to withdraw pensions where this course had not been agreed to. The provision for 1916-17 shows a saving of 235,000*l.* on this account.

The Committee devoted considerable time to the question of securing economies in the administration of *Health Insurance*, which, with its kindred services, now involves an annual charge on votes amounting to close on 8,000,000*l.* It was represented to the Committee that, while the creation of separate administrative bodies for England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland was probably advisable at the initiation of the Act, the main difficulties have now been settled, the questions of policy that still arise are comparatively few, and an expert staff has been trained to deal with them. They were also informed that the majority of insured persons in Great Britain belong to societies common to the whole Kingdom; and a system which compels these societies to settle their arrangements with four independent authorities appears unnecessarily cumbersome. The centralisation of the whole service does not appear to the Committee to be practicable (though many people will dissent from this view); but they think that it should be possible to devise a scheme which would safeguard national interests and sentiment without the retention of so many as twenty-one Commissioners, with salaries mounting to 24,600*l.* per annum. Apart, however, from this question, the

administrative staffs employed by the separate Commissions involve a very large expenditure. The Committee have been impressed by the disparity of the expenditure upon staff per insured person incurred by the several commissions, as shown by the following figures based on the provision made in the Estimates for the financial year 1915-16:

	Number of insured persons.	Total expenditure on staff.	Cost per 1000 insured persons.		
		£	£	s.	d.
England . . .	10,520,000	294,123	29	0	0
Scotland . . .	1,440,000	52,804	36	14	0
Wales . . .	701,000	35,631	51	0	0
Ireland . . .	712,000	42,523	59	14	0

The report adds:

'While the difference in the numbers and distribution of population would not unnaturally result in a smaller charge per head in England than in other parts of the United Kingdom, we are not aware of any sufficient difference of conditions between Wales and Ireland on the one hand, and Scotland on the other, to justify the much heavier charges incurred by the Welsh and Irish Commissioners.'

The Committee state that the greater part of the votes in each case consists not of the expenditure for administration but of grants to societies and insurance Committees, which amount for the year 1915-16 to over 7,000,000*l*. Part of these are the fixed statutory contributions from the Exchequer towards the cost of benefits, but a large proportion consists of additional and in a sense extra-statutory grants; and these grants are continually growing. It appears to the Committee most important, in view of present conditions, that such grants should be very closely restricted, and that the fundamental principle of the scheme, namely mutual insurance, should be maintained. If it is abandoned, the scheme ceases to be a scheme of mutual insurance; and the demands made on behalf of insured persons upon the Exchequer will be illimitable. Moreover, the grant of Exchequer subsidies supplementary to the main insurance scheme is bound to lead, not unnaturally, to demands from the non-insured part of the population for similar concessions.

The Committee express the view that the simplification of the Act is desirable, but they add :

‘The evidence which we have taken showed that few, if any, of these proposals would be absolutely non-contentious ; and it was quite clear that the questions which afford the best field for economies—the system of medical and sanatorium benefit, the constitution of insurance committees, the approval of small societies, etc.—were acutely controversial.’

They therefore came to the conclusion that the best results would be obtained by a special enquiry into the whole administration of the Act, with a view to its reorganisation on a simpler basis.

With regard to *Labour Exchanges* and *Unemployment Insurance*, the Committee recommend that steps should be taken to transfer from the Board of Education to the Labour Exchanges Department all responsibility for Juvenile Committees, and to secure an adequate local contribution to the expenditure entailed. The arrangements for payments of grants to voluntary Associations in aid of expenditure on unemployment benefits are unsatisfactory and should be reconsidered.

The Committee made some enquiry into the administration of the *Post Office*, but they came to the conclusion that the adequate treatment of so large a subject would require a more prolonged and detailed investigation than they were able to conduct. The Committee were impressed by the fact that, of all the numerous services managed by the Post Office, hardly one showed any profit, except the letter-post. The history of the *Telegraphs* was most unsatisfactory. They were taken over in 1870 at a cost (including capital expenditure on extensions) of 10,129,687*l.* Year by year the financial position has grown worse. In the year 1911–12 the Post Office calculated the accumulated loss at 21,796,520*l.*, or double the amount of the original purchase money. The Committee were informed that this unfavourable result was due to (1) the considerable reductions of charges which have been made from time to time, sometimes with little or no regard to the prospects of maintaining a profit ; (2) to the extension of the telegraph system to include areas and classes of business which had been neglected by the telegraph companies as unprofitable ;

(3) to the fact that the staff employed by the Post Office receive higher pay than was accorded by the companies to their employees; and (4) to the increasing competition of the telephones with telegraphs. The State Telephone service is a more recent acquisition. Part of the present system was built up by the Post Office; part was acquired by purchase from the National Telephone Company in 1911. The profit now derived from the whole system appears to be less than the payment which the National Telephone Company used to make by way of royalty to the State; but the Committee were informed that this comparison is to some extent misleading in view of the different systems of account-keeping adopted by the Company and the Post Office.

The Committee in their first report recommended the curtailment of certain postal facilities and a substantial increase in the ordinary postal charges. Effect was given to all the recommendations, with the exception of the proposed special war tax of one halfpenny on every internal postal communication. The Committee express their conviction that it will be necessary to reduce, to a considerable extent, throughout the United Kingdom, Sunday deliveries, and the number of collections and deliveries of letters and parcels generally; and they are of opinion that, where a letter is re-addressed by a private person, he should be required to repeat the postage. The recommendations with regard to the Post Office appear to be altogether sound, and it is to be hoped that Parliament will adopt the proposed special war tax of one halfpenny.

Passing to the expenditure of *Local Authorities*, the Committee state that the problem of civil retrenchment is not confined merely to the expenditure of the Civil Service and the Revenue Departments. If the national resources are to be conserved to the fullest possible extent, it is of course necessary that every practicable economy should be secured in local as well as in central administration. The importance of such economy is shown by the fact that the total expenditure of local authorities in England and Wales alone, defrayed otherwise than out of loans, in the year 1911-12 (the last year for which complete figures are available) amounted to no less a sum than 134,000,000*l.* The Committee

understand that the Local Government Board, the Board of Education, and the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries have invited local authorities generally to reduce their expenditure at the present time, but they are not aware to what extent reductions have actually been effected. They have been informed that reductions of rates have been effected in various localities (ranging from $\frac{1}{2}d.$ to 1s. in the £); and that the loans sanctioned by the Local Government Board in the first five months of the current financial year were for 2,000,000*l.* only, as compared with 7,000,000*l.* in the similar period last year. On the other hand, they understand that in a number of instances rates have recently shown an increase, and they trust that all authorities will endeavour in such cases to reduce expenditure as far as possible in the future.

The Report concludes with the following paragraph :

‘In conclusion we feel bound to draw attention to the fact that, as stated in section 1 above, our enquiry has been very much restricted, and that, as questions of policy have not been considered by us, our recommendations are necessarily incomplete. Practically all subjects on which Parliament has given decisions have been excluded from our review; and in addition it was made clear that, although we were at liberty to examine the Irish Estimates, no useful result would be obtained. The condition of the public finances and the burdens which must fall upon the nation for a generation to come may render it necessary for Parliament to effect a more drastic curtailment of expenditure. We have decided after discussion to adopt the procedure of Select Committees and not to publish any minority reports or individual reservations.’

The Retrenchment Committee has performed a great public service; and its final report—admirably worded and clearly expressed—is one of the most important and valuable documents ever issued by a Parliamentary Committee. Notwithstanding the particular care which the Government and the House of Commons took to restrict the scope of the enquiry and to discourage the activities of the Committee in the narrow limits within which it was confined, it has produced a report which throws a searching light upon the manner in which the House of Commons, the Treasury, and the great spending Departments regard and perform their fiduciary responsibilities

to the nation. It is clear that Parliament has been permitted by the people of this country to degenerate into a scientific vote-catching machine, and that, in the eagerness of its members to obtain the support of voters, the House of Commons as a whole has surrendered for all practical purposes the control and the distribution of public money. The House of Commons has devoted so much time and energy to devising schemes which necessitate the voting away of large sums of public money that it has long ceased to exercise its concurrent responsibility of seeing that the money is wisely and economically expended. The net total of the Estimates for Civil Services for the year ending March 31, 1917, is 86,893,952*l.*, representing a decrease of 3,568,964*l.* on the estimates for the previous year. Some of the Committee's recommendations have been adopted in the present estimates, and others will perhaps be adopted in future years, but there is no guarantee that effect will be given to all the recommendations of the Committee. It would be a patriotic act if a powerful group of members of the House of Commons would take upon themselves the duty of pressing upon the Government in season and out of season the necessity for economy and the carrying out of all the recommendations of the Retrenchment Committee. The Retrenchment Committee should be constituted upon a permanent basis, and the scope of its enquiries should be extended; in particular, it should be empowered to review the expenditure of Local Authorities. But, valuable as have been the services of the Retrenchment Committee, it is obvious that their efforts will go but a little way towards enabling us to finance our war expenditure. The saving in the Civil Service Estimates represents about 3,500,000*l.*, on a total expenditure of 1,825,000,000*l.*, say about 4*s.* per cent.

The area which affords the greatest scope for immediate savings on a large scale is that which has been excluded from the operations of the Retrenchment Committee, namely, the war expenditure. Innumerable instances of waste and extravagance have been given in the House of Commons and the House of Lords within the past nine months. For example, Viscount Peel, speaking in the House of Lords on Nov. 9, 1915, said :

'As regards separation allowances, if the Government had known six or eight months ago the scope and extent of this war they would never have fixed the allowances on the present scale. Was it right that men by joining the army should be put in so many cases in a far better position than they were in in civil life? Again, far too many men had been enlisted and trained for six months, who, after being sent to the front, had been sent back because they would never make efficient soldiers. In this way 150*l.* per man had been lost to the country. He knew a hospital which was absolutely full of men who suffered from long-seated defects, not one of whom ought ever to have been accepted for the army. He knew of a case where a recruiting demonstration costing 30*l.* secured two recruits, neither of whom was able to pass the medical examination. Chauffeurs who were perfectly satisfied with 30*s.* a week got 3*l.* a week on joining the army. House surgeons were difficult to get because the Government were offering them 365*l.* a year, whereas in ordinary times their services could be obtained for 200*l.* No effort appeared to be made by the Government to consider such matters from the point of view of the market. There were also numerous instances of extravagance in regard to contracts and of waste of food and rations. Rations had been practically given away, and bakers were ruined by the mountains of superfluous bread.'

The Minister of Munitions, in the course of his speech on Dec. 20, 1915, made some interesting statements. He said the main feature of their organisation had been that they had had placed at their disposal the services of a considerable number of business men of high standing, who had been running successfully great business concerns. Mr Lloyd George also said that the engineer of the North-Eastern Railway was placed at the disposal of the Ministry of Munitions, and that he was in temporary control at Woolwich. He gave one illustration of the conspicuous services rendered by this gentleman. The manufacture and filling output of various articles had increased since he took it in hand, in some cases by 60 per cent., in others by as much as 80 per cent., whereas the staff had only increased by 23 per cent. One of the things he initiated was a statistical record of the output. *These records were not compiled prior to his assumption of control.* Now they were having and would continue to have a potent effect not only upon the output but

upon the cost of the output. As an illustration of the use to which such figures could be put, he mentioned that, when the output of a certain shop or section of a shop was noted the following morning, it was possible for the superintendent or the works manager immediately to put his finger upon the fact that perhaps the flow of raw materials had failed, or that owing to congestion of the arsenal railways the output could not be got rid of, and the inefficiency could be checked. Such hitches in the daily work of a factory could only be avoided and minimised by a most complete system of statistical control; and that had been instituted at Woolwich.

The point to which I should like to direct the special attention of the taxpayer is that it was only after the introduction of business men of high standing on the organisation of the Ministry of Munitions, and the placing of Woolwich under the control of a business man, that a statistical record of output was introduced. How many other Departments of the Government are still without a complete system of statistical control, such as has been found indispensable in the conduct of our great mercantile undertakings? And how much public money has been and is being wasted through the neglect of the Government to institute such systems of statistical control in all the great spending Departments years ago?

The Auditor-General's report on the Army Appropriation Account for 1914-15, which covers the first eight months of the war, affords many instances of loss and waste of public funds in connexion with army administration. The report describes as 'an unnecessary outlay of public funds' the grant of extra duty pay, up to March 1915, to retired officers employed on recruiting duties only. It also directs attention to the amount (100%) of the outfit allowance originally made to officers, 'with the result that the grant became in many cases a source of profit.' The accounts of the regimental paymasters revealed the fact that the number of men discharged with less than three months' service on account of medical unfitness was disproportionately high. Each of the men received a gratuity on discharge; and, when to such expenditure is added the cost of pay and maintenance while in the army, it is evident that a very large loss to the public was involved. About 9,000,000*l.* was

expended in 1914-15 in providing hutments for the troops. The provision of hutments in the Home Commands was carried out mainly by firms who acted as agents for the War Office and by competitive contract. The remuneration of the principal firm under the first arrangement was fixed at a commission of 5 per cent. on the total cost for labour and material, plus a commission of $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. to cover establishment charges. In other cases the rate of commission was reduced to 4 per cent. Expenditure largely exceeded anticipations and involved a very large liability for commission. Contracts for several camps were made on varying dates, but the huts were to be ready for occupation about Nov. 15, 1914. Certain of the huts were occupied in that month, but in consequence of the leaky state of the roofs and bad conditions generally the troops were removed into billets, involving heavy additional expenditure; and it was not until March 1915 that the huts were again occupied. As a result, billeting on an extensive scale continued throughout the winter, the total expenditure under this head down to March 31, 1915, being 6,250,000*l.* The report deals with certain unsatisfactory features with regard to the purchase and transport of horses. The instructions issued to the purchasing officers indicated that 70*l.* was considered a reasonable sum for an officer's charger. 'It was noticed in the accounts of one Command that in three cases 200*l.* per horse was paid, in addition to about twenty cases varying from 110*l.* to 160*l.*' In the Irish Command, owing to the purchase of unsuitable horses which had to be re-sold, there was a loss of 52,693*l.*

As the Retrenchment Committee has not been permitted to review our War Expenditure, all the nation can rely upon at the moment is departmental control. This has been proved to be wholly inadequate. The Treasury is just now, perhaps, the most overworked department of the Government; and it is unreasonable to expect a Ministry, which has been designed to control an expenditure of about 200,000,000*l.*, to deal adequately with an outlay at the rate of 1,825,000,000*l.* per annum. There is urgent need for the creation of a powerful Department of War Finance which should be independent of Cabinet control, and should be entrusted with all problems arising in connexion with the raising and

expenditure of war funds. It should consist of a small number of expert business men of high standing and wide financial experience, who should be appointed by Parliament in the same manner as the Speaker; and it should be endowed with unlimited powers to investigate and report to Parliament upon every feature of our war expenditure which deserves consideration.

One matter which specially calls for the attention of such a body is that of the war pensions and the separation allowances. In November 1914 the Treasury issued a White Paper which contained an actuarial estimate worked out on various bases. Series II, which provided for 2,000,000 men, a duration of war of one year only, 10 per cent. of deaths and 12 per cent. of disablements, total and partial, showed a total amount to be disbursed, during the currency of the Pensions and Allowances, of 178,000,000*l*. At the beginning of February 1915 it was announced that an amended scheme on a much more generous scale had been adopted and would come into operation on March 1, 1915. My own personal conviction is that we shall be doing very well if the total capital cost does not exceed 500,000,000*l*. The pensions paid by the Federal Government of the United States afford a glaring example of the abuses which may arise if due care is not exercised from the outset as to the conditions under which pensions are granted.

Our greatest hope of retrenchment on a large scale lies in the reduction of consumption by private individuals. On the basis of the figures furnished above, the average cost of living, etc., works out at 40*l*. per head. We have permitted ourselves to become so dependent upon external supplies of foodstuffs that it is difficult to believe that, with the growing shortage of shipping, our expenditure upon food can be cut down materially, unless the entire population voluntarily reduces its consumption of food. The freight on wheat coming from New York to Liverpool was 6*s*. per ton before the war; at the end of December 1915 it was 70*s*. per ton, an increase of 1060 per cent. With regard to drink there should be a substantial saving. The restrictions which have been placed upon certain areas have resulted in a decrease of consumption; and, when these restrictions have been

universally applied and made more rigorous, further savings may be looked for. In spite of the economies which have already been effected by well-to-do people, it is doubtful whether the expenditure upon dress will be much curtailed. There has been a very large increase in the cost of cotton and woollen manufactures and leather goods; but, here again, if our people are really in earnest, material savings can be effected. There does not appear to be much prospect of the expenditure on house-rent being reduced. The cost of coal, gas and electricity has advanced, so that, unless the most rigorous economy is practised by all, any savings from reduced consumption will probably be offset by the increased charges.

With regard to miscellaneous expenditure, any large reduction of the outlay upon education would be dangerous. Motoring is still being indulged in to an unduly large extent. The pressure of public opinion is having an appreciable effect in this matter, and considerable further savings may be anticipated under this heading. Railway travelling for pleasure has been considerably reduced, but some further economies should be practicable in this direction. The cost of distribution is likely to increase rather than decline. The advance in the cost of labour, coal, rubber and petroleum for commercial motors, as well as the advance in cross-channel and other freights, renders it highly improbable that any savings can be effected. The cost of professional services—Barristers, Lawyers, Accountants, Stockbrokers, etc.—has been reduced in a most drastic fashion. There has been a general reduction in domestic service, but further economies may still be looked for here.

On the whole, it is quite clear that, if the British people are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices, they can cut down their outlay to a very considerable extent; and it should be a matter of comparative ease for them to reduce their expenditure by at least 15 per cent. all round without endangering efficiency and the public health. On a total civilian expenditure of 1,943,000,000*l.*, this would mean a saving of nearly 292,000,000*l.* per annum. If at the same time the Government could effect an all-round saving of 15 per cent. on our war expenditure, the deficiency for the year to March 31, 1917, should not exceed an amount between 250,000,000*l.*

and 300,000,000*l.*, a sum which, in view of our accumulated wealth, should not create excessive financial embarrassment. But there must be no misapprehension as to the urgency of the need for public and private retrenchment.

The least satisfactory feature of our financial position is the enormous excess of imports over exports. In the five years 1909-13 the excess of imports over exports averaged 140,000,000*l.* per annum. The returns for the year to Dec. 31, 1915, show imports of commodities to the value of 853,756,000*l.*, and exports to the value of 483,444,000*l.*, leaving an excess of imports to the value of 370,312,000*l.* The question of the adjustment of our trade balance has therefore become one of the first importance. In ordinary times the excess of imports over exports is met by the interest earned on our foreign investments, the earnings of our banking and insurance houses, and the profits of our carrying trade. The credits from these sources are not only sufficient for this purpose in normal years, but they have provided a fund of about 200,000,000*l.* per annum for investment abroad. The ordinary investment of capital abroad has been practically suspended during the war, but its place has been fully taken by the loans which we have been called upon to make to the Overseas Dominions and to our Allies. After making all adjustments, it may be estimated that the year 1915 closed with a deficit of about 450,000,000*l.* so far as our foreign trade was concerned.

There are five methods by which such a deficiency can be met: (1) by reducing imports, (2) by increasing exports, (3) by the export of gold, (4) by the raising of loans abroad, and (5) by the sale abroad of our foreign and colonial investments. There are certain indications which point to the conclusion that all these methods, with the exception of reduction of imports, have been brought into operation for the purpose of adjusting our trade balance. But as to the future, it is difficult to see how the volume of our exports can be greatly augmented in view of the demands of the Army, unless there is an enormous speeding-up of production by the workers who remain. The export of gold has already assumed large dimensions; and our stock of the precious metal is not

sufficiently great to admit of any further recourse on a large scale to this method, unless our Allies transfer a portion of their huge gold reserves to London. While we are playing such a large part in the War Finances of France and Russia, it appears to be a waste of power to keep 350,000,000*l.* in gold demobilised in Petrograd and Paris. We have already succeeded in raising a substantial loan in America; and there can be little doubt that this policy will be continued, although the terms will be onerous. With regard to the fifth method, there is reason to believe that we have already sold to the United States about 250,000,000*l.* of our American investments. By the processes above referred to we have managed to bring our debit balance for the current year within manageable limits; but it must be recognised by all classes as a patriotic duty to limit consumption, and particularly the consumption of foreign manufactures and produce to the utmost extent possible.

That the Government at last realise the importance of restricting consumption of foreign manufactures may be gathered from the fact that on March 21 the Privy Council issued a Proclamation prohibiting the import into this country of motor-cars, motor-cycles, and various musical instruments. The prohibition also extended to spirits and other strong waters, with the exception of brandy and rum. On March 24 the Board of Trade gave notice that a Proclamation would shortly be issued prohibiting, as from March 30, the importation of a long list of goods into the United Kingdom except under licence.

We have been able so far to conduct our war finance in accordance with those sound principles which have made British credit the first in the world, and we must continue on these lines so far as possible. One of the most noteworthy features of the economic history of the war is the recuperative power and mobility of our credit system; and I deprecate the exaggerated views which have been widely expressed as to the parlous condition of our war finance. We are adjusting what practically amounts to a revolution in our foreign trade balance with a celerity and ease that will in after years be regarded as a remarkable achievement, and at the same time a tribute to the soundness of our banking methods; but, if we wish to preserve for the benefit of

future generations the fabric of credit built up by the devotion and self-sacrifice of our forefathers, and at the same time to fulfil our financial obligations to our gallant Allies, we must in our turn make sacrifices. I am confident that the British people will respond willingly to the duties laid upon them in this connexion, as they have done in all matters relating to the war, so soon as the urgency of the position is put before them; and that they will make such changes in their mode of living as will place us in a position to finance a war of many years' duration if need be.

We possess a war treasure in the shape of our investments abroad, which represents at least 4,000,000,000*l.*; and we have only been able so far to realise a fraction of this great asset. As a matter of fact, what has taken place has amounted merely to a change of investments. We have disposed of a portion of our American investments at highly profitable prices; and in their place we have purchased much larger amounts of British Colonial and French, Russian and Italian investments. We have hardly begun to mobilise the financial resources of the Overseas Dominions and our Dependencies. The national income of the British Empire for 1915 may be provisionally estimated as under, viz.:

	<i>£</i>
United Kingdom	2,600,000,000
Canada	350,000,000
Australia	230,000,000
South Africa	50,000,000
New Zealand	55,000,000
India	700,000,000
Crown Colonies and Protectorates	150,000,000
Total	<u>4,135,000,000</u>

The Empire's war expenditure, therefore, amounts to less than half its national income. In view of the above facts I am convinced that our economic position is sound to the core, provided we pursue a policy of the most rigid economy in public and private expenditure.

EDGAR CRAMMOND.

Art. 15.—THE COURSE OF THE WAR.

At the beginning of January public attention was directed chiefly to the Near East, whither French and British troops were being hurried as fast as ships could carry them; while the Germans were reported to be pressing on the repairs to the railway from Belgrade to the Greek frontier, and preparing for an advance against the Allies' position at Salonika. Information published in the press from day to day was, indeed, so contradictory as to cause many people to doubt whether Salonika was ever seriously menaced. That the Allied headquarters expected the enemy to attack may be inferred from General Sarrail's action in blowing up the railway bridges at Demir Hissar and Kilindir on Jan. 12. The demolition of these costly structures, besides involving a heavy claim for compensation, and the risk of aggravating the already strained relations with the Greek Government, would inevitably add to the difficulties which would confront the Allied force when it, in turn, should take the offensive. A step of such importance would not be taken prematurely, or without definite necessity; and the fact that, after having been so long deferred, it was ultimately taken without a previous understanding with the Greek Government, suggests the inference that on the date named General Sarrail became convinced of the imminence of a hostile advance which there had been previously no great reason to apprehend.

But, if the Germans designed an attack, they had no intention of committing themselves too deeply to the enterprise. With the defeat of the Serbians and the opening of the road to Constantinople the main objects of their policy had been accomplished. The appearance of the Franco-British force in Macedonia was an unpleasant episode which had not been provided for in their plans; but it threatened Austro-German interests only indirectly, while it was an immediate menace to Bulgaria's newly-acquired territory in Serbian Macedonia. Just as the conquest of this territory had been left to the Bulgarians, so its defence should rest with them; and, so long as the defence should be successful, Austro-German interests, which lay further north, would be

secure. Austria, indeed, covets Salonika; so does Bulgaria; but neither could have it, because among Germany's Balkan bargains there was a guarantee assuring the integrity of Greek territory. Herein lay one of the difficulties in the way of arranging the offensive; for Bulgaria was unwilling to attack Salonika when, if successful, she could not keep it. By assisting in the conquest of Serbia her part of the bargain had been completed, and she preferred to hold the fruits of her treachery defensively, rather than to bear the greater part of a costly offensive in the interest of her patron and ally without additional bribes. Ultimately, it is said, she was bought by further concessions of Serbian territory; but not till the end of December, when the opportunity for a *coup de main* had passed. General Sarrail was already strong enough to defy attack, except by larger forces than Bulgaria could muster, supported by heavy artillery, which could not be employed until the railway had been reconstructed.

The new railway bridge over the Save at Belgrade is reported to have been opened for traffic on Dec. 30, but the tunnel near Ripanj was not ready till a week or two later. The precise date is unknown, but it was before Jan. 15, when the first through train was run from Berlin to Constantinople. Meanwhile work on the Nish-Ghevveli section of the line had been pushed forward at high pressure; and there is no apparent reason why it should not have been completed by Jan. 12, the date when General Sarrail seems to have thought that an attack was imminent.

But complications had arisen which would account for the enemy changing their plans. The Bulgarian army had suffered heavily at the hands of the Serbians; part was engaged in Northern Albania, and part in watching the Danube frontier of Rumania; the remainder, said to comprise eight divisions, could not take the offensive without strong support. The Germans had, at the outside, five divisions in Serbia, including garrisons; and, having arranged for important operations in France to follow the Balkan campaign, were not in a position to give much help even had they been disposed to do so. There remained the Austrians and the Turks. The former were fully occupied in subjugating the

Montenegrins, and in opposing a Russian offensive on the Bessarabian frontier which had necessitated the withdrawal of such troops as could be spared from the Balkans. The Turks, after the evacuation of Gallipoli by the Allies, had concentrated a force about Xanthi on the Greco-Bulgarian frontier, apparently with a view to advancing on Salonika; but the series of defeats which began on Jan. 8 obliged them to turn their attention to Armenia. Thus the force available for active operations in Macedonia amounted, at the outside, to three German and eight Bulgarian divisions, or about 120,000 rifles with artillery, a force which was clearly inadequate for an attack on Salonika.

Since that time Salonika has become a stronghold which in defensive strength far surpasses all the great fortresses of the pre-war period, because the positions which surround it are at such a distance as effectively to secure the town and harbour from bombardment, while the entrenchments embody the principles evolved from recent experience, and are generally considered, probably with justice, to be as impregnable as science and artillery can make them. Nothing is to be gained, however, by standing on the defensive if the enemy decline to attack; and, as a base for offensive action, Salonika has certain disadvantages. The avowed purpose of the Allies is to reconquer Serbia for the Serbians, which can only be effected by large forces equipped for mountain warfare, necessitating the substitution of pack for wheeled transport, and the provision of mountain artillery. The operations of large forces would be seriously hampered by difficulties of supply. Roads are practically non-existent; and there are only the single-line railways from Salonika to Uskub and Monastir, probably ill-supplied with rolling-stock. The use of motor-transport being impossible, the supply of forces operating at a distance from the railways with a view to outflanking movements would be a task of some difficulty. Similar difficulties would, of course, confront the enemy if they should take the offensive, with the additional disadvantage that the attack would be purely frontal, as the flanks of the Salonika position rest on the sea, and cannot be turned. The Germans, indeed, are unlikely to contemplate such a hazardous enterprise, even in the doubtful

event of their being able to provide the requisite force. They would risk much to gain little. As will be seen later, they must look elsewhere for decisive success; while defeat would ruin their prestige in the Balkans, which seems to be already on the wane, and would, perhaps, cause Rumania to join the Entente Powers, with the consequence that the Austrian flank in Galicia, which depends for its security on the neutrality of Rumania, would be turned. It is, therefore, to be expected that the enemy will remain on the defensive on the frontier, where they occupy a strongly-entrenched position. The conquest of Montenegro and Albania by the Austrians has not improved the situation for the Allies, who are deprived of the assistance which the Italians might have rendered in the re-conquest of Serbia by operating against the enemy's flank; while General Sarraill will be exposed to similar activities on the enemy's part during his advance.

What, then, is the value of Salonika to the Allies? The reconquest of Serbia, which at the present stage would promise to be a costly and difficult enterprise, would not bring them much nearer decisive victory; nor would the defeat of the Bulgarians, who are unlikely to be of much further value to the Germans for offensive purposes, advance matters much. Nothing short of an invasion of Hungary across the Danube could be expected to determine the main issue; and the difficulty of such an undertaking has been enhanced by the precaution which the Germans have taken of constructing fortifications of great strength along the line of the river, and on its approaches. It is therefore possible that the value of Salonika, which thus far has been no more than a *pied à terre* in the Balkans, may not appear until the closing scenes of the war, when the enemy, having been weakened and reduced to the defensive, is being driven back on all the main fronts. At that stage an advance from Salonika might expedite the final decision. Whether it is worth while, in the meantime, to lock up an important force there is a question on which opinions may differ.

The Russian offensive on the Bessarabian frontier, to which allusion has been made above, began about

Christmas, and continued for nearly a month. The operations took the form of a principal attack in the space between the rivers Pruth and Dniester, directed against Czernowitz, combined with an offensive in the area between the Sereth and the Strypa, designed to drive the Austrians across the latter, and, the right flank having been thus secured, to force the passage of the Dniester on the left. The attack on Czernowitz succeeded in attaining the heights north-east of the town, where it was held up by a labyrinth of trenches, and failed to make further progress. In the other sphere of action the Austrians were driven across the Strypa, but maintained the line of the Dniester intact till, on Feb. 8, some weeks after the close of the operations, the Russians captured Uscieczko, ten miles north-west of Zaleszyki, and reached the southern bank, only, however, to be driven back again. Subsequently, on March 19, the capture of the bridge-head at Michalcze, a point three miles further up-stream, was reported; but the bridge had been destroyed, and the Austrians, at the time of writing (March 31), were still in possession of the right bank.

The interest of these inconclusive operations lies chiefly in their political and strategical aspects. In view of the undecided attitude of the Rumanians, who are supposed only to be awaiting a favourable change in the situation to join forces with the Allies, a decisive Russian success in such close proximity to the frontier might end their hesitation; while, irrespective of Rumania's attitude, the Russians, by breaking through in the Bukowina, would turn the enemy's defences in Galicia. It is, therefore, not surprising that large Austrian and German reinforcements were hurried up from all quarters, including the Balkans, causing a complete dislocation of any aggressive schemes the enemy may have had in mind on the Eastern or the Balkan front. The combination of attacks on the Strypa with the advance on Czernowitz was in accordance with the interrelation of the Strypa—Dniester and Bessarabian fronts, which causes them to be mutually dependent. An advance up the Pruth valley towards Stanislau would turn the line of the Dniester; while the possession of the latter would make the Austrian defences in the Bukowina untenable. The

Russians, by operating simultaneously on both fronts, gained a double chance of success, while the knowledge that a defeat on either front would entail the collapse of the other added to the enemy's anxieties.

In Armenia better fortune has attended the Russian Army of the Caucasus. After their defeats at Sarikamish and Ardahan early in January last year, the remnants of the Turkish forces fell back, part to the fortress of Erzerum, and part towards the Black Sea coast. During the succeeding months the Russian Commander, General Yudenitch, owing to the exigencies of the European campaign, was obliged to confine himself to clearing the Turks out of the north-western corner of Persia about Lake Urmia, and covering the approaches to Kars and Erivan.

By the end of the year both armies had been reinforced, the Turks numbering in all some 200,000 men; and General Yudenitch found himself able to take the offensive. He began by falling suddenly on the Turkish left wing in the region of Lake Tortum on Jan. 8, and driving it in the direction of the coast. He then attacked the entire front between Lake Tortum and Melasgird, thirty miles north of Lake Van, with the result that by the 18th the Turks had suffered a signal defeat, the centre flying towards Erzerum, and the right wing, which was cut off, being driven south-westwards in the direction of Mush. Guns, ammunition and stores of all kinds were abandoned; and thousands of prisoners were left in the hands of the Russians, who pressed the pursuit with extraordinary vigour through blinding blizzards, and over trackless mountain ridges, deep in snow. The Deve Boyun heights, close on 7000 feet above sea-level, which, with their eleven forts, bar the approaches to Erzerum from the east, were captured by Feb. 15; and on the following day the fortress surrendered. On the same date Akhlat, on Lake Van, and Mush, in the upper valley of the Euphrates, were occupied, completing the isolation of the Turkish right wing, which fell back on Bitlis. In a little more than a month the Turkish army in Armenia had been decisively beaten and dispersed by a series of brilliant operations, conducted under difficulties of climate and country which might well have seemed insuperable;

and the main pivot of defence, the base of operations in the province, was in the hands of our Allies.

It is unnecessary to follow General Yudenitch in his pursuit of the different fractions of the Turkish army, northwards towards Trebizond to cut off the left wing which is retreating along the coast, followed by the Russian right; westwards down the valley of the Kara Su, towards Erzingan; and southwards through Bitlis (stormed by the Russians on March 2), whence the right wing appears to be retreating towards Mosul. These operations, at the time of writing, are still in progress; and the bulk of the Turkish reinforcements has not yet been encountered.

The full results of the Russian victory cannot as yet be discerned. Its immediate effect has been to attract troops from other theatres of war, thereby putting an end to any schemes for offensive action which the Turks may have entertained, or which the Germans may have planned to execute with their assistance. The force set free from Gallipoli, which was probably intended to play some part in the Balkans, has had to furnish reinforcements for Armenia; the projected attack on Egypt has been averted; and troops marching to Mesopotamia are said to have been recalled. By thus throwing the Turks everywhere on the defensive, the Russians have done something to repair the failure of their Allies last year to make an end of the Turkish military power by striking at its heart, Constantinople. They have paralysed one of its limbs; but the injury has not mortally affected the vital parts, while other limbs retain enough strength to detain important Allied forces in Egypt and Mesopotamia. The Turks thus continue to perform one of the functions for which their German masters intended them, namely to threaten from their central position certain regions which one or more of the Allied Powers could not afford to neglect, and so to bring about a wide dispersion of forces, which are either inactive, or employed in operations promising no decisive result. The Allied forces now operating, or inactive, in Armenia, Mesopotamia, and Egypt, probably exceed the whole effective strength of the Turkish army; not to mention Salonika, which is itself a legacy of the failure in the Dardanelles.

How far the Russians will be able to carry the work of reparation is a question about which it would be futile to speculate. It is evident that decisive results are not to be achieved on the outskirts of the Turkish Empire in Armenia, nor by operating towards Mosul and Baghdad. They must be sought on the road to Constantinople, to bar which the Turks would be compelled to bring up all their available forces and accept battle, the issue of which might decide the fate of the war party and the German directors at Constantinople, whose reign is said already to have become unpopular. But the way is long, the country difficult; and the line of communication by Erzerum, besides being inadequate for the supply of such forces as would be required when operating at a distance from the railhead on the Caucasian frontier, would need a large number of troops for its protection. The difficulties of supply might, perhaps, be mitigated by establishing fresh bases on the Black Sea coast, supplied by sea-transport. Up to the present, the Russians appear to be occupied in clearing their flanks, and moving their main forces by the Kara Su valley towards Erzingan; while the rate of advance suggests that entrenching and road-making demand a great part of their attention. It may be that by striking a blow to relieve the tension in Mesopotamia and elsewhere, they have effected the object of their offensive, and that they will refrain from embarking on operations the end of which cannot be foreseen; contenting themselves with making good the dominating position already gained, and establishing connexion with their forces in Persia, whose advanced columns are working towards Urmia and Baghdad. The Turks, meanwhile, in anticipation of an advance towards Constantinople, are reported to be concentrating large forces about Sivas, and to be entrenching a position in that region under German supervision.

The situation in Mesopotamia, where General Townshend has been beleagured at Kut-el-Amara since the beginning of December, has caused general anxiety; and the conception and conduct of the campaign have been the subject of much criticism. The original object of the expedition is understood to have been the protection of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's wells, and the pipe-line

which leads through Ahwaz to Barein on the Shatt-el-Arab, thirty miles below Basra. A force comprising two infantry brigades was despatched from Bombay early in November 1914, which after a couple of insignificant engagements, occupied Basra and Ahwaz. The security of the pipe-line would have been ensured by the maintenance of adequate forces at these points; but, whether more ambitious operations had been originally designed, or whether they were suggested by the feebleness of the opposition hitherto encountered, reinforcements were sent forward, and the advance was resumed with Baghdad as the objective. It may have been that the opportunity was thought favourable for striking a blow to strengthen British prestige in the East, which German and Turkish emissaries in India and elsewhere were endeavouring to undermine. Baghdad, though an object of Germany's ambition, was at the time of little military importance; and to bring the Turks to terms it would be necessary to strike at a more vital point. The political results anticipated from occupying the ancient City of the Caliphs were no doubt great, but it may be questioned whether they justified the employment of a considerable force, at a time when troops were scarce, in an isolated enterprise which could not be decisive.

The usual mistake was made of underestimating the enemy. The long line of communication, liable to attack by predatory Arabs, needed large numbers for its protection; and General Townshend, with little more than a division, encountered greatly superior forces at Ctesiphon which obliged him to retreat to Kut-el-Amara, after having snatched a transient and costly victory. Reinforcements, which were on their way, had been despatched too late. The slow progress of General Aylmer's relieving column has probably been due not so much to insufficient strength as to the state of the country, which has enabled the Turks to occupy successive positions with their flanks resting on extensive swamps which, flooded by torrential rains, have made outflanking movements impossible. On each occasion the troops have been restricted to purely frontal attacks, over ground which afforded no vestige of cover, against formidable entrenchments well provided with machine guns, and manned by infantry which, having been trained under German supervision, is of

much higher fighting value than the local troops and Arab auxiliaries encountered during the early stages of the expedition. The losses, in consequence, have been very severe.

The large increase of numbers due to the relief operations, and the heavy casualties, have evertaxed the administrative services, the expansion of which has not kept pace with the augmentation of the fighting force. The river, in the earlier operations, afforded an easy and efficient means of supply; but, as the force grew, the number of barges and steamers became inadequate both for the carriage of supplies and for the evacuation of the wounded. Construction could not keep level with requirements; a number of new barges were swamped in crossing the ocean; others were destroyed by hostile agents. The medical personnel, appliances, and dressings were short, with the result that the wounded could not be properly attended to, and the proportion of deaths was abnormally large. All these shortcomings were, of course, the result of the initial miscalculation which led to the campaign being undertaken too light-heartedly and with insufficient force; for, as in other instances, a fraction of the strength needed to repair failure would have ensured success at the outset.

As already observed, the Russian victory in Armenia has probably done something to relieve the situation by stopping the flow of Turkish reinforcements to the Tigris. Our Allies have rendered further assistance by defeating German intrigues in Persia, and dispersing the mercenary levies of Prince Henry of Reuss, both of which were a serious menace to our position in Mesopotamia. The advance of one of their columns from Kermanshah towards Baghdad should also have a salutary effect by causing the enemy disquietude for the safety of the city and of their line of retreat.

Towards the middle of January there were signs of the development of a German offensive on the Western front which culminated in the Battle of Verdun. Attacks of varying importance took place at seventeen different points, the chief of which were in Champagne (Jan. 9), north of Arras (Jan. 23), about Frise, on the Somme

(Jan. 28-29), and south-east of Ypres (Feb. 14). Concerning these it need only be observed that they were probably intended to distract attention, and, by frequent false alarms, to cause the French to hesitate about moving their reserves to meet the real attack until its nature should be established beyond doubt.

It has always been expected that the Germans would endeavour to return to the offensive in France, because it is on that front that they must seek a decision. The immense size and consequent extensive fronts of the main armies of the present day has made it practically impossible to destroy them in battle, as the Germans found when operating against the Russian armies last year. A defeat affects only a limited portion of the line, and can be remedied by retreating and reforming on a new alignment. As the Russians proved, this manoeuvre can be repeated, if necessary, so long as there is sufficient space in rear of the armies. It has, therefore, become more necessary than in former times to aim at the heart of the enemy's country, usually his capital, the capture of which, apart from the moral effect produced, would dislocate the machinery of government and administration, and tend to discourage the nation and weaken resistance. The vast extent of Russia offers no such tangible objective. At the end of their twelve-months' campaign the Germans were still 300 miles from Petrograd and more than 400 miles from Moscow. Paris, on the other hand, is comparatively accessible, while the country provides relatively little space for retreat.

These considerations, among others, defined France as the theatre in which the Germans must first seek a decision. The repulse of the Russian armies made Germany's eastern frontier temporarily secure. The Balkan campaign was an interlude, necessitated by the precarious position of the Turks. Behind it there were political aims of the first importance,* which required the destruction of Serbia; but these might have waited. No decision that could be attained in the Balkans would bring the end of the war in sight; though the Germans probably hoped that the Turks, when relieved from their

* See 'Quarterly Review' for January 1916, pp. 229-230.

embarrassment, would strike a successful blow at Egypt, the 'neck of the British Empire.'

For the Allies the case has been different. The reasons which prescribed for the Germans offensive war in the West combined with a strategical defensive in the East, suggested the converse for the Allies. The simile in vogue early in the war, which likened the French front to a stone wall and the Russian army to a steam-roller, embodied a strategic truth. Berlin and Vienna are more immediately threatened from the Russian frontier than from the Rhine; while Austria would be most effectively attacked from the Italian and Balkan fronts, especially in co-operation with Russia.* But the conditions of the problem have been changed by the Russian retreat, the German mastery of the Balkans, and the inability of the Italians to break through the Austrian defences.

The Germans, therefore, at the close of the Russian and Balkan campaigns, built a strong defensive front from Riga to the Rumanian frontier, and fortified the Danube and other lines of defence in Serbia. Although their purpose had not been fully attained on the Eastern front, the Russian armies had been driven far from the frontier, and the risk of invasion made correspondingly remote. If they could snatch a victory in France they might afford to pursue the advantage, in the hope of gaining Paris and, possibly, reducing France to submission, even at the cost of having to recede in Russia. It remained to settle the plan of operations.

The importance to the Germans of breaking down the north-eastern frontier defences, extending from Verdun to Toul, has been discussed in a previous article.† After the war of 1870-71 the German and French General Staffs recognised that the line of the Moselle would provide the best base for an invasion of France. The Germans, accordingly, set to work to expand the Lorraine railway system into a network of strategical lines, connected with the interior by numerous fortified bridges over the Rhine; while the French spent large sums in fortifying the line of the Meuse. There has been for

* Cf. Napoleon's campaign in 1797, and Clausewitz 'On War,' Book viii, chap. 9, as regards the influence of the Italian front on operations in France.

† See 'Quarterly Review' for December 1914, pp. 96-97.

some years a school of military thought in Germany which believed that the French fortress-line could be carried by assault under an overwhelming fire of heavy artillery; but to avoid any risk of failure at the outset of the war, the circuitous and inconvenient, but surer, line of invasion through Belgium was adopted. The capture of the Verdun—Toul defences, however, formed part of the original plan; and attempts to that end were made in September 1914, which were partially successful. The defeat on the Marne put an end to this enterprise; and the subsequent extension of the line to the North Sea caused the Germans to direct their efforts against the Belgian and British armies in the hope of defeating them before they were firmly established and reinforced, and thus turning the flank of the Allies' line. The lure of the Channel ports,* which they had advertised as their objective in October 1914, may have enticed them to renew their offensive on the Yser Canal last April. During the remainder of the past year they learnt, in Russia, valuable lessons in methods of attack and in the use of heavy artillery, which, in conjunction with the strategical considerations already indicated, probably led them to revert to the plan of breaking through the Verdun—Toul defences. The design having been thus conceived in outline, tactical considerations determined the point of attack. But before proceeding to enquire into their probable nature, it is necessary to make a slight digression.

The course of the war during the past year, which has been, in the main, prescribed by Germany, and has therefore been conducted in harmony with her resources, provides almost certain indications that her military power is on the decline. The offensive which began in February 1915 embraced nearly the whole of the Niemen—Bobr—Narew front, an extent of 200 miles. Mackensen's famous 'phalanx' advanced from the Dunajetz, in May, on a front of about thirty miles, while large armies prolonged the line far into the Carpathians on the right, and South Poland on the left. Heavy fighting extended over some 250 miles of front. The main fighting front

* Concerning Germany's aims in this direction see 'Quarterly Review,' January 1916, p. 230.

during the envelopment of Poland in August reached the enormous extent of 300 miles, exclusive of the Bug—Dniester and the Niemen—Courland fronts. About this period the Germanic Empires appear to have reached the zenith of their military power, for the subsequent operations showed a steady decline. Although the elimination of the Polish re-entrant reduced the front by 100 miles, and the line from Rumania to the Niemen was held defensively, the German offensive showed signs of weakness about Wilna, and ultimately degenerated into isolated and ineffective attacks between Dwinsk and Riga. Again, a comparison between the scope of the operations in Russia and the present offensive in France, for which the Germans had several months to prepare by training new levies, leads irresistibly to the conclusion that Germany's reserves are on the wane; of which corroboration may be found in the presence of large numbers of the 1916 and 1917 classes in the units fighting at Verdun.

Assuming, then, that the Germans were obliged to husband their reserves, the choice of the objective would be influenced by consideration of the force needed to attain it. An examination of the front at Verdun will show that the configuration of the French line was, in this respect, favourable to the Germans. But first it is necessary to bear in mind one of the causes to which the failure of frontal attacks has been due, and to which reference has been made in previous articles.* Broadly stated, what has repeatedly happened is this. The attacking force, after carrying the first line of trenches, is assailed during its subsequent advance by fire and counter-attacks on both flanks, and rarely succeeds in penetrating the second line, which, being two or more miles in rear, suffers little, if at all, from bombardment. The shorter the front of attack, the greater is the effect of the flank fire and counter-attacks, and the smaller the prospect of success. Hence there has been a marked tendency to widen the front of attack.†

* See especially 'Quarterly Review' for December 1914, pp. 99-100.

† The British front at Neuve Chapelle (April 1915) was about 4000 yards (say, 2½ miles). The French, in Champagne (September 1915), attacked on a front of 16 miles.

The form of the French lines north of Verdun, however, enabled the Germans to attack on a comparatively short front without incurring these disadvantages, and thus to make the most effective use of their available numbers by attaining a corresponding depth of formation. Throughout the operations the German right flank was protected by the deep valley of the Meuse and the flooded river, while the left was immune from envelopment owing to the receding form of the French line beyond Azannes. Instead of being able to attack the German left, the French were obliged, as the attack progressed, to withdraw from their positions in the Woëvre plain between Azannes and Fresnes.

In another respect the conditions favoured the Germans. The interior of the French position between the Meuse and the Woëvre front, had, at the beginning of the battle, a width of eight miles at Consenvoye, widening to about ten miles at Verdun. Within this narrow area, a great part of which was obstructed by the entrenchments of successive positions and searched by the hostile artillery, the forces engaged in the defence had to be accommodated and manœuvred. When the Woëvre front was drawn back, the space was further restricted. Thus, while the Crown Prince had ample space for massing troops in secure positions in rear of his fighting line, the numbers which General Pétain could bring within reach of his line of battle were definitely limited, while their movements were impeded, and in the stress of battle there was great risk of congestion and disorder. The Meuse, flowing behind the position, though doubtless spanned by numerous bridges, would obstruct the advance of reserves placed in rear of Verdun, and make it difficult to co-ordinate and time their movements. On the whole, the Verdun salient was probably the most vulnerable locality, because the most difficult to defend, on the whole western front; and there is no doubt that, when the details of the battle are known, it will be found that our Allies fought under grave disadvantages with almost superhuman valour.

The accompanying map shows approximately the daily progress of the first phase of the battle. One of its notable features is the regularity of the German advance. Only on the first day was there any pronounced

irregularity in the line attained. The conclusion suggested is that the attack was conducted on a methodical system, by which each stage was subjected to superior control. How this control was maintained in the stress of battle, when units become dispersed and lost in the maze of unfamiliar trenches, and field telegraph and telephone wires are destroyed by shells as quickly as they are laid, is a matter not merely for surprise, but for serious thought. Possibly a well-defined objective was set at each stage for each unit of the attacking force, beyond which it was not to proceed; or the system of intercommunication may have run laterally between units, and not between front and rear, ensuring, at least, the preservation of an unbroken line. But such arrangements, though beneficial, would still leave unsolved the fundamental problem of securing concerted action between artillery and infantry; for the artillery commanders, unless accurately informed of the progress of the fighting line, can ensure it neither adequate support nor immunity from the fire of their own guns. For all that is known at present, the action of the artillery may, of course, have been subject to the usual imperfections. One can only judge from general results. The only thing known with certainty is that the advance was remarkably regular till, on Feb. 27, it was finally stopped by the French third line on the front Bras—Douaumont—Damloup. In spite of the formidable defences and tenacious valour of our Allies, the distance covered—about four miles in depth—constitutes a record on the Western front since the Battle of the Marne.

When we turn to the official accounts of important attacks by the French and British forces, such as those in Champagne and Artois in September last, we find that the progress on different portions of the front was, apparently, determined rather by the amount of resistance encountered than by superior control or pre-arrangement; with the result that fractions of the fighting line would push on too far, and, in addition to suffering severely, and sometimes having to retreat, would be unable to assist adjoining portions which had been held up by some formidable obstacle or unforeseen contingency. The attacks have, in consequence, been spasmodic and irregular, wanting in co-ordination, artillery support,

and timely reinforcement by reserves; seldom penetrating the second line of defence, and then only at isolated points. The Allies, indeed, have derived no advantage, on such occasions, from adventitious circumstances; while at Verdun the conditions were exceptionally simple on account of the small extent of front to be controlled, and the immunity from flank attacks. But, after making allowance for these advantages, there remains a strong presumption that the Germans, with their varied experience in Russia, and after many failures, have gone some way towards overcoming the difficulties incidental to the attack.

There are indications that the turning-point of the battle was reached soon after the Germans arrived before the third line of defences. On Feb. 29 their right wing began to entrench, and their subsequent attacks were made on narrow fronts, chiefly about Douaumont and Vaux. It is likely that most of the troops which had been engaged were by that date worn out, and that the drafts for replacing casualties, and the greater part of the reserves, had been expended. On March 6 the Germans began a fresh offensive on the western heights between Bethincourt and the Meuse, but their attacks were made on narrow fronts never exceeding $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and none succeeded in penetrating the second line. By March 16 the troops appear to have reached the limit of their endurance, for a pause of three days ensued, after which a fresh attack was made against the front Avocourt—Malancourt by a division which had been brought from a remote point of the front; from which it may be inferred that the general front had been drawn on to the limit of safety to feed the fighting line at Verdun. The purpose of the offensive on the western heights was probably to get within range of the railway and the bridges over the Meuse, in order to interrupt the flow of reinforcements and supplies to the troops on the right bank, without which they could not have maintained their position. But the forces available were inadequate, and the conditions which favoured the attack on the eastern heights did not exist in an equal degree; for the salient was less pronounced, and, there being no obstacle in rear of the position, the French had better facilities for the employment of their reserves.

Although Verdun, from the tactical point of view, offered an inviting objective, its capture did not promise decisive results. The French would probably have been obliged to abandon the eastern heights of the Meuse as far as St Mihiel, but they would have been able to reform on a shorter front between that place and some point in the Argonne. The Germans, however, anticipated great political results from the capture of the fortress, in addition to the military advantage of acquiring the line of railway from Metz through Verdun to Mezières, which would aid the supply of the armies between the Oise and the Meuse, and facilitate further operations. They are said to have brought 28 divisions from the Eastern front, and to have employed, in all, 29 divisions in the battle which came to an end on March 22. According to a French official statement, six army corps (14 divisions) were identified during the first two days of the battle, a force which, at full strength, would amount to 300,000 men, comprising 175,000 rifles. The extent of front being, at the most, eight miles, this would give an average of about 22,000 rifles per mile. There was also an unknown force of artillery, the Germans' most important asset; and large drafts were used to replace casualties. The forces employed on the Woevre front and the western heights did not, probably, exceed eight, or, at the outside, ten divisions; and the balance of the twenty-nine were available for the main attack. Their failure, under unusually favourable conditions, and with such immense forces in relation to the front attacked, may well cause the Germans to doubt the possibility of securing a decision in France.

During the month of February the conquest of the Cameroons was completed; and General Smuts is engaged in subjugating the last of Germany's colonial possessions. That the German flag should have flown so long overseas is a consequence of the lack of foresight on the part of successive British governments, and a testimony to the thoroughness of Germany's preparations for war. It is well not to be too elated at its disappearance; nor may we assume that it will affect the ultimate decision of the war, for the future of the colonies must follow the issue of the war in Europe. If Germany should win, she will

re-enter on possession. Nor can they be weighed, as some have suggested, against German conquests in Europe, to be bartered for the latter if the war should end in an inconclusive peace. It would, doubtless, be the aim of Germany in that event to secure terms which would enable her to prepare for a renewal of the struggle under more advantageous conditions; and it is hardly to be supposed that she would exchange Belgium, and the open road to Constantinople, which are essential to the realisation of her dreams of dominion by sea and land, for distant territories which have, in comparison, no military value.

In this connexion a kindred doctrine may be noticed, which attributes a similar efficacy to sea-power. It asserts that, if the Allied Powers should be defeated on land, we could continue the war by sea, and, by blockading Germany, compel her to relinquish the occupied territories. This seductive theory assumes, in the first instance, that the blockade could be made more effective than it seems to have been hitherto, when France, Italy, and Russia had been added to the neutral countries from and through which Germany receives supplies. It also assumes that neutrals, who are now chafing at the restriction of their trade, would submit to its continuance after having ceased to make the large profits they are reaping from the war. Germany's oversea trade might be stopped; but to upset the commerce of a large part of the world, disregarding protests and possible reprisals, would need more resolution than British governments habitually possess.

These, however, are minor considerations. The conditions of peace which Germany, if victorious by land, would impose on our Allies are the vital matter. *Ex hypothesi*, she could exact what terms she pleased, for on no other terms would she conclude peace. These would comprise the cession of such occupied territories as she desired to keep, advantageous commercial agreements, and an embargo on trade with Great Britain. She would then start to outbuild our Navy, and, doubtless to attack us in Egypt, and, possibly in the East—enterprises which we could not resist, because sea-power is ineffective on land beyond the range of the ships' guns, while the residue of our land forces would be inadequate. If

Germany should think the end likely to be doubtful, or too long in coming, she could take the short and simple way of stipulating, in the terms of peace, for the transfer of our Allies' fleets, and thus at once secure preponderance at sea.

It is time that we ceased to imagine that decisive victory can be gained by these or by other indirect methods. The war will be decided on land, like other wars; and victory will go to the side which can maintain the larger armies in the field, and use them more effectively. It is another pleasing theory that time is on the side of the Allies, because they have the greater resources. Time and resources favour those who put them to the best use; and in this respect we have been wanting in the past. It is an elementary principle of war that other things being equal, success depends on superior forces being concentrated at the decisive point *and time*. On several occasions—at the Dardanelles, at Salonika, and in Mesopotamia—we have been too late; and the decision, which may be difficult to reverse, has, in consequence, gone against us. Another consequence has been that large forces are dispersed in distant regions, and the resources of our mercantile marine are overstrained in keeping them supplied, causing us to suffer from a sort of self-imposed blockade, and our Allies to be mulcted in high freights. We have followed the enemy's lead, instead of anticipating him. In other vital matters the Government, instead of adopting a resolute and far-seeing policy, has waited on public opinion. It is time to reverse these methods, for the crisis of the war cannot be far off; and it will need all the efforts of the Allies to give it a favourable turn, which, by ensuring decisive victory, may obviate an inconclusive peace.

W. P. BLOOD.

Art. 16.—THE RECRUITING CRISIS.

THE serious political crisis which has again arisen over the question of recruiting illustrates the difficulty which this country has found in adjusting its essentially 18th-century conceptions of war to 20th-century conditions. The division which threatens the existence of the Coalition Cabinet is not one between parties, nor even over particular measures, but rather between two points of view. On the one side are those who regard war as a limited affair waged by governments which levy taxes, raise recruits and purchase munitions from among a community carrying on its usual life so far as possible under somewhat abnormal conditions. On the other are those who realise that modern war is a desperate struggle for existence between nations, where victory can only be won by the nation that can concentrate the energy of every single citizen upon the prosecution of the war, and can subordinate every other consideration or interest to the one supreme aim of victory.

The former school of thought is represented by the Prime Minister and by those of his colleagues who, with him, have stamped the Coalition Government with its peculiar character; by a majority, probably, of the existing House of Commons, including not a few Unionists as well as Liberals, Labour men and Nationalists; and by a considerable element outside. It controls the united caucus of all the political parties and of the Trade Union Executives, and is supported by the whole of the Liberal Press and a considerable, but diminishing, proportion of the Unionist Press outside of London. The latter school has, as yet, no political organisation or acknowledged leader. Some of those who are regarded as embodying its views are, like Mr Lloyd George, uncomfortably quarantined in the Cabinet. Others, like Sir Edward Carson or Lord Milner, are watched, with eager hope or with sullen suspicion, as possible leaders of an Opposition which has yet to come into being. The speeches of Mr Hughes, giving to the same views an expression intensely democratic and at the same time intensely Imperialist, have inspired many with a conviction that

somehow the barriers of our unorganised Imperial system must be surmounted so as to enable the vigour and freshness of Dominion statesmanship to take a direct and continuous part in the conduct of the war.

Which of these two points of view is to prevail? Upon the answer to that question depends the issue of the war and the future of British civilisation. And it is because the recruiting question brings these two conceptions of war into sharpest conflict, no less than because of its intrinsic importance from the military point of view, that it is of such immense significance at the present moment.

When the war began there were two recruiting organisations in existence—the Recruiting Department of the Regular Army, and the recruiting machinery of the Territorial Force Associations. The former recruited about 35,000 men a year, the latter about double that number. So little had the expansion of the Regular Army in war been contemplated that practically all the competent recruiting officers were withdrawn on mobilisation and replaced by 'dug-outs.' The recruiting offices were mostly down some back street in a county town, and all the arrangements, including the interminable forms which required filling up, were based on a maximum daily intake of twenty or thirty recruits at any one office. The recruiting officers' ideas were, as a rule, as limited as the accommodation. The Territorial Associations were much more elastic in composition and in outlook, as well as in touch with much broader strata of the population.

There can be no doubt that, from the point of view of recruiting, as well as from that of organisation, the whole task of raising new armies should have been thrown upon the Territorial Associations, strengthened, where required, by fresh blood in the shape of men of local influence, and helped by any additional staff that the War Office could have provided. Unfortunately Lord Kitchener knew nothing about the Territorial Force or its machinery, and decided that what he wanted was more 'Regular Soldiers' and not more 'Territorials,' and that the raising of these soldiers should be done through the War Office organisation. The Territorials were, however, allowed to do as they pleased, and

eventually, in competition with the War Office organisation, recruited well over half a million more men.

Meanwhile Lord Kitchener opened proceedings by appealing for 100,000 men for his new Army. Recruits came forward, in numbers insignificant compared with subsequent figures, though quite beyond the capacity of the existing recruiting staff or offices. For a few days the New Army hung fire. Then half a dozen enterprising members of Parliament took the matter up in their constituencies, organised recruiting committees on the lines familiar to them in political organisation, commandeered Town Halls and other places suitable for carrying on recruiting on a large scale, and took it upon themselves to authorise medical and clerical staffs, stationery and all other requisites; after which, having proved the success of their method, they secured Lord Kitchener's permission to go round the country and organise the same machinery elsewhere. Other members followed suit; and a few weeks later the effort was systematised in the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee. The whole existing Party machinery was put at its disposal, and a campaign of oratory and organisation was inaugurated. A great wave of enthusiasm, stimulated by the serious news of the retreat from Mons, swept through the country. Within a month the recruiting figures had worked up to 30,000 a day; and the original idea of an extra six divisions had given way to the conception of a British Army of something like continental proportions.

But for this ever-swelling army there was no accommodation, no uniforms available or likely to be available for months, no rifles, no artillery. To go on enlisting meant chaos and overwork at headquarters, discomfort and privation to the men, and an immense waste of public money. On the other hand, it was awkward to admit that nothing had been provided beforehand, and impossible to turn a great popular movement on and off like a tap. The remedy that at once suggested itself was to attest the men as reservists and let them continue at their work till wanted, pushing on at the same time with the recruiting campaign at topmost pressure. By such means it was hoped that practically the whole able-bodied population of fighting age might be induced to attest,

so as to be called up, like a population under universal service, in successive age-groups as required.

Early in September 1914 Lord Kitchener acquiesced in a scheme of deferred enlistment, the recruits receiving sixpence a day till called up. But, for some inscrutable reason, no efforts were made to explain the scheme through the Press or in any other way, with the result that in a few days thousands who had given up their employment and enlisted were sent away to live on sixpence a day. Questions were at once asked in Parliament; and Mr Asquith met the difficulty by raising the sixpence to three shillings. Hereupon the flood of recruits poured in faster than ever. Lord Kitchener promptly set himself to check it by raising the standards of height and chest measurement by two inches. This was done over the week-end; and on the Monday masses of recruits, who had left their employment on Saturday with every reason to believe that they could pass any physical test, were turned away. The efforts of the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee were at the same time damped down so far as possible. These proceedings could not but have a discouraging effect both upon recruiters and would-be recruits. The enthusiasm of these early weeks was never recovered.

Nevertheless in the first six months of the war voluntary recruiting brought at least 1,500,000 men to the colours, over and above those already in the Army Reserve or Territorial Force. It was a wonderful testimony to the patriotic and vigorous spirit of the nation. But from the point of view of efficient organisation the result was not so satisfactory. Far more men were enlisted than could be equipped and armed for a long time to come, among them tens of thousands of skilled workers who ought to have been making the very arms and equipment for lack of which the new armies were wasting their own time and the public money, or the munitions which were so sorely needed at the front. After all, the men were collected not from the occupations from which they could best be spared in the national interest, but from those which could be most easily got at for recruiting purposes, or from those strata to which the monetary inducement appealed most effectively.

It was in this connexion that the question of the 'married men' first cropped up, though in a sense very different from that which it has since acquired. In the economic competition between industry—where pay is the same for those who do the same work, regardless of their domestic responsibilities—and the Army, with its relatively low pay and high separation allowances, it was obvious that a much higher proportion of married men would enlist, at any rate out of the classes whose wages do not exceed the sum total of pay and separation allowance added to the cost of the man's own keep. The objection then raised against this disproportionate enlistment of married men was partly one of public economy, and partly a social one based on the undesirability of breaking up homes and of condemning an unnecessarily high proportion of families to the loss of husbands and fathers. The generous separation allowances, however reasonable where enlistment is regarded as a matter of contract and not of sacrifice, had another unfortunate consequence from the point of view of national efficiency, inasmuch as they discouraged that flow of female labour to replace male labour which would otherwise have been set up automatically, while on the other hand they encouraged, in a large section of the population, an increased rate of expenditure.

An Army organisation on the basis of a total of some 70 divisions for the field was now completed. But, though voluntary recruiting, by a marvellous effort, proved itself capable of raising such an army, it soon showed itself quite incapable of maintaining it. The recruiting history of the greater part of the year 1915 is one of a continuous vain attempt to find recruits in sufficient numbers to complete the scheme and make good the wastage growing at an ever-increasing rate with the increase of our forces at the front. Before long the Army, instead of growing, steadily began to dwindle. Units for service at the front were broken up and converted into drafting units. Drafting units were so skimmed of properly trained men that thousands were sent to the front with practically no training at all. Everywhere training was being progressively disorganised by the shortage of men. At the front itself divisions were reduced to mere skeletons. At the time of the

Suvla operations Sir Ian Hamilton's force on the Gallipoli Peninsula was 40,000 under its establishment, owing to the shortage of drafts; and it is clear from his despatch that the arrival of the new divisions never really compensated for the wasting away of the old ones.

Every effort was made to whip up the flagging movement. Immense sums were spent on covering all the walls and hoardings of the United Kingdom with posters, melodramatic, jocose or frankly commercial. In many districts a regular system of 'peaceful picketing' was set up; and wounded heroes in mufti found white feathers thrust upon them by well-meaning females. But all to no effect. The number of those with whom the call of patriotism or adventure outweighed all other considerations, or to whom the pay and allowances represented a reasonable compensation for the employment sacrificed, was rapidly being exhausted; and only those were left who did not want to go, or to whom enlisting meant a sacrifice which they were not prepared to make without definite orders.

The continuous urgency from above for better recruiting returns, and the interest of recruiting sergeants and doctors, led to an ever-increasing acceptance of men unfit for military work. 'I have any number of unfits, the halt, the lame and the blind, men who cannot march, and even if carried to a trench could not see to shoot.' So wrote a commanding officer whose letter was quoted in the House of Commons last September. In the same debate a list was given of men suffering from every conceivable defect, rendering them obviously incapable of any kind of military service, who were enlisted into a battalion in spite of the fact that every one of them had already previously been discharged as useless from some other battalion. Since the passage of the Military Service Act more attention has been drawn to the habit of passing almost anyone for service in order to keep up the returns; and the attempt has even been made to treat it as a consequence of compulsion instead of a consequence of the breakdown of voluntaryism. But the evil had reached its height long before the Act was in force. It has been stated in the House of Commons that at least 200,000 men, absolutely useless for any conceivable military purpose, have been maintained during the past

year as nominal soldiers, at a cost of something like 50,000,000*l.* to the taxpayer.

Meanwhile the military situation was steadily becoming more serious. Neuve Chapelle and the second Battle of Ypres gave some foretaste of the colossal losses that would have to be incurred to gain any decisive issue in the West. The Dardanelles adventure started a new drain upon our resources. With the Russian collapse in Galicia and Poland all hopes of a speedy conclusion to the war faded away, while an ominous development of Balkan affairs confronted all who had eyes to see.

The development of the new situation coincided with the formation of the Coalition Ministry. But the Unionist leaders, in coming to the rescue of a tottering Government, seem to have made no stipulations as to the effective conduct of the war. What representations they may afterwards have made behind the scenes is not known. The fact remains that the Government, as such, refused for months to face, or even to acknowledge, the critical situation created by the failure of voluntary recruiting. When the House of Commons adjourned at the end of July, Mr Asquith calmly assured them that recruiting had never been so satisfactory; and even in September he was not prepared to admit more than 'signs of falling off' during the last few weeks! The only step taken that summer was the passage of the Registration Bill, a measure which its sponsors solemnly assured the House of Commons was not meant to assist the enforcing of National Service, and which those responsible for its subsequent administration certainly made little attempt to keep up to date for that purpose.

On the outbreak of war, Lord Roberts, Lord Milner, and all those who had been associated with them in the movement for National Service, had decided that they would only embarrass the Government by urging their views at such a moment, and placed themselves and the organisation of the National Service League at Lord Kitchener's disposal. Then, as later, the best efforts to make the voluntary system succeed came largely from the very men who believed in it least, but were anxious to avoid any ground of contention till the nation, as a whole, was convinced by the course of events of the necessity of stronger measures. And it is significant

that the first demands for National Service came not so much from its old champions as from Liberals like Mr Ellis Griffith or Sir L. Chiozza-Money. Within the ranks of the Cabinet, too, it was generally known, the necessity of compulsion was most strenuously urged by Mr Lloyd George and Mr Churchill.

From July onward, however, the recruiting position had become so grave that the self-imposed silence of the advocates of National Service could no longer be maintained. A vigorous press controversy sprang up, in which the opponents of National Service concentrated their efforts largely upon obscuring the merits of the issue by affecting to treat the whole movement as a conspiracy engineered by Lord Northcliffe. This, too, was the attitude taken up by the Trade Union Congress at its meeting early in September, an attitude which made it less difficult for its members to fall into line afterwards when definite proposals for compulsion came from the Government.

Meanwhile a Parliamentary group of some forty members, equally divided between Liberals and Unionists, was constituted to press the matter forward when the House of Commons met in September. Vigorously led by Colonel Lee, Captain F. E. Guest, and Captain Amery, the group kept the issue of National Service well to the front during the opening weeks of the session. Far more important, however, than their efforts were the conclusions of the sub-committee of the Cabinet which, under Lord Curzon's chairmanship, had for some two months been investigating the figures, and which pointed with irrefutable clearness both to the necessity and feasibility of compulsion. It was known that the Cabinet was ranged in two almost equally divided camps. The one doubtful factor was Lord Kitchener, who seems, throughout this critical period, to have maintained a curiously detached attitude, and to have made no effort either to take a lead in the Cabinet on a question with regard to which he was primarily responsible, or even to keep in touch with the views of his colleagues.

On Sept. 28 there was a secret Labour Conference which was addressed both by Mr Asquith and by Lord Kitchener, separately and apparently without previous consultation. From the reports which leaked out, it

would seem that, while Mr Asquith declared himself definitely opposed to compulsion in any shape, Lord Kitchener foreshadowed a system of county quotas, to be compulsorily enforced if not secured voluntarily. A few days later it was generally believed that Lord Kitchener had made up his mind in favour of compulsion, and was pressing for an immediate decision. For the moment the internal crisis in the Cabinet over compulsion was put on one side by the crisis over Salonika, which led to Sir Edward Carson's resignation. But the advocates of compulsion refused to be put off indefinitely. They insisted on bringing matters to a head at a Cabinet meeting on Oct. 14, fully prepared to leave the Cabinet if their views were not accepted. The Cabinet met, but, before the critical issue came up, Mr Asquith found himself too unwell to continue, and everything was left in suspense. Mr Asquith was, indeed, '*felix opportunitate morbi*,' for it is doubtful if even his unrivalled resourcefulness could otherwise have evaded a decision.

After this unexpected *dénouement* there was a natural reaction; and, before the issue could come to a head again in the Cabinet, it was switched off on to new lines by the suggestion that Lord Derby, who had made a great success of recruiting in Lancashire, should make one last vigorous effort to secure recruits by voluntary methods, so that all sections should be satisfied that the voluntary system had really failed, after fair trial, before compulsion was accepted. The suggestion came far too late, from the military point of view, to make it safe to risk the loss of two or three months, when it was vitally important to have the men trained in readiness for the summer of 1916. But, from the political point of view, it was almost impossible to resist; and both those who regarded it as a waste of precious time, and those who suspected it as likely to take away the last excuse for not facing the necessity of compulsion, felt bound to accept it and to do their best to make it a success.

It was obvious that no mere whipping-up of committees or multiplication of posters would yield results worth considering, and that some new and more attractive way of getting recruits would have to be devised. The plan Lord Derby selected was, in substance, an amplification of the system of deferred enlistment which,

as already described, had been introduced, mismanaged, and hastily dropped more than a year before. The whole body of attested persons was to be divided into groups or age-classes; and the groups were to be drawn upon successively, as under a system of universal service, when required. Again following the analogy of the procedure in countries where National Service is in force, there were to be tribunals to enquire into the cases of all those who, whether on personal or national grounds, ought to be exempted or postponed to a later group. The idea was, in short, to put the whole body of attested recruits in the same position as the ordinary citizens in a Universal Service country, and to let them enjoy, as between themselves, the advantages of order, method and fairness which Universal Service brings with it. But those advantages could only be attained fully if the residue of unattested men was substantially negligible, and if no particular social class or set of groups failed to play its part.

A special feature of the grouping was that the married men were reckoned separately from the single men, and all the married groups put after the single groups, so that no married group should be called up till after all the single groups had been called up. The justification for this was partly the popular feeling against the large number of single young men of all classes who were still holding back, and partly the fact that the married men in the class where the separation allowance was a real compensation, or even a profit, had largely gone, and those who were left were mainly superior artisans, clerks, shopkeepers and professional men whose current expenses and domestic responsibilities far exceeded anything that the separation allowance could provide. But, while some special consideration for the married men was desirable, the hard-and-fast division thus set up was exaggerated. It gave rise to a false antithesis which soon came to dominate the whole situation, and led to endless trouble and confusion.

In spite of Lord Derby's energy and the zeal with which the local recruiting committees everywhere threw themselves into the task, the campaign opened none too well. The general feeling among men with business or domestic responsibilities was that they should only go if

others in the same case as themselves were called too. The alternative of compulsion, if the voluntary effort failed, was no menace to them, for the very thing they wanted was the certainty and fairness of real universal service. At this stage Lord Derby conceived an idea, most successful in its immediate consequences, but most unhappy in its ultimate effect upon the whole situation. That idea was to assure the married men that they would only be held to their undertaking if the overwhelming bulk of the single men had first been enlisted, whether voluntarily or by compulsion. The assurance worked both ways; to the married men it implied that they would not be called up till practically the whole of the single men of military age had gone; for the single men it spelt definitely compulsion, and was consequently an inducement to attest at once and secure the benefits of the Derby scheme, whatever they might be.

But the assurance lacked official authority. Something more was required, and that was its endorsement by the Prime Minister. For once Mr Asquith was fairly cornered. To refuse to give the pledge meant that the Derby scheme would come to a standstill, and that he would be confronted with the necessity for coming to an immediate decision for or against general compulsion. To accept it might definitely and irrevocably commit him to compulsion, at any rate for single men. On the other hand, it might secure such a success as would make compulsion by actual legislation unnecessary; and, at any rate, it postponed the necessity for any action for a few weeks longer. So Mr Asquith accepted it, solacing himself and his voluntarist followers by the comforting assurance that the fulfilment of the pledge could be dismissed as 'a contingency which I do not think is ever likely to arise.' The acceptance was made at first with his customary guarded evasiveness. But the recruiting committees would have none of this, and in the end Mr Asquith was obliged to subscribe to a definite formula laid down by Lord Derby in a letter dated Nov. 18.

With compulsion definitely assured, the recruiting committees were able to go full steam ahead. The canvass was conducted with all the zest and vigour, and, it must be added, with no little of the inaccuracy, of a General Election. The general idea that compulsion was coming,

unless practically every one joined, was the dominant theme. The pledge, it is true, did not necessarily imply more than compulsion for single men. But canvassers did not pay much attention to this detail; and, indeed, hardly any one seriously contemplated that the failure of the Derby effort would be followed by anything less than a general measure of National Service. Their great difficulty was to convince the canvassed that there was any advantage to be gained by attesting rather than waiting for compulsion. Assurances of every sort were lavished in this respect, the commonest, definitely endorsed by the publications of local committees, and implied in some of those issued by the War Office itself, being that the privilege of special consideration before a tribunal would be confined to the attested, and that those who stood out would simply be swept in under compulsion without any regard to their circumstances. Everything was done to secure the largest possible gross figures, regardless of their net value in men available for fighting. Many munition works and Government offices attested their men in a body. A very large proportion, consequently, of those who attested did so, not because they wished to serve or believed they ought to serve, but to secure the badge of attestation, to give a good example to others, or to make sure of the best chance of being exempted from service if compulsion should come about.

The original date for the completion of the six weeks' canvass was Nov. 30. This was prolonged to Dec. 13; and hundreds of thousands who had held back till the last moment rushed in on the closing days. Altogether, out of 5,000,000 men of military age in Great Britain, 2,800,000, or more than half, presented themselves for enlistment. Over 1,000,000 were accepted between Dec. 10 and Dec. 13; in fact, very nearly half the total can only have come in during the last week. Of the married men nearly 1,700,000, or over 60 per cent., presented themselves; of the unmarried 1,150,000, or 52 per cent. of the total. More than a third of those who attested were 'starred' men and not supposed to be available for military service; and of the others a very large proportion had good reason to believe that they would be exempted. But there still remained untouched over

1,000,000 single and 1,150,000 married men. Of these 650,000 single and 686,000 married men were unstarred. No one could assert that these were negligible figures, or that voluntary enlistment, even when backed up by the direct and imminent threat of compulsion, had succeeded in covering the ground. Compulsion had become inevitable. Mr Asquith and his colleagues, excepting Sir John Simon, accepted it with such grace as they could muster.

Voluntaryism having failed, the obvious and natural course was to introduce a measure of compulsory service calculated to make the fairest and the most efficient use of all the available man-power of the country for the rest of the war. The attestations under the Derby system could have been cancelled, or at most allowed to confer certain limited privileges on those who had come forward. But this was not Mr Asquith's plan. Fairness and efficiency were not matters of primary consequence in his eyes. The essential thing was not to do more than was absolutely necessary. And by necessary Mr Asquith means necessary in the political, and not in the military sense. Accordingly a Military Service Bill was introduced to fulfil the pledge given by enforcing compulsory service on such single men as had not joined under the Derby scheme. This was compulsion without any principle underlying it, without any appeal to the national spirit, without equity, without efficiency, without guarantee, or even a reasonable expectation, of finality. The amazing thing is that Lord Derby and Mr Asquith's colleagues were prepared to accept this miserable legislative abortion.

The Military Service Bill was introduced by Mr Asquith on Jan. 5. Beginning by asserting that no case had been made out for general compulsion, and that he, at any rate, would be no party to a measure which had that for its object, he went on to state that the Bill was confined to the specific purpose of redeeming a pledge, and, as such, could be sincerely supported by those who opposed compulsion, whether on principle or on grounds of expediency. As if the 1,150,000 unattested married men were not as good a case for compulsion as the 1,000,000 unmarried, or as if compulsion were less compulsion when enforced to make good a politician's pledge

than when it is supported on its merits as essential to the safety of the State! The shuffling ineptitude of the reasoning was not supported by a single word of appeal to the patriotism, to the sense of duty, to the spirit of self-sacrifice of the nation, or even by a reference to the needs of the military situation. Rarely in all history can a great change in the institutions of a nation fighting for its existence have been heralded by a more ignoble utterance. And yet the feebleness of the opposition in the House of Commons, and the unequivocal condemnation of those who did oppose the Bill by their constituents, showed how easy it would have been to introduce a broad measure and justify it by generous arguments.

The Bill emerged from Committee even worse than it began. Amendments aimed at increasing its military value were consistently rejected; only those which were calculated to whittle it away had any prospect of acceptance. Apart from the lists of men exempted wholesale by Government departments or on account of conscientious objections, it contains every kind of ludicrous anomaly in the way of exceptions. Men who were rejected for enlistment before Aug. 14, 1915, are liable to its provisions, but not men rejected subsequently. Men accepted and discharged on grounds of health, whether only after a day or whether it happened ten years ago, are exempted. So is every man that reached the age of eighteen after Aug. 14 last, though it is known that the Army is full of boys under nineteen, and that even boys of seventeen are not released when once they have enlisted. This last absurdity was almost too much for the House of Commons. A direct vote by the champions of outraged common-sense was only averted by the transparent device of a message from Lord Kitchener, conveyed by Mr Long, declaring that, even without the amendment, the Bill would provide all the troops the nation required to secure victory. Subsequent events have furnished a sufficient commentary on that fatuous proceeding.

The first results of putting the new Act into operation were certainly not too encouraging. The local tribunals, though overwhelmed with claims, did their work on the whole satisfactorily, meting out rough but substantial justice to conscientious objectors and shirkers, and only in exceptional instances showing an inclination

towards wholesale laxity. But it was discovered that more than half the men nominally available were outside the jurisdiction of the tribunals, thanks to the provision that Government departments could exempt industries and occupations wholesale, and to the fact that thousands of young men, seeing compulsion coming, had utilised the last few months to take cover in these industries. Moreover, as no attempt had been made to enforce the provisions of the Registration Act with regard to notice of removal, or to keep the register up to date, or to give the police powers to demand the production of registration certificates, a large proportion of those liable to the Act were simply not to be found. The writer has been told of a case where, out of 250 notices sent out, 200 were returned by the post, 42 ignored, and only eight complied with. In another instance, quoted in Parliament, 68 men reported out of 420 to whom notices had been sent, and of these only 20 were physically fit.

Meanwhile the needs of the Army, in spite of the temporary fillip of over 200,000 men directly enlisted during the Derby campaign, were growing more and more urgent. A whole year's neglect required to be made good if the Army was really to be fit to take the field in the summer in the strength originally decided upon. The whole of the Derby groups of single men and the corresponding classes of single men under the Act were called up in the first few weeks after the Act came into force. Owing to claims, appeals and temporary postponements, the immediate yield was, of course, much less than the ultimate yield of these groups and classes will be in the course of the next few months. But the Army had to have the men before that, if they were to be trained in time. The only thing, therefore, was to proceed to call up the married groups under the Derby scheme as well.

To the attested married men this news came as a profound shock. Officially or unofficially they had been given the impression that they would not be liable to be called up till the overwhelming bulk of the unmarried men had actually joined the colours. Now they discovered that, under the provisions of the Military Service Act, a mere fraction was being called up; the rest were sheltered behind the enormous lists of reserved industries

or were simply disregarding the law and were not being traced. Over a million married men who had been shrewd enough not to attest were going about their profit-making as usual, secure behind the Prime Minister's declaration that he was opposed to any legislative extension of the measure already passed. On the other hand, such was the need of men that those who did report themselves, whether previously attested or summoned under the Act, received very short shrift from the tribunals when they raised the plea of financial or domestic hardship.

The attested married men consisted very largely of the men who could least afford to go, but who had attested as an example to others, confident in the assurance that, if they were called, it would only be in the last resort and after the fullest consideration of their special circumstances. It now began to dawn upon them that, far from being a last reserve and in a position of advantage and special consideration, they were worse off not only than the unattested married men, but than such single men as had been clever enough to join any one of the innumerable reserved occupations or even merely to change their residence and leave no address behind. And, while the tribunals were obviously not giving exemption for such normal cases of hardship as might be involved in inability to meet liabilities for contracts, rent or insurance out of the separation allowance, they realised that the Government had made absolutely no provision, such as exists in every conscriptionist country, for saving them from ruin and the break-up of their homes.

That these married men agitated and protested that the pledges made to them had been broken is not in the least surprising. What should rather give ground for surprise, and certainly for satisfaction, is that the agitation never for a moment assumed the complexion of a demand to be absolved from the obligation undertaken. It was an appeal for fairness and nothing more; and the real key-note of the movement was the insistence that the whole existing system of chicanery and injustice should be swept away and the principle of equal service and equal sacrifice for all men of military age established in its place. A declaration that universal service would be enforced, and that meanwhile single men would be

vigorously rounded up, would have allayed the whole trouble at the outset. But such a declaration could not be expected from Mr Asquith. Had he not contrived to explain that the existing lop-sided measure of compulsion was not compulsion at all, but only the fulfilment of a pledge beyond which he would not go? Had he not subsequently pledged himself to a secret Labour Conference that he would resolutely veto any further extension of compulsion so long as he remained in office?

Once again the Government chose the line of least resistance. The real essence of the attested married men's agitation, namely the injustice of the whole voluntary system such as it had now become, was discreetly evaded. But an effort was made at the end of March to meet the married men, on the narrower ground of the original Derby-Asquith pledge, by hurried attempts to *désembusquer* more single men, while the calling-up of the later married groups was temporarily held back. Mr Walter Long announced these measures in detail on March 28. A 'Conference,' presided over by Mr Long, was going over and cutting down the interminable lists of reserved occupations piled up by the Reserved Occupations Committee. In some cases the exemption was being wholly removed; in others, as respects single men under certain age limits. All men who had moved into a reserved occupation since Aug. 15, 1915, were not to be regarded as belonging to such occupation. The list of munitions occupations was to be abolished as from May 1; and here, as in the other cases mentioned above, not the occupation but the individual case was to constitute the claim for exemption. Orders were to be issued for the compulsory production of the registration certificate; and the register itself was to be brought up to date. Sums were to be granted to the Statutory Pensions Committee to enable them to make grants in cases of hardship. The Courts Emergency Powers Act was to be amended so as to apply to contracts made since the war. County Court Judges were to be empowered in certain cases to break leases. These latter proposals seem reasonable in principle, though the machinery of the Statutory Committee is at present quite inadequate for carrying out its new task.

But, taking the proposals as a whole, they do not deal

either with the moral or with the military crux of the problem. The sense of unfairness created in the attested married men by the fact that a million unattested married men are to enjoy the reward of their wisdom in not trusting the Government is left to rankle; and men who are nominally voluntary recruits, and might have been willing citizen soldiers, are being forced to join the colours under a deep sense of grievance. Such is the tangle of the existing system that the half-hearted attempt to remedy one grievance only creates another. The sweeping away of exemptions which held good when the Derby campaign was going on drags into the Army men who attested on a perfectly definite understanding that attestation in their case was a mere form. Even in the case of single men, those who attested under the Derby system are liable to service forthwith, while those who held back, and are subject to the provisions of the Military Service Act, have two months' grace under a clause clumsily drawn up to allay the bogey of 'industrial compulsion.' Industry, too, has a good case for complaint against the disregard of its interests shown in allowing these single men to enter the reserved occupations since August last with no warning that they might be suddenly withdrawn.

But the military objections to the policy of fiddling with a great issue are even more conclusive. The war cannot be carried on many months longer unless the men who are still outside the provisions of the Military Service Act are compelled to come in. Lord Kitchener clearly implied as much when he said in the House of Lords last month that, even if all the single men were secured, the attested married men would be wanted within a few weeks. The war certainly is not going to end in a few weeks. The choice, therefore, is not between general compulsion and the present Act, but between general compulsion now to straighten out and clear up the injustice and military and industrial inefficiency of the present hand-to-mouth state of affairs, and general compulsion two or three months later, after the maximum of mischief has been done to our armies, our industries, and the spirit of our people. The essence of the situation is that the demand for men for the trenches, for the munition works and for other essential

purposes is so great that nothing but the most effective organisation of the whole human material available will give us any reasonable hope of victory. To leave outside of the scope of our organisation something like 1,500,000 men of fighting age because they do not come within the scope of a parliamentary pledge given last November is to invite defeat.

This question of general compulsion has now become the test case between the advocates of whole-hearted national effort and those who believe in the possibility of war kept well within the limits of commercial and political convenience. And it bids fair to precipitate a definite struggle between them in the House of Commons. It is now matter of common knowledge that the Unionist War Committee, under the leadership of Sir Edward Carson, definitely mean to force the issue, and that a small but not inconsiderable body of Liberals will support them. What immediate effect that may have upon the Coalition Government, whether it will break up, or whether on the contrary it will shed one or two of its more advanced members and harden its heart in its 'coalitionism,' is a matter for infinite conjecture. What is certain is that its own inherent weakness and the inexorable march of events must before long bring it to its fall. But that fall must come soon if real, definite, conclusive victory is yet to be achieved.

CORRIGENDUM.

On p. 113 of No. 446, at the end of the first paragraph, there is a statement implying that women-typists and shorthand writers continually lived, before the war, below the poverty line. This is, of course, far from being the case; and the author of the article desires to rectify the statement, which arose from inadvertence on the part of the editor, who omitted an intervening passage touching certain other classes to whom the remark in the last sentence of the paragraph correctly applied.

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